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“Dreadful Scenes of Carnage on Both Sides”

*The Strangford Files and the Eastern Crisis
of 1821–1822*

THEOPHILUS C. PROUSIS

Lord Strangford, an experienced diplomatic official with previous postings to Portugal, Brazil, and Sweden, served as Britain’s ambassador to the Sublime Porte from 1821 to 1824, an especially turbulent time in Ottoman-European encounters. As the Ottoman Empire coped with a series of challenges, Strangford sent hundreds of reports to the London Foreign Office. His correspondence detailed the state of the sultan’s realm at a tense but pivotal moment in the Eastern Question, that precarious web of European power, rivalry, and intrigue in the remarkably resilient Ottoman Empire, which still possessed strategic lands and vital waterways in the Levant, or eastern Mediterranean. Rebellion broke out in the Danubian principalities, the Peloponnese, and other Greek-inhabited regions of the Ottoman Empire. War between Russia and Turkey loomed, largely over Ottoman actions that abrogated Russian-Ottoman treaties. Ottoman restrictions disrupted European trade. Politics clashed with religion. Sectarian abuse and violence deepened the



Portrait of Percy Clinton Sidney Smythe, 6th Viscount Strangford, 1820-24. (reprinted with permission from the Trustees of the British Museum)

Greek-Ottoman divide. Administrative disorder heightened public uncertainty, government factions contested the sultan's rule, and border disputes sparked hostility between Turkey and Persia.

The virtually untapped Strangford treasure trove, located in the National Archives, Kew, UK, provides an invaluable resource on Ottoman domestic and foreign affairs, European interests in the Near East, and Greek stirrings for national independence. The Strangford files, much like the Dashkov papers in Russian archives, hold potential riches

for scholars working in Ottoman, Mediterranean, borderlands, and especially Eastern Question history.¹ Against the backdrop of an intensifying crisis in the Near East, Strangford chronicled a volatile situation from Constantinople, the epicenter of the upheaval. The messy realities at the core of this unfolding cataclysm featured the escalating cycle of Greek-Ottoman fighting and reprisal; the Ottoman massacre of Greek residents on Chios; the discord among Greek rebels; the debates among Ottoman officials about military and administrative reform; and the dogged efforts of European envoys like Strangford to pacify the Greek uprising and reduce Russian-Ottoman tension.² Britain's ambassador probed all these ramifications, along with the predictable matter of British trade in the troubled Levant. His communiqués also recounted his persistent attempts to persuade the Porte to evacuate Ottoman troops from the Danubian principalities, to appoint new *hospodars* or governors, and to remove Ottoman impediments against Black Sea and Mediterranean shipping.

Strangford's description of these topics sharpens our view of the complex nature of the Eastern Question in the early nineteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire faced internal and external pressures spawned by war, revolt, administrative breakdown, and European intervention. Archives and manuscripts like the Strangford collection widen our approach to the Eastern Question, from a purely great-power military, naval, and diplomatic rivalry to a more varied and dynamic contest. European strategic, commercial, religious, and other objectives entwined with the unpredictable circumstances of the Ottoman Empire. By relating specific episodes of janissary unrest, Greek sedition, economic dislocation, and public insecurity, the writings of Strangford elucidate not just the overlapping problems at the crux of the Eastern Question but also the human element at the grassroots, institutional, and policy-making levels of Ottoman society. Rich in texture and detail, these snapshots depict commercial disruption, sectarian strife, administrative disorder, and foreign meddling in the embattled Ottoman East.

The Greek revolution, which erupted in the Danubian principalities and spread to the Morea, Attica, Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Aegean Archipelago, triggered an Eastern emergency with European-wide repercussions. The established order of legitimacy confronted the principles of liberty and nationality, and the unrest morphed into the prolonged Greek conflict.³ This struggle drained Ottoman resources and revenues; stoked dissension among factionalized Greeks; provoked outside intervention that resulted in an independent Greek kingdom;

and inspired incendiary outbursts in Europe, Russia, and the Balkans. The Greek uprising also eventually led the Porte to accelerate its program of centralizing reforms for the purpose of modernizing the empire.⁴ Already in the opening months of the disturbance, European envoys and consuls had to cope with the seemingly intractable realities of the Eastern quandary: the flare-up of sectarian strife, the dislocation of trade, the upsurge in piracy, and the risk of war between Russia and Turkey, especially after the Russian legation severed official ties with the Porte and left Constantinople in the summer of 1821.

In taking measures to crush the Greek mutiny, the Porte infringed on specific articles in Russian-Ottoman treaties and thus antagonized official relations between the two empires. Reprisals against the Greeks, most notably the execution of Ecumenical Patriarch Grigorios V in April 1821, breached the Porte's promise in the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji (1774) to shelter the faith and churches of Ottoman Orthodox Christians.⁵ Trade obstacles seemingly contravened Russia's right of unimpeded merchant navigation in the straits, guaranteed by Kuchuk Kainardji and the Treaty of Commerce (1783). The Porte's dismissal of the *hospodars* of Moldavia and Wallachia, accusing them of abetting the agitation, undermined the sultan's imperial decree of 1802, and subsequent stipulations in the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), sanctioning Russian consent in the appointment and deposition of *hospodars*. Facing strong public clamor for intervention on behalf of persecuted Greeks, and despite urgent calls by high-ranking officials for military action to rectify broken treaties, Alexander I upheld the order of legitimacy. The tsar deplored the rebellion as a menace to Europe's peace and security and to the principles of monarchical solidarity and political stability; he also advocated the Porte's swift suppression of the disorders before they engulfed other regions. At the same time, the tsarist regime requested the strict observance of treaties, intent on using them as instruments for exerting pressure on Turkey.

The Foreign Ministry's dual approach of censuring the revolt but insisting on complete compliance with treaty accords became the basis for Russian policy in 1821. Russia's ambassador in Constantinople, Grigorii Aleksandrovich Stroganov, rebuked the insurrection but remonstrated for Orthodox brethren, protested violations of trade clauses, and counseled moderation and restraint in Ottoman treatment of non-insurgent Greek Christians.⁶ For a host of reasons, however, the Porte strongly suspected Russian complicity in the turmoil: Russia's past wars against Turkey; its self-proclaimed guardianship of Orthodox

Christians under Ottoman rule; its generous support of Greek migration to southern Russia, in particular the distribution of land grants and tax exemptions to Greek settlements in recently annexed Ottoman territories; and its extensive network of Greek protégés in Black Sea and Aegean commerce. Furthermore, Greek merchants in Odessa participated in the national ferment that produced the Philiki Etaireia (Society of Friends), the secret society that launched the insurgence of 1821. Founded in Odessa (1814) and headquartered in Kishinev, this conspiratorial organization recruited members and monies from Greek centers in Russia and came under the leadership of Alexander Ypsilanti, a Greek general in the Russian army and an aide-de-camp of the tsar. Also, Russia refused to extradite rebels who fled to Bessarabia, in particular the *hospodar* of Moldavia, Michael Soutso, who joined the Philiki Etaireia and took part in the Ypsilanti upheaval.⁷ Treaty provisos crumbled not just because of the Porte's plausible, but mistaken, accusations of the Russian government's entanglement in the subversion but also because of the outbreak of sectarian rage in Constantinople, Smyrna, and elsewhere. Ironically, treaties that sought to maintain cordial ties between Russia and Turkey and safeguard Russian activities in the Near East did neither.

