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Russian Philorthodox Relief During The Greek War Of Independence

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THE GREEK WAR of Independence against the Ottoman Empire (1821-1830) constituted the first breach in the Metternichean system established at the Congress of Vienna, which sought to preserve the status quo and protect legitimate rulers against liberal and nationalist revolts. The Greek struggle was the major diplomatic issue confronting the great powers in the 1820s and became something of a cause célèbre for European public opinion.

During the course of the "Greek affair," philhellenism developed into an international movement. It expressed deep appreciation for the classical and Byzantine heritage and strong interest in the fate of the Greek nation struggling to reconstitute itself as an independent nation-state. Philhellenes, be they in the West or in Russia, supported the Greek cause either through political, military, financial, and humanitarian assistance or through literary-artistic expression. After a brief introduction to the nature and chief characteristics of Russian philhellenism, this article will focus on one of its heretofore little known but vital manifestations—Russian humanitarian relief assistance.¹

The topic of Western philhellenism has been extensively studied in numerous works.² One is surprised, however, that the Russian philhellenic movement has received but scant scholarly treatment.³ This omission is striking given the fact that Russian philhellenism existed and indeed represented a unique phenomenon. It was only in Russia that a renewed interest in the classical world, which was prevalent in Western Philhellenic circles, interacted with traditional religious and historical affinities with the Greek or Orthodox East—the lands and peoples which had formerly
been part of the Byzantine Empire. Russian response to the "Greek affair," therefore, while associated with the framework of European attitudes toward ancient Greece, was rendered distinct and unique because of Russia's Orthodox-Byzantine heritage.

A common Orthodox tradition, in addition to promoting a sense of cultural cohesion among Russians and Greeks, was a more valid and viable cultural bond than the reviving interest in classical Greece. In the theocratic society of the Ottoman Empire, which divided its subjects into millets (nations) based on religion, religious affiliations became the major factor in determining cultural identity. For most Greeks, Orthodoxy, not the classical heritage, provided hope and sustenance and served as a value system upon which they based their life and world view. In contrast to most Westerners' preoccupation with the glory of ancient Greece, Russian philhellenism thus presented a more balanced image of the Greeks, one which included both the classical and Byzantine dimensions of the Greek experience.

The outbreak of the Greek revolt confronted Russia with a number of challenges and opportunities. For the tsarist regime, the uprising posed the dilemma of preserving the status quo or supporting Greek coreligionists in revolt against their "legitimate" ruler, the sultan. Despite the tsar's reservation about disturbing the balance of power and order of legitimacy, the possibility of Russian intervention in the Greek crisis raised the prospect of an expansionist Eastern policy directed not so much toward fulfilling Greek national aspirations as toward reaping additional strategic gains. In this context, the Greek issue could conceivably be used as a pretext to protect and extend Russian influence in the Balkans, Constantinople, and the Black Sea.

For most of Russian educated society, on the other hand, the revolt became synonymous with the continued existence of the Greeks as a cultural entity. At stake was the very survival not only of the Greeks but of Russia's traditional bonds and associations with the Greek East, particularly such cherished shrines as the Holy Places in Jerusalem, Mt. Athos, and St. Catherine's on Mt. Sinai. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the Greek revolt stimulated several manifestations of Russian public support.

Indeed, the Greek cause aroused an enthusiastic reaction from nearly all sectors of Russian society, which for a long time held the notion that imperial Russia had a vital role to play in protecting and liberating the Sultan's Orthodox subjects. Russian philhellenism became a broadly based movement, cutting across political and ideological camps and gathering support from all major soslovitsa or social groups. Comprised of indigenous and Western-adopted elements, Russian philhellenism expressed appreciation for the classical, Byzantine, and modern Greek experience and support for the Greek national struggle.
Widespread public backing of the Greek issue is readily seen in the numerous agencies or lobby groups which manifested and promoted Russian philhellenism. An amorphous war-party, composed of reform-minded “liberals” and staunch advocates of tsarist autocracy, called for Russian intervention on the Greek’s behalf. Its members ranged from conservative government officials who, as spokesmen of official policy, viewed the Greek affair through the prism of orthodoxy and the dynamics of imperial expansion, to liberal-minded Decembrists, who, as proponents of the political ideals of the French Revolution, associated the Greek revolt with aspirations for liberal reform and national renewal in Russia.

The Greek conflict struck a responsive chord in Russian classical scholars and romanticist poets. For classicists such as Ivan I. Martynov and Nikolai I. Gnedich, the revolt of the modern Greeks stimulated renewed zeal to study and appreciate the classical heritage. Russian classical studies made significant strides in the 1820s, best seen in Martynov’s 26-volume bilingual translation of Greek classics (Grecheskie klassiki) and Gnedich’s translation of the Iliad. Gnedich also became a pioneer in the development of modern Greek studies in Russia as a result of his translation of C. Fouriel’s work on modern Greek folk songs. For Pushkin and other Russian poets of the ’20s, the Greek cause became a source of literary inspiration, clearly evinced in the numerous philhellenic poems comparing the deeds of contemporary Greek warriors to those of classical heroes.

The Greek affair also became a compelling news feature for Russian journalists and publicists. Publicistic coverage of the revolt and Greek-related themes was closely bound to the other manifestations of Russian philhellenism. By offering readers a diversified body of information on the Greek situation, Russian periodicals, including such prominent ones as Synotechestve, Vestnik Europy, and Moskovskii telegraf, to name but a few, reflected and helped shape Russian educated opinion on the Greek issue.

Finally, and the aspect to be examined in detail below, the Russian government and church hierarchs organized the collection of humanitarian relief aid. The study of the variety and diversity of Russian response to the Greek War of Independence raises the crucial question of Russian public opinion. It is essential to note that, since the vast majority of Russian society was still illiterate, “educated society” or “public opinion” consisted of a small but influential fraction of the population. Naturally, the Russian philhellenic movement drew its most vocal supporters from the educated elite. But the collection of relief aid on the district and parish level clearly indicate that the appeal of the Greek cause extended far beyond the educated and urbanized stratum of Russian society. Indeed, in many respects Russian relief assistance offers the most illuminating index to measure the extent and intensity of public response to the Greek revolt.

The tsarist regime and Russian society found common cause during the Greek War of Independence by organizing humanitarian relief assis-
tance. For the tsars, relief aid to Greek coreligionists became a means to demonstrate continued support of the Sultan's Orthodox subjects, thereby upholding Russia's traditional role as protector of Orthodoxy. Government policy was also determined in part by the hope of encouraging Greeks from the Ottoman Empire to settle permanently in southern Russia in order to stimulate the economic development of the still underpopulated steppe region. For Russian society, some form of concrete assistance was all the more urgent in view of Russia's non-intervention in the Greek crisis.

The relief drives, coordinated by the government and the church, received widespread support from all major social groups. By underscoring Russia's traditional religious and cultural bonds with the Greek East, the regime lent further credence to the politically safe, and government-endorsed, view that the Greek revolt was primarily a religious struggle between the forces of Islam and Orthodoxy rather than an insurgent movement which sought to create a constitutional and independent national state. Because of the primacy of the religious element in urging public support, humanitarian relief assistance for the Greeks is appropriately labeled "philorthodox" and represented a major aspect of the Russian philhellenic movement.

More so than any other manifestation of Russian philhellenism, relief aid must be seen in the context of Russia's post-Byzantine ties to the Greek world. Despite the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans and Constantinople, Orthodoxy continued to provide a common bond between Russia and the Greek East and, more crucially, opened up numerous avenues of contact. These points of contact and interaction included the settlement of Greeks in Russia; Russian pilgrimages to Mt. Athos, Mt. Sinai, Jerusalem, and other shrines of Orthodoxy; Muscovy's official relations with the four eastern patriarchates; and the steady stream of Greek clergymen who came to Russia in search of funds to rebuild monasteries, pay taxes and restore beleagured sees from financial exploitation by Turkish authorities. In a very real sense, philorthodox relief was natural and understandable in view of the large-scale alms which the tsars had distributed to Greek religious pilgrims. Indeed, no other great power had rendered as much material assistance to help alleviate the plight of the Greek church under Turkish rule.

Turkish reprisals against Greeks in 1821 provided the spark for Russian relief efforts. Patriarch Gregorios of Constantinople, despite his official denunciation of Ypsilantis, the commander of Greek insurgents in Moldavia, was guilty in the sultan's eyes of failing to perform his fundamental duty as head of the Orthodox millet, namely, to ensure Greek obedience and submission to Ottoman rule. The hanging of Patriarch Gregorios on Easter Sunday, April 1821, together with the execution of numerous church hierarchs and Phanariots, led to random attacks against Greek Christians. Turkish crowds roamed the streets of the capital, de-
stroying or pillaging Greek churches and religious shrines. Outbreaks of violence also occurred against the Greek population of Adrianople, Smyrna, Thessaloniki, Crete, and Cyprus, events which were regularly reported in the Russian periodical press.\(^7\)

To add insult to injury, Turkish authorities left Gregorios's corpse hanging at the Phanar gate, thus requiring anyone entering the Greek quarter of Constantinople to push the body aside. After three days, the Turks ordered several of the capital's Jewish inhabitants to remove the body, which was then dragged through the streets and thrown into the harbor. The corpse was eventually retrieved by an Ionian merchant vessel, captained by I. N. Sklavos, which sailed to Odessa. In June 1821, at the tsar's behest, local government and church authorities, as well as Odessa's Greek community, accorded Gregorios a ceremonial funeral replete with all the honors befitting his high status in the Orthodox church.\(^8\)

The funeral sermon was delivered by the clergyman and educator Konstantinos Oikonomos, a close friend and associate of the Patriarch who fled to Odessa just before the onset of Turkish reprisals. Oikonomos's ten-year stay in Russia (1821–1831), where he published several religious and philological works, provides another example of an enlightened Greek cleric who not only pursued scholarly research in Russia but became an ardent spokesman for Greek national concerns, specifically Russian-sponsored deliverance of the Greek East.\(^9\)

