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The Philosopher's Journey: A Chapter in Kindness and Animals

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The Philosopher's Journey: A Chapter in Kindness and Animals

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Submitted to the Philosophy Department at the University of North Florida

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for Honors.

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ABSTRACT

We each are presented with a choice; do we remain in the cave of ignorance or embark on the philosopher's journey. Your choice will determine the way in which you interpret this paper. However, I will confidently make the assumption that you, like myself, desire to embrace an existence guided by the light of wisdom. This thesis is one of many chapters in the philosopher's journey, dealing with animals and (cutting through the jargon) kindness. I have found that a lot of scholarship on animal ethics acknowledges a truth, but does not acknowledge that the application of such a truth is pragmatic and dependent on an individual's circumstances in life. This thesis is an attempt to dispel shadows and guide one outside the cave in a pragmatic manner. This journey is not siloed or an immediate sprint toward wisdom. Each step in the direction of truth will guide us toward the exit of the cave. There is a reason the philosopher's journey is lifelong; the radiance of wisdom may blind us if we do not exam our surroundings and then eventually face the sun. This paper will guide us up the stairs by challenging speciesist lines of reasoning, acknowledging a failing of moral duty, ushering in non-human animals as moral patients within the moral community, and providing an examination of a possible intervention model to reduce speciesist attitudes.

Keywords:

Animal Ethics, Animal Rights, Animal Welfare, Animal-Human Framing, Kindness, Moral Agents, Moral Patients, Philosopher's Journey, Speciesism

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

Section I- Introduction	1-7
<i>Part I: The Extension of Compassion</i>	<i>1-2</i>
<i>Part II: Structure of Paper</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>Part III: Section II-Speciesism as a Neglect of Moral Duty</i>	<i>3-5</i>
<i>Part IV: Section III- Impact of Framing Intervention Model on Animal Attitudes, Animal Rights, and Human Social Outgroups.....</i>	<i>5-6</i>
<i>Part V: Framing the Discussion.....</i>	<i>6-7</i>
Section II-Speciesism as a Neglect of Moral Duty.....	7-26
<i>Part I: Introduction.....</i>	<i>7-8</i>
<i>Part II: Byproducts of Leaving the Cave-Animal Welfare and Animal Rights.....</i>	<i>8-11</i>
<i>Part III: Discussion Summary</i>	<i>11-13</i>
<i>Part IV: Addressing Carl Cohen's Challenge</i>	<i>13-17</i>
<i>Part V: Response to Cohen's Challenge</i>	<i>18-21</i>
<i>Part VI: Addressing Christine Korsgaard's Challenge.....</i>	<i>21-23</i>
<i>Part VII: Response to Korsgaard's Challenge.....</i>	<i>23-26</i>
<i>Part VIII: Conclusion</i>	<i>26</i>
Section III-Impact of Framing Intervention Model on Animal Attitudes, Animal Rights, and Human Social Outgroups.....	27-37
<i>Part I: Introduction.....</i>	<i>27-29</i>
<i>Part II: Overview of Study</i>	<i>29</i>
<i>Part III: Method.....</i>	<i>30-32</i>
<i>Part IV: Results</i>	<i>33-35</i>
<i>Part V: Discussion</i>	<i>35-37</i>
References.....	38

Section I - Introduction

Part I: The Extension of Compassion

The philosopher's journey is the essence of life; to love (philo) wisdom (sophos).

I use the word *life* intentionally above *humanity* as the philosopher's journey is not in a silo; awakening from ignorance is an inclusive process inspired by all inhabitants of the natural world.

With human capacity comes a battle between ultimate reality and the material world. It can be argued that plant life and non-human animals are by default closest to wisdom as their capacities are most present within reality and are not subject to the pleasures of the 21st century material world, disconnecting us from wisdom and plugging us into ignorance. To quote Zen Master Shunryu Suzuki, "In the beginner's mind there are many possibilities, but in the expert's, there are few" (Suzuki, 1). To remain in ignorance is to hold the belief that humanity is an expert on the philosopher's journey.

Human beings occupy many roles that result in the pursuit of wisdom. What may be intuitive to other beings comes with great effort to humanity. One of many simple examples is remaining focused on one task. With metacognition comes the *de facto* ability to hold several thoughts in mind, many of which are false realities found within a nonexistent future. For non-human animals, such a task comes easier as their capacities are constructed to have intentions remain in the present moment. Just as the non-human animal's existence can inspire such wisdom as present focus, humanity has the capacity to pursue moral reflection championing justice for those most vulnerable in our society. However, such an ability is a challenge to mobilize as both the academic philosophical community and humanity in general are caught within the ignorance of semantics that labels and divides beings leading to prejudice. It is my belief that if you play a role in the philosopher's journey, you are deserving of just treatment.

However, this belief is an ideal that may take centuries to advance in its entirety. As such, I will advance a thesis to extend the moral community to non-human animals and bring to light the moral impermissibility of the prejudice of speciesism or the discrimination based on mere species membership. It is my hope that ideals of today will become realities of tomorrow that advance kindness, compassion, and wisdom.

Part II: Structure of Paper

To advance a thesis to extend the moral community to non-human animals while bringing to light the moral impermissibility of speciesism is not a task I take lightly. There are several dimensions that must be addressed to support such claims. Even though it is not as in depth as a doctoral thesis, my paper is structured to acknowledge a problem and test a possible solution to said problem. This will be done through two additional sections: Section II: Speciesism as a Neglect of Moral Duty; Section III: Impact of Framing Intervention Model on Animal Attitudes, Animal Rights, and Human Social Outgroups. The first section will examine the issue at hand through a philosophical lens providing arguments opposing my thesis, which will in turn be responded to by drawing on key scholarship in animal ethics. The second section will consist of a psychological research study I performed in order to determine the legitimacy of an intervention model that may have the potential to reduce speciesist mindsets if employed at the right stage of adolescence. Through my interdisciplinary scholarship I will provide a path for non-human animals to enter the moral community, demonstrate how speciesism is morally impermissible, and test the efficiency of an intervention model that may have the potential to reduce speciesist attitudes toward non-human animals.

Part III: Section II-Speciesism as a Neglect of Moral Duty

In Section II, I will examine and respond to two philosophers and their scholarship that opposes my thesis. They are as follows: (1) Carl Cohen in his *Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research* and (2) Christine Korsgaard in her work *Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals*. Both philosophers deny non-human animals the opportunity to be among the moral community by labeling them as an obligation. As an obligation, human beings do not have a moral duty to protect them, but rather to treat non-human animals to the extent to which they will not prevent human beings from fulfilling their own duties toward other humans. For instance, as an obligation non-human animals can be subject to medical experimentation by doctors as doctors have a duty to treat their patients. Whether this research is cruel to non-human animals is irrelevant as they are not a part of the moral community and thus are not a primary moral concern.