In an ultimatum delivered to the Porte on 6/18 July 1821, Russia demanded the evacuation of Ottoman troops from the Danubian principalities, the restoration of damaged churches and religious properties, the protection of Orthodox Christians, and the guarantee of commercial rights. If the sultan did not accept these terms, Russia would have to offer asylum and assistance to all Christians subjected to "blind fanaticism."⁸ The expiration of the Russian note's prescribed eight-day deadline without the Porte's full compliance, followed by Ambassador Stroganov's departure from the Ottoman capital, severed official relations between Russia and Turkey, the two realms most profoundly affected by the uproar of 1821. Thus began a strange twilight period of no war yet no peace. Alexander I proved reluctant to act unilaterally without the sanction of the Concert of Europe and dreaded the prospect of a Russian-Turkish clash that would disrupt the status quo, incite revolts elsewhere, and jeopardize the balance of power in Europe. Firmly committed to the Concert of Europe, the tsar suspected that a Jacobin directing committee in Paris had instigated trouble in the Balkans. Yet the Eastern quagmire thickened, Greek-Ottoman fighting intensified, Russian-Ottoman affairs festered, and treaty vows shattered amid war and revolution in the Levant.

Britain remained neutral in the Greek-Ottoman feud of 1821 yet pursued its own strategic, political, and commercial ends. Above all, Foreign Secretary Castlereagh resolved to avert war between Russia and Turkey, to maintain the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against the perceived peril of Russian expansion, to extend British trade in the Levant, and to safeguard Britain's protectorate over the Ionian Islands.⁹ All these objectives framed Lord Strangford's responses to the Eastern predicament. Despite his considerable skill, finesse, and energy in striving to calm Russian-Ottoman antagonism and to mollify the Greek havoc, he remains a controversial figure. As the chief representative of British policy in the Near East, he chided Stroganov for his harsh tone toward the Porte and falsely implicated several tsarist officials, including Russia's ambassador, in the subversive Philiki Etaireia. Yet Strangford worked tirelessly with his European and Ottoman counterparts to neutralize a dangerous situation, to shield Orthodox Christians, and to reestablish tranquility in Moldavia and Wallachia. He became convinced that the Porte's timely restoration of order, most notably the safekeeping of sacred shrines and the evacuation of troops from the Danubian principalities, would forestall Russian-Ottoman hostilities. Through steadfast negotiation, Strangford and his colleagues sought to prevent a great-power war and to defuse the Greek insurgency.¹⁰

Along with his foreboding of a Russian-Ottoman confrontation, Strangford registered concern over the impending danger of anti-Greek reprisals—what he termed “atrocious and sanguinary proceedings” and “a spirit of relentless fanaticism.” Attacks against Greek Christian property and churches became all too palpable to the British envoy, who bemoaned “the prolongation of that system of sanguinary persecution.”¹¹ Violent incidents heightened the mood of disquiet and trepidation in Constantinople, especially at European embassies, obviously caught off guard when the sultan ordered the execution of Constantine Mourousi, an Ottoman Greek who served as grand dragoman (interpreter or translator) of the Porte. The death of the ecumenical patriarch and other church hierarchs amplified the perceived sectarian character of the Greek-Ottoman collision.¹² Strangford's dispatches portrayed an escalating Eastern flashpoint, fueled largely by the danger of partisan slaughter in the capital and other embattled areas. With indelible images and scenes, his writing evoked the religious wrath and nationalistic ferocity that prolonged, as well as exemplified, the Greek-Ottoman fight. Random and deliberate violence, retribution and excess, by both Greeks and Turks, took place in Moldavia, Constantinople, Smyrna,

Aivali, and Tripolitsa. A progression of retaliation and vengeance exacerbated the Eastern emergency, magnified the human cost of the conflict, and made diplomatic mediation all the more difficult and imperative.

Perhaps the most infamous of these outrages occurred on the island of Chios. The Chios catastrophe epitomized both the folly and the fury of the Greek revolution, eliciting horrific reminders of fire and sword memorialized in Eugène Delacroix's edgy *Massacre at Chios* (1824), the expressive painting that inspired European sympathy and support for the Greek cause. Located only five miles from the Turkish mainland, Ottoman Chios enjoyed relative autonomy, prospered economically, and blossomed into a commercial hub, perhaps the richest island in the Aegean, perfectly situated along the main shipping routes in the Levant. Renowned for its physical beauty, mild climate, fertile soil, and resourceful population, and supposedly the birthplace of Homer, Chios featured merchant-funded schools and hospitals and a printing press that produced new editions of the ancient Greek classics. When a band of misguided adventurers from nearby Samos landed in March 1822 and raised the flag of liberation, most Chioties remained skeptical; they understandably feared that Samiote foolhardiness and bravado might jeopardize their coveted autonomy and prosperity. Cautious Chioties questioned the prospect of successful rebellion, given their island's proximity to Turkey and its distance from the main Greek naval base at Hydra. Fears became reality when the Ottoman navy approached in April 1822. The Samiote “liberators” fled to the mountains or to their awaiting boats, leaving Chios to a bitter fate of plunder, savagery, and slavery. Ottoman regular and irregular forces exacted a terribly high price in retribution, looting and burning the island, slaughtering unarmed residents, and enslaving thousands. Massacre, captivity, and flight greatly diminished the island's Greek population, from nearly 120,000 to some 20,000.¹³

Throughout these mounting pressures during the opening two years of the crisis, Strangford counseled restraint and caution. He rebuffed Ottoman complaints that the tsarist regime stood behind the Ypsilanti expedition. He advised the Porte to put its trust in the tsar's revulsion of revolution. He protested the execution of the patriarch. And he repeatedly tried to assuage the anger and resentment that incited further atrocities by the belligerents. Far from disloyal to Stroganov, he echoed his Russian colleague on several crucial issues yet criticized his provocative demeanor and language, such as Stroganov's sweeping assertion

that Russia had the right not just to protect the sultan's Christian subjects but to denounce the Ottoman Empire's existence as "incompatible with the stability and security of the Christian faith."¹⁴ Although Strangford did not succeed in thwarting a rupture in Russian-Ottoman relations, he exhorted the Porte to observe the strict letter of existing treaties—by withdrawing Ottoman troops from the Danubian principalities, by repairing damaged churches, and by protecting Greek Orthodox subjects.