Oikonomos's sermon, one of several he delivered in Odessa in 1821 and 1822 on behalf of the Greek cause, eloquently praised Gregorios's devotion to his faith and calling. Making explicit reference to the traditional bonds uniting the Russian and Greek worlds, he underscored the symbolic significance of the Patriarch's arrival in Odessa, an event which "renews and manifests after so many centuries the indissoluble and essential unity which has always existed between the Greek and Russian churches." With the death of Gregorios, the Greek church now placed its hopes on "Emperor Alexander, the successor of St. Vladimir, the august defender of the Orthodox church." Oikonomos appealed to the tsar to offer sanctuary to the wave of Greek refugees seeking haven "under the wings of the great eagle of Russia." In conclusion, Oikonomos prayed for Greek victory against the infidel and called on Greeks in Russia to assist their compatriots.\(^10\)

While the Patriarch's execution aroused Russian religious indignation, the immediate backdrop to the organization of relief aid was provided by the large influx of Greeks to Bessarabia and Odessa. Either as refugees fleeing Turkish reprisals or as insurgents in search of asylum after Ypsilantis's defeat, thousands of impoverished Greeks abandoned homes, property, and possessions and crossed the border into Russia. General Ivan N. Inzov, Military Governor-General of Bessarabia, reported to General Wittgenstein of the Ukraine-based Second Army that, from February to April
1821, roughly 1,230 refugees of diverse social origin arrived in Bessarabia, while in one day in May more than 1,500 came. By mid-1822, according to Count Alexander F. Langeron, Military Governor-General of New Russia, more than 12,000 had been registered by customs and quarantine officials in Odessa.\(^{11}\) Greek migration to Russia continued throughout the revolt. As in past conflicts between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829 brought in its wake another wave of uprooted Greeks, with 360 families settling in Odessa, Bessarabia, and the Crimea.\(^{12}\)

The plight of the refugees drew the attention and concern of local authorities in southern Russia, including the philhellenic Decembrist officers Pavel I. Pestel' and Mikhail F. Orlov, both of whom urged Inzov to provide food, shelter and medical treatment.\(^{13}\) Initial funds for such assistance came from local government revenues in Bessarabia and Odessa. But clearly these were but stop-gap measures which could only proffer short-term help and hardly meet the needs of the increasing wave of insurgents and refugees seeking haven in Russia. A large-scale relief program was needed, one organized by the central government and able to channel contributions from all sectors of Russian society.

In July 1821, Alexander I approved the opening of a subscription campaign to raise money for the refugees in Odessa and Bessarabia.\(^{14}\) It is not precisely clear who initiated the proposal. Prince Aleksandr N. Golitsyn, Minister of Religious Affairs and Public Enlightenment, who played the most vital role in organizing and coordinating the relief drive, noted in his correspondence to Russian church hierarchs that “several persons, moved by sympathy for residents of Greece who have abandoned their country, homes, property . . . , have raised the idea of opening a subscription on behalf of unfortunate refugees who by the thousands stream into Odessa and Bessarabia.”\(^{15}\) Although Golitsyn did not specify who these “several persons” were, it is safe to assume that likely candidates included such prominent Greeks as Oikonomos; Ioannes Kapodistrias, who during his tenure as Russian foreign minister (1815–1822) promoted Greek interests in Russian official and unofficial circles; and Alexandros S. Stourdzas, a close associate of Kapodistrias and a specialist in Balkan affairs at the Russian Foreign Ministry.\(^{16}\) For all three, organizing Greek relief would have represented not only a natural extension of their cultural patriotism but also a means to render concrete assistance to their compatriots.

Another possible candidate was Golitsyn himself, one of several high Russian officials who expressed support for the Greek revolt.\(^{17}\) Golitsyn was known for his commitment to benevolent projects. His endorsement of Greek relief programs should in fact be seen in the context of his involvement in several philanthropic endeavors, most notably the Prison Reform, Bible, and Imperial Philanthropic Societies, all of which were inspired by
humanitarian and religious motives. Regardless of who actually initiated the relief project, Golitsyn’s support and participation were indispensable. His tenure in high office throughout Alexander’s reign made him one of the tsar’s most trusted advisers and confidants. In many instances, Golitsyn was the man through whom the tsar could be reached on a particular problem or issue requiring immediate decision.  

Golitsyn officially launched the relief drive on behalf of Greek refugees in a written announcement (24 July 1821). Couched in religious terms, it underscored the subscription campaign’s philanthropic and humanitarian motives:

> The terrible events in Constantinople are known to all Russians. Many of our coreligionists, in order to escape death, have fled to the borders of Russia. Thousands of unfortunate victims of persecution, as of March, continue to seek asylum in Odessa and Bessarabia. The refugees are received hospitably, thanks to the mercy of the tsar and the compassion of local inhabitants. But the assistance rendered them is insufficient to care for such a large number of families, increasing from day to day. In just one day in Odessa, they numbered almost 4,000. Salvaging only their life and the honor of their women and children, they lost all property and possessions. Such a disastrous lot of our brothers by itself calls for help. Pious Christians, in faith and love, will certainly lend a helping hand and will not refuse to take part in the newly opened subscription on behalf of Greek and Moldavian refugees in Odessa and Bessarabia.

Golitsyn’s announcement went on to say that donations for relief aid would be sent to Governors-General Inzov and Langeron for distribution to individuals and families in the greatest need of help.

Along with copies of the announcement, Golitsyn sent a special cover letter to Russian church hierarchs and military and civilian governors, urging them to organize and collect donations in their respective eparchies (dioceses) and gubernii (provinces). Golitsyn encouraged clerical and secular authorities “to call on persons . . . , who are known to you by their love and compassion, to take part in this benevolent enterprise.” In fulfilling the tsar’s will, church and government authorities were not to refrain from using their high position and influence in order to facilitate the success of the relief drive. Like the proclamation itself, Golitsyn’s cover letter stressed the religious aspect of the relief effort. It also suggested Russia’s debt to Byzantium for adopting Christianity:

> When it pleased providence to bring them to Russia and preserve their life amidst horrors of death, they were without doubt not deceived in the hope that they would find hospitality and help within the blessed borders of the fatherland of those who at one time borrowed from them [the Greeks] the sacred learning of the gospel, the teaching of mercy, love, and mutual help.

A different cover letter was sent to the military governors-general of
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Moscow (Prince D. S. Golitsyn), the Ukraine (Prince Nikolai G. Repnin-Volkonskii), and St. Petersburg (Count M. A. Miloradovich). It called on them to encourage donations from the inhabitants of their respective regions, particularly from their numerous Greek subjects who were “obliged by a sacred duty not to abandon help to their suffering compatriots.”

In conjunction with this, Golitsyn forwarded copies of his announcement directly to the Greek communities of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Odessa. His accompanying cover letter urged Greeks to assist compatriots both out of humanitarian impulse and love of fatherland. Golitsyn concluded his letter to the Greeks by mentioning Europe’s debt to classical Greek civilization and Russia’s special debt to Byzantium:

Without a doubt the success of such a benevolent undertaking will justify the expectations of friends of humanity who desire to render help to the sons of that country which fostered enlightenment in Europe and to which Russia is even more obliged having borrowed from it the enlightenment of faith, which firmly established the saving banner of the gospels on the ruins of paganism.

Golitsyn’s remarks shed light on the uniqueness of Russian philhellenism, a movement which in a sense represented the convergence of two forces, Russia’s growing appreciation of the classical heritage and its traditional religious ties to the Orthodox East.

In addition to church hierarchs, provincial governors, and Greek communities, Golitsyn addressed his announcement to a variety of potential sources of help. He requested members of the Russian nobility “who had demonstrated support in the past for humanitarian and philanthropic endeavors” not to stint in rendering aid to indigent Greeks. City officials of St. Petersburg were called upon to enlist the support of merchants, both local and out-of-towners, and the social group [soslovie] of industrious artisans to help alleviate the plight of Greek arrivals. “I am sure,” Golitsyn continued, “that Russian merchants are eager to demonstrate once again their virtue in philanthropic works, which can only bring eternal treasure and before which all the riches of the world are nothing.” In his note to the hetman of the Don Cossacks, Golitsyn stated that the “brave and courageous residents of the Don have never been alien to compassion and humanity.” Finally, Golitsyn encouraged the participation of Catholic, Uniate, and Armenian Orthodox church hierarchs, emphasizing that “you, as guardians of Christian life, will no doubt alleviate their lot.”

Along with the patriarch’s martyrdom and the flood of refugees to Russia, other events inflamed Russian religious sentiment and inspired philanthropic relief efforts. Throughout the Greek revolt, as had been the case in the Ottoman Empire’s wars with Christian Europe since the fifteenth century, it was not uncommon for Turkish troops to take prisoners of war as booty. Christian captives were forcibly converted to Islam and
became valuable commodities in the empire's slave trade, which included such cities as Constantinople, Smyrna, Aleppo, and Alexandria.27 From June 1821 to April 1822, most of the inhabitants of Kassandra, one of the three elongated peninsulas of Chalkidiki in Macedonia; Kydonies, a town on the coast of Asia Minor; and the island of Chios, located but five miles from the Turkish mainland, were either displaced, massacred or enslaved.28

The Chios massacre (April 1822), more than any other episode in the revolt, stirred European and Russian public opinion. Since its conquest by the Turks (1566), Chios had enjoyed a degree of political autonomy and had developed a prosperous economy. With the expansion of Greek commerce, Chios became a commercial and cultural center in the Levant. In February 1822, when a band of overzealous adventurers from the neighboring island of Samos landed on Chios and raised the flag of "liberation," most Chiots were cautious and skeptical about their island's chances of remaining independent. Many felt that the bold action of the Samiots jeopardized Chios' unique status. They also raised the crucial question of how successful a revolt on Chios could be given its close proximity to Turkey, not to mention its great distance from Hydra, the base of Greek naval operations. Chiot fears were fully borne out with the appearance of the Turkish fleet. The island's Samiot defenders, who had come to coerce the Chiots to accept liberation, hastily fled and abandoned the islanders to their fate.