To provide background which will be examined further within Section II; the moral community consists of moral agents, those that can employ moral reflection and have a moral duty toward moral patients, or those that are unable to rely on metacognition when presented with a moral dilemma (e.g. mentally disabled, elderly, or children). However, as members of the moral community, patients are subjects of moral concern and consideration, and we should prevent their abuse and unjust suffering. I will argue in Section II that non-human animals should be among the individuals we consider moral patients as they too cannot employ metacognition to morally reflect and are thus not held morally accountable for actions. Thus, we would be providing them with the protections awarded to human patients. Namely, moral agents would provide protection for non-human animals by defending them from exploitation and needless

suffering. However, as we will discuss, both Cohen and Korsgaard deny animals the rationality that is awarded to human moral patients or rather the “potential” for moral reflection. Cohen explicitly adopts the position that this capacity only exists in humankind while Korsgaard argues that under the Kantian sense of autonomy human beings have a level of rationality not awarded to non-human animals, thus denying them a relevant moral status.

I will argue against such claims in order to establish non-human animals as beings who deserve membership in the moral community. I will respond to Cohen and Korsgaard by using the scholarship of the following two animal ethicists: (1) Peter Singer in *Animal Liberation: The Definitive Classic of The Animal Movement* and (2) Tom Regan in his work *The Case for Animal Rights*. I will utilize the works of Singer to address Cohen’s dependence on human potentiality of capacity rather than actual mental capacity. This can be illustrated such that a four-year-old pig has an equal if not greater mental capacity to that of a baby, but is denied moral status as he is not human and does not have the potential for greater moral reflection. However, it is an assumption, in this brief example, to rely on the possibility of moral reflection developing when it may never. Therefore, to be considered a moral patient, individuals must be evaluated based on present capacities.

To a certain extent this is done with the elderly who may have once been moral agents, but become moral patients as mental capacities diminish with older age. To not apply the same principle to animals is speciesist; an act of prejudice because non-human animals are denied moral relevance based merely on species membership. Once addressing Cohen and providing an explication of Korsgaard I will argue against her denial of rationality of non-human animals. Through Regan’s notion of preference autonomy, non-human animals will be given a level of rationality which provides them with the inherent right to moral patienthood. An example of

preference autonomy may be your household pet's decision to not eat when hungry because it prefers treats. Once non-human animals are recognized as moral patients, metacognitive human beings or moral agents will have a direct moral duty to non-human animals, protecting them from undue suffering and exploitation. This duty will acknowledge their moral worth and thus further show speciesism as morally impermissible, a prejudice that results in a denial of a moral agent's duty to non-human animals and the wider moral community based merely on species membership. This paper's central objective is to elevate a non-human animal's position from being a mere obligation to the morally relevant status of patienthood, awarding them a place within the moral community. However, once a moral patient, further research will need to be done in order to reinforce and define the role of moral patienthood among human and non-human animals, allowing each member to thrive within the moral community.

Part IV: Section III- Impact of Framing Intervention Model on Animal Attitudes, Animal Rights, and Human Social Outgroups

In Section III, after having established the moral status of non-human animals, I will transition to the examination of speciesism as a prejudice and test a possible solution to increase moral attribution and sense-related capacities awarded to non-human animals. Such an intervention may reduce speciesist attitudes amongst human beings. In their recent study, *When Closing the Human-Animal Divide Expands Moral Concern: The Importance of Framing*, Brock Bastian, Kimberly Costello, Steve Loughnan, and Gordon Hodson concluded that a particular framing model "animals-are-human-like" increases moral concern for both non-human animals and human outgroups. However, the sample size of the study was small, calling into question if the effect of "animal-human" framing would stay consistent with a larger sample size. The effect,

even though existent, may be too small to be a viable means to reduce bias among non-human animals and human outgroups.

Therefore, Dr. Curtis Phills of the University of North Florida and I have replicated the study (Bastian et al.) to determine if the effect of “animal-human” framing can be a reliable intervention model. For instance, in the study *Attitudes Toward Animals: Age-Related Development Among Children* by Stephen R. Kellert, it is explained that eleventh graders’ attitude toward animals is most moralistic compared to every grade prior. A moralistic attitude is defined as a “primary concern for the right and wrong treatment of animals, with strong opposition to exploitation or cruelty toward animals” (Kellert 48). During such a stage in adolescence an intervention model such as animal to human framing, may be a viable way to reduce speciesist attitudes early on, habituating an ethical concern for animals that by default will allow rising moral agents to fulfill his or her duty to the moral community. This duty being not causing non-human animals needless suffering.

Part V: Framing the Discussion

The intention of this thesis or conversation is to approach animal ethics and the philosopher’s journey in what I would like to classify as a “safe space”. I am not shaming those who are not vegan (I am pescatarian myself due to medical reasons) or using this as an opportunity to stir the pot of resentment and stereotypes. At the root of my defense, is my goal to foster civil discourse in a way that is void of the ignorance brought upon by judgements or preconceived notions of another’s experience. If the readers are to take anything away from my scholarship it is to extend kindness to all life sentient and non-sentient. Our existence is one that is driven by compassion

and collaboration if we let go of our egos and take a moment to suspend judgement and actively listen. I look forward to being one of many inspirations along the philosopher's journey.

Section II – Speciesism as a Neglect of Moral Duty

Part I: Introduction

Join me as we return to every philosopher's origin: Plato's cave. You are the protagonist, chained by your neck and ankles to a cold damp rock wall. Directly across from you is another wall where there are two figures moving and speaking; you have known them since birth, and they are a consistent and important part of your existence. However, one day a third figure appears and suddenly unshackles your chains. As you fall to the ground, you are paralyzed with fear and bewilderment. The third figure helps you up, dusts you off, and says, "We need to talk." Even though you are now unchained, you have always enjoyed having discussions with the figures in the room, so you agree to listen. The third figure explains that the figures you have been talking with are shadows projected through a hole in the wall above your head; a reflection of a fire and two physical figures who are in a room above your own are projected onto the wall across from you. The third figure continues, "I have returned from a land above where there is only brightness; the shadows of the cave have blinded you. Will you join me in the ascent to regain your vision?" You respond, "Why should I believe these outrageous claims coming from a figure I have not seen until today? You must be a deceiver, for the truth is right before my eyes, plain as day." The third figure responds, "My dear friend, you are the one that must decide what to believe, but I encourage you to join me, as I was a prisoner shackled here so many years ago beside you."

If you are continuing to read, just as I continue to write, we have both made the decision to follow the third figure. Just as the prisoner of the cave became accustomed to viewing shadows as truth, as children we are raised on beliefs that serve as a foundation for our worldview. Such foundational beliefs can chain us to Plato's cave because challenging personal beliefs or societal norms calls into question who we are and ultimately the individual we choose to become in the world. By questioning the shadows in front of us we are given the gift of *philosophia* or the love of wisdom. By pursuing wisdom, we are met with its counter parts such as justice, truth, knowledge, and all subsequent derivatives that come from exiting the cave into the world where the sun shines brightly.