The narratives of Strangford reflect the advantages and limitations of primary sources written by Europeans in the Ottoman Islamic world in the early nineteenth century. Their commentaries conveyed conventional Western views of the Ottoman Empire, perceptions that stigmatized the Ottoman other with occasional distortion, bias, and exaggeration. Envoys and consuls—and not just British representatives—depicted Ottoman officialdom in a mostly negative light, accenting episodes of oppression and abuse by pashas, janissaries, and customs officers. Many of these authorities, portrayed as rapacious, corrupt, and arbitrary, interfered in the administration of European diplomatic and commercial concessions—the capitulations—and thus complicated European-Ottoman interactions. Through their anecdotes and choice of words, Western records alluded to commonly accepted European images of the Ottoman Empire, fast approaching what became known as "the sick man of Europe" in Western political discourse and popular opinion.¹⁵

Yet the dispatches excerpted here elucidate some of the essential benefits of Western firsthand testimony on the Eastern Question. Strangford relied on a circle of sources, gathering intelligence from merchants, travelers, protégés, consuls, and dragomans; from high-ranking as well as regional Ottoman officials; and from other European envoys. Sifting through these different accounts, the ambassador chronicled what he deemed the most critical realities in Constantinople, the geopolitical heart of the Ottoman Empire, and addressed a range of topics beyond the political and diplomatic facets of the Eastern crisis. Moreover, given Strangford's access to highly placed authorities in the central government and their protracted deliberations, his correspondence sheds light on how Ottoman officialdom perceived and reacted to the Greek sedition. The very specificity and urgency of his reports deepen our understanding of the multiple issues, such as sectarian friction and religiously tinged Russian-Ottoman tension, which marked an age of upheaval in the Ottoman Levant.

Documents

These passages introduce readers to the various concerns that not only preoccupied Strangford but characterized Eastern Question diplomacy during the Eastern crisis. Document 1 suggests the intrigue and duplicity that accompanied European dealings with Ottoman court favorites and influential advisers of the sultan. Selections 2 and 3 highlight the crux of Strangford's overarching task: to defuse Russian-Ottoman tension and avoid war between Russia and Turkey. Documents 4, 7, 8, and 10 demonstrate the prominence of commerce in Eastern Question negotiations during this troubled period, especially in view of the disruption of trade caused by the Greek revolt. Selections 5 and 9 deal with the Chios massacre, while document 6 focuses on the festering problem of orderly governance in the Danubian principalities. All these sources are located in the Foreign Office holdings of the National Archives, Kew (TNA FO).¹⁶ When the manuscript has a word or phrase underlined for emphasis, I have retained the original format. In most matters of wording, grammar, punctuation, and citation of numbers, I have retained Strangford's format, including his archaisms and inconsistent spellings. All explanatory material in brackets is mine.

1. TNA FO 78/106, FF. 14-16,
10 JANUARY 1822 (NO. 3) (SECRET)

[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the possibility of influencing Halet Efendi, the main adviser and close confidante of Sultan Mahmud II, by a bribe.]¹⁷

Among the means which have occurred to my colleagues and to me, as likely to influence the Turkish policy in the present crisis, the employment of a sum of money has more than once been under consideration.

That Halet Efendi, the sultan's sole favourite and principal adviser, is accessible to corruption, is as certain as that his power over his imperial master is unbounded. A negotiation of this nature (supposing it to be previously authorized by Your Lordship) would of course require the utmost delicacy and circumspection. But it does not appear to be impracticable, or unlikely to be successful.

The fear of the janissaries is (confidentially) admitted by the Turkish government as a chief reason for their delay in completely evacuating the Principalities and in nominating the *hospodars*.

On this ground, the offer of money might be made to Halet Efendi. He might be told, that immediately on orders being given for the removal of the troops, and on the publication of a decree appointing the *hospodars*, a sum would be secretly placed in his hands, to be applied, at his sole discretion, to the purpose of quieting any opposition or discontent which those measures might excite among the janissaries.

Halet Efendi is too wealthy to be tempted by an inconsiderable offer. Perhaps one thousand purses, or between twelve and thirteen thousand pounds sterling, though in itself, a large sum, would not be considered by the allied cabinets as bearing any proportion to the expenditure of treasure which a war between Russia and Turkey might hereafter impose upon the governments of Europe.

2. TNA FO78/106, FF. 204-12A,
25 FEBRUARY 1822 (NO. 27)

[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the British ambassador's conference with Ottoman ministers on the demands submitted to the Porte by the tsarist regime.]

My conference with the Turkish ministers took place at the house of the *reis efendi* [Ottoman foreign minister] on Saturday the 16th instant.

It was originally intended by the Porte that this meeting should be of a private and confidential character; but in consideration of the important interests which it involved, I requested the Turkish ministers to consent that it should be conducted in the most formal and official way. . . .

Your Lordship will perceive that in the absence of any late instructions from His Majesty's government, I regulated my language according to the more recent intelligence which my colleagues had received from their respective courts, founded upon their knowledge of the intentions of Russia in case the Porte should not accede to her demands with regard to the Principalities.

The intelligence thus received, left no room to doubt that a further resistance to the Russian demands would be followed by war; and that the month of March would be the term of the emperor's forbearance.

On this point my conference principally turned—peace, and the active good offices of the allies for the future, in case the Divan should accede to the Russian propositions—war, and the cessation of all friendly intervention on the part of the allies if it should refuse, or delay to admit them.

In placing this alternative before the Turkish ministers, with all possible frankness, though at the same time, with all the conciliatory forms of friendship, I could hardly avoid making use of language which I fully expected would have been ill-received by Ottoman pride.

But I was completely mistaken. Everything which I uttered was placed to its true account; the friendly part which England was acting, seemed to be thoroughly and gratefully felt; and on no previous occasion did I ever experience such marked attention—such perfect amenity—and such invincible, I might say, such provoking good humour. It was difficult to avoid entertaining a suspicion that they had already made up their mind to grant what I demanded—that they were resolved to keep this determination a secret—and that they were amusing themselves with the anxiety and agitation under which they saw me evidently labouring.

There were none of those offensive allusions, upon this occasion, with which the language of the Turkish ministers formerly abounded—and no insolent reference was made to the union of the Koran and the sabre, or to the irresistible might of an Empire armed in defence of its religion.

The result of the conference may be summed in a very few words. The Russian demands were admitted in the most unequivocal manner, and a solemn promise to execute them with the least possible delay, was given, together with a declaration that the Divan was seriously occupied in actually carrying them into effect. But no positive term for the accomplishment of this engagement was appointed.

Were we to judge merely from the text of those assurances, it would certainly seem that little real progress had been made in the negotiation. But I cannot avoid thinking that I have gained much more than appears on the face of the protocol. To say nothing of the tone and manner of the Ottoman ministers, and of the various favourable indications which they presented, it is quite impossible for me to suppose that such language as that which was held to them, in the name of the king of England, can be altogether without effect. The confidence which this government places in His Majesty, and in the friendship of Great Britain, is certainly greater than that which it is disposed to shew towards any other of the allies; and I have every reason to hope that such full credit is given to us for the disinterestedness of our advice, as will ensure its being finally and speedily accepted.