Turkish forces, with the assistance of unruly armed masses who crossed over in small boats from the mainland, exacted a high price. The inhabitants of Chios, most of them unarmed, were treated as insurgents. Some of the more wealthy families were able to buy Turkish protection for large sums of money, while others managed to escape to Psara and other Greek islands. Estimates vary on the extent of the casualties. Of Chios' population of 120,000, roughly 50,000 were massacred, 45,000 were enslaved, 30,000 fled, and 2,000 remained on the gutted and ruined island.29 British diplomatic documents indicate the plight of the Chiots taken captive, most of whom were women and children. In a letter to the Levant Company (May 1822), John Cartwright, British Consul in Constantinople, noted the miserable lot of the survivors: "The females and children are doomed to slavery from which there will be little chance of redemption, as all possible means are taken to prevent the sale of them to Christians."30

The name of Chios became familiar to the world at large as a result of the vengeance exacted by the Turks. The incident gave fresh impetus to the wave of European philhellenism and was immortalized in Delacroix's famous painting, Scenes from the Massacre of Chios (1824). The Russian response took the form of a second subscription campaign to collect ransom money for enslaved Greeks from Chios, Kassandra, and Kydonies.

The initiative for the second relief drive came from three Greek clerics
in Bessarabia—Metropolitan Grigorii Irinopol’skii, Bishop Konstantin Buzevskii, and Archimandrite Parfenii. On 3 July 1822, they petitioned the tsar to accept donations among the Greeks of Russia in order to ransom Greek captives. Emphasizing their religious and humanitarian intentions, the clerics focused the appeal on the plight of Greeks who were forced to convert to Islam and sold into slavery: “We hope that your Imperial Majesty, in considering the nature of such a charitable undertaking, will deign in your mercy and extreme piety to grant us your high permission in order to save from the abyss of perdition as many Christians as providence will allow.”

Although addressed to Alexander I, the three Greek clerics did not send their petition directly to the tsar. Instead, according to Governor-General Inzov’s letter (16 July 1822) to Kapodistrias, they requested Inzov to convey the proposal to Alexander, convinced that this would attach a greater degree of respectability and legitimacy to the project than if they themselves sent it. Most likely, word reached the tsar either directly from Inzov or from a close adviser, such as Kapodistrias or Golitsyn, both of whom were in regular correspondence with local authorities in Bessarabia and New Russia. After reading it on 3 August in Tsarskoe Selo, Alexander approved the proposal.

On 22 August, Minister of Interior Count Viktor Kochubei notified Inzov of the tsar’s endorsement of the new subscription drive to raise ransom funds. Kochubei also requested Inzov to find out, if at all possible, the approximate number of captive Greeks and the approximate amount of money needed for their release. Inzov replied that, according to various direct and indirect sources, which he did not specify, the Greek clerics estimated that roughly 100,000 Greeks had been enslaved as a result of the events in Kassandra, Kydonies, and Chios. Each captive could be ransomed, Inzov went on, for about five rubles; thus a working sum of at least 500,000 rubles had to be raised.

The large number of Greek captives, most of whom were held in Constantinople, Smyrna, and Aleppo, altered the original proposal which had been limited to the collection of ransom funds from the Greek communities of Russia. In a despatch to Golitsyn (25 October 1822), Minister of Interior Kochubei noted that, in view of the sizable number of Greeks held captive, the tsar had broadened the original proposal in order to enlist contributions from all Russian subjects, both Greek and non-Greek, who were “willing to take an active part in this feat of humanity.” Informing Golitsyn of the approximate number of captives and the working sum needed for their redemption, Kochubei concluded his letter with the following:

With regret we must realize that we cannot flatter ourselves with the hope of ransoming all our coreligionists cast into captivity by recent disastrous events. But the eager benevolence of your Highness without a doubt will not grow cool. It is equally comforting to think that, out of a sense of humanity
and Christian duty, we can save at least a few from the most terrible slavery and perilous temptations [a reference to the prospect of captives converting to Islam and thus alleviating their plight].

Similar to his announcement to assist Greek refugees, Golitsyn’s proclamation on the ransom subscription, approved by the Holy Synod in November 1822, underscored its humanitarian objective. Golitsyn asserted that the plight of captive Greeks offered a new occasion for pious Russians, inspired by faith and humanity, “to extend a helping hand to our coreligionists who are saddled with all the despondencies of captivity and are threatened to be cut off from the Church of Christ.” The proclamation ended with an appeal:

... now is the time to show that fortune and wealth have value only when used for the salvation of our neighbors. To return to the fold of the church its sons ..., to disconsolate fathers their children, and to hopeless children their fathers – this is a feat of worthy charitable zeal for all friends of humanity.

As with the first subscription drive for Greek refugees, Golitsyn sent copies of the announcement to all eparchial church hierarchs – such as Metropolitans Filaret of Moscow, Serafim of St. Petersburg and Novgorod, Evgenii of Kiev, and Archbishops Avraam of Astrakhan and Amvrossii of Kazan. To publicize the new campaign among the Greeks, Golitsyn notified well-known merchants who were influential and respected community leaders – Z. Zosimas and N. Patsimadis of Moscow; I. Varvakis of Taganrog; and D. Inglezis, A. Mavros, and T. Seraphinos of Odessa. Upon Golitsyn’s urging, Minister of Interior Kochubei instructed the governors-general of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the Ukraine to take all necessary measures in order to facilitate the successful organization and operation of the new subscription effort. Appealing to them that “faith and humanity must arouse zeal to alleviate the suffering of coreligionists,” Kochubei requested the governors-general to encourage the direct participation of local marshals of nobility, rural and town police superintendents (ispravniki), and all other provincial, regional, and district officials.

The Russian government and society at large responded enthusiastically to both relief drives. Among the most generous supporters of philanthropic assistance were members of the imperial family. Their donations came as no surprise and were expected in view of the tsars’ history of sending large contributions to religious shrines in the Greek East, most notably Mt. Athos, St. Catherine’s, and the Holy Places. Alexander donated an initial 150,000 rubles for the plight of Greek refugees. Realizing that this sum was insufficient to meet the daily needs of an increasing number of newcomers, the tsar instructed Minister of Finance Dmitrii Gur’ev to make monthly transfers of 13,000 rubles from the central treasury to local authorities in Bessarabia and New Russia. Nicholas continued the monthly
transfers; at one point (31 December 1827), he ordered Count Pahlen, Governor-General of New Russia, to borrow 70,000 rubles from the Bessarabian oblast' treasury in order to continue distributing "indispensable aid to Greek arrivals." As a result of the monthly donations from the central treasury in St. Petersburg, which extended from January 1822 to August 1830, roughly 1.5 million rubles were sent to local authorities in southern Russia on behalf of the refugees. Nicholas terminated such aid upon the emergence of independent Greece, convinced that the end of Greek-Turkish hostilities would allow Greeks to return to their former homes or to independent Greece without obstacle.

Other members of the imperial family supporting Greek relief included Empress Dowager Maria Fedorovna, the mother of Alexander and Nicholas, who contributed 15,000 rubles for the refugees. Empress Elizaveta Alekseevna, Alexander's wife, was informed of the refugee subscription campaign by one of her ladies-in-waiting, Roxandra Stourdza-Edling, the sister of Alexandros Stourdzas and a generous patron of Greek educational endeavors. The empress supported the relief effort out of humanitarian and Christian sentiment, as evinced in her letter of thanks to Stourdza-Edling for "showing me the way to alleviate the lot of unfortunate victims with such a praiseworthy and noble cause."

Numerous government ministries and departments supported the relief campaigns, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and the Departments of Foreign Trade, Engineering, and Religious Affairs. In most cases, the head of a particular department or ministry organized the collection of contributions from high- and low-ranking officials and civil servants under his authority. In several cases, government ministers and high officials made substantial donations. As noted, Minister of Interior Kochubei, at Golitsyn's behest, gave explicit instructions to the governors-general of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the Ukraine, requesting them to coordinate and facilitate the collection of ransom funds in their respective regions. Kochubei himself contributed 3,000 rubles to both relief drives. Minister of Finance Gur'ev and Comptroller Baron B. B. Kampenhausen also made significant personal donations. Prince Adam Czartoryski, Curator of Vilna University, not only contributed 2,000 rubles but organized the collection of funds from university officials, faculty, and regional school supervisors under his jurisdiction. Other educational institutions participating in the relief drives were Kazan University, the Academy of Sciences, and the Imperial Lyceum in Tsarkoe Selo.

By far the largest and most consistent donations from government sources came from the Postal Department, which is readily understandable in view of Golitsyn's position as chief administrator of Russia's postal system. Given his sponsorship and full support of both subscription campaigns, it was natural that he would attempt to utilize postal departments
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in the capitals and gubernii to organize and mobilize relief aid. In addition, Golitsyn was assisted by the Grecophiles Aleksandr Ia. Bulgakov and his brother Konstantin, directors of the postal districts of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Both did their utmost to encourage gubernii and district postal units to collect relief funds. As the detailed postal records indicate, Golitsyn and the Bulgakovs succeeded in amassing sizable donations from postmasters and postal officials throughout the Russian empire.\textsuperscript{51}

Russian military elements, many of whom favored tsarist intervention on the Greeks' behalf, registered support for the Greek cause by contributing to relief efforts. Donations were made by the prestigious imperial guard regiments — including the Preobrazhenskii, Semenovskii, Izmailovskii, and Hussar Regiments — and the Don Cossacks.\textsuperscript{52} General Wittgenstein collected 4,000 rubles from the ranks of the Second Army stationed in the Ukraine and Bessarabia.\textsuperscript{53} In sending their donations to Golitsyn, military officers often expressed statements of support for the Greeks. General Iakov A. Potemkin of Voronezh wrote that he collected 970 rubles from staff officers "desiring to take part in this humanitarian feat of saving coreligionists."\textsuperscript{54} Similarly, Colonel Arkadii Kochubei expressed "sincere gratitude for allowing me to take part in this endeavor which is so in line with the principles of our faith and my personal feelings." Kochubei went on to state the following:

The donation of 250 rubles is from me and several others who empathize with the calamitous condition of Greeks who are perishing, under the burden of barbarians, for the Orthodox church and the freedom of their fatherland. I am sure that your benevolent intentions will be completely successful. Certainly each Russian will not be indifferent to the sufferings of coreligionists and will rush, each according to his means, to participate in this useful campaign for our unfortunate brothers.\textsuperscript{55}

Kochubei's remarks indicate that he was one of the few supporters of Greek relief who made direct reference to the political aspect of the Greek revolt — "freedom of their fatherland" — as well as its religious dimension, which, in contrast to the former, was the focal point for Golitsyn and the tsarist regime.