Part II: Byproducts of Leaving the Cave - Animal Welfare and Animal Rights

Two former prisoners that have made the ascent outside the cave, Peter Singer and Tom Regan, each have endorsed a distinct philosophy that serves as a guide toward wisdom or the world outside the ignorance of the cave. By challenging our assumptions about the current societal treatment of non-human animals we each can recognize the "shadows" that distract us from the pursuit of wisdom each day. The first, adopted by Peter Singer, is Animal Welfare and the second, advanced by Tom Regan, is Animal Rights. Even though each philosopher's school of thought differs in certain aspects each view advocates for the moral treatment of non-human animals and positions speciesism, or discrimination based on mere species resulting in unfair treatment, as immoral. Speciesism is pervasive within society, but is disguised through practices that have gone unquestioned until recently. Examples of practices that are defined as speciesist in nature include animal scientific experimentation, fur farms, factory farming, and other daily

practice that many, including myself, are not prompted to question until we are provided with a road map to leave the cave.

Such a map begins with Animal Welfare, a school of thought originating from Jeremy Bentham's philosophy of utilitarianism or, "each to count for one and none for more than one" (Singer, 5). Animal Welfare extends a basic principal of equality to all beings that can feel pleasure and pain or suffer (2). However, the principal of equality does not require equal treatment, rather equal consideration for all humans and non-humans who can feel pains and pleasures (2). For instance, even though an individual may slap a horse on the rump it may feel little pain as its skin is thick; however, if we were to slap a baby with the same force it will cry and feel pain as its skin is sensitive (15). In this instance, it would be worse to slap a baby than a horse, however, if we were to slap a horse with a large stick with enough force to be equivalent in pain to slapping a baby this would be wrong (15). To inflict an equal amount of pain, but label one as morally permissible solely based on mere species affiliation goes against the principle of equal consideration and is immoral (15).

Therefore, equal consideration lends itself to produce different treatment and rights (2). This is exemplified through laws permitting human fights like UFC while other laws penalize dog fighting. However, our laws also penalize the use of human test subjects, while permitting and rewarding the deaths of animals in scientific research. The principal of equal consideration is upheld in some cases, but denied in others. In the Animal Welfare view to deny a non-human animal this equal consideration is a form of speciesism or "a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species" (Singer, 6). Another way of putting this is that speciests allow the interests of their own species to override the greater interests of others based on mere species membership (9). This holds true

to other forms of prejudice such as those who are racist and give greater weight to interests of members of their own race when their interests are in conflict with the interests of another's race, simply due to their race (9). The same applies to sexism where men may only favor the interests of other men over women, simply due to their sex (9). Humans being raised to be world class fighters that engage in brutal violence should be evaluated under the principle of equality as different, therefore laws are put into place to advance this equal consideration; however, when it comes to other species such as animals commonly used in biomedical research (rats, rabbits etc.) speciesism draws the line, denying a being who can suffer and feel pleasure equal consideration to that of other species.

A second motivation for the moral treatment of animals is the Animal Rights view endorsed by Tom Regan, holding the position that moral rights are universal and individuals cannot deny others moral rights (Regan, 267). This is because of the respect principle for inherent value or the ability for those with inherent value to have a claim to respectful treatment (277-278). According to Regan inherent value is the view of an individual having value in themselves. No external features should deny this moral equality (235). Those with inherent value are subjects of life:

they are able to perceive and remember; if they have beliefs, desires, and preferences; if they are able to act intentionally in pursuit of their desires and goals; if they are sentient and have an emotional life; if they have a psychophysical identity overtime; and if they have an individual experiential welfare that is logically independent of their utility for, and interest of others. (264)

An example of an animal possessing Regan's inherent value would be a dog or pig. Each can remember the face of their owners, have preferences such as deciding to play outside when hungry, both have emotional love for their owners (multiple examples found on YouTube or

social media), and each in Regan's view have worth outside the interest of others or in the case of both dogs and pigs, worth outside human consumption.

Therefore, all beings with this level of sentience possess inherent value and therefore are morally entitled to fair treatment. When vulnerable members of our society are exploited, like the elderly, mentally disabled, children, or non-human animals, we are faced with a moral decision, or the decision to act or ignore. There are laws in place to promote action that protects such vulnerable population of humans, however, millions of non-human animals are exploited every day in research labs or factory farms due to their mere species membership. Such moral separation occurs when speciesist attitudes are acted upon unbeknownst to most people in our daily lives including myself. By leaving the cave we can gain an alternative perspective that, when applied to our own lives, can expand our moral outlook of the world and its inhabitants' human and non-human alike. This paper is an attempt for us both to take a moment to question a foundational belief we all were raised to leave unchallenged, namely the treatment of non-human animals within our society.

Part III: Discussion Summary

In my paper, I will examine two challenges to the schools of thought presented by Peter Singer and Tom Regan. I will provide an explication of the first challenger, Carl Cohen in his *Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research*, in which he challenges objections raised by animal welfare advocates (those who believe that non-human animal suffering should not count less than human suffering simply because it is experienced by a different species) and animal rights advocates (those that believe animals have inherent rights as living sentient beings). He believes the philosophic outlook of animal welfare advocates is mistaken in their calculation of

consequences while the animal rights advocates argue with a misunderstanding of the properties of a right. Once addressing Cohen's argument, I will begin to argue against Cohen's speciesist premise or his denial of moral patient status to non-human animals solely based on an individual's mere species membership, appealing to human potentiality rather than actual mental capacity. Through Peter Singer's scholarship, I will address Cohen's misconception of utilitarian calculus and establish that animal experimentation would not lead to a higher net gain but rather may result in a net loss under the hedonic calculus model.

Transitioning to the second challenger, philosopher Christine Korsgaard, I will provide an explication of her work *Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals*. Korsgaard's thesis argues that non-human animals are not rational beings and thus are not awarded a moral status that allows them to be an end in themselves and a duty to moral agents or those that have the capacity to employ moral reflection and who have a duty toward moral patients. Namely, the duty to acknowledge them as members of the moral community and protect them from exploitation that would imply they are not worthy of moral concern. For instance, agents would have a duty to protect non-human animals from cruel experimentation that promotes the exploitation of non-human animals, as well as denies them moral consideration.

I will respond to Korsgaard by appealing to Tom Regan's notion of preference autonomy, establishing a level of rationality for non-human animals that can provide them with a moral status equal to that of a moral patient, or those who are objects worthy of moral concern even though they lack mental capacities that moral agents possess. Once established as inherent moral patients, I will again appeal to Tom Regan's recognition that human moral agents have a duty to prevent the unnecessary suffering of moral patients inflicted by human beings. To not do so would be to neglect a moral agent's duty thus resulting in immoral action. This immoral action I

will denote as speciesist or discrimination based on a sentient being's mere species membership. Such discrimination calls into question both Cohen's and Korsgaard's claims, giving us reason to reject their cases against both Animal Welfare and Animal Rights respectively.