But I have other grounds on which to found these hopes. Private assurances have been repeatedly sent to me, since the day of my

conference, by some of the ministers with whom I am in more confidential relations (particularly by the *kapudan pasha* [grand admiral of the Ottoman navy]), that all matters would be settled to my satisfaction—but that I must allow the government to do things in its own way.

3. TNA FO 78/106, FF. 252-55,
25 FEBRUARY 1822 (NO. 29)

[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the issue of direct negotiations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.]

Your Lordship will perceive from the report of my last conference, that there is no immediate hope of inducing the Porte to accede to the very desirable proposition of opening a direct negotiation with Russia. The unconquerable feeling of Turkish pride will stand in the way of such an arrangement, and the pretence, that, as they were not the first to break the ordinary relations between the two governments, they are not called upon to be the first to renew them, will, I apprehend, be obstinately adhered to. At all times, the reluctance of the Turks to engage in negotiation at a distance from the seat of their own government, has been notorious, and I do not imagine that there is anything in the present question, which will induce them to relinquish that system of habitual distrust which characterizes them.

If the virtual admission of most of the demands of Russia (which we may consider as having already taken place), and the fair and honest execution of those which yet remain to be fulfilled, should be considered by the emperor of Russia as sufficiently re-establishing the state of things which existed previously to the departure of his minister, it is only to His Imperial Majesty's magnanimity that we can look for the renewal of the direct official intercourse between the two governments. I should deceive Your Lordship were I to indicate the slightest hope that the first step towards it, would be taken by the Porte. But I think that in still further satisfaction of His Imperial Majesty's dignity, it would not be found impossible to procure from the Porte, if not a positive request, at all events, the expression of a strong wish that a Russian minister should be sent to Constantinople. The principal difficulty in the way of a negotiation to obtain such a declaration from the Porte, would be the individual exception with which they would most probably seek to accompany it, and which would (perhaps with reason) be considered as offensive to the emperor's dignity.

This government has certainly manifested of late, a wish to have it generally understood that it was on the point of renewing its official relations with Russia, and the language now held upon this subject is very different from that which prevailed some time ago. There is a very wealthy and respectable corporation of Turkish merchants . . . who trade with the Black Sea. These persons presented a memorial to the Porte on the 21st instant, respecting a valuable ship belonging to them, which the crew, composed of Greeks, had carried into Odessa, and sold to a Russian merchant there, at the beginning of the rebellion. The *kiahya bey* [Ottoman minister of the interior] told them, in reply, to have a little patience, and that as soon as matters were settled with Russia, their ship would undoubtedly be restored to them. This assurance not appearing to satisfy the merchants, Gianib Efendi, who was present (and who of all the Turkish ministers is the least likely to make any declaration of a pacific tendency), added—"Matters are now almost finally adjusted. I pledge myself that in one month, or in six weeks at furthest, a Russian minister will be here, and the two governments will be better friends than ever."—The satisfaction with which this intelligence was received by the public, among whom it was speedily circulated, must have proved to the Ottoman ministers (if indeed they could have had any doubt on the subject) the unpopularity of a Russian war, and the desire of all the wealthy and respectable classes for the preservation of peace with their mighty neighbour.

4. TNA FO 78/107, FF. 142-44A,
10 APRIL 1822 (NO. 47)

[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the steps taken by the Porte to repress the abuses of foreign-flagged vessels.]¹⁸

The Turkish government continues to employ very strict measures to repress those abuses of foreign flags which have so long prevailed here, to the great disgrace of such missions as have converted them into a source of pecuniary profit.

Although the right of the Porte to investigate the nationality of the ships which enter and depart from this harbour cannot be disputed, its ignorance of European forms and usages, often leads it into wrong modes of applying a principle, otherwise perfectly justifiable in itself. Frequent disputes arise in consequence between the government and certain of the foreign ministers—and it is to be lamented that some of the latter should occasionally forget that they are called upon at this

moment to watch over higher and more important interests, and should exhaust their time and their temper in paltry squabbles, and in seeking to defend cases which could not be justified according to any navigation code in Europe.

The missions to which we are indebted for the trouble and vexations now imposed upon our trade, are those of Naples, Denmark, and Holland. The *chargés d'affaires* of these courts have long made a public traffic of their national flags, which became at length so notorious as to rouse the attention of the Porte, and to induce her to establish a system of scrutiny, of which the inconveniences are general in their operation upon all the missions at this residence, even upon those against which no accusation has ever been urged.

Nor is it only with reference to our commerce and navigation that we have to complain of the prejudices which the respectable part of the *corps diplomatique* now suffer in consequence of the improper behaviour of the three *chargés d'affaires* already mentioned. The Porte seeks to retrench many of the immunities which we have enjoyed from time immemorial, on account of the flagrant abuse of them committed by some of the individuals whom we are unfortunately compelled to consider as our colleagues. I allude particularly to the right of importing wine for the use of our families. This privilege is now a daily subject of contention with the Porte, owing to the dishonourable conduct of M. Navoni, the Neapolitan agent, who has made prodigious sums of money by lending his name to the publicans of Pera, whom he has thus for several years supplied with liquors, on a fixed and most profitable percentage. The whole conduct of this man is a perpetual scandal—and I speak the sentiments of every mission here, which has the slightest regard for its own honour, when I say that it is a disgrace to the court of Naples that such a person should be charged with the conduct of its affairs, and should be permitted to prostitute the name of a public minister, in such a shameful manner as we have lately witnessed.

5. TNA FO 78/107, FF. 227-30,
25 APRIL 1822 (NO. 55)

[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the Ottoman attack on Chios and the recapture of that island by the *kapudan pasha's* fleet.]¹⁹

The Turkish expedition against Chios has been successful.

We are yet without complete details of this transaction, but from all that can be collected, it seems to have been productive of dreadful scenes of carnage on both sides.

On the first appearance of the *kapudan pasha's* formidable fleet, the Greeks who were stationed between Chesme, on the mainland, and Chios (to prevent the troops assembled at the former place from crossing over), cut their cables, and effected their escape, leaving Chios to its fate.

This circumstance enabled six thousand of the Chesme troops to join the *kapudan pasha*, who, on the 11th instant proceeded to summon the insurgents to surrender, offering pardon to all who should lay down their arms, and giving them eight hours to consider . . . his proposals.

The insurgents rejected this offer—and instantly attempted to carry the castle by escalade, thinking that they could effect that object, and secure themselves in the fortress before the *kapudan pasha* could have time to disembark his troops. In this they were mistaken—they were vigorously repulsed by the garrison, and in the meanwhile, the *kapudan pasha* landing about nine thousand men, and the former making a sortie, they were enclosed between two fires; lost all their artillery, amounting to twenty pieces, which was speedily turned against them, and after a short and most bloody resistance, took to flight, and were pursued in all directions. It is said that the loss on both sides amounts to fifteen thousand men. No quarter was given after the action. Every person taken with arms in his hands was instantly put to death. The women and children have been thrown into slavery. Previously to the action, and on the first appearance of the fleet, the Catholic inhabitants had shut themselves up in their convent. They have been protected by the *kapudan pasha*, who has stationed a guard for their security, and who has received numbers of them on board of his fleet, where they are treated with the utmost kindness. The Catholic Greeks have, as Your Lordship is aware, never taken any part in the insurrection, and, as well at Chios, as in all the other islands, have constantly maintained their allegiance to the sultan.

