Role Tension in the Academy: A Philosophical Inquiry into Faculty Teaching and Research

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Role Tension in the Academy: A Philosophical Inquiry into Faculty Teaching and Research

by

Nicolas Antione Michaud

A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Education
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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This Dissertation titled The University Divided: Understanding the Conjoined Faculty Roles of “Teacher” and “Researcher” is approved:

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Dean of the Graduate School
I would like to dedicate this work to all of my students. I hope that someday I will teach them as well as they teach me.
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to understand the conjunction of faculty roles as teachers and as researchers. This understanding is pursued through philosophical analysis. Discourse ethics, in particular, is used as a framework by which to best understand the roles played by faculty and if the roles of teacher and researcher are, in fact, commensurable. The purpose of the work is two-fold: 1) to develop a construct that may be used by future researchers to better understand the roles played by faculty, and 2) to suggest a best-construct that enables future researchers to propose how actual lived roles should be instantiated in the world.

The dissertation reviews a series of university handbooks, professional association ethical guidelines, and philosophical arguments to establish how the roles of faculty are best understood. The investigation illuminates the tensions at the heart of faculty roles. This tension is not definitionally embedded in the roles of faculty as teacher and researcher. Rather, the tension emerges from the failure of institutions to fully actualize faculty roles as normatively grounded in human communicative interaction. As a result, the work suggests that in order to best resolve the cognitive dissonance that may be experienced as a result of role ambiguity, faculty should engage in a process of self-reflection and community dialectic in order to best determine how “faculty” can be actualized in a way that best benefits all stakeholders.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Chapter 1 lays out the motivation of the project as a means by which to understand that shifting roles of faculty as teacher and researcher as a result of the pressures applied to those roles by shift in the university paradigm to that of a “diploma market.” The chapter justifies the project’s research questions through an investigation of research that suggests both: 1) The university has already been radically redefined in its purpose; and 2) This redefinition is potentially harmful to both students and faculty. In order to understand this redefinition and its conceptual implication for faculty roles, two research questions presented later in the chapter emerge. Those questions suggest that this project is meta-analytical, potentially challenging the epistemology of educational research itself. In order to best answer these research questions in a way that acknowledges the self-reflexive nature of the work within the educational research paradigm, philosophical analysis, particularly discourse ethics, is an apt methodological approach. As the work will seek to understand and examine the emergent norms that emerge from the communicative actions of our conceptual role theoretical dialectic, it is the work of philosopher Jurgen Habermas that is best suited for the analysis. Thus, the chapter will introduce the project as both a descriptive and normative project that will use Habermas’ work as the philosophical methodology.

Background and Contextualization of the Issue

The university, as an institution in the U.S., is crumbling, according to some observers (Readings, 1996). This collapse of the institution, argued theorists like Readings (1996), Slevin...
(2001), and Carter (2004), is the result of a fundamental paradigm shift in the way society engages education. The shift of which they spoke is the result of the corporatization of the university (Carter, 2004; Readings, 1996). Noam Chomsky, in a 2013 lecture, argued that this corporatization may result in “converting schools and universities into facilities that produce commodities for the job market, abandoning the traditional ideal of the universities: fostering creative and independent thought and inquiry, challenging perceived beliefs, exploring new horizons and forgetting external constraints” (Chomsky, 2013). This privatization, which Chomsky defined as “privatization for the rich [and a] lower level of mostly technical training for the rest,” is something he argued is happening “across the country” (Chomsky, 2013). Given the heavy emphasis on standardization, STEM, and assessment that seems ever increasing, there is good reason to believe that Chomsky is right: public education in the United States is becoming increasingly oriented towards the generation of “productive citizens.” Simply, it seems that the goal is not the generation of those who, through participation in a “liberal” education—as argued by Dewey (1900), Bialostosky (1991) and Nussbaum (1998)—are an informed electorate, but, rather, the generation of workers who participate actively in the economy by both providing goods for that economy and purchasing goods through that economy. It should be noted that while the first notion of education requires that the electorate be well-informed regarding its own welfare and best interest, the second does not.

The shift towards privatization as we see it today may well have its origins in the economic troubles of the 1970s. A Carnegie Commission report, *The New Depression in Higher Education* by Earl F. Cheit, reported numerous concerns regarding post-secondary education and funding. According to Zumeta, Breneman, Callan, & Finney (2013),
The basic problem was that the cost of educational production was rising faster than institutional revenue, as the sharp funding increases of the 1960s began to slow, while the growth and expansion of faculty, staff, and programs continued apace. At about this time, the labor market for PhD’s, which had witnessed high demand relative to supply in the 1960s, suddenly had an excess supply in many fields. (p. 67)

As a result, the 1970s saw a great deal of argument regarding the question of, “To whom should the cost and burden of education fall?” Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980 saw a shift away from the general paradigm that the fiscal involvement of the government helped to alleviate social ills. The general notion that privatization can solve social problems became popular and remains popular today. As a result, the school choice movement (Ravitch, 2010) has gained much popularity, arguing that education best benefits from parents’ ability to choose to send their children to schools that are “most successful.” This idea of success, of course, requires assessment—an increasing concern since the publication of A Nation at Risk. Education as a whole, therefore, has been under increasing pressure to demonstrate measurable value (St. John, Daun-Barnett & Moronski-Chapman, 2012). Under the Obama administration it has become clear that the belief that schools should be able to demonstrate accountability and gains (if not gainful employment) is not limited to the K-12 public school system.

Numerous proposals have been forwarded to defund programs that are themselves difficult to assess, do not produce an “employable skill,” or cost more than they produce (Zumeta, Breneman, Callan, & Finney, 2013). To quote James Slevin (2001), speaking of the university,
If the spirit is anything other than collegial, in its exact sense, then it is not a college or university. For the sake of having a name to name this thing that a college or university is not, I will call it a diploma market, an institution trading in commodities, selling and delivering instruction in order to sell and deliver the instructed. As it turns out, diploma markets are what most of the 3000+ postsecondary institutions may be in the process of becoming. (p.234)

Research in academia is, of course, one means by which to judge production. Those faculty members who produce research—particularly research that, itself, can be capitalized upon (i.e. garner respect for the university, enables profit through publication, or enables profit through research and development)—are therefore highly desirable, as they produce something of tangible value to the economy of the institution and society as a whole.

This shift towards production that Readings described has resulted in a perspective such that, “Teaching, we are told, is undervalued in favor of research, while research is less and less in touch with the demands of the real world, or with the comprehension of the ‘common reader’” (Readings, 1996, p.1). Gerald Graff (2003), in his book Clueless in Academe: How Schooling Obscures the Life of the Mind, argued that “academia reinforces cluelessness by making its ideas, problems, and ways of thinking look more opaque, narrowly specialized, and beyond normal learning capacities than they are or need to be” (p. 1) This is not to say that there is a necessary divide between teaching and research, but rather that the history of academia has been to create one. This generated division between teaching and research works in synonymy with the opacity of the research produced by academics to those outside of the academy to produce division between research and teaching. To Quote Graff (2003),
The view that academic writing is necessarily insular and obscure props up the overdrawn opposition between research and teaching. We are so used to opposing research and teaching that we overlook the fact that good research is itself pedagogical, often drawing on the skills of explanation, clarification, and problem-posing…central to good teaching. (p. 10)

Thus, teaching is undervalued, perhaps, because it is seen as a proletariat labor-enterprise performed by easily replaceable workers, while research is similarly demeaned for failing to produce that which is “useful,” with immediacy, to the Gross National Product.

The shift to a production paradigm, in which true value of education is determined by the generation of “useful” goods, therefore, causes a greater strain between teacher and researcher; the teacher role, when seen as “productive,” avoids the supposedly opaque uselessness of academic research, while academic research is also seen as a superior means by which to judge the production capacity of faculty. Thusly, the production paradigm shift places both the role of teacher and the role of researcher against the other, both of which must defend their usefulness in the language of productive economy.

This shift has had numerous consequences: one specifically addressed by Readings is the significant increase in the usage of adjuncts hired solely to teach. “The redistribution of roles within units is already a reality: teaching is increasingly done by part-time and temporary full-time faculty. The ‘units’ so ‘diversified’ have become incredibly ‘productive’ using this model, and with more powerless teachers, there is a whole lot more ‘collaboration.’ But it is a model based on an injustice and for that reason alone—though there are others—damages the quality of education (Slevin, 2001, p. 242). The consequences of the production paradigm that has
redistributed and diversified university roles such as teacher and researcher are grounded in the expectation that the university should produce employable workers, who themselves can “produce,” thusly maintaining the economy.

Another shift caused by the current focus on a production paradigm is the significant pressure on faculty to produce research. The pressure has become so intense over recent years that ethical questions and concerns are beginning to emerge. In the Journal of Clinical Investigation, Neill (2008) reported a greater number of ethical violations seen by the journal. Researchers, under the pressure to publish, are now engaging in “ethical gray areas.” When the pressure to publish is sufficient, it is not unreasonable to worry that these “gray areas” may also include the misuse of their own students.

Researchers who are under the pressure to publish are now turning to their own classrooms as research laboratories, which can be used for publication in education journals (Hutchings, 2002). An increasing number of teachers use their own students as research participants as a means by which to evaluate their own teaching practices—and, of course, simultaneously publish (Burns & McCarthy, 2010; Gan & Geral, 2010). Darling-Hammond (2010) suggested that the “gaming” of the standardized testing system has increased dramatically since the advent of “No Child Left Behind,” placing teacher’s careers and schools funding in jeopardy if students do not perform satisfactorily on high-stakes tests. Similarly, one may reason that the corporatization of the university has increased the amount of low-quality faculty research and arguably unethical faculty research due to increased pressure to publish.

Thusly, the roles of faculty as teachers and as researchers are both in flux, potentially in ways that conflict incommensurably. As the university enters into this revisioning of the
capitalistic educational paradigm, the roles of faculty may change significantly, so it may well be prudent to establish a clear understanding of how teacher and researcher in the university as faculty should best be understood.

The University

It may come as no surprise to post-secondary faculty that a significant paradigm shift has been taking place on the university level over the past two decades. Bill Readings (1996) wrote ominously about the “University in Ruins,” describing the collapse of university structure as we know it. Much of his text acts a revisioning of academic life, explicating what faculty should do as they wander out into the desolate landscape of academia: “To dwell in the ruins of the University is to try to do what we can, while leaving space for what we cannot envisage to emerge” (Readings, 1996, p. 176). This fundamental paradigmatic shift, as Readings saw it, is in large part due to the conceptualization of knowledge as a product to be bought and sold. As Reading stated, “The University is on the way to becoming a corporation” (1996, p. 22). This corporatization, suggested thinkers like Readings, Geoffrey Sirc, and Christopher Carter, is not just an eventuality; it is an inevitability.