Part IV: Addressing Carl Cohen's Challenge

Carl Cohen disputes arguments against the use of animals in biomedical research. Cohen attempts to dismantle both animal rights and animal welfare views that oppose such research. Cohen's objections are based on the following: (1) a misunderstanding of a right and (2) a reliance on a mistaken calculation of consequences (Cohen, 865). Beginning with rights activists he addresses why animals have no rights. A right, according to Cohen, is a claim or potential claim one party exercises over another (865). The content of the claim can vary, as can the right holder: namely, the holder can be a single entity, such as an individual using "the fifth" in order to not self-incriminate in front of a police officer, or a community, such as students walking out of class to advocate for gun-reform. In these two instances, to comprehend rights fully, we must know who holds the right (accused persons, students), against whom it is held (police officer, government officials), and to what it is a right (right to not self-incriminate, right to freedom of speech) (865). Cohen goes on to argue that rights are claims or potential claims that are within a specific type of community: that of human moral agents and patients. Rights only arise and are possessed by beings who make moral claims against one another, according to Cohen, and this is only a capacity of human beings (865).

To bolster his claim Cohen turns to Kant who emphasizes humanity's possession of a moral will (or one's ability to confront moral choices and establish moral laws for themselves and others) (866). This awards human beings with the autonomy to make decisions when

confronted with moral laws or to self-legislate (866). Cohen claims that non-human animals lack the capacity for self-legislation or free moral judgement, therefore excluding them from the capacity to hold rights (866). Unlike non-human animals, human beings are able to recognize possible conflicts between their interests and decide what is just (866). According to Cohen, a being that is simply alive cannot derive rights from life in and of itself, as an animated being must possess the ability to assert free moral judgement (866). Therefore, humans are the only possessors of rights.

However, humanity is not morally free to abuse this higher moral status; in fact, Cohen believes we have obligations to animals. This is because those who possess rights also have obligations (866). According to Cohen, rights and obligations are not reciprocals; this is because obligations arise from internal commitments made (866). This can manifest in the form of a special relationship (a mother has the obligation to feed her son) or a difference in status (a boss has the obligation to pay his or her employee) (866). Obligation towards non-human animals is presented as doing no gratuitous harm to sentient creatures (non-maleficence) and/or to do good toward a non-human animal if in one's power (beneficence) (866). However, the distinction Cohen makes here is that treating non-human animals humanely does not equate to treating them as beings who possess rights and are subject to moral concern (866). To clarify, unlike Regan and Singer, Cohen's view of "humanely" permits animal suffering based on mere species discrimination (animal experimentation, factory farming, etc.) so long as it does not impede on a human's moral duty to other human beings.

Cohen addresses two objections to his present claim: (1) humans lacking the capacity for self-legislation, but still have rights, justifies the notion that rights exist without the presence of moral capacities. (2) These capacities, though Cohen awards them exclusively to non-human

animals, do not actually distinguish humans from other animals because animals reason (exhibit desires and preferences) and display features of moral relevance (rationality, interdependence, and love) (866). He responds to the first objection by explaining that the capacity for moral judgement is an essential feature of humanity (867). It is irrelevant whether someone is cognitively able to act on these capacities as it is inherent within human kind and as humans we possess such latent or active capacities (867). Persons unable to perform to the full moral function natural to humans are not ejected from their moral community (867). For instance, humankind can be subjected to experimentation only if they give consent, while animals are unable to do so because they are not of the kind that could ever have this capacity to consent.

Cohen addresses the second objection by stating that patterns of conduct do not allow animals to exist as a member in a community of moral agents. Actors in such a community are capable of moral judgement or grasping the “generality of an ethical premise in a practical syllogism” (867). According to Cohen, humans unlike non-human animals, are inherently equipped with the capacity to be able to discern by applying a moral rule to the facts of a case. Non-human animals are unable to be morally autonomous in this way, such as a wolf not being faced with discerning the rights of potential prey. Non-human animals are unable to grasp the internal and external dimensions of moral action and thus are not members of a self-legislating moral community; therefore, Cohen claims that animal rights arguments against biomedical research on animals rely on a false premise about the meaning of ‘inherent value’ (867). The issue for Cohen, as he puts it, is rooted in the notion of ‘kind’ (867). Unlike animal rights activists, Cohen believes inherent value (in the relevant sense) is an essential feature to humanity that non-human animals never have nor will possess (866). For instance, a wolf can neither be prosecuted for killing a baby rabbit or question the moral implications of killing a human infant.

In Cohen's view this moral rationality serves as the inherent value placed on humankind. A non-human animal cannot be obligated by or obligated to a moral action.

Transitioning to Animal Welfare claims against biomedical research on animals, Cohen argues against the welfare activists, who argue against his premise on the grounds of an animal's sentience or capacity to feel pain (867). According to Cohen, stating that non-human animal experimentation is wrong because of the net pain or absence of pleasure to the animal does not serve as an effective justification (867). Cohen argues that animal welfare advocates commit two errors: (1) a misconception that all sentient beings have equal moral standing and (2) assuming that the utilitarian calculus would not be in favor of animal research (867). He responds first to the claim that speciesism is parallel to racism in the way that it is wrong to give unjust moral preference to one species based merely on species membership or race over another (867). He states that unlike racists who do grave moral wrong because there is no morally relevant distinction among races, a speciesist recognizes the morally relevant difference between a human and non-human animal as they are not on equal moral standing (867). The ability to distinguish this difference promotes the right conduct necessary to recognize an individual's moral obligations (867). According to Cohen if the pains of a human and non-human animal count equally, then our society must conclude that rodents and humans possess all the rights that humans possess (867).

According to Cohen, the moral regard humans owe other humans is not the same as what humans morally owe non-human animals (867). For instance, a human obligation may be that a doctor needs to heal her patient, as a principle duty as one who possesses rights; the fulfillment of this obligation may require the sacrifice of animals (868). Therefore, a doctor who does not research on animals as a biomedical investigator would fail to do his or her duty if the research

would support the healing of a patient. Cohen's response to the second error addresses the extent to which biomedical research must weigh the benefits of research. He claims that unlike animal rights activists who can ignore the benefit of research (as it would violate an animal's inherent right), the animal welfare advocate must acknowledge the pleasures that are derived from using animals in research (as they believe all pain and pleasure are morally considerable) (868).

According to Cohen the elimination of disease, increased longevity, and the avoidance of pain that comes about as a result of animal experimentation has improved the lives of both humans and non-human animals, fixing the hedonic calculus in support of the long-term results of biomedical research (868).