The *kapudan pasha* has left a considerable body of troops on the island, who will, I fear, pursue the work of destruction to the very utmost. The Samiote Greeks, whose unfortunate expedition to Chios has been the cause of the calamity which has overwhelmed that once happy and flourishing island, took no part in the combat, and basely fled to Psara,

hastily embarking on the side opposite to that where the Turkish troops landed.

The *kapudan pasha* is said to have proceeded to the Morea, with the intention of attacking some of the insurgent islands in his way.

I have the honour to enclose a translation of the placard which accompanied the exhibition of heads, standards, and other trophies, sent to the Porte by Vahid Pasha, the governor of Chios.

6. TNA FO 78/108, FF. 50-59,
10 MAY 1822 (NO. 70)

[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the nomination of the new *hospodars* and the proposed changes in the administration of the Danubian principalities.]²⁰

At the council held on Monday, . . . [the] question of nominating the new princes [*hospodars*], and of choosing them from among the native boyars, was proposed to the *ustaas* [officers] of the janissaries who were present, and unanimously approved. The slight offered to the Greek nation by this selection, has more than any other cause, induced the janissaries to approve of the nomination of princes being carried into effect. Had the choice of the government fallen upon Greeks, I am convinced that the janissaries would have resisted to the very utmost.

In truth, the policy of the Porte seems now to be decided; and its resolution to reduce the Greek nation to a state of absolute nullity, may be considered as irrevocably fixed. That *imperium in imperio* [empire within an empire, or state within a state] which had made such silent but rapid progress during the last thirty years, will exist no longer. The great source of Greek influence, and with it, of that hitherto exercised by Russia, will now be cut off, by the employment of Turkish subjects as the future dragomans of the Porte, and by the selection of natives to govern the two Principalities. Some observations which were lately made to me on this subject by one of the most intelligent Turks I have hitherto known, are perhaps not unworthy of Your Lordship's attention.

"What has Russia gained," he asked, "by precipitating the Greek affair? For that it originated in the hopes held out by her ministers at St. Petersburg, and her agents in Turkey, no man who has his eyes and ears, can for a moment doubt. However, praise be to God, that she acted as she did. But for the conduct of her consuls in the Archipelago, and the intemperance of her minister here, in hurrying matters to an extremity, we should have gone on in a false and fatal security. The

Greeks would have, slowly perhaps, but surely, appropriated to themselves, the entire government of this Empire. In commerce and in affairs of state, they were already all powerful, and nobody among us had begun to suspect the gradual encrease of their influence. Had this state of things gone on for thirty years more, we should have been lost. Russia has done us a great service without intending it. She held a lever in her hands, with which she could at any time, have shaken this Empire to the foundation. It is now broken. She has (also without meaning it) rendered us another service. The powers of Europe have taught her, that she cannot make war upon us under flimsy pretences. I was in the ministry when the Holy Alliance was proclaimed; and when all my colleagues were frightened by it, I said, that if the sovereigns of Europe acted up to their word, the Holy Alliance would, one day, be our barrier against Russia. If I am not now in the ministry, it is owing to what I then said, and to the indignation with which it was received. But I was in the right. Had it not been for that alliance, which has now proved to Russia that she is but one, and the other states of Europe are many, we should have ere now been fighting against Russia for the possession of Constantinople. This result was not foreseen by Stroganoff [Stroganov] when he sought to excite his government against us. The Russian influence here is no more. She will again seek to exert it, under pretence of settling the affairs of the Principalities, and of restoring to them the blessings of peace and good order. But we mean to deprive her of this pretence. We shall anticipate her, by our new arrangements for the relief of Wallachia and Moldavia; and when her minister returns here, he will find that everything is done, and that he has no excuse for meddling in our affairs."

Your Lordship may depend upon the fidelity with which the above observations are reported.

7. TNA FO 78/108, FF. 167-69A,
10 JUNE 1822 (NO. 85)

[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the British embassy's successful resistance against the Porte's endeavor to search British ships in the harbor of Constantinople.]

Your Lordship is aware that many of the most essential of our commercial privileges here, do not depend upon the positive letter of our treaties with the Porte, but are derived from the stipulations of those subsisting between Turkey and Russia, inasmuch as the

arrangement concluded in 1802, placed us upon the footing of the most favoured nation.

Whatever advantages therefore are accorded to Russia by treaty, we have a right to claim, even though they should not be specifically provided for in our own capitulations.²¹

Among the new arrangements established by the Porte for the purpose of preventing the abuses in foreign navigation which have been detected here, is the practice of causing ships to be visited at the moment of their departure, by the officers of the Porte, in order to ascertain whether the cargoes correspond with the manifests.

This new regulation has hitherto been exercised with great severity, and has been the subject of loud and violent complaints on the part of the foreign merchants.

By the 55th Article of our capitulations, the right of the Porte to make this visit or search on board of our ships is clearly admitted. But on the other hand, in her treaty with Russia, this right is as positively abrogated, as far as the navigation of that power is concerned.

Conceiving that we are entitled, in virtue of the arrangement of 1802 to every advantage possessed by Russia, I have strenuously resisted the claim set up by the Porte, to examine our ships, demanding for them, the same exemption which is accorded to those of Russia.

This attempt on my part was attended with considerable difficulty, as all the other missions here had yielded to the pretensions of the Porte, and had admitted her right of searching the ships of their respective nations.

I will not trouble Your Lordship with the details of a negotiation, which has occupied me almost incessantly for the last three weeks, and I confine myself to a communication of its successful result, as announced in the accompanying official report from my first dragoman [Francis Chabert].

The British navigation in this port is now placed upon a footing quite distinct as far as relates to the right of search, from that of any other nation. I am very unwilling that we should be exposed to the jealousy likely to arise from this circumstance, but as one of my first duties here is to assist our commerce, I cannot think that I ought to reject any exemption from inconvenience which I may be able to procure for it, from a principle of delicacy, because other missions may not have succeeded in obtaining it for their respective countries. If it were [a] question of any positive and exclusive favour to our commerce, I

certainly should not think it worth being purchased at the price of the discontent of my colleagues, but as the present arrangement relates merely to relief from a great and serious inconvenience, I conceive that I am bound to do all that I can in behalf of my countrymen, without any tenderness for the jealous feelings of merchants belonging to other nations.

8. TNA FO 78/108, FF. 261-64,
25 JUNE 1822 (NO. 97)

[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the *reis efendi's* confidential proposal on commercial matters.]

I have the honour to transmit a copy of an unexpected communication which has been made to me by the *reis efendi*.