Philorthodox assistance provides the most useful means to assess the nature and extent of Russian public response to the Greek War of Independence. Golitsyn received donations from eparchies and gubernii spanning the entire Russian Empire — from the Kingdom of Poland to Tobolsk, Omsk, and Irkutsk in Siberia, and from Finland and the Baltic region to Astrakhan and Odessa. Eparchy and gubernii files clearly reveal the popularity and appeal of the Greek cause at the grassroots level of Russian society. Most of these files are replete with entries listing the contributors, their social status and occupations, and the specific amount of their donations. One readily sees that the widest possible cross-section of Russian society
took an active part. All major social groups contributed—nobility; church hierarchs, monks, and parish priests; merchants and townsmen; and peasants.

Based on eparchy and gubernii records, one can reconstruct the procedure for collecting Greek relief. The leading church hierarch of a particular eparchy—such as Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow, Metropolitan Serafim of St. Petersburg and Novgorod, or Archbishop Amvrossii of Kazan—called on all clergymen and clerical institutions within the region to coordinate and organize the collection of donations. As in other eparchial matters, the consistory and chancery of each eparchy ensured that ecclesiastical and religious policy percolated downward to individual parishes. At the grassroots level, organization of Greek relief entailed parish priests and deacons mentioning the subscription campaigns in sermons to villagers and townsmen and urging would-be contributors “to help save coreligionists who are suffering in Odessa and Kishinev” or, in the case of the ransom drive, “to redeem Greeks of Chios, Kassandra, and Kydonies held in Turkish captivity.”

Gubernii records reveal a similar procedure. The civilian or military governor of a particular region called on marshals of nobility, city officials, and town and country police superintendents (ispravniki) to help organize and collect funds from local residents. Eparchy and gubernii files also indicate that copies of Golitsyn’s announcements, both printed and handwritten, circulated widely.

Once donations were collected and recorded, the governor of a particular guberniia, or church hierarch in the case of an eparchy, sent the funds to Golitsyn with an accompanying cover letter which usually affirmed continued support for the relief efforts and pledged to keep the subscriptions open. As expected, the largest donations were forthcoming from densely populated eparchies and gubernii—Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novgorod, Pskov, Kiev, Smolensk, Kharkov, Mogilev, Kazan, Astrakhan, Kursk, Tver, Kaluga, Iaroslav, Kostroma, Riazan, Voronezh, and Ekaterinoslav.

Some of the more revealing files are those from distant regions, such as Perm and Orenburg in the Urals and the Siberian towns of Tobolsk, Tomsk, and Irkutsk. While donations from these areas were understandably lower than those from densely populated eparchies and gubernii, they clearly indicate that relief drives were not restricted to major centers but extended to the far reaches of the Russian Empire. For example, Archbishop Amvrossii of Tobolsk informed Golitsyn (December 1821) that 1,833 rubles had been collected from local clergy and laymen on behalf of “unfortunate Greeks seeking salvation in Russia.” In January 1824, he notified Golitsyn that 11,685 rubles had been raised to ransom Greek slaves. Similarly, the eparchy of Irkutsk, which was under the jurisdiction of Bishop Mikhail, had raised 2,720 rubles in ransom money as of March 1824.
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The existence of eparchy and gubernii records, particularly the detailed manner in which they were kept, allows one to grasp the broad backing the relief campaigns received from diverse social elements in Russia. Of the major soslovia, the nobility made the largest contributions. In most cases, local marshals of the nobility were instrumental in coordinating the collection of relief funds. That the Greek cause appealed to the upper crest of Russian society is evinced in the sizable donations from well-known princes and counts: Anna A. Orlov-Chesmenskaia (8,000 r.), Dmitrii N. Sheremetei (7,000 r.), Nikolai P. Rumiantsev (2,500 r.), the Lobanov-Rostovskii family (2,200 r.), Petr K. Razumovskii (2,000 r.), Dmitrii P. Buturlin (1,500 r.), Ivan I. Bariatinskii (1,500 r.), V. Dolgorukov (1,500 r.), Nikolai Iusupov (1,500 r.), Aleksei G. Bezborodko (1,200 r.), Andrei Gagarin (500 r.), and many others. Another noteworthy contribution was that of Prince Aleksei B. Kurakin who, in addition to donating 3,000 rubles for the refugees, pledged the same amount annually to support Greek families until they could return home. From their correspondence to Golitsyn, most princes and counts contributed out of religious and humanitarian sentiment. Countess Anna A. Orlov-Chesmenskaia expressed gratitude in being allowed to take part in “this God-pleasing cause” to assist “our brothers by faith and Christian love.” Similarly, Count D. N. Sheremetei wrote of his intention to contribute “with an open heart . . . to help alleviate the burdensome lot of our coreligionists seeking salvation from Turkish barbarism.”

Russian church hierarchs not only organized relief drives in their eparchies but made substantial personal contributions, such as Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow who gave 1,000 rubles on behalf of Greek captives. Large donations were also forthcoming from monks, abbots, and archimandrites of well-known monasteries in Petersburg and Moscow — Aleksandr Nevskii, Donskoi, Novospasskii, Novodevichyi, Troitskii, Simeonovskii, Rozhdestvenskii, Predtechenskii. Eparchy files, such as those from Kazan and Kursk, indicate that the bulk of contributors were humble clergymen—parish priests and deacons—who, although legal members of the privileged dukhovenstvo (priesthood), eked out a meager existence not far removed from that of the peasantry.

The popular or truly grassroots appeal of philorthodox relief is best seen in donations from Russian merchants, townsmen, and peasants. Merchant-townsmen contributions were received from Smolensk, Novgorod, and Moscow. The largest such donation came from the merchants of St. Petersburg, who gave 25,000 rubles in 1821–1822 on behalf of Greek refugees. Numerous Russian and German craft guilds in Petersburg—tailors, bakers, bootmakers, blacksmiths, makers of surgical and medical instruments—donated 5,000 rubles for refugees, with contributions ranging from 5 to 1,000 rubles. Similarly, funds were raised from masters, craftsmen, apprentices, and workers at the Aleksandrovskii textile factory in St. Petersburg. The gubernii file from Vladimir-Suzdal, which is one
of the best kept and most useful files to discern the grassroots appeal of the Greek cause, contains listings of donations not only from local merchants and townsmen but also from obviously well-off peasants in the village of Manisheva and the town of Suzdal, with contributions ranging from 1 to 1,000 rubles. In most regions, peasant donations were much smaller, ranging from 10 kopeks to 3 rubles.

Greek relief endeavors met with support from diverse ethnic and religious elements within the Russian Empire. Catholic hierarchs in Mogilev and Vilna translated Golitsyn's announcements into Polish and urged all Catholics to contribute on behalf of "fellow Christians." In addition to donations from the Kingdom of Poland and Roman Catholic monasteries in the Ukraine, Uniates and Evangelicals also raised relief aid. Governor-General of Finland Baron von Stein collected 20,000 rubles in 1822-1823, while Baltic Germans, primarily pastors, merchants, and town officials from the towns of Riga, Dorpat, and Vyborg, were also encouraged to raise funds. From Stockholm, a pastor Dunkel of the Dutch Reformed Church called on all "German friends of Greece and humanity in Swedish and Russian lands to contribute on behalf of Christianity." In Georgia, Exarch Iona was instrumental in gathering donations from local clergy, the military, and members of the local Muslim community.

Armenian support for the Greek cause was understandable given the close relations between the Armenian and Greek communities in Russia, not to mention their shared experience of Ottoman subjugation. Recent Soviet scholarship has attempted to show the impact of the Greek revolt on the development of an Armenian national consciousness. Archbishop Ioann of Astrakhan’s Armenian community informed Golitsyn that he collected 2,235 rubles from "people of the Armenian nation on behalf of suffering Greeks." Some Armenians equated the plight of Greek refugees and captives with that of their Armenian compatriots in the Ottoman Empire. An Armenian civil servant in Moscow, State Counsellor Iakim Lazarev, who donated 500 rubles on behalf of the refugees, noted:

> the poor state of the Greeks truly merits compassion, but it is not superfluous to point out that, similar to their ill-treatment, thousands of my compatriots, also residing in Turkish lands and deprived of all property, wander from place to place and receive meager assistance, as the Armenian nation, due to its limited means, is unable to provide sufficient help to alleviate the lot of its sorrowful subjects.

Understandably, the largest and most consistent donations from non-Russian sources came from the Greek communities in Russia. Their active participation in the relief drives represented a natural extension of their broad support for the Greek national movement. Prior to 1821, the Greeks of Russia made significant contributions to Greek education and enlightenment, both in Russia and the Greek world. Upon news of Ypsilantis's revolt in the Danubian Principalities, Greeks in Moscow, St. Petersburg,
Taganrog, Kishinev, and Odessa formed volunteer units and organized shipments of arms and supplies to insurgent forces. After the defeat of Ypsilanti's forces, Russian-based Greeks concentrated on raising relief funds. Especially active in this early phase of relief assistance was the Greek Philanthropic Society of Odessa, organized in August 1821, which collected roughly one million rubles and rendered food and shelter to nearly 300 indigent Greek sailors. Although tolerated by local government authorities in southern Russia, the Greek Philanthropic Society was regarded by Alexander I as a screen for political and insurgent-related activity and was thus outlawed in January 1822.

Within this context, therefore, generous Greek donations to Golitsyn's two relief drives were hardly surprising. A Greek in Moscow, D. Mimiris, donated fifty furs to provide winter hats for refugees in Odessa and Bessarabia; while in St. Petersburg, local Greek clergymen selected I. Domboisis, E. Kallergis, and D. Pistolis to organize the collection of ransom funds. In most cases, Greek support took the form of sizable donations from individuals, many of whom were merchants and active promoters of Greek nationalistic activity in Russia and the Greek world, such as Z. Zosimas of Moscow (2,000 r.); N. Patsimadis of Moscow (2,000 r.); A. Notaras of Moscow (1,000 r.); M. Rizaros of Nezhin (1,000 r.); D. Inglezis of Odessa (1,000 r.); G. Chrisarios of Odessa (720 r.); and G. Matsos of Moscow (100 r.).