It is now common to hear politicians lament the uselessness of degrees in the humanities and argue for an increase in cost of those degrees that do not produce something deemed to be of sufficient worth by society. Interestingly, at the same time, a 2014 U.S. Department of Education press release reveals that federal regulations will also demand that programs that produce poorly balanced debt to income ratio over a series of years will be closed, encouraging what they term “gainful employment.” Whilst it seems that both ideas have the best interest of students and their financial futures in mind, they also are clear markers of what is most valued by our society—
production of tangible things. Thusly, ideas, values, understanding, self-worth, reflection, compassion, enlightenment, and knowledge are means to that end, and the worth of a college education is now determined largely by the average income produced by a particular degree (Carter 2004). To quote Kögler (2015), “Politicians too often fall prey to reducing college to the production of job-conferring degrees, instead of seeing its function in the wider context of producing agents capable of participating productively in society as such, including the democratic political sphere” (para. 43). It is not a “liberal education” paradigm in which we now dwell; rather, the university has become the servant to a capitalistic end.

Chomsky, (1995) wrote,

[T]he educational system is divided into fragments. The part that's directed toward working people and the general population is indeed designed to impose obedience. But the education for elites can’t quite do that. It has to allow creativity and independence.

Otherwise they won't be able to do their job of making money.

Presumably he is speaking of the K-12 system, as supposedly higher education must allow for the creativity and independence of which he speaks. One comes to realize immediately, though, that in the twenty years since Chomsky wrote the above, post-secondary education has experienced greater and greater pressure to produce workers. It is difficult to express the emphasis on STEM in any other way. As the United States has begun to move into the post-industrial “knowledge economy” described by Peter Drucker (1992), the idea of worker has begun to include the notion of the knowledge worker. To quote Drucker,

Whereas the Grosstadt was founded on the industrial worker, the megalopolis is founded on, and organized around, the knowledge worker, with information as its foremost output
as well as its foremost need. The college campus rather than the factory chimney is likely to be the distinctive feature of megalopolis, the college student rather than the “proletarian’ its central political fact.” (p. 35)

Thus, Chomsky’s apparent distinction between k-12 and college institutions is becoming increasingly irrelevant in our “knowledge economy;” there is a central worker to our economy and she is produced by the university.

Readings (1996) noted that the U.S. University is becoming increasingly more proletariat as its focus becomes that of production and “practicality.” We see, synonymous with this change, a change in the way we think about faculty itself, as institutions rely more and more on part-time faculty to fill specific “practical roles” in our institutions. This reliance on part-time faculty who are employed only to teach to the specific bureaucratic needs of the institution and society represents the fundamental way our understanding of both purpose and content of knowledge have changed. The focus of post-secondary education—the modern public seems to demand—should be on the production of citizens who have useful skills. Knowledge, at best, is now a byproduct of the more pressing corporate need.

_Corporatization_

The corporatization to which Readings was referring is not just external, insofar as the university is required to meet the demands of society, but internal as well. Christopher Carter explicated the way disciplines themselves have become corporatized in the university. He addressed composition specifically and the demands that have been placed upon composition by this new paradigm. Carter wrote, “As composition departments encourage students’ immersion in capitalist practice, they more openly and egregiously practice capitalist exploitation
themselves” (2004, p.190). It seems as if the institution, by virtue of teaching towards the end, must, by definition, become a tool of that end. Composition programs find themselves under significant pressure to focus on writing for work and only for work.

Carter argued that as the institution orients itself towards the production of students who themselves produce measurable results, the means of assessment and the practices of pedagogy are becoming oriented toward those ends as well. This shift in understanding is similar to the impact high stakes testing has had on the K-12 fine arts curriculum. Intense pressure to teach the mandated curriculum hinders the inclusion of fine arts in classrooms (Oreck, 2004); according to the American Evaluation Association, fine arts teachers find that the curriculum has been narrowed to the tested subjects. Thus the institution of K-12 has molded itself to find the needs and demands of high-stakes education policy, and the curriculum reflects and emphasizes the culturally held belief that education is for jobs rather than for enlightenment. The result of such shifts has been a change in the way we think of knowledge, which now may be best defined as, “That which enables a student to find a lucrative job.” The institution as university, as a result, has become at odds with itself as Readings (1996) argued.

Carter suggested that the most problematic result of this shift has been the emphasis on the needs and authority of university bureaucracy. Students are taught to follow the “rules” of composition in the same way that faculty are themselves taught to abide by the rules of the hierarchy of the institution. “They attempt to fill their roles within an administrative hierarchy while encouraging students to become suspicious of hierarchical structures. They attempt to prepare their students for the working world while nevertheless objecting to that world’s exploitative practices” (2004, 186). The shift, then, to corporatization is in effect a kind of
symbiosis produced by the demand for students who will follow intellectual rules and, thus, a faculty that will do nothing more (so as to not waste the institution’s resources) than make sure they learn those rules. Simultaneously, faculty are increasingly aware that their worth as researchers is in question and they find themselves struggling to distinguish their roles from the roles of those faculty who are hired only to meet the productive bureaucratic needs of the institution.

Figure 1. The Precarious Balance Required of Modern Faculty

Carter chastised this victimized professoriate, though: “We do nothing to inhibit academic corporatism if we construct ourselves as gentle managers bound by the constraints of an unkind system” (2004, p.188). Simply, to educate students on the importance of free thought and critical thinking while at the same time sheepishly passing out departmentally developed rubrics, following state determined curriculum, and requiring that the students themselves respect the hierarchy of which we are a part is contradictory. The professoriate seems to, on the one hand, worry that students who do not acknowledge and respect the superior position of
professors will be unteachable, while, on the other, hold on to the belief that the faculty themselves should not have to bow to a social hierarchy as it is in the pursuit of a far greater goal—knowledge.

The professoriate, then, is placed between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand, it is important to meet the financial needs of the students to help prepare them for the world of work, yet, on the other, it is also fundamental to the core of a liberal education to recognize that work is not the purpose of knowledge. To quote Geoffrey Sirc,

Of course I have students—many each quarter—who just want to know the tricks to writing, how to psyche it out. Who want the grades and the jobs. I don’t want to deny them that; I, after all, have a job. But there remains the way I choke on that system, the way we all do, ultimately. There is a profound dissatisfaction many of us feel at having to enable that system. (1995, p. 550).

For this reason, it seems impossible for professors to help students learn to navigate the rules of the system without, at the same time helping to further instantiate a system that itself *deems the fundamental goal of the professoriate unnecessary.*

The efficiently-functioning, productive university will turn students out as quickly as possible who have taken nothing but the necessary coursework their degrees demand. Additional knowledge, especially on the taxpayers’ expense, is deemed not just impractical, but immoral. The university, therefore, is under constant pressure to further cut back on general education programs, as coursework that *seems* unrelated to a specific major is a waste of both time and money. Students who take the time to explore additional electives are in danger of losing their funding and failing to earn a degree.
Faculty are expected to mimic the no-frills model of the institution itself. The more courses they teach, the more notoriety they gain for the university; the greater number of students they pass, the better numbers they produce for the university. “Student success rates” have become the new mantra of some institutions, suggesting that professors who fail too high a percentage of their students are failing to produce a useful product, and—perhaps worse—wasting the students’ and the taxpayers’ dollars. In order to meet this streamlined end, the institution has sought an employee base that does the work that is required and *only* the work that is required. However, institutions of learning need more than that from their faculty. To quote Immanuel Kant,

> The university would have a certain autonomy (since only scholars can pass judgment on scholars as such), and accordingly it would be authorized to perform certain functions through its *faculties* (smaller societies, each comprising the university specialists in one main branch of learning): to admit to the university students seeking entrance from the lower schools and, having conducted examinations, by its own authority to grant degrees or confer the universally recognized status of “doctor” on free teachers (that is, teachers who are not members of the university—in other words, *to create doctors*. (1993, p.23). Our current demand for production, though, has left behind Kant’s notion that the university exists to produce “free teachers” and scholars both inside and outside of the university who, themselves, are capable of “passing judgment” on the effectiveness of the institution.

Again we note that as a result of this demand for production, institutions have relied more and more on part-time faculty (June, 2014). These marginalized faculty members are generally not treated as part of the “actual” faculty, insofar as they do not participate in curriculum
development or faculty meetings and there is no research required of them. Often due to union regulations, the adjuncts themselves must work at numerous universities in order to cobble together fulltime work, for which they are significantly underpaid and, because none of their assignments is full time, they receive no benefits. The shift, then, is from the idea that the professoriate is an educated class that should add to the generated body of knowledge through research and education to one in which the “professors” are a service class that teach toward the end of helping students obtain degrees in profitable fields. The ranks of adjuncts are continuously growing as institutions find them a far more financially palatable and bureaucratically sound alternative. The fact, then, that these adjuncts rarely participate in any form of institutional self-reflection through research and participatory self-governance that might endanger the capitalistic ends of the institution is an added bonus. These adjuncts are far too busy trying to survive financially and professionally to be any real danger to the corporatization of the university, and they are largely ostracized by the shrinking professoriate that sees them as an underclass threatening the prestige and quality of the professoriate itself.

The professoriate finds itself batting down the hatches against a world that is increasingly unaware of its worth and increasingly incapable of understanding what it produces. The enemy is found everywhere from those in society who lack the knowledge base necessary to understand the opaque nature of their research to the part-time faculty, of which two could take on a single professor’s course load without the costs of retirement plans, health benefits, and long-term commitment. Students, the public, and politicians are disparaged, largely behind closed doors, for not having the wisdom to know that what the professoriate produces within the ivory tower is essential to human flourishing, while the adjunct faculty members are looked down upon as
insufficient scholars and thinkers. The part-time employees have become the proletariat to the professorial bourgeoisies.

As described by Audrey Williams June in the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, “Across the nation, colleges have undergone similar shifts in whom they employ to teach students. About 70 percent of the instructional faculty at all colleges is off the tenure track, whether as part-timers or full-timers, a proportion that has crept higher over the past decade” (2014). Where once, adjuncts were seen as experts in their field retired or employed full time elsewhere, occasionally invited to teach due to their practical expertise, they now teach the majority of general education courses at most universities and are often seen as a threat by the full-time faculty. The adjuncts find themselves forced to fly below the radar out of fear of the administration and, even, the students. (June, 2014)

The concern, then, becomes twofold when public perspective of academia is combined with the professoriate’s own treatment of adjunct teachers: On one hand, teaching is seen as that lowly tool that belongs to a proletariat class of academics, and on the other, research is demeaned by the public at large to whom much of it—if not most—is unintelligible, as an unnecessary waste of taxpayer funding. To quote, “teaching, we are told, is undervalued in favor of research, while research is less and less in touch with the demands of the real world, or with the comprehension of the ‘common reader.’” (Readings, 1996, p.1). Thusly, the professoriate must be wary of the label teacher and convince itself that such an occurrence could not happen in the university because professorial work is of such greater depth and breadth, as they watch the K-12 system lose self-governance, respect, and tenure.
The Faculty

The professoriate has, at least, a vague awareness that both K-12 teachers and adjunct faculty are in constant danger that their respective administrations will fire them as a result of student complaints and a lack of student success. June reported in her chronicle article that many adjuncts feel pressured to pass students, avoid contentious issues, and reduce the rigor of coursework in order to avoid bad student evaluations that may result in termination (2014).