After stating that the restrictive measures which have lately been adopted by this government with regard to foreign commerce, are aimed prospectively at Russia, and destined to prevent the navigation of the Greeks from being carried on almost exclusively under the flag of that country—and after renewing his promise that the British trade should continue to be exempted from the effects of the new regulations, the *reis efendi* expresses the wish of this government that the commerce of its *reaya* [tax-paying Orthodox Christian] subjects, hitherto conducted under Russian protection, should be transferred to Great Britain. He adds to this (sufficiently obscure) proposal, a request that I would concert with him as to the means of carrying the dispositions of the Porte into effect, in such a way as to be reciprocally beneficial to England and to Turkey.

Even were this overture likely to be advantageous to our commerce and navigation (which it certainly is not), I am persuaded that Your Lordship would not conceive the present to be a proper moment for accepting from the Porte any invidious distinction in our favour.

But while I act in conformity to what I presume will be Your Lordship's opinion, by declining to avail myself of the *reis efendi's* proposition, I feel persuaded that I am not sacrificing any real advantage to the commercial interests of His Majesty's subjects. Their navigation does not require any new stipulations to support it, for the political circumstances of this Empire have, of themselves, been sufficient to place it in a more flourishing condition, and to give it a greater extension [than] it ever before possessed. The Greek carrying trade is extinct, or

more properly, the greater part of it is now lodged in our hands or in those of the Ionians. It seems therefore better to leave matters as they are, and to suffer our commerce to profit by the natural course of events, without seeking to foster it by new arrangements between the two governments.

In this opinion, I have desired M. Chabert to thank the *reis efendi* for his communication; adding, however, that it was only valuable to me as a mark of His Excellency's confidence and of his good-will towards the nation with whose interests I am charged—but that I did not see how the proposal which he had made to me, could be turned to the advantage of either country. I observed, moreover, that discovering in this overture a sincere proof of his desire to favour our commerce, it would encourage me, when a proper opportunity occurred, not to make new demands in behalf of it, but to invite him to define and settle certain rights (with reference in particular to our Black Sea trade) to which we had an undoubted claim, but which had either lapsed into oblivion, or had never hitherto been recognized with sufficient precision by the Ottoman government.

9. TNA FO 78/108, FF. 303-07,
26 JUNE 1822 (NO. 101)

[Strangford to Castlereagh re: naval clashes off Chios between Greek and Ottoman ships.]

The [Austrian] internuncio [Rudolf von Lützow] having delayed the departure of the post until this day, I am enabled to have the honour of reporting to Your Lordship that most unwelcome and disastrous intelligence has arrived from the Turkish fleet before Chios.

On the night of Wednesday last, the Greeks attacked the *kapudan pasha's* vessel (a three-decker) and two other ships of the line, with their fire ships. The crews of the two smaller vessels of the line succeeded in extinguishing the flames, but the admiral's ship was blown up, and the *kapudan pasha* perished, together with all his officers and crew. The body of the *kapudan pasha* was picked up, floating on the sea, and was interred at Chios on the following day.

I sent M. Chabert to the Porte early this morning, to ascertain from the *reis efendi* the truth of this intelligence, a rumour of which had reached me last night, but in such a vague manner that I did not report it in my dispatches to Your Lordship. The *reis efendi* fully confirmed the

particulars which I have related as above; and though deeply affected with the disgrace thus brought upon the Ottoman arms, endeavoured to assume an appearance of the utmost indifference.

The loss of the finest and largest vessel in the Turkish fleet, and of the only commander of any skill in naval matters whom this government possessed, must undoubtedly be a cause of the greatest mortification to the Porte—while it will proportionally augment the audacity of the Greeks. I dread the exasperating effect which this affair may have on the public mind at Constantinople and Smyrna, and still more those measures of barbarous policy to which this government will too probably have recourse for the sake of calming it. Nor can I look without apprehension to the unfavourable influence which this disaster may have on the progress of the negotiation, which I had flattered myself was so near to a successful termination.

10. TNA FO 78/110, FF. 18-25,
3 SEPTEMBER 1822 (NO. 145)

[Strangford to Castlereagh re: Russia's demand for the retraction of Ottoman regulations on navigation in the Black Sea.]

It appears that the Russian government has invited the British and Austrian missions at St. Petersburg to propose to the internuncio and to me, the employment of our joint efforts for the purpose of procuring from the Porte the abrogation of the system on which she is now acting with respect to foreign navigation.

The Russian government, while it admits that these regulations are justified by the enormous abuses which have been committed here, and that they contain nothing contrary to treaty, discovers in them, notwithstanding, a clear indication of an unfriendly if not a decidedly hostile disposition towards Russia, on the part of the Turkish government.

The regulations of the Porte respect those nations which have not acquired by treaty the right to navigate in the Black Sea. The Turkish ministers say that this privilege was granted to those nations who enjoy it, either in consequence of a war, at the end of which the Porte yielded it, or of some amicable negotiation at which an equivalent for it was granted by the other contracting party—that the Porte is ready to concede the navigation of the Black Sea to those powers who are willing to negotiate, and to grant a fair compensation for it in some

shape or other, but that she will not suffer those powers to defraud the interests of the Porte, by surreptitiously availing themselves of an advantage for which other states have been content to pay.

This is the principle on which the Porte is now acting. Its attention to the question of foreign navigation, has been provoked by the multiplied and scandalous abuses of foreign flags which have prevailed in the chanceries of the Dutch, Danish, and Neapolitan missions—abuses, which I am obliged to say, have been equally injurious to the interests of the Porte and disgraceful to the legations which have practised them.

That Russia in particular has no just ground of complaint against these regulations, may be inferred both from the fact that since the departure of her minister, the navigation of bona fide Russian vessels has been constantly respected, and has never been interrupted, but also from the indulgence which the Porte, in the very face of those regulations, has extended to vessels which have no right to be considered as Russian. In August last, a number of Genoese and Sardinian vessels arrived here under the Russian flag, with the intention of proceeding to the Black Sea. Their owners being apprehensive of a Russian war, changed their flag for that of France, which M. de Viella, the French chargé d'affaires, accorded to them. Under that flag they accordingly proceeded to the Black Sea; on their return from which, every one of them, on their arrival at Constantinople, was permitted by this government to resume the Russian flag, under which they had originally sailed, and to which they were in point of strict right, as little entitled as to that of France, or of any other country except their own.

I do not therefore perceive on what ground Russia is (at least for the present) justified in complaining against the new regulations of the Porte; nor how I can charge myself with the office of supporting these complaints.

But there is, moreover, another consideration of which, as long as it shall be my first duty to watch over British interests, I must not permit myself to lose sight. The restrictions of the Porte with respect to the navigation of other countries, have produced such a sudden and extensive effect in favour of that of Great Britain, and the British shipping interests in the Levant have been so greatly benefitted by their operation, and by the exclusion of, what may be termed interlopers, from the trade of the Black Sea, that I can hardly venture to do anything which may disturb the progress of these advantages, without Your Lordship's express commands.