Some Greeks claimed their contributions were limited as a result of the decline in Russia's Black Sea trade. M. Psalidas, who collected 185 rubles, bemoaned his meager 5 ruble donation: "Because of the sad events in our fatherland, which caused a complete fall in my trade activity, I have been placed in extreme straits and thus could not be more helpful to my compatriots in alleviating their plight." In like manner, N. Patsimadis attributed his small collection (1,620 r.) from Moscow Greeks to the decline in trade revenues, which compelled several who were "generally known for their compassion" to restrict their donations.

Alexandros Stourdzas and his sister R. Stourdza-Edling took a lively interest in Greek affairs and helped refugees from Constantinople and the Danubian Principalities. As mentioned, Stourdza-Edling was responsible for informing Empress Elizaveta Alekseevna of the subscription drive for refugees. In order to help the poor and needy, both Greek and Russian, Stourdza-Edling built schools, churches, a hospital, and an orphanage on her estate in Bessarabia. She and her brother donated generously to both
relief drives and interceded personally on their compatriots’ behalf whenever they could.90

For the period 1821–1830, Russian philorthodox assistance from government and military circles, various sosloviia, and non-Russian elements extended into the millions of rubles. More significant than the final amount is that donations continued throughout the nine years. While contributions were more forthcoming from 1821 to 1824, when the Greek cause had the largest and most enthusiastic public backing in Russia, sizable amounts of relief aid were raised in the last three years of the revolt. In June 1827, for example, Archimandrite Polikarp of Novospasskii Monastery in Moscow collected 2,900 rubles; Metropolitan Serafim of Petersburg and Novgorod 3,500 rubles; and Metropolitan Evgenii of Kiev 2,500 rubles.91 In 1829, the eparchies of Kostroma, Kaluga, and Pskov raised 20,000 rubles and the Petersburg Religious Consistory 4,300 rubles.92 Also in 1829, Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow received 8,800 rubles in exchange for selling two local merchants ecclesiastical treasures which had originally been donated by several churches in his eparchy on behalf of Greek captives.93 The continuity and longevity of philorthodox assistance, in addition to casting light on the widespread appeal of the Greek issue in Russian society, reveal that P. S. Meshcherskii and Admiral A. S. Shishkov, Golitsyn’s successors after 1824, continued to support Greek relief. The same can also be said of Alexander’s successor, Nicholas I.

The Russian government did more than just organize and encourage the collection of relief support. This was only half the battle. Efforts had to be made to see that relief aid was properly administered and distributed. Upon the tsar’s approval, Golitsyn created local mechanisms in Odessa and Kishinev designed to do just that. Specifically, Golitsyn instructed Governors-General Inzov and Langeron to establish relief assistance committees in Bessarabia and Odessa to supervise distribution of Greek relief funds. It would appear that, based on the archives of the Holy Synod which were examined, more positive results were forthcoming from the attempt to assist refugees than the attempt to ransom Greek slaves.

Our knowledge of the ransom procedure is fragmentary at best. British and French diplomatic records indicate that efforts were made to ransom Greek captives. Francis Werry, British Consul in Smyrna, wrote to the Levant Company (May 1822) that, although local authorities prohibited the sale of slaves to Christians, “many are redeemed by general subscription.” In a subsequent note to the Levant Company (June 1822), Werry mentioned the European diplomatic community’s intercession on behalf of Greek slaves: “In these severe moments, everyone is called on to assist in redeeming the poor children who are continuously paraded through . . . the streets for that purpose.” Werry noted that many females and children were held captive in Smyrna, where they were “exposed to sale—or redemption.”94
The French ambassador to the Porte, M. de Latour Maubourg, informed the French foreign minister (May 1822) of his intention to open a subscription drive among Frenchmen in Constantinople for the purpose of redeeming Chios’ enslaved Greek Catholics. Funds would be handled by the French consul, while Catholic religious authorities would be in charge of making arrangements for the exchange. British and French documents demonstrate, in a general way, the concern which the Chios massacre aroused in the Western diplomatic circles of Constantinople and Smyrna. Further exploration of Western diplomatic and travel reports might enhance our knowledge of the results of such efforts to ransom Greek slaves.

Our picture of the distribution of Russian ransom money and the role played by Russian consular officials is shrouded with uncertainties. In a letter to Golitsyn (November 1822), Oikonomos underscored the need to minimize as much as possible the fanfare and publicity surrounding the subscription drive for captives. It would be advisable, he wrote, if the Turkish government did not catch wind of this “new deed of Russian benevolence.” On the crucial matter of redeeming the slaves, Oikonomos suggested that donations be placed in the hands of a secret committee in Odessa, comprised of two or three prudent and reliable individuals, such as A. Stourdzas and the merchant D. Inglezis. The committee would be in charge of making arrangements for ransoming captives. The letter, which apparently went unanswered by Golitsyn, raises more questions than it answers. Most important, Oikonomos did not mention how the secret committee was to go about arranging its transactions.

A more detailed but still incomplete picture of the ransom procedure emerges from the report of Governor-General of Bessarabia General Inzov to Minister of Interior Kochubei (30 July 1823). A committee in Kishinev comprised of local clerics was to send ransom donations to prominent and trustworthy Greek merchants in Odessa. Upon receiving the money, the merchants would forward it to commercial agents in the Ottoman Empire, with instructions to use the funds to ransom Greek slaves. If and when the instructions were carried out successfully, according to Inzov’s report, the merchants of Odessa who had originally received the money would inform the Kishinev committee of the results, specifically the number of Greeks ransomed and the price paid for each one. The Kishinev committee would then report the results to the governor-general of Bessarabia and to Golitsyn.

If such was the actual procedure, it is safe to assume that Russian consular officials played a role of some sort. This seems all the more likely in view of the fact that since 1774, Russian consuls and vice-consuls in the Near East, most of whom were of Greek descent, had close ties with the sultan’s Greek subjects and attempted to alleviate their plight whenever possible. Concrete and detailed information on Russian attempts to ransom Greek captives might be forthcoming from a further investigation of
archival materials of the Holy Synod. A more complete picture of this question might also emerge from an examination of the archival collections of the Russian Foreign Ministry and regional archives in Odessa and Kishinev.

There exists an anonymous published account describing the fate of three young Chiots who were ransomed in Constantinople and ended up in Kazan. Appearing in Kazanskii vestnik (Kazan Messenger) (1823), a journal which was under the supervision of a special editorial board of Kazan University, the brief article mentions that Konstantinos Vostanoglou, a Greek who spoke Turkish, was in Constantinople when many Chiot captives were brought to the local slave market. Moved by the miserable lot of two young Chiots who had fallen into the hands of an Arab from Aleppo, Vostanoglou decided to ransom them. The Arab, who had unsuccessfully tried all means to convert the youths to Islam, agreed to the sale. The arrangements were made by a friend of Vostanoglou, a Greek believer who outwardly professed Islam. When Vostanoglou discovered that the Arab owned a third Chiot slave, he ransomed all three. The fee was set at 6,500 piastres for the three youths—M. Tofras, 12, S. Pouladas, 12, and P. Kliamouris, 11. The parents of all three had perished during the Chios massacre.

Vostanoglou initially placed the redeemed captives in a Greek school in Constantinople. But due to the climate of religious frenzy and the unruliness of the janissaries, he made provisions to send them to Russia. After great difficulty, the nature of which was not discussed in the article, Vostanoglou arrived in Odessa (1823) with the three Chiots. He expected that "compassionate souls" would be found to give the youths a decent upbringing and education, something which Vostanoglou was unable to do himself after the ransom and travel expenses. The curator of the Kazan Educational District, Mikhail L. Magnitskii, one of the most reactionary civil servants in the final years of the Alexandrine era, interceded on behalf of the Chiots and sought Golitsyn's permission to place them in the Kazan Gymnasium at government expense. Golitsyn approved the request and instructed Governor-General of New Russia, M. S. Vorontsov to provide necessary funds for travel expenses and clothes for the Chiot orphans.

The article in Kazanskii vestnik concluded with the observation that the unexpected arrival of the "three young believers" was a reward for the large donations and generosity which the Kazan Educational District had rendered on behalf of the Chiots in captivity.

This brief article, while offering a specific example of redemption, raises several questions. Above all, how did Vostanoglou and the Chiots make their way to Odessa? How, if at all, did Russian diplomatic officials assist Vostanoglou? While generalizations are difficult based on this one piece of evidence, it would seem that individual initiative and Christian charity played a major factor in the ransom procedure.
One gets a clearer and more detailed picture of the subscription drive for Greek refugees, particularly the activity of the relief committee established in Odessa. The Relief Assistance Committee was initially headed by Metropolitan Kiril of Silistria and included two Phanariot Greeks, G. Handjeri and N. Soutsos. This particular committee was immediately superseded by another appointed by Langeron. Because of poor health, Metropolitan Kiril was replaced by M. Ia. Minchaki, a Russian diplomatic official who had served in Constantinople and had extensive contacts with the Greek communities in southern Russia. More significant was Langeron's decision to broaden the social base of the original committee by appointing merchants from Odessa and Constantinople—D. Inglezis, A. Mavros, D. Schinas, and S. Kosmandas. They all had commercial dealings with a large cross-section of Greek society. They also, according to Langeron, were probably more aware than aristocratic Phanariots of the true state of indigent Greeks from middle and lower social groups who were in the greatest need of assistance. The Relief Assistance Committee of Odessa received donations either from Golitsyn, who in most cases channeled them through the Ministry of Finance, or directly from eparchy and gubernii authorities. Upon receipt, the relief funds were to be deposited in the Odessa Exchange Bank. Langeron entrusted the merchant D. Inglezis with the duty of treasurer; it was his function to keep accurate records of the committee's revenues and expenditures, copies of which were to be sent to Golitsyn on a regular basis.

The committee's chief task consisted of distributing emergency assistance to individuals and families from middle and lower social groups, that is, "traders, townsfolk, masters, craftsmen, and sailors." Langeron took it upon himself to provide help to Phanariot Greeks. Before distribution, the committee was required to assess the actual needs of each individual or family and determine the amount of emergency support each should receive. Upon arrival in Odessa, the refugees were placed in two-week quarantine, during which period the committee divided them into three broad groupings or categories based on social status and occupation: merchants and others of "significant standing;" artisans, peddlers, and shopkeepers; and workers and sailors. Distribution of relief aid corresponded roughly to an individual's or a family's social classification. The higher the grouping, the larger the monthly sum issued by the committee. For example, a single person from the first social grouping received 2.5 rubles a month, while a single person from the second and third categories received 1.5 rubles and 60 kopeks respectively. Similarly, a family from the first, second, and third groupings received 5, 3.5, and 2.75 rubles respectively. In addition to one's social classification, distribution of relief aid was determined by the amount of donations at the committee's disposal. Depending on the latter, relief help was to be issued either monthly or every two months.
The detailed financial records of the Odessa Relief Assistance Committee reveal the concrete support it rendered to refugees. To take one six-month period, January–June 1824, the committee distributed 81,760 rubles, most of which went to widows, orphans, the needy, and patients at Odessa City Hospital who were in need of medical care. The committee also provided funds and other assistance to 214 Greeks expressing interest to return to the Greek world.