Simply, there is a growing awareness in the university that being a teacher hired by an institution to produce a product means following a corporatized set of rules that do not engage the system itself on any critical level. Teacher, as it has been redefined by the corporatization of education, now means, “One who provides a degree in exchange for the money produced the consumer.” Failure to provide that degree, if the student herself does not learn enough, is not, then, the fault of the student, society, or the administrator, but the fault of the teacher who has not supplied the fairly purchased product.

The faculty, as a result of these demands and demeaning definitions, has become divided against itself, fundamentally contrary to the very notion of liberal education (Readings 1996). On the one hand the professoriate has become wary of the label “teacher,” as it now carries, connotatively, the weight of a public servant who is responsible only for the production of degreed students, and on the other it must be wary of the part time faculty who fulfill the institution’s bureaucratic ends without the annoying complications of having a body of professors who, themselves, act as evaluative and guiding force of the university. The faculty, thusly, is at odds with itself, seemingly directed towards contrary aims: the professoriate towards
increasing the general body of knowledge and the teachers towards the production of profitable degrees (Readings and Carter 1996).

Readings’ claim in *The University in Ruins* certainly seems to suggest that the battle has been lost and the divided house collapsed. “Institutional pragmatism thus means, for me, recognizing the university today for what it is: an institution that is losing its need to make transcendental claims for its function. The university is no longer simply modern, insofar as it no longer needs a grand narrative of culture in order to work” (1995, p.168). Certainly, faculty members find themselves trying to construct a grand narrative that will continue to justify their existence as academics.

Readings, though, suggested that this action is hopeless. The world has fundamentally changed in regards to what—and who—it values. Whereas a “renaissance man” would once have been considered the pinnacle of societal achievement, now, it is a man who makes a tremendous amount of money doing almost anything. Academia, without having realized it, has already accepted society’s rejection of knowledge and culture as valuable for its own sake. It has locked itself behind closed doors and now fights against itself, arguing that one form of knowledge is more “true” than another. Moreover, an internal conflict has arisen between “teacher” and “professor.” The faculty now find themselves crushed between the notions, if not the human embodiments, that teaching is inferior intellectually to research and that research is inferior practically to teaching.

*Teachers and Professors*

Not long ago, the researcher, himself, experienced an instance of this tension. In writing a paper for publication in the field of post-secondary education, the researcher was required to
change the usage of “teacher” to “faculty.” He was told that the term “teacher” would insult faculty in “higher education.” Consider the terminology we use to demarcate teachers and professors. Firstly, we use the misnomer—a rather insulting one at that—to discriminate between k-12 and post-secondary by referring to one as “higher.” More to the core of the definitional distinction is the realization of what the term “Professor” connotes. “Professor” means “to profess.” This is not an impressive thing, or something of which we should be proud. “To profess” simply means “to tell.” It means “to tell at.” In other words, we profess beliefs. Anyone can do that; this speaks nothing to either 1) the content of those beliefs or 2) the effectiveness with which one professes them. Being a professor, at its heart, suggests that one tell others what to believe in an authoritarian tone while they passively receive that knowledge from “on high(er).” Our very terminology smacks of an epistemology of divine revelation. Viewing this in conjunction with the perception of teachers as servants to a social and corporate machine makes it clear why the professoriate is insulted by the label teacher; the term professor suggests that one is free to profess without having to engage the machinery because one is, by default, worth listening to.

Now, more than ever, it is imperative that we come to understand the integration of teaching and research in the professoriate. The role of professors as both teacher and researcher is simultaneously opaque and at odds with itself. As the professoriate seeks to distance itself from what is quickly becoming a service industry of teaching, with all of the indignities of the service industry, it relies on research as a means by which to demonstrate that the professoriate is producing something of worth that is not reducible to teaching only. There is danger, though, in a focus on research as a means by which to distance the professoriate from the corporatization of
the university. Namely, the fact that the corporatization of the university, itself, encourages researchers to use students as the means of production. Hence, the students may find themselves the dialogical object.

Publication

In part, this change in understanding of the university is addressed through publication. Publication is a means by which the institution can demonstrate “production” and assess the productiveness of its faculty. As a result, many faculty working at post-secondary university institutions in the United States are under significant pressure to publish (Gad-elHak, 2004; Crane & Pearson, 2011). The pressure has become so intense over recent years that ethical questions and concerns are beginning to emerge. For example, in a 2008 editorial for the Journal of Clinical Investigation, executive editor Ushma S. Neill wrote, “The academic scientific enterprise rewards those with the longest CVs and the most publications. Under pressure to generate voluminous output, scientists often fall prey to double publishing, self-plagiarism, and submitting the ‘minimal publishable unit’” (p. 2368). She reported a greater number of ethical violations seen by the journal. Neill suggested that these “ethical gray areas” may easily become significant and clear ethical transgressions. Researchers who are under the pressure to publish are now turning to their own classrooms as research laboratories, which can be used for publication in education journals (Hutchings, 2002). Students are now being asked by their teachers to participate in research not just outside of the classroom, but inside of the classroom; an increasing number of teachers use their own students as research participants as a means by which to evaluate their own teaching practices—and, of course, simultaneously publish (Burns & McCarthy, 2010; Gan & Geral, 2010). This research, in which faculty publish findings for the
purpose of improving classroom practice (often using their own classes as research populations) is known as the “Scholarship of Teaching and Learning” (SoTL).

The potential harms to students are significant, and there is a growing body of research supporting the claim that students can be and are occasionally harmed when used as research participants. The potential to benefit students is also significant (Gordon & Edwards, 2012). The depth of the research thus far on harm done to student participants is rather shallow, and the breadth of the literature is largely focused on students in medical fields such as psychology or nursing. There is a growing body of research that suggests that participatory research, such as action research, can benefit students and is, itself, effective pedagogy (Burke & Cummins, 2002; Elmes-Crahall, 1992; Holly, Ahar & Kasten, 2005). In fact, Roberts and Allen (2013) conducted a qualitative study that suggests that the potential educational gains from using undergraduate student participants (such as understanding researcher behavior, increased content knowledge, increased understanding of being a research participant) outweighed potential costs such as emotional drawbacks. The fact, therefore, that faculty, being under significant pressure to publish, often turn to their students as a body of readily available participants and eager researchers is no surprise.

**Potential Harms**

What remains unclear is the best way to conjoin the role of teacher with the role of researcher in post-secondary education. Few researchers have specifically asked the question, “How does the conjunction of faculty as teachers, researchers, and servants affect students?” However, the body of research that suggests that students may be harmed when faculty think of themselves primarily as researchers is growing. Pat Hutchings (2002), generally considered one
of the foremost scholars in SoTL, conducted seven case studies in order to better understand the implications of SoTL research on student participants. She concluded that faculty and institutions must think carefully about the ethical dimensions of conducting research using one’s students. Daugherty and Lawrence (1996) conducted a survey study of 96 male college students in a social science course at The Citadel. The students were asked to complete a questionnaire that would evaluate their appropriateness for selection for further research. Based on their study, Daugherty and Lawrence concluded,

We agree with those (e.g., McCord, 1991; Sieber & Saks, 1989) who have asserted the importance of continually reevaluating the ethics of research practices, and we believe that our study underscores the importance of considering the impact of participation on individuals. In addition to familiarizing themselves with the American Psychological Association's ethical principles (American Psychological Association, 1992) and with Korn’s (1988) statement of participant rights, researchers may be well served by having a collaborative model of research. As Gillis (1976) suggested, researchers may need to see students as unique collaborators in the research process rather than as subjects to be manipulated. (p.76)

Clark and McCann (2005) considered these ethical implications through a double-blind peer-reviewed investigation of research conducted in the field of psychology. They conclude after their review of 23 recent articles and studies that,

Good research must be based on sound ethical practices, and the obligations researchers have are greater if they share other relationships with their subjects. In recent years the ethics of research have come under increasing public scrutiny, yet documents such as
Research Governance Framework for Health and Social Care (DH 2001) or National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans (National Health and Medical Research Council 2001), do not explicitly refer to the issues surrounding lecturers researching students, or students researching each other. It may be timely for regulatory bodies to consider whether these research relationships need greater scrutiny, or governance. In the absence of guidelines, institutional ethics committees are left to ensure the integrity of such research. (p.50)

Comer (2009) further buttressed Clark and McCann’s conclusions with an examination of student participants in nursing programs as a vulnerable population. Pecorino, Kincaid, and Gironda (2008) similarly conducted a literature review discussing the potential pitfalls of using one’s own students as research participants, specifically examining Institutional Review Board (IRB) policy and the protections provided by IRBs to students. The research suggests that without a set of best practices that are well grounded in ethical standards, well-evidenced by current research, and well-argued utilizing sound logic, the harm to students is likely to increase. Dangerously, questionably ethical use of students as research participants may become an established norm amongst educational institutions as the pressure to publish increases.

Pecorino, Kincaid, and Gironda (2008) described the following potential harms of using students as research participants:

- Academic: decline in completion and retention rates, decline in success rates/GPA, inability to perform at the next level of study, inability to develop and use skills that are needed beyond the classroom.
• Intellectual: failure to develop critical thinking skills, failure to develop information-processing skills, failure to acquire new knowledge.

• Social: inability to function as a fully educated member of a democratic society, inability to realize socio-economic goals (career).

• Psychological: decrease in self-esteem, increase in hostility towards the educator/institution, negative impact on future educational success (self-efficacy)

• Economic: loss of time, loss of tuition, student loans.

Consider the following hypothetical cases:

1) A professor at a university that requires both teaching and scholarship on the part of the professoriate has had some difficulty publishing recently in her field of philosophy. Out of concern for promotion and tenure, she begins to consider other avenues of peer-reviewed publication. She discovers the growing field of SoTL research and realizes that some of her classroom activities may be publication-worthy. In fact, last semester she introduced a change in course method, requiring that students now keep self-reflective journals. This is rather unusual for a philosophy class, but she found that it was effective. She decides, now, after the fact, that this is worthy of publication and begins reviewing the students’ journals for useful data. However, the students were not notified at the time of their writing that their work might be used for purposes other than their own educational growth. Perhaps more concernedly, the professor decides to quote portions of some of the journals to demonstrate how powerful journaling in a philosophy course can be.
One of the excerpts quoted, although names were changed, included some graphic, powerful details of the personal tragedies experienced by one of the students who described how philosophical reflection has helped her overcome that difficulty. In fact, a few years later, that same student decides to become a philosophy teacher. During her graduate course work she conducts research on philosophy teaching methodologies, only to realize that her own personal story has been published, though without her name.

Of concern, here, is the realization that student artifacts, while useful for research, are often personal to each student. Students do not turn in their work under the assumption that it might become public knowledge or that it might be used to forward the professor’s research agenda. In fact, such work is often turned in as a matter of trust. I recall, anecdotally, a professor violating that trust by commenting in front of a doctoral class about the content of one of the cohort’s personal reflections. The class was horrified, and the student in question reported never trusting that teacher again.