Cohen's reliance on capacities stems from the deontological belief in a legislative will. Through a speciesist lens, this Kantian principle excludes non-human animals from being members of the moral community and instead views them as obligations. This obligation extends as far as it does not encroach on the duty of human beings, namely treating others with just and fair treatment. If a human killed every non-human animal he or she saw on the street this repeated action may one day translate to human beings. To mistreat animals intentionally for no benefit to humankind can demonstrate the potential to harm humans within the moral community that may be vulnerable, such as elderly, children, or other moral patients. On the reverse side, this obligation permits acts such as animal experimentation as the benefits to humanity are part of a moral agent's duty. By testing on animals those with a legislative will can advance the betterment of humanity.

Part V: Response to Cohen's Challenge

According to Cohen's logic, rights of non-human animals do not depend on the presence of moral capacities, but of their mere species. In this instance, a non-human animal is underserving of rights as their capacity, according to Cohen, is not performing at a full moral function natural to human moral agents. I am in agreement with him when he wants to extend the moral community to accept human moral patients, as would be Regan. However, when he excludes non-human animals from the moral community by labeling them obligations he is appealing to the prejudice of speciesism. Based on Cohen's views he would endorse the claim that humans can be subjected to experimentation as they have the innate capacity to give consent, while non-human animals are an obligation that can be experimented on as they do not have this innate capacity. This, however, is flawed, as those humans who we consider moral patients such as infants do not yet have the innate ability to give consent themselves. In this instance, it is not a capacity that has developed or may ever develop; awarding a capacity on the foundation of human potentiality is immoral. If there are two individuals one who will never have the capacity of moral reflection and one who lacks the mental ability to enact meta-cognition they are both unable to perform an action necessary to be considered a moral agent. Therefore, distinguishing the two solely based on mere species or perceived inherent capacities is morally impermissible.

A child may transition from infancy to adulthood, but this does not change the fact that a young child cannot consent to practices such as experimentation. In fact, children as moral patients require an adult to give that consent. A child gets their ability to consent from their parents, who are moral agents. This is an example of a moral agent fulfilling his or her duty to a moral patient, defending the patient's right to not suffer in the moral community. For instance, a mother would not consent to their child being tortured to find the cure for the common cold. The

same framework must be awarded to non-human animals. Non-human animals deserve the right to respectful treatment just like human moral patients, from which humans of agency have a duty to provide. Just as the child's consent is defended by their moral agent parents we as a species have a moral duty to defend non-human animals who, just as children, cannot provide consent to abusive experimentation. A human child and a non-human animal are both worthy of moral patient status as each play a role as a member of the moral community. To exclude non-human animals is appealing to speciesism, which does not amount to sound argumentation.

When considering experimenting on animals for biological research, the animal rights advocate, as seen above, would be against such practices as it violates the rights owed to a moral patient. The same conclusion is reached from an animal welfare perspective. Cohen's claim that there is a misconception that all sentient beings have equal moral standing is a misconstrued interpretation of an animal welfare's defense of non-human animals. According to Cohen if the pain of a human and non-human animal count equally, then this leads to the seemingly false conclusion that both are deserving of equal rights. As established above, being a moral patient or a moral agent awards the right to respectful treatment; however, a patient does not have the ability to give consent like an agent does. What Cohen fails to see is this: "The basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment; it requires equal consideration. Equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights" (Singer, 2).

Just as Regan established the rights of moral patients by appealing to the similarity of suffering (Regan, 183), Singer emphasizes that "[n]o matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering-insofar as rough comparisons can be made-of any other being" (Singer, 8). As Regan suggests,

recognizing the similar unjust pain or suffering endured by a human moral patient causes a moral agent to act from duty (Regan, 183) and expanded upon by Singer, this “comparison of suffering” promotes agents to act and protect non-human animals, thus is reason to disenfranchise animal scientific research (Singer, 8). Contrary to popular belief, research on non-human animals is detrimental to humans as well as non-human animals. Aysha Akhtar, Fellow at the Oxford Center for Animal Ethics states, “The use of nonpredictive animal experiments can cause human suffering in at least two ways: (1) by producing misleading safety and efficacy data and (2) by causing potential abandonment of useful medical treatments and misdirecting resources away from more effective testing methods” (Akhtar, 414). Due to the unnatural variables scientist impose on non-human animals (manufactured diseases and environments) and differences in biological framework, other animals are an unpredictable source to develop lifesaving scientific ingenuity. Therefore, to argue that such experimentation provides an overall greater net pleasure (human gain) than net loss (animal suffering) is a large assumption as the net loss includes the humans within society who receive ineffective treatments, causing financial and physical pain, constructed from species with different biological processes.

When Cohen claims that animal welfare advocates believe non-human animal research is wrong on the basis of net pain, he is misinformed. When faced with the question, “Would we be prepared to let thousands of humans die if they could be saved by a single experiment on a single animal?” (Singer, 81) Singer responds as follows: “If the experimenters would not be prepared to use a human infant then their readiness to use non-human animals reveals an unjustifiable form of discrimination on the basis of species” (82). According to Cohen’s logic, Singer should kill both the non-human animal and the infant as we have established that both are moral patients; however, just as speciesism would have us kill the non-human animal, Singer would not have us

kill the child or non-human animal. This is because Cohen's speciesist attitude has blinded him to the negative implications of his position. The animal welfare view would in this case appeal to rule utilitarianism. The rule in this instance would be to sacrifice thousands of non-human animals to possibly save one or more humans. However, as we established above, human suffering may arise from non-human animal experimentation. Therefore, the rule of killing several animals to possibly save one or more humans is both implausible and in the long run may increase the overall suffering of both humans and non-human animals.

Part VI: Addressing Christine Korsgaard's Challenge

Through the analysis and interpretation of Immanuel Kant, Christine Korsgaard argues that non-human animals are not rational beings, but instead are an obligation (in line with Cohen's notion of obligation) to humanity, thus presenting a view contrary to Animal Welfare and Animal Rights advocates. According to Korsgaard the utilitarian or Animal Welfare approach is flawed as it permits an individual to be sacrificed against his or her will if the interests of many are served by the sacrifice (Korsgaard, 80). This contradicts Korsgaard's deontological approach as it treats others as a mere means to an end, rather than an end in itself (80). This is because according to Kant's Formula of Humanity, it is morally impermissible to deny human beings autonomy. This autonomy is nonexistent if humans are used as a mere means to an end. This is justified because of the distinct rational nature of humankind (80). This rational nature is characterized by a human's capacity to govern themselves and utilize their autonomy for rational choice (80). To respect this autonomy, humanity must protect the autonomy of others by refraining from deception or coercion (81). This also involves the promotion of the ends of others when they require assistance; this leads to the Kantian idea of the "Kingdom of Ends"

(81). This can be illustrated in the form of a constitutional democracy, where humans have a legislative voice crafting moral laws (81). The utilitarian comparison between non-human animals on the one hand and infants, elderly persons, and the mentally disabled on the other are misguided (81). These particular conditions, according to Korsgaard or the Kantian conception, do not affect their standing as rational beings (81).