In line with traditional patterns of Greek migration to Russia since 1453, Greek clergymen were treated with extreme generosity by both government authorities and the Odessa and Kishinev relief committees. Indeed, of all the refugees, Greek clerics received the largest and most consistent monthly financial support, ranging from 45–75 rubles for monks, priests, and deacons; 150 rubles for archimandrites, bishops, and archbishops; to 170 rubles for metropolitans. In February 1822, Archbishop Dmitrii of Kishinev, head of the local relief assistance committee, distributed 25,000 rubles to 441 Greek clergymen from Moldavia–metropolitans, archimandrites, monks, nuns, priests, and deacons. The Odessa and Kishinev committees, at Golitsyn’s request, also tried to place Greek clergymen in Greek monasteries in Taganrog, Kiev, and Moscow. While most remained in Russia for at least the duration of the revolt, some clergymen expressed a desire to return to the Greek East as soon as possible. For example, in January 1826, the monk Chrysanthos received 300 rubles before venturing to return to Mt. Athos.

On many occasions, high-placed Greeks in Russian service, such as Kapodistrias before his resignation (August 1822) and Stourdzas, interceded on behalf of Greek families to either Golitsyn or the relief assistance committees. One such example occurred in July 1822, when Kapodistrias informed Golitsyn that Anton Isaii, a Smyrna-born Greek, and his family were in need of emergency relief support. Golitsyn fulfilled the request, reporting to Kapodistrias that “at your behest I gave A. Isaii 1,000 rubles from the sums collected to assist Greeks.” A Phanariot Greek, Anastasii Kalliardji, benefited from Stourdzas’ intercession on his behalf. In view of Kalliardjis’ significant losses of property in Bucharest and Constantinople and the martyrdom of his brother, who had been archbishop of Ephesus before meeting the same fate as Patriarch Gregorios, Golitsyn instructed Governor-General Inzov to give Kalliardjis and his family 3,200 rubles in addition to an annual pension of 400 rubles.

The successors of Inzov and Langeron showed continued support of and commitment to the relief endeavors. They rendered as much help as possible to facilitate the distribution of relief aid to indigent refugees. Governor-General of New Russia Vorontsov, for example, proposed to Golitsyn that a captured supply of Greek arms be sold to Don Cossacks, in exchange for which the money could be used to help “unfortunate Greek refugees.” Upon the approval of the tsar and Golitsyn, Vorontsov carried out his project and raised 875 rubles.
The Russian government’s sponsorship of Greek relief assistance was motivated by pragmatic in addition to humanitarian concerns. With the influx of refugees, officials recognized the need to supply not only temporary emergency aid but also productive employment. If realized, this would facilitate the settlement and economic-commercial development of southern Russia—long an objective of tsarist policy which brought the Russian and Greek worlds closer together in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

One such attempt at Greek settlement was the proposal of Major-General Count V. V. Orlov-Denisov to settle one hundred Greeks on his estate near the Sea of Azov. Along with food, shelter, and medical care, Orlov-Denisov would provide full-time labor in fishing-related industries. The Odessa relief committee, which published the proposal in Greek and posted it throughout the city, expressed reservations about the potential success of the project. In its reply to Golitsyn and Langeron, the committee stated that the bulk of refugees—sailors, sea-captains, peddlers, small-time merchants, and shopkeepers—did not consider themselves permanent residents in Russia. Reluctant to resettle in areas where their skills might be in demand, they sought instead to stay as close as possible to the southern border in the hope of returning to Greek lands once hostilities ended. More crucial, the committee asserted, it would be difficult for predominantly urbanized and maritime Greeks to grow accustomed to rural life. To the committee’s surprise, sixty-three Greeks, most of them sailors, accepted the proposal on condition that the committee supply proper clothing and travel expenses. In line with Golitsyn’s instructions, the committee complied, offering clothes, shoes, and 40 rubles to each would-be settler on Orlov-Denisov’s estate.

The tsar himself, fully aware of the refugees’ labor potential, requested the Odessa committee to find employment for the newcomers. Foreign Minister Nesselrode relayed Alexander’s instructions in a despatch on June 1822 to Governor-General Langeron. It opened by expressing gratitude for the committee’s ‘justice, mercy, and good sense” in distributing relief funds. But, the despatch emphasized, more substantial measures were needed to render help to the refugees, all the more so as relief donations might be scarce or depleted in the future. Without work and unable to return to Greek lands, most refugees were thus forced to remain in Russia for at least the duration of the revolt. Along with “shelter and care rendered from the heart of the Russian tsar,” steps were to be taken to put the refugees to work. The committee was to divide the most indigent Greeks into categories designated by their craft and occupation. It was also to contact civilian and military governors of Bessarabia, Georgia, Podolsk, the Crimea, and the Ukraine in order to ascertain the specific labor needs of each region, according to which the refugees would then be resettled. Greek sailors who did not enter Russian naval service were to be stationed in Nikolaev or other naval ports in New Russia.
The tsar requested the committee to rely on its own resources in fulfilling the proposal. In the event of scarce funds, the committee would be allowed to borrow from local government authorities or the Petersburg treasury. But, the despatch underscored, the committee should try by all means to manage without government assistance and refrain from letting Greeks know of the tsar's readiness to offer financial support if need be. Above all, the committee was to convince refugees that only by their own efforts could they become self-supporting and attain proper and prolonged sustenance while in Russia. If successfully carried out, the despatch concluded, the tsar's proposal would not only provide support to impoverished Greeks but hasten the colonization and further development of southern lands.115

Similar to its lukewarm response to Orlov-Denisov's proposal, the relief committee of Odessa questioned the feasibility of the tsarist initiative. The main obstacle, it noted in its reply to Nesselrode, was that most refugees had abandoned homes and property as a result of Turkish reprisals and fully intended to return to the Greek world as soon as possible. The committee also asserted that, in addition to their reluctance to resettle, few, if any, Greek arrivals were viniculturists or skilled artisans (tailors, shoemakers, furriers), both of which occupations were in demand in southern regions. The potential value of the refugees' labor, the committeee noted, was reduced by their "tendency to work in the Asiatic manner." As for Greek sailors, most demonstrated a desire to return home rather than enter Russian naval service. They hoped to follow in the footsteps of 300 Greek sailors who, with partial funding from the committee, had recently set out for the Greek world via Brod and Trieste. The committee's reply concluded with a pledge to assist all refugees, including widows, orphans, the sick and needy; those desiring to return home; and, regardless of the obstacles to the tsarist proposal, those willing to resettle in southern Russia.116

Greek relief assistance, one of several philanthropic endeavors during Alexander's reign, was in accordance with the currents of pietism and Christian universalism which helped shaped the ethos of the final decade of the Alexandrine era. Yet even as a simple act of Christian charity, philorthodox aid to coreligionists ran counter to Alexander's, and after him Nicholas', longing for social-political stability, dread of national independence movements, and commitment to legitimacy. The apparent contradiction of tsarist support for the Greek insurrection is best explained by the political gains to be reaped. In addition to the development of southern Russia, Greek relief assistance was motivated by the prospect of political and diplomatic influence in an independent Greek state. Philorthodox relief thus became a means not only to bolster Russia's traditional image as protector of Orthodoxy but to curry favor with the Greeks. Indeed, it was not the first, neither would it be the last, occasion that humanitarian
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support to a Balkan neighbor carried potential political capital. Another possible pragmatic concern of the regime was to match, if not surpass, the generous philhellenic support raised in Western Europe.

Along with rendering moral and material help to insurgent Greece, government-sponsored relief drives kept the Greek issue before the public eye throughout the 1820s. The subscription campaigns represent a rare example of Russian government and society working together in common cause. The government created an organized and well-defined structure for the expression of Grecophile sentiment, with the result that public enthusiasm for the Greek cause was channeled by the government into effective relief assistance. That all sectors of society contributed would seem to indicate that popular spontaneity, rather than compulsion from local religious and secular authorities, was the chief impulse behind relief donations. The groundswell of public support demonstrates the widespread appeal of the Greek cause and fully substantiates the statement made by the nineteenth-century Russian historian Dmitrii Bukharov: “Up until that time, not one popular [narodnoe] revolt, no matter where it took place, aroused as much general attention and intense sympathy as the revolt of the Greeks.”

Finally, the public’s sizable contributions clearly indicate that a wide cross section of society continued to feel a close affinity with Greek subjects of the Orthodox East. While the bulk of philorthodox relief came from government officials, clergymen, and the nobility, the records of the Holy Synod reveal that aid was also forthcoming from the district and parish level, where, perhaps more so than elsewhere in Russian society, the Greek cause was seen as essentially a religious issue. In addition to the traditional bonds of religion and Orthodox culture, Russian literary circles increasingly viewed the Greeks through the prism of their awakening interest in the classical heritage. For Russian classical scholars and romanticist poets, the modern Greeks were not only coreligionists but the descendants of their renowned classical forebears.

NOTES

1. The following overview of Russian philhellenism is based on this author’s “Russian Cultural Response to the Greek War of Independence (1821–1830),” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1982.

2. See the detailed bibliography of Loukia Droulia, Philhellénisme. Ouvrages inspirés par la guerre de l'independance grecque (1821–1833) (Athens, 1974), which, however, makes no reference to Russian philhellenism.