Trust requires that we place ourselves in vulnerable positions such that we choose to “take an ambiguous path that can lead to a beneficial event or a harmful event depending upon the behavior of the other person” (Swinth, 335, 1967). This “ambiguous path” is a vulnerable state such that the trusted individual’s capacity to do harm is increased. As such, maintaining a trust relationship requires that the potential harm is not actualized. For example, consider two persons: “Person A” and “Person B.” Person B trusts Person A. If Person A speaks poorly of the trusting Person B when B is absent, B’s vulnerability results in a violation of the trust she put in A—greater harm is done because of the greater vulnerability caused by the trust relationship. In
so doing, the integrity of the trust relationship is compromised. Thus, “One of the most important ways to manifest integrity is to be loyal to those who are not present”—an idea popularized by Stephen Covey (2005). Even if students are not present to defend themselves, they exist in a trust relationship with their teacher, and, as such, the trusting students are placed in a position of greater potential harm. Thusly, even if—as in the case above—the student is not aware how her work is being used, potential violations of the trust relationship remain possible.

If anything, because the student is not present, the demands of the trust relationship are even more stringent because the teacher can engage in behavior that may harm the student without the student having any ability to prepare herself for that harm. The professor, therefore, cannot violate that trust, even after the fact (the student’s graduation, for example), without endangering the integrity of the teaching profession itself, as it is grounded in the trust relationship between student and teacher (Noddings, 1988).

2) A professor of foundations of education also regularly publishes textbooks on educational psychology. His successful textbook publications include DVD’s that demonstrate effective and ineffective teaching techniques. In order to make these DVD’s more effective, rather than contrived, he video records teachers in actual elementary school classrooms. Each DVD includes discussions of each lesson’s strengths and weaknesses. One such lesson includes student manipulation of a balance. Students are challenged to understand the way weight at either end of the fulcrum changes the balance. Some of the students, as one can see on the video, almost immediately grasp the mathematics behind the balance. A few students, though—little Timmy in particular—struggle with the concept and do not seem to
master it before the end of the lesson. The DVD commentary discusses this fact, and notes that some students like Timmy may just not be cognitively developed enough to understand those concepts. In fact, education students watching the DVD often cannot help but laugh at how cute and futile Timmy’s attempts to understand the concept are. Problematically, though, 10 years later, Timmy, who has struggled mightily to become an academic success, has now enrolled in college as an education major. The required textbook that he has purchased, now revised over a series of editions, still includes the fulcrum and balance video, which, without his realizing it, Timmy is about to watch with his education class while his cute antics are laughed at.

This outcome seems unlikely. Nevertheless, one wonders if the researching professor was thinking about the welfare of the videoed students as well as his own publication success. It could do serious harm to a young person to realize that he or she is used as the example of a low-achieving or challenged learner.

3) A sociology teacher now regularly publishes her findings in the SoTL field. She believes this is an important field and that her findings benefit other sociology teachers who would like to avoid her mistakes. As in the first case, this professor began publishing in this field by reflecting on previous artifacts produced by her students. Now, however, she has come to realize that an experimental approach is far more convincing. Specifically, if she wishes to show that a particular assignment, methodology, or treatment is more effective than other options, she must have a control group. As a result, she purposefully divides up her class sections by treatment and control.
The professor’s article will explore the powerful technique of having students teach each other the material before the exam. In fact, she knows this technique is effective, because last semester she tried it for the first time and she noticed what seem to be significant results. She thinks her findings will be more persuasive, though, if she can show that two content identical classes taught in the same semester differ only in the treatment. As a result, her 9am MW class will be required to go through a rigorous collaborative process of teaching each other the material before each exam. Her 9am TR class, however, will not be required to do so, and they will study as they see fit. As the professor predicted, at the end of the semester there is a statistically significant correlation between the treatment and students’ grades on the mid-term and on the final. In fact, the professor notes, with some pleasure, the power of her new methodology as she reports her findings: the TR class included two students who failed the class, while the MW course had nothing lower than a “D.”

At issue here is the realization that the researcher has purposefully withheld a treatment that she believes, and has good evidence to believe, will help students succeed. In the medical profession this is clearly unethical. Medical researchers cannot withhold a known effective treatment just to observe the outcome. This fact makes demonstrating efficacy much more difficult, but for good reason: at the hearts of both medicine and education is the notion of “beneficence.” Note that if education is to be treated as a profession not dissimilar from the law or the medical field, then it must hold itself to similar rigorous ethical standards. Allowing two students to fail and potentially drop out of college in order to generate a more persuasive paper does not demonstrate much concern for the welfare of the students. This is why Peter Markie
argued that “a class must be a classroom first and a research laboratory second” (Hutchings, 2003, p. 29).

Some may argue that these questions can and should be resolved by the IRB, but consider the fact that outsourcing our ethical responsibilities to others does at least two harms: 1) The IRB process becomes far more tedious and complex. As the IRB must act both as an ethical and a legal agent, those ethical virtues which should be internal to researchers must be accounted for by the IRB. Thusly, the IRB is placed in the position of having to do the additional work of addressing what are likely obvious ethical problems and contradictions within the researcher’s proposal—problems that she should have, in fact, caught herself. 2) The IRB cannot be held responsible for the actual implementation and results of every act of research. Things can go wrong. Unexpected variables may appear. Once having gained permission to proceed from the IRB, numerous opportunities to do harm remain available. The IRB, the institution, the participants, the students, and the community all should be able to trust that even when leaving with IRB approval, researchers will still hold themselves to the highest ethical standards possible.

Simply, one must wonder if the IRB acts as a means by which to alleviate professors of the cumbersome burden of having to be ethical. To some degree, it seems as if the IRB may well act as a means by which to outsource virtue. Lynn Sharp Paine (2000), in her article “Does Ethics Pay?” noted that corporations, when required to meet a minimum standard of ethical action, meet the minimum standard imposed on them; however, her research found that corporations, when required to develop their own standards developed more exacting ethical standards and were more likely to meet them. One wonders if, similarly, a problem arises within
the professoriate such that researchers will meet a minimum standard imposed on them, but would meet a higher standard if they were placed at the locus of moral responsibility for the ethical standards of their research.

Figure 2. Ethical Research Behavior at External and Internal Locus of Responsibility

There is an ever-growing body of research that suggests that university IRBs are insufficient for ethical research. Researcher complaints that the IRB hinders research are common, and, as a result, the tensions between researchers and their IRBs are increasing (Klitzman 2012). Moreover, Melissa Swauger (2009) suggested that IRBs may hinder ethical research. She argued that requirements such as anonymity are not “necessary assurance of comfort for participants. Some participants may want their voices to be heard” (p. 78). The implication is simple: The IRB exists as a means by which to protect the institution from litigation as a result of unethical practice, not as evidence that the goal of the institution is to be ethical. Research practices that exist for the facilitation of voice as a means by which to combat marginalization are, arguably, undermined by restrictions required by institutional IRBs.
primarily focused on preventing lawsuits. All of this makes it obvious that, with or without an IRB, unethical actions can be conducted by researchers, so the question how to develop, foster, and promote virtue in a professoriate that will—even if given carte blanche by the IRB—refuse to act unethically, remains pertinent and pressing.

This conclusion is further supported by Miller, Birch, Mauthner, and Jessop (2012), who argued that ethical oversight by researchers themselves is preferable to that of IRBs, especially in the case of qualitative research. Swauger (2009) similarly argued that qualitative research, in particular, could be hindered by IRBs. It is important to note that in both cases the researchers argue from a feminist perspective somewhat grounded in the work of Carol Gilligan (1982), arguing for the importance of “voice.” McCarron (2013), however, argued that because, “Even with the noblest of intentions, researchers may do something that is ethically problematic, either through ignorance or unacknowledged bias,” review boards such as IRBs are necessary for the effective oversight of researchers who, intentionally or unintentionally, might do harm (p. 3). Note that even McCarron’s criticism self-reflectively notes that ethical agents must populate such boards. Thusly, it seems reasonable to conclude that the problem of ethical action remains one that cannot be solved by the appointment of a board; it remains a problem of identifying ethical individuals who then can act ethically as professors or as members of oversight committees and boards.
Contextualization and Definition of Foundational Assumptions, Axioms, and Concepts

Roles in the New Paradigm

The question, now, is this: Given the corporatization of the university, the pressures to publish, and the shift in faculty roles for production, can the distinct roles of “teacher” and “researcher” as instantiated through the U.S. University be collectively instantiated as a coherent “faculty”? As a qualitative research project, the goal is understanding of the roles. First, those roles must be defined, and “role” itself must be understood as a construct. For that reason, Bruce J. Biddle’s construction of role theory will be used to set the foundation for understanding and distinguishing the different categories of roles. Into this construct, “faculty,” “teacher” and “researcher” can all be understood in relationship to each other and to society as a whole. Thusly discriminated, those roles then can be defined and then placed in juxtaposition for examination.

The definition of the roles requires extensive examination of the literature in order to understand those roles as defined by philosophers, educators, researchers, professional institutions, the process of tenure and promotion, and professional journals. The argument will then be built by developing and defining both sets of roles and then placing them in conjunction in order to observe their logical, philosophical, and ethical results. These will be used to develop a construct that can then be applied to actual practice in order to best understand how the conjunction of the roles is best enacted.

Thusly, a Gertzian “thickly descriptive” account of the roles can be provided as conceptual constructs. With those constructs in hand, the task of shaping a coherent whole that itself best defines “faculty” as a conjunction of teacher and researcher may be possible. If those roles are, in fact, commensurable, a coherent construct can be formed using a discourse ethical
methodology that can be used as a means by which to understand the actual instantiation of “faculty” in the world. The construct, then, that emerges from the theoretical conjunction of these roles provides a theoretical and normative framework that informs how these roles should be enacted in practice.

Problem Statement

Given the corporatization of the university, as a device for the production of subjects useful to the work force, there is good reason to believe that the educational paradigm is experiencing a significant shift. As it does so, it may be the case that the roles of faculty also shift, perhaps in ways that are a detriment to student welfare, perhaps in ways that are a detriment to the general body of knowledge, or perhaps both. In order to best understand these changes, prepare for them, and perhaps even affect them, a clear understanding of the nature of these roles and their conjunction is needed.

Purpose Statement

The hope is to provide much-needed material to fill a gap in the current understanding of the student-teacher relationship when reconstructed as participant-researcher and the potential harms that may occur as a result of that relationship. The construct that may be produced through this philosophical analysis may help us deploy empirical strategies to better understand both the nature of the teacher-researcher relationship and what shape the incarnation the role conjunction should take. Step one, then, is to determine what shape the conjunction of the roles can take and then step two is to determine, if possible, what shape the conjunction of the roles should take.
Research Questions

1) What coherent construct can be used to best understand the conjoined roles of teacher and research within the current educational context?

2) What form should a construct conjoining teacher and researcher roles take?

Overview of Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework used in this dissertation will emerge from the conceptual framework developed by Bruce J. Biddle—role theory. Two particular understandings of role theory symbolic-interactionist and organizational role theory are especially appropriate for exploring faculty roles. Those two roles, when conjoined will act as the theoretical framework—that actors perform roles established by organizations through both codified and non-codified scripts and actor roles are generated through interaction in a symbolic communicative medium constructed through discourse. That framework in conjunction with discourse ethics as developed by Jurgen Habermas will generate the construct needed to develop understanding of the conjunction of faculty roles.