NOTES

1. I am compiling four volumes of Strangford's dispatches from his ambassadorship at the Porte (1821–24). Volumes 1 and 2 have already appeared: Theophilus C. Prousis, *Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte (1821): The Eastern Crisis* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2010); idem, *Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte (1822): The Eastern Crisis* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2012). Excerpts from these works can be found in Theophilus C. Prousis, "Eastern Orthodoxy under Siege in the Ottoman Levant: A View from Constantinople in 1821," *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* 24/25 (2008/2009): 39–72; idem, "British Embassy Reports on the Greek Uprising in 1821–1822: War of Independence or War of Religion?," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 28 (2011): 171–222. For biographical information on Strangford (1780–1855), see Prousis, *Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte (1821)*, 326. On the Dashkov collection in the Russian State Historical Archive, St. Petersburg, and its importance for studying imperial Russian activities in the Near East, see Theophilus C. Prousis, *Russian-Ottoman Relations in the Levant: The Dashkov Archive*, Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, no. 10 (Minneapolis: Modern Greek Studies Program, University of Minnesota, 2002). Dmitrii V. Dashkov (1784–1839), an adviser at the tsarist embassy in Constantinople from 1817 to 1823, inspected Russian consulates in the Levant, visited sacred sites on Mount Athos and in Palestine, and recorded his observations on Greek and Ottoman affairs in a variety of proposals, memoranda, and dispatches.

2. The Eastern crisis of the 1820s forms part of the larger canvas of internal and external challenges that destabilized and thus restructured the Ottoman Empire in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. See Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged* (Harlow, England: Pearson Longman, 2007), 180–342; Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1923* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 289–446; Suraiya Faroqhi, ed., *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 3, *The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Frederick F. Anscombe, ed., *The Ottoman Balkans, 1750–1830* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2006); Fikret Adanir and Suraiya Faroqhi, eds., *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography* (Leiden: Brill, 2002). European consuls often described the state of the Ottoman Empire during these unsettled times. See Theophilus C. Prousis, *British Consular Reports from the Ottoman Levant in an Age of Upheaval, 1815–1830* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2008); G. L. Arsh, *Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii: Osvoboditel'naia bor'ba grecheskogo naroda v nachale XIX v. i russko-grecheskie sviazi* (Moscow: Nauka, 1970); 29–76; Eleutherios Prevelakis and Kallia Kalliataki Mertikopoulou, eds., *Epirus, Ali Pasha, and the Greek Revolution: Consular Reports of William Meyer from Preveza, 2 vols.*, *Monuments of Greek History*, no. 12 (Athens: Academy of Athens, 1996).

3. On the Greek revolution, see Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 285–305; David Brewer, *The Greek War of Independence: The Struggle for Freedom from Ottoman*

Oppression and the Birth of the Modern Greek Nation (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2003); Petros Pizanias, ed., *The Greek Revolution of 1821: A European Event* (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2011); Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle for Independence, 1821-1833* (London: Batsford, 1973). For a recent Russian perspective on the Greek awakening, based largely on Russian and Greek sources, see Olga E. Petrunina, *Grecheskaia natsiia i gosudarstvo v XVIII-XX vv.: Ocherki politicheskogo razvitiia* (Moscow: KDY, 2010), 100-222. The Greek revolt exerted a profound impact on great-power politics and diplomacy in the Near East. For this European, including Russian, perspective on the Eastern quagmire of the 1820s, see M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923* (London: Macmillan, 1966), 1-77; Paul Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 614-21, 637-64; idem, *Metternich's Diplomacy at Its Zenith, 1820-1823* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962), 164-94, 223-25; A. V. Fadeev, *Rossiiia i vostochnyi krizis 20-kh godov XIX veka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1958); G. L. Arsh and V. N. Vinogradov, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia na Balkanakh 1815-1830 gg.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1983), 127-295.

4. With the benefit of Ottoman archives, several scholars have examined the effect of the Greek uprising on Ottoman reforms of administrative and military institutions and on the ruling hierarchy's exposure to such secular concepts as nation, citizen, liberty, and national independence. See the studies by Hakan Erdem: "'Do Not Think of the Greeks as Agricultural Labourers': Ottoman Responses to the Greek War of Independence," in *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, ed. Faruk Birtek and Thalia Dragonas (New York: Routledge, 2005), 67-84; idem, "The Greek Revolt and the End of the Old Ottoman Order," in Pizanias, *Greek Revolution of 1821*, 257-64. Also see Nikos Theotokas and Nikos Kotaridis, "Ottoman Perceptions of the Greek Revolution," in Pizanias, *Greek Revolution of 1821*, 265-73; Vitalii Sheremet, "The Greek Revolution of 1821: A New Look at Old Problems," *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook* 8 (1992): 45-55.

5. The landmark Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji (1774) ended Ottoman hegemony over the Black Sea region and marked imperial Russia's emergence as a Near Eastern power. In addition to the commercial, consular, and territorial concessions granted to Russia, the treaty stipulated that the sultan would protect Orthodox Christians in the Aegean Archipelago, the Danubian principalities, and western Georgia. The tsarist government subsequently, and speciously, declared that this pledge gave Russia leverage to interfere in Ottoman affairs on behalf of all Orthodox Christians. On this significant but controversial treaty, see Prousis, *Russian-Ottoman Relations in the Levant*, 5-7, 142; Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 157-60*; Jacob C. Hurewitz, ed., *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*, 2nd rev. ed., 2 vols. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975), 1:92-101; Roderic H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 29-59. On the treaty's impact on the Greek national awakening,

see the essay by G. L. Arsh, "Gretsiia posle Kiuchuk-Kainardzhiiskogo mira," in *Istoriia Balkan: Vek vosemnadtsatyi*, ed. V. N. Vinogradov (Moscow: Nauka, 2004), 445-66.

6. On Russia's official policy toward the Greek uprising of 1821, in particular the tsar's delicate balancing act between upholding legitimacy and intervening on behalf of Greek coreligionists, see Theophilus C. Prousis, *Russian Society and the Greek Revolution* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), 26-30, 185-87; idem, *Russian-Ottoman Relations in the Levant*, 25-27; Barbara Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 49-75; I. S. Dostian, *Rossiiia i balkanskii vopros* (Moscow: Nauka, 1972), 196-238; Fadeev, *Rossiiia i vostochnyi vopros*, 36-91; V. I. Sheremet, *Voina i biznes: Vlast', den'gi, i oruzhie; Evropa i Blizhnii Vostok v novoe vremia* (Moscow: Tekhnologicheskaiia shkola biznesa, 1996), 218-86; Alexander Bitis, *Russia and the Eastern Question: Army, Government, and Society, 1815-1833* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 104-21, 161-67.