3. For a review of Western and Russian works on Russian philhellenism see this author’s dissertation. A few of the more significant Soviet works on the subject deserve mention. Much of Soviet scholarship has focused on the Greek revolt’s diplomatic repercussions on the European balance of power and on Russia’s Eastern policy. This literature is sum-
marized in A. L. Narochnitskii, "Grezheskoe natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie i Rossia," Istoria SSR, 12(1980):57-68. For a Greek Marxist view, which is largely based on Soviet works, see D. Loulas, O rolos tis Rossias sti diamorphosi tou ellinikou kratous (Athens, 1981). The works of Grigorii L. Arsh, Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii (Moscow, 1972), and Kapodistriia i grecheskoe natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie, 1809-1822 gg. (Moscow, 1976), treat tsarist policy toward both Greek nationalistic activity in southern Russia and the outbreak of the revolt. Several Soviet scholars, such as Ivan F. Iovva in Dekabristy v Moldavii (Kishinev, 1975), have increasingly dealt with the reaction of Russian educated society, in particular the Decembrists and the revolt's impact on their movement for reform in Russia. Recently, there have been attempts to broaden the scope of such research. Irina S. Dostian's Russkata obschestvennaia mys' i balkanske narody: ot Radishcheva do dekabristov (Moscow, 1980) briefly touches on the revolt's coverage in the Russian periodical press, while O. A. Belobrova's "O grecheskoi teme v russkom iskusstve pervoi treti XIX v.," Balkanske isledovanija. Kul'tura narodov Balkan v novoe vremia (Moscow, 1980) treats the depiction of the revolt in Russian art.

4. These and other aspects of Russia's post-Byzantine ties to the Greek East are explored in N. F. Kapterev, Kharakter otnoshen ii Rossii k pravoslavnomu vostoku v XVI i XVII st. (Sergiev Posad, second edition, 1914); Boris L. Fonkich, Grechesko-russkie kul'turnye sviazii v XV-XVII vv.; Grecheskie rukopisi v Rossii (Moscow, 1977); and William Medlin and Christos Patrinelis, Renaissance Influences and Religious Reforms in Russia (Geneva, 1971), pp. 34-50. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Russian and Greek worlds were brought closer together as a result of the expansion of Russia's Black Sea commerce, in which Greek merchants played a substantial role. See Arsh, Eteristskoe dvizhenie, op. cit., pp. 129-66, and Viron Karidis, "A Greek Mercantile paroikia: Odessa, 1774-1829," Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence, Richard Clogg (ed.) (Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1981), pp. 111-36.


6. The Phanariots were cosmopolitan, wealthy, and educated Greeks of the Phanar quarter in Constantinople. They served as the sultan's financiers, physicians, and interpreters. From 1711 to 1821, they also were appointed as hospodars or princes of Moldavia and Wallachia. Needless to say, the outbreak of the Greek revolt prompted Turkish mistrust and suspicion toward all prominently placed Greeks in Ottoman service. On the Phanariots see K. T. Dimaras, "Peri Phanariothou," Archeion Thrakis, XXXIV (1969):117-40, and the essays in Symposium. L'época di Cléobule Tsourkas (Thessaloniki, 1974).

7. On Turkish reprisals see Charles Frazee, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 1821-1852 (Cambridge, England, 1969), pp. 22-34, and K. A. Vovolinis, I ekkleia eis ton agora tis eleftherias (Athens, 1952), pp. 112-22. See also the eyewitness account of Dmitiri V. Dashkov, member of the Russian diplomatic mission and a keen admirer of the classical and Byzantine heritage, "Pi'sma k I. I. Dmitrievu," Russkii arkhiv, VI (1868):595-98. Spyridon Destounis, Russian Consul-General in Smyrna between 1815 and 1821, described the state of alarm among local Greeks. This information, entitled "Turkish disturbances in Smyrna in 1821," is part of the Destounis Collection, located in the Manuscript Division of the Saltikov-Shchedrin Public Library in Leningrad. I was unable to consult this material, which might shed light not only on the reprisals but on Greek nationalistic activities in Russia and the Greek world. It is hoped that Soviet scholars will examine and make greater use of the Destounis Collection, than has been the case thus far. Russian periodicals offered extensive treatment of the Greek revolt and Greek-related themes in the 1820s. On Turkish reprisals see Vestnik Evropy, CXVIII (10)(1821):151-52; (11):238-40;

9. Oikonomos's career in Russia resembles that of Eugenios Voulgaris, the subject of Stephen K. Batalden's "Eugenios Voulgaris in Russia, 1771-1806: A Chapter in Greco-Slavic Ties of the 18th Century," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1975. Oikonomos became a member of the Theological Academy in St. Petersburg. Of special note among his publications in Russia is a bilingual, three-volume study of the relationship between the Greek and Russian languages, Opyt o blizhaihem srodstve iazykov slaviano-rossiiskogo s grecheskim (St.Petersburg, 1828), which, in its dedication to Nicholas I, urged the tsar to assume a more active role in delivering the Greeks from Ottoman rule. This, according to Oikonomos, would be in accord with the tsar's self-image as the protector of Orthodoxy both within and without the Russian Empire. For a brief biographical sketch of Oikonomos see Gavriil Destounis, O zhizni i trudakh K. Ekonomsy (St. Petersburg, 1860); K. Sathas, Neoelleniki philologia (Athens, 1868), pp. 731-36; and D. S. Valanos, "Konstantinos Oikonomos o ex Oikonomon," Ekklisia, XXXIV (24)(1937):491-98.

10. Oikonomos's funeral sermon was immediately translated into Russian and was published in Moscow and Petersburg. See Perevod nadgrobnogo slova (St. Petersburg, 1821), and Nadgrobnaia rech' blazhennomu konstantinopol'skomu patriarkhu Grigoriiu (Moscow, 1821), which is a bilingual edition. The sermon also appears in A. Goudas, Vioi paralliloi ton epi anagneniseos tis Ellados diaprepasanton andron (Athens, 1870), I, pp. 167-204. For Oikonomos's additional patriotic sermons delivered in Odessa see Slova govorenye v Odese na grecheskom iazyke v 1821 i 1822 godakh pri pogrebenii konstantinopol'skogo patriarkha Grigoriia i pri drugikh slucaiahk (St. Petersburg, 1829).

11. Ivan F. Iovva, Bessarabia i grecheskoe natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie (Kishenev, 1974), pp. 147-49.

12. Information on these families can be found in the Central State Military Historical Archive (TsGVIA), fond VUA (Voennoucheniyi arkhiv), delo 1018, II. 126-126a, 134-134a.

13. Iovva, Bessarabia, op. cit., pp. 157, 200. As Iovva, Dostian, and other Soviet scholars have shown, the efforts of Pestel' and Orlov to organize secret political societies in Russia were influenced by the Philiki Etaireia, the Greek secret society founded in Odessa (1814) which planned and launched the uprising in the Danubian Principalities.

14. The subject of Greek relief assistance, briefly touched on in Russian and Soviet works, has yet to receive a detailed study. A complete picture would most likely entail additional archival research, especially of local materials in Kishinev and Odessa. Iovva's treatment, Bessarabia, op. cit., pp. 152-62, which utilizes regional archives in Odessa and Moldavia, is at best an introductory sketch. The following account of the organization, collection, and distribution of relief aid is based almost exclusively on materials from the Chancelleries of the Holy Synod and the oberprokuror, information which is located in the Central State Historical Archive in Leningrad (TsGIA). For a brief account of Greek relief aid

15. TsGIA, fond 797, opis’ 2, deI1 6395, ill. 2-2a.

16. The outbreak of the revolt sharpened Kapodistrias’s already divided loyalties to his compatriots and to the Russian government. Kapodistrias shared the tsar’s belief that Ypsilantis acted hastily and that his premature endeavor was likely to have disastrous repercussions on the Greeks. Nevertheless, until his resignation in August 1822, Kapodistrias repeatedly urged the tsar to assume a firm line against the Porte in order to protect the Greeks.

The best work on Kapodistrias’s career in Russian diplomatic service is Arsh’s Kapodistriia, op. cit., which utilizes Soviet archival materials to illuminate Kapodistrias’s contributions to Greek enlightenment in Russia and the Greek world. For a Greek perspective see E. Koukou, Kapodistrias, 1800-1828 (Athens, 1978), pp. 39–158.

An advocate of unfettered autocracy and a devoted Orthodox believer, Stourdzas, like other Russian “conservative” philhellenes, espoused intervention in order to defend Russia’s protectorship of the Porte’s Orthodox subjects. In La Grèce en 1821 et 1822, an essay written to promote European philhellenic support, Stourdzas emphasized the religious dimension of the revolt. He asserted that the Greek cause symbolized a struggle for the preservation of Orthodoxy and, by implication, the Greek cultural heritage, both of which, for Greek cultural patriots such as Stourdzas, were inextricably bound. For biographical information on Stourdzas see Diktiadis, Kratkoe svedenie 0 zhizni i trudakh A. S. Sturdzy, (Odessa, 1854), and K. Oikonomos, Alexandros o Stourdzas, viographikon schedisma (Athens, 1855). According to Arsh, Eteristskoe dvizhenie, op. cit., pp. 330–31, which mentions the relief project in passing, Stourdzas was the initiator.

17. While disapproving of Ypsilantis’s actions, Golitsyn believed that the tsar’s condemnation of the Greek affair was a departure from Russia’s traditional policy of protecting the sultan’s Orthodox subjects. See Arsh, Kapodistriia, op. cit., pp. 226–27.

18. Golitsyn occupied a number of high positions in the government. He was oberprokuror of the Holy Synod, 1817–1824; minister of religious affairs and public enlightenment, 1817–1824; and director of the postal services, 1819–1842. See Walter W. Sawatsky, “Prince Alexander N. Golitsyn (1773–1844): Tsarist Minister of Piety,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1976, which delineates Golitsyn’s major role in numerous philanthropic and charitable endeavors. On Golitsyn’s direct involvement in Greek relief assistance see Ignatii Iakovenko, Moldaviia i Valakhiii s 1820 po 1829 g. (St. Petersburg, 1834), pp. 82–86; D. N. Bantysh-Kameniskii, Slovar’ dostopamiatnykh litdei russkoi zemli (St. Petersburg, 1847), I, pp. 415–28; and A. S. Stourdzas, Dan’ pamiati vel moshikhristianina kniazia A. N. Golitsyna (Odessa, 1845), pp. 8–9, which, for understandable reasons in view of its author, focused on Greek relief rather than on Golitsyn’s other philanthropic projects.