Non-human animals are not rational beings as they do not possess the same level of moral reflection necessary to fulfill a moral duty; therefore, they should not be awarded the moral status requiring them to be an end in themselves. Non-human animals form a conception of environment (belief) and guide themselves in the environment (action) (83). It is the action that is essential to the Kantian perspective as it involves an incentive and a principle; however, an incentive is the factor that causes an agent to act (84). Principles and incentives are a pair. However, in a non-human animal these principles are mere instincts (84). Animals respond normatively to the incentive, rather than the incentive causing the animal to act (84). An intelligent animal is one who has the ability to learn from experience, forge new connections or principles, and increase responses (84). However, rationality and intelligence differ for Kant (84). Rationality allows one to develop their self-consciousness, enabling individuals to think about and perceive beliefs as grounds to act (85). Intelligent non-rational animals, however, may be moved to believe one thing when perceiving another rather than internalizing a belief causing an animal to act (85).

According to Korsgaard making a causal connection between two things in the past is not equivalent to using one's rationality as a tool, determining whether or not to act (85). Rather, rational human beings assess the principles that govern our beliefs and actions (86). This enables individuals to assess if their maxim can become universal law (87). For instance, human beings

can employ metacognition to determine why we take certain reasons as a cause for our action or inaction in a given situation. Non-human animals are unable to do this and, according to Korsgaard, cannot perceive their principles, inhibiting the moral reflection necessary for rationality and a place within the moral community (87).

Kant categorizes non-human animals as beings that can be used as a mere means rather than an end in themselves (88). Humanity has the right to use animals for their ends but must refrain from torturing sentient beings, as it would only diminish the moral engagement between human beings (88). For instance, by torturing animals for no reason a moral agent may habituate action that goes against one's moral duty to other humans within the moral community. Our obligation toward non-human animals, according to Korsgaard's view, is centered around the effect of humanity or the cultivating of duties. Therefore, no moral consideration is directly awarded to the non-human animal. According to Kant if humanity were to award animals consideration amphiboly would arise or the natural tendency to mistake an internal relation for an external one supposing we owe something to non-human animals (90). Humans only have duty toward other human beings (91). Non-human animals lack the capacity to obligate human beings, since they do not possess a legislative will that is a criterion of a rational being and one deserving of moral consideration under the Kantian lens (92). In response to the animal rights viewpoint, humanity's autonomy puts individuals in a position to make demands for animal rights; however, this is not a sufficient reason for these rights to exist (100).

Part VII: Response to Korsgaard's Challenge

When considering the Animal Rights defense, I will begin my assessment by arguing against Korsgaard's claim that non-human animals are not rational and are thus underserving of rights. I

will do so by explaining the implications of two distinct senses of autonomy namely Kantian autonomy and preference autonomy. When considering Kantian autonomy or the autonomy awarded to those with a legislative will/moral reflection and the right to not be used as a mere means to an end, which is the foundation of rational choice, Tom Regan provides an alternative view from which animals possess full autonomy or preference autonomy (Regan 84-85). In the preference view individuals are considered autonomous “if they have preferences and have the ability to initiate action with a view to satisfying them” (84-85). Therefore, what Korsgaard considers “instincts” is insignificant to the preference view. An animal’s ability to initiate action from instinct does not require “one to be able to abstract from one’s own desires, goals, and so on, as a preliminary to asking what any other similarity placed individual ought to do.” (84-85). This form of meta-cognition is not necessary to possess preference autonomy. The existence of the Kantian sense of autonomy cannot deny a non-human animal from possessing preference autonomy; thus, non-human animals possess a level of rationality (84-48). An example of preference autonomy would be if you presented your pet dog, we will call him “Dexter”, the option of going outside during his 3:00pm feeding time or staying indoors to eat. Depending on Dexter’s choice he will demonstrate a preference for eating or running outside and thus will act in accordance to this decision, thus exhibiting behavior in line with preference autonomy (85).

Preference autonomy allows for a level of rationality that should be accepted as sufficient grounds to be members of the moral community. However, Korsgaard, using Kant’s view on indirect duty, positions what we owe to non-human animals as a secondary condition from which humans are able to fulfill their direct duty to other human beings (150). According to this a moral community only consists of those who are of direct moral concern or humanity. However, if this view were to be adopted we would remain in the cave of speciesism and continue to believe

shadows are real. Therefore animals, human and non-human, who lack the Kantian self-legislating will, must be categorized as moral patients. Moral patients are those who “cannot do what is right, nor can they do what is wrong. Only moral agents can do wrong. Human infants, young children, and mentally deranged or feeble of all ages are cases of human moral patients” (153). Similar to moral agents, moral patients can be on the receiving end of right or wrong acts of moral agents (154). According to Korsgaard if moral agents perform wrong actions against moral patients, a habit of cruelty is developed that is a detriment to the moral community. According to Regan, there is a resemblance between how a moral agent and moral patient react to wrong action; namely the suffering that is initiated causes anguish (Regan, 183). This similar suffering response thus prompts the question: “if the suffering is similar, and if causing it in the case of moral agents violates a direct duty owed to them, (as Kant allows), then how can we non-arbitrarily avoid the conclusion that causing suffering to human moral patients violates a direct duty owed to them?” (183).

According to Regan, if moral agents have a direct duty not to cause other human beings to suffer, then the same must be applied to human and non-human animal moral patients. However, Korsgaard may dispute this claim as a misinterpretation. In response, Regan would bring to light Kant’s inconsistency. If human moral patients are deserving of direct duties as ends, so are non-human animals as we have established that they are not obligations, but rather individuals deserving of moral patienthood (Regan, 184). To exclude non-human animals would be speciesist and thus would promote immoral action as a moral agent would be neglecting his or her duty to moral patients, “taking the form of declaring that no animal is a member of the moral community because no animal belongs to the right species-namely, *Homo sapiens*” (156). If we are to recognize the role of moral patienthood, non-human animals must be included – and with

that comes a direct duty moral agents owe all members of a moral community: namely the claim or right to respectful treatment as an individual with inherent value (276). This inherent value stems from the rationality given to non-human animals who express preference autonomy and thus have capacities deserving of moral patienthood.

Part VIII: Conclusion

When confronted by both Kristine Korsgaard and Carl Cohen's view on non-human animals as a mere obligation it is clear both are derivatives of speciesism. As we have established, non-human animals are rational beings deserving of equal consideration and/or inherent rights. With such rationality, awarded by preference autonomy, non-human animals deserve the status of moral patienthood and thus are members of the moral community. As rightful members of the moral community, non-human animals must be protected by moral agents who can ensure no needless suffering is placed upon them by human beings in violation of moral responsibilities. Since speciesism results in this violation of moral responsibility, each of us including myself must continue to question practices that involve non-human animals and consider how we can grow toward moral agents who effectively fulfill our duty to the moral community. Through further research philosophers can reinforce and define the role of patienthood amongst human and non-human animals, allowing each member to thrive within the moral community. We must look past the cave and toward the sun. Our speciesist attitudes blindside our moral responsibility, but through continual questioning we each can take a step toward a brighter future for all members of our diverse community human or non-human alike.