7. On these various connections between Russia and the Greeks, see Prousis, *Russian Society and the Greek Revolution*, 3-24; Arsh, *Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii*, 129-76, 200-222, 245-96; G. L. Arsh, *Grecheskaia kul'tura v Rossii XVII-XX vv.: Sbornik statei* (Moscow: Institut slavianovedeniia RAN, 1999); Iu. D. Priakhin, *Greki v istorii Rossii XVIII-XIX vekov: Istoricheskie ocherki* (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2008); I. Nikolopoulos, *Greki i Rossiiia XVII-XX vv.: Sbornik statei* (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2007). Precisely because of these deep-seated Russian-Greek ties, the Ottoman government suspected Russia's direct involvement in the Greek agitation.

8. The tsarist ultimatum of 6/18 July 1821 appears in print in Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX v.: Dokumenty Rossiiskogo ministerstva inostrannykh del*, 17 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1960-2005), 12 (1980):203-10. The old-style Julian calendar, used in Russia until 1918, lagged twelve days behind the new-style Gregorian calendar in the nineteenth century.

9. On British policy under Foreign Secretary Castlereagh toward the Greek insurgency and the larger Eastern crisis in 1821-22, see Charles Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822: Britain and the European Alliance*, 2nd ed. (London: G. Bell, 1934), 349-86; Charles W. Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1833* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930; repr., New York: H. Fertig, 1973), 17-42; V. N. Vinogradov, *Velikobritaniia i Balkany: Ot Venskogo kongressa do Krymskoi voiny* (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), 31-55, for a Russian view of Castlereagh's policy.

10. On Strangford's efforts at the Porte, see the essay by Allan Cunningham ("Lord Strangford and the Greek Revolt") in Allan Cunningham, *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution: Collected Essays*, ed. Edward Ingram (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 188-232; Radu R. Florescu, *The Struggle against Russia in the Romanian Principalities: A Problem in Anglo-Turkish Diplomacy, 1821-1854* (Iași: Center for Romanian Studies, 1997), 109-12, 123-47; idem, "Lord Strangford

and the Problem of the Danubian Principalities, 1821–24," *Slavonic and East European Review* 39, no. 93 (1963): 472–88; Crawley, *Question of Greek Independence*, 17–22; W. David Wrigley, *The Diplomatic Significance of Ionian Neutrality, 1821–1831* (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), 156–62, 166–69, 177–86; Irby C. Nichols Jr., "Hellas Scorned: The Affair of the Ambassadorial Address to the Greeks, 1821," *East European Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (1975): 279–92. For a more nuanced and complete picture of Strangford's observations and negotiations, see the first two volumes of my Strangford compendium, cited above in note 1.

11. Prousis, *Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte (1821)*, 68–69, 77–78.

12. On the executions and other excesses in Constantinople, see Brewer, *Greek War of Independence*, 103–11; Christine M. Philliou, *Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 71–73, 85–86, 91, 210–13; Robert Walsh, *A Residence at Constantinople*, 2 vols. (London: F. Westley and A. H. Davis, 1836), 1:308–20.

13. On the Chios disaster, see Brewer, *Greek War of Independence*, 154–67, largely based on the contemporary diplomatic accounts, including some of Strangford's writings, published in Philip P. Argenti, ed., *The Massacres of Chios Described in Contemporary Diplomatic Reports* (London: John Lane, 1932). Also see William St. Clair, *That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the War of Independence*, 2nd rev. ed. (Cambridge: Open Book, 2008), 78–81, 227; Helen Long, *Greek Fire: The Massacres of Chios* (Bristol, England: Abson Books, 1992), 9–113; Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914; The Emergence of a European Concept and International Practice* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 66–72; Gary J. Bass, *Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention* (New York: Knopf, 2008), 67–75. Philip Mansel, in *Levant: Splendour and Catastrophe on the Mediterranean* (London: John Murray, 2010), 50, writes: "Chios was the first Levantine paradise to be destroyed. The Greek island which least wanted independence suffered most because of it."

14. Prousis, *Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte (1821)*, 137–41.

15. On the views of European travelers, consuls, and other visitors who recorded their observations of the Ottoman Levant in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Allan Cunningham, *Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century: Collected Essays*, ed. Edward Ingram (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 72–107; Prousis, *Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte (1821)*, 43–44, 335. On British literary and travelogue descriptions of the Ottoman Empire in particular, see Gerald Maclean, *The Rise of Oriental Travel: English Visitors to the Ottoman Empire, 1580–1720* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); idem, *Looking East: English Writing and the Ottoman Empire before 1800* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Filiz Turhan, *The Other Empire: British Romantic Writings about the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Christine Laidlaw, *The British in the Levant: Trade and Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Tauris, 2010). Tsar Nicholas I coined the term "sick man" when

contemplating the Ottoman Empire's imminent demise. See Orlando Figes, *The Crimean War: A History* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2011), 105; Trevor Royle, *Crimea: The Great Crimean War, 1854–1856* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 10, 26.

16. See Prousis, *Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte (1822)*, 27–28, 62–67, 92–93, 105–6, 126–29, 149–50, 166–67, 174–75, 231–33.

17. Strangford's correspondence in 1821–22 (see the many references in the first two volumes of my Strangford project) made frequent reference to this prominent Ottoman official. As a close adviser to Mahmud II, Halet Efendi (Mehmed Said) supported the sultan's political drive to restore centralized absolute rule and to curb the powers of *ayans*, or provincial notables, in Anatolia and the Balkans. In organizing some of the military expeditions against regional chieftains, Halet sought to strengthen his own antireform base among the janissaries and their allies and to eliminate contenders for power in the provinces. While he ardently backed the suppression of Ali Pasha's revolt, he worked against the sultan's proposed military reforms. A target of growing criticism because of Ottoman military setbacks in the Peloponnese in 1821, Halet Efendi eventually fell from favor in the sultan's inner circle. Exiled from the capital, Halet Efendi was executed on the sultan's orders in late 1822. See Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 430–31; Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 285–89, 314; Philliou, *Biography of an Empire*, 43–44, 54–59, 75–77, 96–99, 103; Brewer, *Greek War of Independence*, 103, 109, 166.

18. The topic of abuses committed by European-flagged merchant vessels in the Ottoman East belongs to the larger story of the capitulations—the capitulatory agreements between the Porte and European powers, including the numerous irregularities and misuses that became part of the capitulatory system in Ottoman-European relations. For an overview, with the relevant bibliography, see Maurits H. van den Boogert, *The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls, and Beratlis in the 18th Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2005); Prousis, *British Consular Reports from the Ottoman Levant*, 15–22, 103–5, 127–28, 167–68, 229–32.

19. This report appears in Argenti, *Massacres of Chios*, 11–12.

20. Strangford made abundant reference to the status of the Danubian principalities during the Eastern turmoil, focusing in particular on the evacuation of Ottoman troops and the appointment of new *hospodars*. The disturbances of 1821 prompted the sultan to replace Greek Phanariote governors with *hospodars* drawn from native boyars in Moldavia and Wallachia. See Philliou, *Biography of an Empire*, 65–104; Florescu, *Struggle against Russia in the Romanian Principalities*, 124–42.

21. On British capitulations in the Ottoman Empire, see Hurewitz, *Middle East and North Africa*, 1:34–41, 189–91.