19. Golitsyn’s proclamation appears in Russian and French in TsGIA, fond 797, opis’ 2, deI1 6403, ill. 3–3a.

20. TsGIA, fond 797, opis’ 2, deI1 6395, “Delo o posobii grecheskim prishchel’stam v Odessu i ob obezpechenii pribyvshikh v Rossiiu grekov dukhovnogo i svetskogo zvaniia, 1821,” ill. 1–3a.

21. Ibid., ill. 10–10a.

22. Ibid., ill. 6–6a.

23. Ibid., ill. 5–5a. For an example see Golitsyn’s letter to Countess Anna A. Orlov-Chesmen’skaia, ill. 13–13a.

24. Ibid., ill. 16–16a.

25. Ibid., ill. 15–15a.

26. Ibid., ill. 4–4a.

27. L. S. Stavrionas, The Balkans Since 1453 (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1958), pp. 83–85. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Crimean Khanate and Ottoman Empire engaged in lively trade. Kaffa, Azov, Kerch, and Taman were major marketplaces for the
purchase of slaves, many of whom the Tatars had captured in raids on Russian and Polish territory. See also H. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (London, 1973), pp. 130-33.


31. The petition appears in French and Greek in TsGIA, fond 1308, opis’ 1, delo 85, “Delo o pozvolenii nakhodiashchimsia v Bessarabii grecheskim dukhovnym otkryf podpisku dlia vykupa plennykh zhitelei ostrova Khio i gorodov Kassandra i Kidonii,” ll. 2-3.

32. Ibid., fl. 1-1a.

33. TsGIA, fond 797, opis’ 2, delo 6496, fl. 4-4a.

34. TsGIA, fond 1308, opis’ 1, delo 85, ll. 7-8.

35. Ibid., ll. 10-11, and fond 797, opis’ 2, delo 6496, ll. 3-3a.

36. TsGIA, fond 797, opis’ 2, delo 6496, ll. 1-2.

37. Ibid., ll. 6-8a, 12-16, 26-27, contains numerous copies of the proclamation.

38. Ibid., ll. 29-35.

39. Ibid., ll. 36-41a, 55-56a.

40. Ibid., ll. 11-11a, 58-62, and fond 1308, opis’ 1, delo 85, ll. 15-15a, 20-23.

41. TsGIA, fond 1409, opis’ 1, delo 4084, l. 15.

42. TsGIA, fond 1287, opis’ 2, delo 1, ll. 1-2.

43. TsGIA, fond 565, opis’ 13, delo 2061, ll. 1-1a.

44. On Mariia Fedorovna’s donation see TsGIA, fond 797, opis’ 2, delo 6395, ll. 152-153a, and delo 6418, l. 15.


46. TsGIA, fond 797, opis’ 2, delo 6546, ll. 1-4a; delo 6523, ll. 1-9; delo 6511, ll. 1-32; delo 6518, ll. 1-113; and delo 6395, ll. 7-7a.

47. Ibid., delo 6484, ll. 16-17, and delo 6505, ll. 18-18a.

48. Ibid., delo 6504, ll. 11-11a, and delo 6534, ll. 181-181a.

49. Ibid., delo 6418, ll. 2-3a. With the creation of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment (1802), the Russian Empire was divided into six educational districts, each of which had a university and was headed by a curator—Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kazan, Kharkov, Dorpat, and Vilna.

50. TsGIA, fond 797, opis’ 2, delo 6414, ll. 1-5a, 10-10a, 21-26a; delo 6419, l. 38; and delo 6631, ll. 6-9a, 44-46a, 96-96a, 103.

51. In the early nineteenth century, there were six postal districts in the Russian Empire—Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Ukraine, Kazan, Tambov, and Lithuania. Postal officials in the following cities either contributed directly or organized the collection of donations—Moscow, St. Petersburg, Riazan, Kazan, Astrakhan, Simbirsk, Irkutsk, Smolensk, Mogilev, Ekaterinoslav, Iaroslav, Tver, Vladimir, Kolomenskoe, and the Crimean towns of Kherson, Tiraspol, Olviopol, Feodosia, Kerch, and Evpatoria. See TsGIA, fond
797, opis' 2, delo 6415, ll. 1-130; delo 6430, ll. 1-182a; delo 6513, ll. 1-9; and delo 6527, ll. 1-7.

52. Ibid., delo 6395, ll. 95-95a; delo 6516, ll. 7-37; and delo 9971, ll. 24-27.

53. Ibid., delo 6516, ll. 49-56.

54. Ibid., delo 6515, ll. 41-47.

55. Ibid., ll. 38-38a.

56. The sermons of parish priests and church hierarchs on the Greeks' behalf is a topic worthy of further research which, among other things, may enhance our understanding of the manner in which the Russian clergymen promoted the Greek cause.

57. Examples of the numerous eparchy and gubernii files on Greek relief assistance, which are located in TsGIA, fond 797, opis' 2, include delo 6490, 6519, 6537 (Moscow); delo 6422, 6529 (St. Petersburg); delo 6420, 6462, 6584 (Pskov); delo 6445, 6434, 6637 (Kiev); delo 6448, 6376, 6564 (Simbirsk); delo 6414 (Kazan); delo 6532 (Kursk); delo 6454, 6470, 6603, 9977 (Tver); delo 6403, 6539 (Kaluga); delo 6436, 6452, 6566, 6580 (Iaroslav); delo 6408, 6569 (Voronezh); and delo 6519, ll. 1-61 (Moscow).

58. Ibid., delo 6425, 6615, 6617, 6548, 6623 (Perm and Orenburg); and delo 6467, 6417, 6583, 6439, 6599, 9974 (Tomsk, Tobolsk, and Irkutsk).

59. Ibid., delo 6439, ll. 1-3.

60. Ibid., delo 6599, ll. 1-7a.

61. Ibid., delo 6583, ll. 1-8.

62. Ibid., delo 6641, ll. 1-1a; and delo 6582, ll. 1-4a (St. Petersburg); and delo 6519, ll. 1-61 (Moscow).

63. Ibid., delo 6484, ll. 15-18a; delo 6504, ll. 1-26, and delo 6506, ll. 1-21.

64. Ibid., delo 6395, ll. 127, and delo 6484, l. 13a.

65. The letters of A. A. Orlov-Chesmenskaia and D. N. Sheremetev to Golitsyn are in Ibid., delo 6418, ll. 31, 35-35a.

66. Ibid., delo 6522, ll. 5-9a.

67. Ibid., delo 6490, ll. 1-245; delo 6521, ll. 1-7; and delo 6542, ll. 1-4a.

68. Ibid., delo 6414, ll. 24-42a; and delo 6532, ll. 1-185.

69. Ibid., delo 6448, ll. 3-15; delo 6422, ll. 1-7a; delo 6407, ll. 1-3; and delo 6519, ll. 5-8. On the donations of Old Believer merchants in Moscow see delo 6395, ll. 85-85a.

70. Ibid., delo 6484, ll. 1-13a.

71. Ibid., delo 6424, ll. 1-10a.

72. Ibid., delo 6416, ll. 1-6a, and fond 796, opis' 2, delo 1338, ll. 1-1a.

73. Ibid., fond 797, opis' 2, delo 6422, ll. 16-48a.

74. Ibid., delo 6444, ll. 1-47; delo 6400, ll. 1-69a; delo 6446, ll. 1-4; delo 6385, ll. 1-91; and delo 6576, ll. 1-69.

75. Ibid., delo 6474, ll. 1-90.

76. Ibid., delo 6409, ll. 1-35.

77. Ibid., delo 6594, ll. 1-43.


79. TsGIA, fond 797, opis' 2, delo 6400, ll. 70-89.

80. Ibid., delo 6418, ll. 83-83a.

81. The Greeks of Odessa had been especially active in promoting Greek educational and cultural activity. On the Greek Commerical Gymnasium of Odessa, founded in 1817 by Greek merchants, see C. Voulodimos, Proti pentikolltaetiris ti s en Odioso ellino-empor-ikis scholis (1817-1867) (Odessa, 1871), and Osp Senkovskii, "O grecheskom uchilishche v Odese," Vestnik Evropy, CX(7)(1820):202-8. The Greek theatre of Odessa, begun in 1814,


84. For the names of Greek contributors and the amounts of their donations see TsGIA, fond 797, opis’ 2, delo 6395, ll. 81–83, 126–127a.

85. Ibid., delo 6484, l. 13a, and delo 6496, ll. 65–65a.

86. Ibid., delo 6418, ll. 13–14a, and delo 6517, ll. 1–21.

87. Ibid., delo 6418, l. 131a, and delo 6517, ll. 9–9a.

88. Ibid., delo 6484, ll. 135–137.

89. Ibid., delo 6517, ll. 14–16.


91. TsGIA, fond 796, opis’ 105, delo 1323, ll. 12a–13a.

92. Ibid., ll. 16–16a.

93. Ibid., and fond 797, opis’ 103, delo 1102, ll. 751–752a. For additional information on donations from 1824–1830 see TsGIA, fond 797, opis’ 2, delo 9975, ll. 1–47; fond 796, opis’ 105, delo 1322, ll. 1–20; and fond 796, opis’ 105, delo 1310, ll. 1–40.


95. Ibid., 96.

96. TsGIA, fond 797, opis’ 2, delo 6496, ll. 21–22.

97. TsGIA, fond 1308, opis’ 1, delo 85, ll. 25–31a.


100. “Zapiska o trekh maloletnykh grekakh privezennykh v Odessu iz Konstantinopoliya,” op. cit., p. 113.


102. Ibid., ll. 125–130a.

103. Ibid., l. 128a.

104. Ibid., ll. 143–145a.

106. TsGIA, *fond 797*, *opis' 2*, *delo* 9971, *ll.* 44–51. In most cases, the committee recorded specific names of relief recipients and the amount issued to each one.


114. The Orlov-Denisov proposal is covered in *ibid.*, *delo* 6402, *ll.* 2–17a.


116. *Ibid.*, *ll.* 101–109a. From the relief records examined, I was unable to gather any specific information on how many, if any, Greeks were resettled in accordance with the tsar's proposal. Based on local archives in Kishinev, Iovva (Bessarabia, *op. cit.*., pp. 160–63), claims that only a handful of gentry families in Bessarabia expressed a desire to provide labor for the refugees on their estates.