Section III – Impact of Framing Intervention Model on Animal Attitudes, Animal Rights, and Human Social Outgroups

“Once one has seen it {the Good} ...one must infer that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful in anything...it controls and provides truth and understanding; and that anyone who is to act sensibly in private or public must see it (Republic, 517c).”

Part I: Introduction

In Plato’s allegory of the cave, we all are imprisoned by ignorance; it is not until we open ourselves to diverse perspectives that we can see the Good or kindness, respect, and truth. In order to “act sensibly” in contemporary society, humanity must pursue the Good, by rejecting divisions in society that propagate ignorance such as racism, sexism, homophobia and other prejudices. This journey toward the Good begins by acknowledging the biases we have and discontinuing the unjust action associated with such prejudice. Speciesism, or the prejudicial attitude toward non-human animals based on mere species membership, is correlated with these forms of bigotry such as racism, sexism, and homophobia, fostering a society that can deviate from the Good (Caviola, Everett, & Faber, 2-3). The present research is designed to investigate the impact of an intervention aimed at reducing speciesism on biases against both non-human animals and humans. Speciesism is the normative claim that humans assign moral values to individuals based on mere species membership (1). This may be illustrated by finding the suffering of the non-human animal (a horse) as morally acceptable, while the same degree of suffering would be immoral to a human baby.

Speciesism is positively associated with the Social Dominance Orientation (SOD) and negatively associated with open-minded thinking and empathic concern (2-3). The Social Dominance Human-Animal Relation Model (SD-HARM) describes how the social ideological

beliefs that legitimize hierarchies among human groups also legitimize hierarchies of humans over non-human animals (3). An important piece of these hierarchies relates to whom moral concern should be applied. Moral concern is intervening when an individual suffers from actions rooted in prejudicial attitudes. For instance, intervening when a white supremacist discriminates against people of color or intervening when an individual subjects a non-human animal rabbit to harmful scientific research that would otherwise be condemned if performed on a human. Moral concern is important because it reduces and/or eliminates harmful actions stemming from prejudicial attitudes. Speciesism's positive association with (SOD) lowers the moral concern one may have for social outgroups (3). By an individual believing humans are superior to animals the belief that some humans are superior over other humans is legitimized (3).

To combat speciesist attitudes a study conducted by Brock Bastian, Kimberly Costello, Steve Loughnan, and Gordon Hodson, found that comparing humans to non-human animals reduces moral concern for animals but comparing animals to humans does the reverse (Bastian et al, 422). This is because comparing non-human animals to humans highlights the morally relevant capacities of non-human animals such as sense related capacities that are associated with the ability to suffer, whereas comparing to humans to non-human animals diminishes these morally relevant capacities (422). The impact of comparing non-human animals to humans (or vice-versa) on moral concern for non-human animals was demonstrated in Study 3 (Bastian et al.) by participants writing about either what makes animals similar to humans, what makes humans similar to animals, or what makes telephones similar to computers. Afterwards, a moral circle measure was completed indicating the animals the participant felt morally obligated to show concern for, followed by a measure of speciesism consisting of 10 questions from the Animal

Rights Scale and 10 items from the Animal Attitudes Scale, and a measure of moral concern determining the likelihood of taking a moral stand for a social outgroup.

However, it is important to replicate the afore-described study before deploying the essay-writing intervention in schools and organizations because the sample size is too small. Any estimate of effect size is imprecise when the sample is small. A p -value only tells us whether an effect exists, not how large it is. It is possible that the afore-described effect is too tiny to meaningfully reduce bias. According to g^* power statistical analysis software, a sample size of 218 provides enough power to detect effects at least as large as $d = .46$ which is considered small in psychology. A sample size of 109 only provides enough statistical power to detect effects at least as large as $d = .63$ which is considered medium in psychology. We predict that a replication of the essay-writing intervention with a larger sample size will demonstrate that a large effect exists that can reduce speciesism.

Part II: Overview of Study

The present research replicated Study 3 in the paper, *When Closing the Human-Animal Divide Expands Moral Concern: The Importance of Framing*, using animal to human framing to increase moral concern for animals and social outgroups with a larger sample (Bastian et al.). We hypothesized that “Animal to Human” framing compared to “Human to Animal” and control framing would increase moral concern for animals and social outgroups. We also predicted that an “Animal to Human” framing would increase positive attitudes toward animal rights, animals, and social outgroups. Replication was done in an effort to evaluate whether an increased sample size would have an overall effect on the power of framing results.

Part III: Method

Participants and Design

Participants will be both male and female, ages ranging from 18-24. Participants were undergraduate students at the University of North Florida who participated for course credit. Participants will be randomly assigned to one of three conditions (Animal is Human like framing, Human is Animal like framing, Control) in a between-groups design. After removing both Vegan/Vegetarians and those that spent less than 200 seconds on the study, the total amount of participants went from 244 to 193.

Procedure

Participants were informed that they would be participating in a study designed to learn about people's social impressions, in particular, what they think about animals. However, the true purpose of this study is to determine if an "animals-are-human-like" framing compared to a "humans-are-animal-like" framing attributes greater moral worth to animals. Participants were also told that this study's benefit will help the researchers learn about social impressions, in particular, what people think about animals; however, the true benefit is to determine if an "animals-are-human-like" framing compared to a "humans-are-animal-like" framing is an effective intervention model to reduce speciesism. The first task, serving as the independent variable, was an essay prompt. The participant is presented with one essay prompt out of the following three: "What makes animals similar to humans?", "What makes humans similar to animals?", and "What makes telephones similar to computers?"

Manipulation Check

After completing one of the randomized essays serving as the independent variable participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt animals are similar to humans (1= very much dissimilar to 7= very much similar).

Moral Circle Measure

To determine the number of animals in a participants moral circle they were asked to “indicate those animals that you feel morally obligated to show concern for.” Participants were presented with a list of 26 common non-human animals.

Animal Rights.

In order to measure moral concern for animals, participants completed the Animal Rights Scale. Questions included declarative statements that indicated if an individual attributed moral concern for animals. (e.g. Humans have no right to displace wild animals by converting wilderness areas into farmlands, cities, and other things designed for people.) The scale ranged from 1-Strongly disagree to 7-Strongly agree.

Animal Attitudes

In order to measure attitudes toward animal welfare generally, participants completed the Animal Attitude Scale. Questions included declarative statements that indicated the level to which a participant agreed or disagreed toward a statement indicating animal welfare attitudes (e.g. Basically, humans have the right to use animals as we see fit.) The scale ranged from 1 Strongly disagree to 7 Strongly agree.