Significance of the Research

This construct (of determining what shape the conjunction of the roles can and should take) would provide a cogent argument, grounded in ethical standards, that suggests a series of best practices for faculty who are expected to simultaneously teach, conduct research, and perform service. The construct developed through this dissertation may assist faculty and institutions in their endeavor to minimize harm and maximize benefit to students by virtue of producing a mechanism by which the conjunction of faculty roles can be better understood and through which, if the best practices are followed, students are less likely to be placed at risk. If
faculty, themselves, do not want to be understood as “teachers” because their work includes the role of “researcher,” then we must understand how these roles integrate, if one should have primacy over the other, and the potential benefits and harms that face students when educated by individuals who instantiate both roles.

Delimitations and Limitations of the Study

Of particular import, here, is the fact that criticisms of role theory include the tendency of role theory to take a seemingly conformative and normative stance regarding social roles (Jackson 1998). That is to say, one might argue that role theory engages and endorses social imperatives such that a role occupant should “endorse normative behavioral expectations for oneself” as well as hold “expectations for those individuals occupying counter-positions” (Jackson 14). While evaluating this criticism is beyond the scope of this work, the tendency of role theory to act as a normative construct will prove useful. This work, as it is undergirded by role theory—which itself tends toward normativity—will not only provide a description of roles as found in the literature, but will suggest that there is a normative component to that role construction—simply, that there is an kind of “best practice” when generating and playing the role faculty.

This work is both descriptive and normative, but like all normative work, it must be revisable. One cannot simply avoid the traps of misunderstanding by making reference to previous research and the thoughts of others in the past tense when discussing what others should do. An imperative carries with it a force that requires of researchers the willingness to constantly revise and analyze their work. Thus, the very methodology of this work will require active discovery and revision through the development of the literature review. There will be no
standard “data collection” through empirical observation of the external world. Rather, this work will analyze and consider theories and definitions in order to gain greater understanding and in order to generate a useful construct. This fact, then, results in a constant act of addendum to the literature review as additional language is both discovered and generated that informs, changes, and develops the definitions and constructs analyzed. As noted by Michael Scriven (1997), when we conduct philosophical analysis, “We are not only analyzing the concept of definition, itself, which is a key tool in any kind of research and, hence, in educational research, but also looking into the nature of language” (137). It is not unreasonable to suggest, as the work turns now to the literature review, that the literature could—if the author had limitless time—continue its development and investigation *ad infinitum* as the roles of faculty are redefined continuously into the future.

**Organization of the Study**

This work makes no claim to being merely descriptive. Rather, it seeks to determine the basic axioms central to the roles under discussion. Thus, some assumptions must be taken, and those assumptions are normative. Once accepted, a device that can be used objectively can be developed and applied. This work, therefore, does not simply examine the roles as constructed by society; it is not a work of sociology. Rather, it is, to an extent, critical theoretical—it seeks to suggest a best construct that is justifiable both in the construct's empirical grounding in the social structure that defines faculty roles and in the construct's normative grounding in theories that suggest the best possible structuring of that construct. Thus, application of the developed construct does more than suggest that the subject does or does not conform to the described roles, but also suggests whether they should conform to that role as established by society.
Chapter Summary/Conclusion

There are significant changes taking place in universities. These changes are in many ways the result of the corporatization of the university. This corporatization, for the purpose of producing degrees, has placed the professoriate in an untenable position. They must on one end meet the goal of doing what is in the best interest of the students’ knowledge while at the same time producing as much research and as many diplomas as they can. For this reason, some thinkers like Readings (1996) have argued that the university is in “ruins.” Others, like Slevin (2001) argued that universities are quickly becoming “diploma markets” no longer invested in student best interest or learning.

Regardless of if Slevin and Readings are correct, there is considerable, and increasing, pressure on the professoriate to publish. These publications help strengthen a university’s reputation and add to its prestige. Those who do not publish sufficiently, and in the right ways, will find themselves out of a job. This increasing pressure as led to an increase in unethical actions by some faculty (Neill, 2008). This is particularly concerning when the increase in pressure to publish has also led to an increase in SoTL research that uses one’s one students as the research population (Hutchings, 2002).

Students used by their teachers are at considerable risk as discussed by Pecorino, Kincaid, and Gironda (2008). These risks include academic as well as intellectual and emotional harm. Immediately one wonders if faculty can both meet the need to do research while at the same time teaching to the best of their ability. On one hand it would seem that research can buttress and inform one’s teaching (Burke & Cummins, 2002; Elms-Cranhall, 1992; Holly, Ahar & Kasten, 2005). On the other hand, it seems as if the pressure to complete research, particularly
using control groups and experimental groups, could place students in harm’s way or at least place students in a situation in which they are receiving less than the teacher’s best in order to act as a control group (Clark & McCann, 2005).

The fundamental question then becomes, “Are the faculty roles of ‘teacher’ and ‘researcher’ commensurable?” One wonders, moreover, if there are some ways in which those roles can be constructed to be more consistent while also meeting the demands of the fundamental definitions of “teacher” and “researcher” particularly as understood by the domains themselves? These questions, particularly pressing as the university continues to become more corporatized and both faculty and students are increasingly used for monetary ends, should be answered so that those universities which seek to best instantiate faculty as a coherent, and ethical, conjunction of teacher and researcher can do so in an informed way. The purpose of this dissertation, then, is to ascertain if those roles are commensurable, if they are coherent, and what construction of those roles would be most effective both ontologically and ethically. To do so will require a philosophical examination of definition through the application of role theory and discourse analysis and an ethical construction using the work of Habermas.
CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

The purpose of this work is to generate a construct that can be used to better understand and analyze faculty roles in post-secondary institutions. Thus, the first step is to define those roles. In many ways, the act of definition will be the primary objective of this dissertation. Those role definitions, however, will not be generated *ex nihilo*—they will not simply spring, like Athena, fully mature from Zeus’s head. Rather, we will investigate the work of preeminent theorists, seminal literature, and institutional documents in order to form those roles. Note that “form” rather than “understand” is the operative verb. Although understanding those roles is fundamental to this project, the roles must first be in existence to do so. Thusly, we must have in hand, metaphorically speaking, the roles which we seek to understand in order to turn them about, take them apart, and experiment upon them.

In order to address the research question, this literature review will address the basic question of “What is a role?” as understood in the context of institutions and organizations. Role theory is currently the prevailing means by which to understand roles as social constructs. Thus, the first step in this review is the establishment and definition of roles as social constructs through the literature. Once having established an understanding of roles as social constructs, the review will then consider the major historical developments in role theory and examine, briefly, the different kinds of role theory in order to best understand what form of role theory best applies to the research question. To further understand and establish role theory as an appropriate theoretical framework for this dissertation, the dissertation will then consider contemporary forms of role theory and their applications to institutions. Such contemporary application of role
theory will demonstrate the appropriateness of the application of role theory to the question of faculty roles and the research question.

Theoretical Framework

Social Constructs

Roles, although already in existence, maintain the odd ontological status of both being a thing-in-the-world and, yet, not a physical thing. We cannot simply go out into the world and physically pick up faculty roles. We cannot, however, simply define those roles as we please, either. The roles exist as constructs, specifically sociocultural constructs. Social construct, itself, must be defined before we can proceed further. Ian Hacking (1999), in his book The Social Construct of What?, provided a useful function for determining if something is a social construct.

If “x” stands for a social construct, then

(0) In the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted; X appears to be inevitable (P. 12).

(1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable. (p. 6).

Hacking noted that “2” and “3” are often the case, though “social construction” does not necessarily include them.

(2) X is quite bad as it is.

(3) We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically transformed (p. 6).

Hacking then suggested that this function demonstrates that “gender” is a social construct. (0) it often appears, in the present state of affairs given the development of society,
that gender appears to be an inevitable fact about human beings. However (1) gender need not have existed; it is not a biological necessity. Thus, it is a social construct. Moreover, the use of gender as it is used is “bad” for many individuals who do not view themselves as “male” or “female.” Therefore it may be the case that (3), We would be much better off if gender were done away with. He writes,

Undoubtedly, the most influential social construction doctrines have had to do with gender. That was to be expected. The canonical text, Simone de Beauvoir’s *The Second Sex*, had as its most famous line… ‘One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman’ (de Beauvoir 1049, II 1; 1953, 267)... Previous toilers in the women’s movements knew that power relations needed reform, but many differences between the sexes had a feeling of inevitability about them… One core idea of early gender theorists was that biological differences between the sexes do not determine gender, gender attributes, or gender relations. (p. 7)

In other words, “What is socially constructed is not...the individual people… It is the classification” (p. 10). The social construct is not the agent in the world. Instead, it is a kind of classification. Note, however, that a social construct, as in the case of gender, is not just a classification; it is more than a label. The construct has a thing-in-the-world like quality to it, so much so that many people today still find gender confusable with biological sex. Certainly, feminist theorists would not think of woman as just a label; it is, as a social construct, the way we create, interact with, and understand woman. Thus, social constructs take on a life on their own through social interaction. Once labeled, we are no longer only interacting with “Jane”; we are now interacting with “a woman,” and in so doing we create what it means to be “woman.”
Faculty and its subset roles, teacher and researcher, seem to be the necessary result of the development of our society (0). Nevertheless, there is no physical fact or biological necessity for the existence of faculty, teacher, or researcher. Therefore, it may be concluded that faculty, teacher, and researcher are social constructs. Moreover, I am willing to venture that whether or not (2) and (3) hold in regards to the existence of faculty depends a great deal on not just how individual faculty members choose to act but, specifically, on the way society constructs that roll, in essence “writes the script.” This conclusion seems so obvious as to be teleological. Yet, it merits noting if Sirc, Readings, Carter and other like-minded theorists are correct and the university, as an institution, is undergoing significant changes, perhaps for the worse. If the social construct faculty is in the process of being significantly redefined, then, given the vulnerable nature of the population which it serves, we have good reason to concern ourselves with the potential harms of that redefinition.

Hacking’s work does seem to effectively apply to faculty and its constituent roles: they are socially constructed and not biologically or physically inevitable. Thusly, these roles are themselves are not physical. Further insight into their ontological status is warranted, as Hacking’s definition does not seem to account for the fact that social constructs are so easily confusable with physical facts in the world (as is the case with gender). There are things which seem to be supervenient upon the physical world, impact the physical world, and are perhaps confusable with “things in the world” and, yet, themselves lack the physical necessity to be considered physical objects—thus passing Hacking’s test. What then is the ontological status of a role?
What is brought to mind is Gilbert Ryle’s (1949) discussion of mental constructs in his work, *The Concept of Mind*. In it, he describes the fundamental problem of identifying a mind as a Cartesian substance. The tendency, of course, is to treat the mind-object as a physical thing in the world, but one that is just of a different substance kind than the substance constituting the body. This Cartesian dualism, though, leads of course to numerous problems that need not be explicated here. It suffices to say that Ryle identifies a “category mistake” on the part of Descartes in his treatment of the mind as substance as opposed to what can be thought of as a construct of the brain. Simply, it is the same mistake one might make in trying to identify a university as a conglomeration of buildings because the university is thought of as a physical thing (as it has physical effects and we can interact with it physically). Ryle wrote,

A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative offices. He then asks, ‘But where is the University? I have seen where the members of the Colleges live, where the Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and the rest. But I have not yet seen the University in which reside and work the members of your University.’ It has then to be explained to him that the University is not another collateral institution, some ulterior counterpart to the colleges, laboratories and offices which he has seen. The University is just the way in which all that he has already seen is organized. When they are seen and when their coordination is understood, the University has been seen. (p. 6)

What one comes to realize, upon reflection, is that universities are not physical things, despite the buildings. Indeed, we can burn the buildings to the ground and yet the University still exists.
This, though, is not reason to assert that the University is a *spiritual* thing, either. As the University can be killed by ceasing the interaction of its most fundamental components through the exchange of money and knowledge by students and professors, faculty roles are generated by the interaction of faculty, universities, and professional institutions, making them interactions generated themselves by sociocultural constructs that *also* exist as interactions (universities and institutions specifically).

What this means, then, is that the analysis and understanding of these roles that this work seeks cannot be conducted by simply defining the roles as we see fit, nor is it a simple matter of observing the constructs out in the world. It is not illicit, therefore, for the researcher to consult the literature and theorists in order to conceptualize the roles. The roles are conceptual things, and thusly, it is through conceptualizing that the roles will be found. The roles, although enacted out in the world, are not observable things in the world. We can observe people teaching and researching, we can observe the buildings of the university, but we cannot *see* the roles. Rather, we must conceptualize the roles from the interactions of those things. As this work seeks to understand those roles at the earliest possible stage, we cannot begin with the inference of the roles from the observation of people acting out those roles, as we don’t know how to identify them yet as participants in those roles. Simply, we must avoid begging the question. One must ask, “How do I know that the subject is, in fact, fulfilling the role of teacher?” To say, “…Because she is a teacher,” begs the question and assumes that we already have access to and understanding of the role, allowing us to apply that role to subjects in the world. Firstly, therefore, we must understand what roles are, and then ascertain what the roles specific to this
inquiry are, then seek to understand those roles, and then that understanding can be applied to the world for further research purposes.

One might ask if we are, though this process, begging the question by virtue of seeking to tease the roles out from the literature and theorists themselves. This is not the case, however. Because the roles, themselves, are sociocultural constructs rather than physical ones, finding them is a matter of finding out how they are defined. Their ontological status is one of definition rather than physical instantiation. The roles exist as they are defined (perhaps loosely, perhaps inconsistently, perhaps unclearly) by society and by culture, so they are therefore best understood through those definitions generated by the culture that instantiates the roles. The question, then, “Where can these roles be found?” is in the literature that defines the constructs lived by society. The question, “Where are these roles lived?” is best answered, “Out in the world.” Thus, we begin with examination of those thoughts that construct the roles lived by others so that future researchers may examine those lived roles with a construct in hand rather than armed only with the assumption that because the subject is labeled as such, that she is such.

The construct developed here, then, will enable researchers to not only understand the roles better but also to identify if those roles are in fact *not being instantiated by an agent, regardless of the label*. Note that sociocultural constructs are more than labels and are more than ideas. Simply to say, “I have an idea of the Roman Empire” does not instantiate the Roman Empire as it once was in the world. The Roman Empire is more than idea, though it is not reducible to a physical thing. It was the interaction of agents in the world in a particular way; that interaction has ceased, thusly the Roman Empire has also ceased to be. If, then, society has generated the roles under discussion here, then there are those who live it and those who do not.
Some agents may even be under the impression that they instantiate a role, due to a label or simply a misguided belief, but by virtue of the fact that they do not actually interact in such a way as to generate the role, they do not actually fulfill that role. This is not to say that society cannot simply change what definitions are and how roles are best defined. This can be and is done. One must keep in mind, though, that such deep social constructs do not simply turn on a dime. They are thick and rich, and though they may be ever-changing, understanding such constructs requires the understanding the narrative arc of definition and construction that has lead up to the present moment.

What has been established here so far, through examination of the literature, is that “role” is a sociocultural construct. Hacking’s (1999) work presents social constructs as categories that need not exist and are generated by society and culture—they are not physical facts in the world. Faculty roles are sociocultural constructs in the same way that gender is a sociocultural construct. Those roles need not exist; they are not physical nor inevitable. His work also reminds us that sociocultural constructs often can be “bad” insofar as those labels can do harm to their occupants (as in the case with gender). We come to realize, then, that if it is the aim of this dissertation to better understand faculty roles, we must consider the possibility that faculty roles may be similarly harmful.

One then also understands, through the work of Ryle (1949), that social constructs are not just “ideas.” This is an essential realization because it is often our social tendency to ignore social constructs as less important than “physical facts in the world.” Our somewhat positivistic preference for empirical observation and “hard science” can easily lead to the dismissal of social cultural constructs as less powerful or less important. Anecdotally, one might note that recent
acceptance of “gender” as a social construct has resulted, largely, in greater focus on “sex” as a category, as if gender is now less important. The work of theorists like Bordo (1993) and Cixcous (1976) suggests that the converse is true. Gender, as a social construct, has great power and impact on society and the humans that live in and are defined by that society. As Ryle’s work demonstrates, our understanding of “university” as a kind of function does not make the university any less powerful. If anything, the fact that the university is not reducible to its physical parts grants it greater power, ensuring that it will continue to exist even after the current agents who comprise it die off.

Moving forward, then, the understanding and formation of faculty roles, here, requires a better understanding of roles as social construct. These particular kinds of social constructs must be defined before an understanding of those roles can be generated. In this way, the theoretical framework of the dissertation is developed—through the establishment and understanding of role theory. It is upon role theory that the definitions established by this dissertation will rest. The conceptual framework that then will emerge, primarily through the development of the methodology, is grounded in this dissertation’s research paradigm. That paradigm rests on the fundamental assumptions of role theory: there are roles, and those roles are occupied by human agents.

Review of Relevant Research

Origins of Role Theory

To quote Peter Markie (1990), “To be a professor is to occupy a particular institutional role, and that role may be defined by certain duties so that claims attributing those duties to professors are analytic” (134). This definitional-tautological relationship between roles and
duties has its grounding in a sociological theoretical framework known as role theory. That there are persons (actors) who, as a result of the scripted expectations of their duties, perform certain roles is a theatrical metaphor that we may now take for granted, but we must remember that it is a metaphor for understanding human behavior and that the metaphor has its origins somewhere. According to Bruce J. Biddle (1986), discussion of roles began to gain prominence in sociological circles with the work of George Herbert Mead, Ralph Linton, and Jacob Moreno early in the 20th century. Since their work it has been thinkers like Biddle himself who have made role theory a mainstay of sociological research, and contemporary conversation regarding human interaction in society. The assumption that we inhabit roles or play roles is, in fact, relatively new. As Biddle argued, the advent of our understanding of roles as essential to human interaction has its grounding in the developments of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, and psychology.

George Herbert Mead is, perhaps, best known as a philosopher. In addition to his philosophical work, though, he had a profound impact on sociology in the early 20th century (Biddle 1986). Mead’s students collected their class notes and conversations with Mead and published them as Mind, Self, and Society in 1934. The work lays out the foundation for the notion of symbolic interactionism in which reality is understood as a product of social interaction. Through this interaction, reality is constructed by virtue of various social constructs formed by participation in society that produces a construct holism. One can see that the importance of roles emerges out of Mead’s metaphysic as it is the way an agent interacts with others—the role she plays—that generates reality. Even if one is wary of taking on Mead’s metaphysical baggage, the proposition that our social reality, the only world to which we have
epistemic access, is constructed through our interaction with others, seems cogent and
descriptive of human engagement with the world.

Ralph Linton was a particularly influential anthropologist who taught at Yale University. In his 1936 work, *The Study of Man*, Linton engaged the distinctions between *status* and *role*. A role, according to Linton, is understood as a set of behaviors that are associated with one’s status. Thusly, one performs a role by virtue of exhibiting the behaviors correlated to its status. Status itself can be divided, though somewhat loosely, between ascribed status and achieved status. The former being that status that is assigned regardless of one's characteristics or actions and the latter as the result of one’s effort. Roles, then, are understood by virtue of interaction, if one conceives as behaviors as one’s interaction with others, the world, or oneself. Thusly, Mead’s notion and Linton’s notion both locate human interaction with the world as defining of the self.

Jacob Moreno’s work was influential in both psychiatry and in sociology. His introduction of the treatment technique *psychodrama* has had a significant impact on contemporary role theory (Biddle, 1986). The psychodrama requires that clients, as if in theater, play roles, often spontaneously. Moreno reasoned that through the playing of different roles while having to improvise within those roles spontaneously, the client may learn how she can inhabit new and different roles in her life. This understanding of role, as something one plays and inhabits, once again underscores the concept of role as defining selfhood. Note that psychodrama is conducted in a group context as playing a role requires interaction with others. Thusly, we see again the understanding of a role as that which requires interaction with others for instantiation. Without others to whom one may be *some-thing*, one cannot inhabit a role. That “being” requires action and interaction with others in order to both earn status and be ascribed status. The role,
then, is an interactive phenomena generated by agents within a social context that acts as a defining and selfhood-generating device. To quote Biddle (1986),

“Roles” are conceived as the shared, normative expectations that prescribe and explain these behaviors. Actors in the social system have presumably been taught these norms and may be counted upon to conform to norms for their own conduct and to sanction other for conformity to norms applying to the latter. (p. 70)

Thus, role theory has emerged over the last century as a way of understanding human performance through the metaphor of theater. Roles, then, are part of a dialectic—an exchange between actor and actor, actor and script, as well as actor and self.

Perhaps because of its philosophical, psychological, sociological, and anthropological backgrounds, role theory has enjoyed little consensus. Biddle (1986) stated, “Confusion entered role theory because its basic theatrical metaphor was applied only loosely and because its earliest proponents [were]… different in the ways they used role terms” (p. 68). By 1986, Biddle came to describe role theory, in which he played an essential part in developing, as being sufficiently developed, yet, so convoluted that five different perspectives could be discriminated: Functional, Symbolic Interactionist, Structural, Organizational, and Cognitive. Although the differences between perspectives appear substantial, Biddle argued that “the problem is more terminological than substantive” (p. 68). He also argued that although theorists differ in the “assumptions they build into basic concepts, they are largely similar in philosophic orientation and in methods used for research” (p. 69). Specifically, Biddle held that it was expectation, more than anything else, that undergirds role theory: “Most versions of role theory presume that expectations are the major generators of roles, that expectations are learned through experiences, and that persons are
aware of the expectations they hold” (69). As such, the presumption is that humans are socially engaged reflectively and thoughtfully.