Outgroup Moral Concern

In order to measure moral concern to social outgroups, participants completed a scale consisting of six social outgroups (Black people, Asians, Muslims, Aboriginals, Immigrants). The question indicates the participants likelihood of intervening or taking a moral stand on behalf of members of the social outgroups if “treated unfairly or badly” The scale ranged from (0=not intervene, 50=neutral, 100= definitely intervene)

Evaluation Thermometers

In order to measure how favorably participants felt toward social groups, participants completed a scale consisting of 11 social groups (Whites, Black people, East Asians, South Asians, Americans, Canadians, Mexicans, Europeans, Liberals, Conservatives, Animals). The question indicates how favorable do participants feel toward each social group. The scale ranged from (0=not favorable at all, 50=neither favorable or unfavorable, 100= extremely favorable)

Ascent of Humans

In order to measure how human like a social group seems, participants completed a Human Ascent scale consisting of six social groups (White People, Black People, Americans, Canadians, and Animals). The question indicates that people can vary in how human-like they seem. Some people may seem highly evolved whereas others may seem no different than lower evolved beings. Using an image of the evolution of man participants indicate using the sliders on a scale of 0 to 100 how evolved he or she may consider the average member of each group to be. 0=quadrupedal human ancestor while 100=full modern-day human.

Part IV: Results

Animal Dependent Variables were measured in an attempt to determine whether or not the independent variables would have an effect on a person attributing moral concern for non-human animals.

Manipulation Check

To investigate the impact of the essay participants wrote on how similar are animals to humans, I conducted a one-way ANOVA with types of essays as in the independent variable and similarity of animals to humans (manipulation check) as the dependent variable. The type of essay did not have a significant effect on support for animal rights, $F(2, 191) = 1.33, p = .270$.

Moral Circle

To investigate the impact of the essay participants wrote on the number of animals included in a person's moral circle, I conducted a one-way ANOVA with types of essays as in the independent variable and number of animals in moral circle as the dependent variable. The type of essay did not have a significant effect on expansion of one's moral circle., $F(2, 185) = 1.57, p = .210$.

Animal Rights.

To investigate the impact of the essay participants wrote on support for animal rights, I conducted a one-way ANOVA with types of essays as in the independent variable and support for animal rights scale as the dependent variable. The type of essay did not have a significant effect on support for animal rights, $F(2, 191) = 1.48, p = .230$.

Animal Attitudes

To investigate the impact of the essay participants wrote on attitudes toward animals, I conducted a one-way ANOVA with types of essays as in the independent variable and animal attitudes as the dependent variable. The type of essay did not have a significant effect on animal attitudes, $F(2, 191) = 2.07, p = .130$.

Human Dependent Variables were measured in an attempt to determine whether or not the independent variables would have an effect on a person attributing moral concern for non-human animals.

Moral Concern all Outgroups, all Members of Outgroups Excluded.

I conducted a one-way ANOVA with essay type as the independent variable and measures of moral concern to all outgroups as the dependent variable. The type of essays did have a marginal effect on the way participants viewed human outgroups, $F(2, 191) = 2.16, p = .080$. A t -test demonstrated that participants who wrote about how similar animals are to humans ($M = 85.96$) had more moral concern for all human outgroups compared to participants who wrote about how similar humans are to animals, $M = 79.99, t(127.11) = 1.73, p = .043$. However, participants who wrote about how similar animals are to humans ($M = 85.96$) and how similar telephones are to computers ($M = 86.81$) did not differ in their moral concern for all human outgroups, $t(118.33) = -0.26, p = .602$.

Feeling Thermometers, No Outgroup Participants

To investigate the impact of the essay participants completed on attitudes toward social outgroups, I conducted a one-way ANOVA with types of essays as the independent variable and feeling thermometer scores as the dependent variable. The type of essay did not have a

significant effect on feeling thermometers, $F(2, 123) = 1.51, p = .230$. Notably, participants who were members of the target outgroups were excluded from this analysis.

Ascent of Humans: Black people, Black Participants Excluded

To investigate the impact of the essay participants performed a how evolved participants believe Black people are, I conducted a one-way ANOVA with types of essays as in the independent variable and the how evolved participants believe Black people are as the dependent variable. The type of essay did have a significant effect on viewing Black people as more evolved when excluding Black participants in test, $F(2, 160) = 3.23, p = .040$. A t -test demonstrated that participants who wrote about how similar animals are to humans ($M = 91.76$) and how similar humans are to animals ($M = 90.46$) did not differ in how evolved they viewed Black people, $t(126.73) = .4473, p = .327$. However, participants who wrote about how similar animals are to humans ($M = 91.76$) viewed Black people as more evolved compared to participants who wrote about how similar telephones are to computers, $M = 96.20, t(89.98) = -2.0493, p = .021$.

Part V: Discussion

The results suggest that with a slightly larger sample size the effect of the framing model was not significant. Therefore, “Animal to Human” framing is not a viable intervention model to implement in schools or for a universal population in an effort to increase moral concern for non-human animals. There were inconsistencies between this study and the original that may have resulted in a different pattern of results. The first being with the demographics: student participants in our study were from the United States whereas students in the original study were from Canada. The variance in culture may have affected the way participants understood the framing model, resulting in different p values amongst dependent variables.

The second inconsistency was using a different operationalization of speciesism. The original study used 10 questions from the Animal Rights Scale and 10 questions from the Animal Attitude Scale, but we used the complete version of each scale. We did this because the original study did not specify the questions used and we wanted to measure each scale as a separate dependent variable.

Notably, the effect of the framing model on moral concern for social outgroups was significant in the original study and marginal in the current replication. The present study also added on two additional dependent variables evaluating the effect of “Animal to Human” framing on social outgroups. The additional variables are as follows: an additional feeling thermometer evaluating how favorable a participant feels toward a variety of social outgroups, as well as the human ascent scale measuring how evolved participants view select social outgroups. The impact of the intervention was marginal on these new variables.

It was also consistent that in both studies the “Animal to Human” framing did not differ significantly from the control condition when evaluating moral concern. With the addition of the Human Ascent scale we also discovered a marginal *p* value suggesting that when participants completed the “Animal to Human” framing they viewed black people as more evolved.

The implications of the present study suggest there are some marginal effects of the framing model on social outgroups; however, with the primary goal of increasing moral concern for non-human animals the framing model would need to be the subject of more scientific research. As animal ethics is a relatively new topic in both psychology and philosophy the present research provides another interpretation of an intervention model with the aim at increasing moral concern to non-human animals, as well as expands on existing studies in this field. With further research the effects of the present “Animal to Human” framing can be shown

as more significant or a new intervention model can be tested that may prove more effective for increasing participants moral concern toward non-human animals, while reducing speciesist attitudes that diminish the moral concern individuals have toward non-human animals. By continuing to question present research and expanding on the field we can dispel the ignorance of bigotry and pursue the Good promoting justice, kindness, and compassion.

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