**Expectations**

In his earlier text *Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors*, Biddle (1979) explained expectations as relevant to his concept of role theory. He argued that expectations were a means by which to explain why roles persist even if the role isn’t “facilitated, rewarded, or reinforced in any obvious way” (p. 115). The role theorists, argued Biddle, suggest that the agent acts as she does because of “shared expectations:”

Thus, family members “expect” the father to work in an office and the mother to cook meals and succor children, whereas both spectators and players “expect” the audience to cheer at a football match and would be surprised if they did so in church. (p. 115)

These expectations form over time due to prior experience and represent, suggested Biddle, the meaningful whole constructed by the agent in order to make sense of those experiences. Therefore, “expectation connotes awareness, thus suggesting that persons are phenomenally alive and rational in their orientations to events” (p. 116). It is important to note that Biddle was not clear by what he means when he wrote, “rational.” I suggest that this rationality cannot mean that the agent is logical and consistent in her engagement with role expectations; otherwise, the notion of role conflict would be largely meaningless. Rather, *rational* means that the agent is engaged in the world cognitively, not just physically, as a behaviorist or a functionalist may explain human action (Biddle, 1979, p. 120).

Biddle (1979) argued that the understanding of expectations emerges from the dramaturgical notion in three stages. Firstly, there are the analogous scripts, those written forms
of rules. These occur in literate societies in the form of codebooks, laws, and rules of conduct. Secondly, spoken injunctions emerge as models for behavior. Ceremonial occasions in which rules are memorized and repeated *en masse* exemplify this stage. The Catholic tradition of reciting as a community the *Profession of Faith* is an example of spoken injunctions. Finally, there is the notion of “expectation in the mind of the performer. The journeyman carpenter builds a beautiful cabinet not because written instructions have been given him (or her) nor because of injunctions spoken by others, but rather because of his own internalized standards” (p. 117). From these stages much of the rest of our understanding of expectations can be derived.

Biddle (1979) noted that a series of assumptions emerge from the stages above that themselves must be teased out and examined. One recognizes that we have assumed that expectations are *sanctioned*, or approved of by others. We also assume that there is *correspondence*, insofar as the injunctions themselves match. Therefore, to make sense of role theory there must be *phenomenal equivalence*—the correspondence of the written or spoken injunction must also be equivalent to a phenomenally similar experience by the objects of expectations—thus generating the assumption that those who experience those expectations *conform*. Through all of this one can also infer that expectations are *formed simply*; the process is one of experience of assimilation to internalized shared expectation.

Expectations, then, can be further categorized. There are *overt expectations*. Those expectations are enunciated, so Biddle (1979) referred to them as *enunciations*. Enunciations are so sufficiently clear and understood that they can be stated. This does not mean that they *are* stated or written down. For example, in the discussion in chapter 4 there will be both discussion of enunciated expectations as made clear by faculty handbooks. Some expectations are written
down and are clearly inscribed as clear requirements for professorship. One must, for example, take attendance in class. That expectation, though is inscribed as well as enunciated. Others, however are only enunciated. The handbook may require that teachers show respect for students. The action actions though involved in “showing respect” are too numerous to list. Thus the inscribed expectation of “show respect” also includes the enunciated expectation (one so clear that it could be said) “do not slap your student’s in the face with old fish.” Covert expectations, however, either are unknown or we refrain from enunciating for some reason. Biddle (1979) wrote,

Our personal experience suggests that sometimes we hold an expectation but do not utter it. Moreover, it appears likely to us that others also hold expectations covertly. Consider the mother who threatens and then later punishes her children for not cleaning their plates at dinner time. We may also observe that she rewards her children when they do clean their plates, is careful to clean her own plate, avoids serving foods that seem to cause difficulty, discusses the matter with her husband, or is observed to consult a book on child psychology for advice. These several actions become explicable when we assume that the mother thinks her children should clean their plates. In short, we posit the existence of a covert expectation in her mind in terms of which she takes action. (p. 120)

It is for this reason that behaviorism and role theory are largely incompatible. Covert expectations cannot be observed and they assume a reasoning consciousness behind the eyes of the actor. Moreover, one need not assume that even the actor herself is aware of her covert expectations as contemporary psychoanalysis would suggest. One may find oneself disappointed that a date does not offer to pay his or her portion of a dinner check, only to realize after the fact,
that this expectation was harbored—indeed, it may well be that the actor does not realize the expectation is harbored until it is unveiled during conversation with friends or a counselor. Thus, in order to make sense of our application of role theory we must assume that others have internal states that are not observable, and, as such, we can then infer that everything we observe in terms of roles (such as written codes, behaviors, and enunciations) may be insufficient for explaining human behavior. Simply, we may find that there are tensions between roles: though no clear contradiction is enunciated, it may be inferred, implied, and covertly harbored.

There are, of course, also written expectations. Biddle (1979) distinguished between these and enunciations because spoken injunctions are fleeting and “have only a transitory effect on the environment” (p. 121). However, inscriptions—written expectations—in effect “bind time, and the person who inscribes his or her thoughts in the public record has earned a form of immortality impossible in the preliterate society” (p. 121). For numerous reasons, Biddle’s conclusion, here, seems hasty. Certainly the arguments forwarded in Plato’s Phaedrus suggest that writing does not necessarily capture the truth of the author’s intent for posterity—rather, writing enables others to subsume and adjust the thoughts of others as they see fit. Further, I suggest that the power of dialectic is unintentionally underestimated by Biddle’s statements above. The reverberatory power of spoken word, whether passed on through Homeric repetition or as an ocean current through a gathered crowd, the transitory effect of the spoken word through dialectic is also its force. Thus, an analysis of roles would be sorely under evidenced if it only examined the written expectations and ignored those enunciations articulated between subjects, behind closed doors, and through implication.
For the purpose of further clarity, Biddle distinguished between “subject persons” and “object persons” (1979, p. 122). Subject persons are those who enunciate or hold an expectation of another (including oneself). Object persons are those “whose characteristics are at issue in the expectation” (p. 122). Biddle went on to clarify,

The subject person is a real, observable human being. The object person appears only as a referenced identity and may not be present, may have lived only in the past (or will live in the future), or may even be fictitious—from our viewpoint as social analysts. (p. 122-123)

Biddle gave no reason for the requirement that the subject person must be a human rather than an institution. This is one reason why Wickham and Parker (2007) went through pains to conceptualize role theory for contemporary role contexts. The comedy that is contemporary politics aside, there is certainly a current trend toward the understanding of institutions such as corporations as “persons.” The world of Peter French (1995) suggests this understanding may not be wholly insane if corporations are understood as actors that can self-reflectively consider their wellbeing into the future and, moreover, act to pursue that wellbeing. Thus, given the contemporary understanding of corporations, it may well be that “subject person” may be a term applicable to institutions, or perhaps even societies, that themselves hold expectations of others.

Biddle (1979) went on to discriminate between individual and shared expectations. “Those expectations that are held uniquely by a single subject person are individual expectations, whereas those that correspond among subjects are termed shared expectations” (p. 123). The application of these two notions helps explain human behaviors when there is a disagreement between the individual expectation maintained by a subject person and the shared
expectations held, for example, by a family unit. Tension can be generated by the limits of the social system, which do not allow for the sharing of expectations across boundaries.

Of particular importance when engaging the roles generated by societies and institutions is the distinction between personal expectations and positional expectations. Personal expectations are held for specific object persons such as Nicolas Michaud. Positional expectations are held for object person positions such as graduate students. Thus Biddle argued that there are three distinctions commonly made for types of expectations: individual versus shared, personal versus positional, and expectations for self versus expectations for other.

Expectations as understood in role theory are modal. They can, argued Biddle (1979), take on the quality of expressing a prescription, cathexis, or a description. Those expectations that take on the prescriptive mode are normative and express how the subject should or should not react—“Suzie should or should not…”. Expectations are in the cathexis mode if they express the feeling about a characteristic—“I do not like it when Suzie…” Those that seem to offer an objective statement about the characteristic are descriptive—“Suzie did her job.” The descriptive mode can also take on the quality of past, present or future. Biddle, then, uses those modes to generate a chart into which different expressions of an expectation can be depicted:

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prescriptions</th>
<th>Cathexis</th>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I should</td>
<td>I like</td>
<td>I have</td>
<td>I am</td>
<td>I will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I should not</td>
<td>I dislike</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>She should</td>
<td>I like her action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>She should not</td>
<td>I dislike her action</td>
<td>She did</td>
<td>She does</td>
<td>She will</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Modes of Personal Expectation  Adapted from Biddle, 1979, p. 125
Different implications result from the different modes of expectations. Statements of prescription may indicate consequentiality, so one may infer that the object understands what may occur if a certain action is taken. Cathexis may imply that certain rewards or punishments have been experienced in conjunction with particular characteristics, while present-tense descriptions suggest a stability over time. Biddle, though, did not generate such a chart for positional expectations.

Biddle (1979) did confirm that the above modes are entirely arbitrary and that expectations could be classified under different sets of modes. He wrote,

In the long run, however, the discrimination of three modes appears to be based on semantic features that occur frequently in Western languages. When we speak of the characteristics of others or ourselves, we often discriminate those things we believe in from those we advocate and those that would please us. There is no intrinsic reason why additional modes should not be discriminated. (p. 130)

In addition to underscoring the way language generates the world and our ability to understand it, Biddle’s assertion above suggests that it may be possible to generate a similar chart for positional expectations by considering the modes that are emphasized in English when discussing what might be considered the expectations of institutional persons. In fact, a similar chart of modes may then be developed that diverges little from Biddle’s own, as exemplified below:
Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prescriptions</th>
<th>Consequentiality</th>
<th>Descriptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We should</td>
<td>We are rewarded</td>
<td>We have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should not</td>
<td>We are punished</td>
<td>We are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They should</td>
<td>We reward when</td>
<td>They did</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They should not</td>
<td>We punish when</td>
<td>They do</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Modes of Positional Expectation

In the chart above, the only difference from Biddle’s original depiction is the replacement of singular pronouns with plural to either indicate the community of subjects that constitute an institution (We) or the community of objects that constitute the positional role (They) and the replacement of consequentiality for cathexis. Consequentiality is a mode that Biddle (1979) himself notes is a potential expectation mode. In order to avoid concerns that institutions cannot themselves experience like or dislike, the emphasis, rather, is on behavioristic reward and punishment. A philosopher such as Peter French may then infer something similar to affective states on the part of an institution from behaviors that seem to demonstrate cathexis, but consequentiality meets many of the same categorical needs without engaging metaphysical debate on the ontological statues of an institution’s feelings.

Contemporary Work in Role Theory

As previously mentioned, according to Biddle (1986), five perspectives have emerged as role theory has developed. Although these five perspectives are understood by Biddle as largely differing only terminologically, understanding the fundamental differences between them proves useful. Although they are all grounded in expectation, as stated above, they may be said to differ in a philosophical sense in the way they use roles to explain human behavior.
*Functional Role Theory*

Functional role theory emerges from Lindon’s work. Focusing on the “characteristic behaviors of persons who occupy social positions within a stable social system,” roles are understood as a shared and normative experience (Biddle, 1986, p. 70). Thus the functional perspective is particularly useful when addressing questions of positional roles. Bates and Harvey described social structures as “collections of designate social positions, the shared norms which govern differentiated behaviors” (Biddle, 1986, p. 70). Thus one might argue, from a functionalist perspective, that universities are essentially their collection of faculty, student, and administrator roles and the shared norms that govern the behavior of those positions. Functional role theory, however, is not as popular as it once was due to its emphasis on positions, as many roles do not have a position with which they are associated (Biddle, 1986, p. 70).

*Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory*

The symbolic interactionist perspective can been seen in direct connection to Mead’s work. It emphasizes individual agents who, through social interaction, interpret their own and others’ behaviors (Biddle, 1986, p. 71). “Actual roles, then, are thought to reflect norms, attitudes, contextual demands, negotiation, and the evolving definition of the situation as understood by the actors” (Biddle, 1986, p. 71). This places symbolic interactionist role theory in a far better position to understand roles that themselves are not positional, and, rather seems to understand roles as part of a social dialectic. The difficulty, suggested Biddle (1986), is that the symbolic interactionist is often guilty of using “fuzzy and inapplicable definitions” as well as ignoring empirical research findings (p. 72). This same fuzziness, though, enables the symbolic interactionist to continue to understand roles of actors in positions beyond the expectations.
expressed by an institution by considering the role as a construct produced by a manifold and constantly evolving organism.

**Structural Role Theory**

Conversely, another perspective that has its genesis in Linton’s work is *Structural Role Theory*, which rejects the amorphous quality of symbolic interactionist role theory. Structural role theory is a mathematically expressed, axiomatic theory that focuses on structured role relationships. The structuralist seeks to identify patterned behaviors that are directed toward persons or sets of persons (Biddle, 1986, p. 73). Sympathetic to the structured nature of explicit logic, structural role theory avoids many of the fuzzy pitfalls of role theory in general. This avoidance of vagueness, though, tends to cause the structuralism to avoid investigation and discussion of phenomenal experience, which is, argued Biddle, (1986) part of the broad appeal of role theory.

**Organizational Role Theory**

Most empirical research utilizing role theory has taken place from the perspective of organizational role theory (Biddle, 1986). The organizational role theorist is particularly interested in the development and structure of organizations. “Roles in such organizations are assumed to be associated with identified social positions and to be generated by normative expectations” (Biddle, 1986, p. 73). Because organizational roles, though, are generated by numerous groups (formal associations, informal groups, society at large) and by multiple role participation, organizational role theory understands agents as often subjected to *role conflicts*. Biddle notes that organizational role theory “implies that organizations are rational, stable entities, that all conflicts within them are merely role conflicts, and that the participant will
inevitably be happy and productive once role conflict is resolved” (1986, p. 74). As the focus of this dissertation is on the university as an organization, organizational role theory seems apropos. Biddle’s criticism, though, must be kept in mind. The roles played by actors are not reducible to constructs developed by institutions; the roles themselves are occupied by reflective agents who may experience and express expectations in a multitude of ways.

*Cognitive Role Theory*

Cognitive role theory, like organizational role theory, is also a perspective taken in much empirical research (Biddle, 1986). Of particular interest is the development of techniques for measuring expectations, and measurement of the impact of those expectations on social conduct. Cognitive role theory has within it numerous subfields, including studies addressing the effectiveness of role playing in psychotherapy, understanding the behavior of group norms and the roles of leaders and followers, and research on *role taking* based on the work of Mead and Piaget (Biddle, 1986). Interpretations of role taking have included the assumption that “this term refers to the degree to which persons attribute sophisticated thoughts to others” (p. 75). Cognitive role theory, however, is criticized for failing to take into account the importance of social positioning in favor of focus on the individual.

Biddle’s work tends to lend itself to empirical study. Despite numerous criticisms, role theory remains useful as a means by which to generate a narrative of interaction through the metaphor of the theatrical stage. Biddle, himself, noted that role theory, thus far, has failed to generate a set of propositions regarding human behavior about which there is consensus amongst role theorists (1986, p. 86). This potential weakness of the system is also a potential strength. As long as one does not posit some sort of ontological *Truth* about role theory, role theory remains a
useful means by which to *understand* why actors act as they do. The review of Biddle’s work suggests that role theory is a useful narrative. The weakness that there are numerous perspectives is, in fact, again a potential strength. One must posit different perspectives in order to engage a fruitful dialogue. Thus, consideration of numerous narrative perspectives which all ground their understanding in their narrative that human agents are participants in social context that, as a result of experience, produce expectations, produces a broad dialectic.

*Role Conflict*

Expectations, though constitutive of roles, can be contradictory. This fact is of particular interest to this dissertation. A role, such as faculty, may be comprised of other roles, such as teacher and researcher. These sub-roles, though, exist as constituted by sets of expectations. Reason suggests that these expectations cannot be identical sets—otherwise there would be no need to differentiate the roles. It may be, though, that the expectation sets comprising constitutive sub-roles themselves may be consistent with each other—none of them negate any of the others. If they are consistent it may also be that they are coherent, if by *coherent* we mean they are consistent *and* they imply each other, support each other, or are intuitively constructive in conjunction with each other. Conversely, the sets of roles may conflict with each other. The sets may be internally inconsistent by virtue of negating each other definitionally, or externally inconsistent through an implied consequence that is, itself, incommensurable with expectations within a constitutive set. Similarly, constitutive role expectation sets may be internally incoherent by virtue of being consistent, and, yet, having no connection to each other or by virtue of being externally incoherent by producing an agent whose behaviors are consistent, yet have no relationship to each other. Internal and external inconsistency of expectations are called *role*
conflict defined by Biddle (1979): “Role conflict is said to occur when someone is subjected to two or more contradictory expectations whose stipulations the person cannot simultaneously meet in behavior” (p. 160).

James Montgomery (2005) attempted to logicize problems of role conflict. His work specifically focuses on problems of contradiction in self-concept. His system falls into the category of structural role theory as he sought to formulize roles and actor behavior. He wrote, “[B]ecause it cannot admit logical contradictions, standard logic is an inappropriate model of human reasoning in real-world social systems where individuals experience role conflict as a consequence of inconsistent roles, norms, and constraints” (p. 34). Thus, Montgomery used non-monotonic logic to generate a model of actor behavior that allows for change as a result of contradiction. Simply, rather than a collapse of the system due to the introduction of a contradiction, non-monotonic logic mimics common-sense reasoning and allows “tentative derivations that may be retracted in light of new information” (p. 34). This suggests that role conflict experienced by human agents does not result in a collapse of their rational system—rather those contradictions may result only in a shift of behavior or may go unnoticed until the contradiction itself is articulated coming into the focus of an agent’s practical reason.

Montgomery’s (2005) work suggests that that agent’s very self-concept is constantly revised as the result of interaction with contradiction. Individuals, due to self-concepts and norms, choose actions that observers use to make attributions about the individual (p. 34). Thus, a feedback loop of self-absorption is generated, in which the agent assimilates the attributions of others into the self-concept, revises, and then takes further actions that produce observer attribution that themselves are then assimilated (pp. 46-50). Thus, the experience of role-conflict
propels the agent forward through a series of behavior corrections aimed at a consistent self-concept. He wrote,

My analysis has focused on the long-run ‘absorbing selves’ generated by the social system. The central result is that absorbing selves exist only when norms are logically consistent. Intuitively, logical inconsistencies in the normative system permit multiple attributions, undermining the stability of the self. (p. 67)

A balance is achieved by the absorbing self that adjusts to new attributions and changes in norms as long as they remain consistent. Inconsistency, however, produces an instability that does not result, necessarily, in the explosion of irrationality described by formal logic, but rather in a lack of balance in the self-concept.

Montgomery (2005) did not address the psychological implications of an imbalanced self-concept. As is the case with much structural role theory and formulized logical exploration in general, focus is given largely to syntactic issues, leaving the semantics for others to engage. His work suggests, though, that while a Charles Taylor-esque broken personhood may not result from the introduction of inconsistent norms into the framework of an agent’s self-concept, an unstable personhood may. Instability, in this case, seems to mean the state of seeking consistency. The imbalanced self seeks balance, likely through an attempt to identify those norms which must be ignored, changed, or eliminated.

Further, although understated by Montgomery (2005), I suggest that the unstable self may experience a great deal of psychological turmoil. If Montgomery is correct and the absorbing-self is one who exists in a kind of norm-action equilibrium with her environment, then the unstable self does not experience such equilibrium. Moreover, if the stable self is an absorbing self,
capable of assimilating attributions in a way that makes sense to her and producing actions that themselves result in attribution that she can consistently assimilate, then the unstable self may exist in a state of *impermeability*. Simply, she cannot assimilate the attributions of others without conflict with the norms that comprise her self-concept, and, thereby, cannot interact with the world in a way that allows forward movement of her self-concept. Montgomery’s work seems to suggest that the unstable self becomes a stagnant agent, unable to effectively engage the environment until a consistent input-output balance is achieved. The person may not be *broken*, but she is *immobilized*.

Role theory, then, provides a means by which to understand relationships between human actors and the world in which they live. Role theory provides an understanding of the social forces that direct human action and expectations. One can, for instance, hypothesize that particular actions by an actor are the result of “role conflict.” Moreover, one may use role theory in a predictive way, hypothesizing that unless such conflict is resolved, broken personhood may result. Role theory, by no means, provides exhaustive accounts, nor necessarily, given the many forms of role theory, consistent accounts of human action. It does provide, however, multi-variant ways of understanding human actions that are useful as analog devices. If one can access the script and the actor’s understanding of the script, one may generate an analogous understanding of why the actor acts as she does. For this reason, role theory has proven useful in examinations of the interactions of actors within institutions, particularly when there is conflict.

*Applications in Role Theory*

In order to better understand role theory and the ways in which it may or may not apply to the university paradigm, current examples of role theory as used in research are warranted.
Two particular cases will be explicated here, one in which role theory is applied to a care-oriented profession, healthcare, and one in which it is applied to a corporation. Not only does this research then provide us with an understanding of the ways in which role theory can be used as a conceptual framework for research and analysis; additionally, these two studies fit two prevailing paradigms in universities: that of care and that of business. Given the research (Readings 1996; Carter 2004) that suggests that universities are becoming increasingly businesslike, we cannot reasonably only consider role theory as it applies to educational expectations and other care-oriented paradigms. In order to understand the role of faculty, one must also consider the way role theory helps develop understanding of those who work in business, as the university is also a business enterprise.

In “Role theory: A framework to investigate the community nurse role in contemporary health care systems” (2007), Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb investigated nurses’ perceptions of their roles. They define role theory as “a conceptual framework that defines how individuals behave in social situations and how these behaviors are perceived by external observers” (p. 146). The aim of Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb’s research was to establish whether role theory is an effective means by which to understand nurses’ roles in contemporary health care. They hinged their research on the work of Schuler, Aldag, and Brief (1977), arguing that “role theory can also serve as a conceptual framework in which to relate the properties of the organizations and the individual.” In this way, their research serves an excellent example of contemporary application, rather than theorization, of role theory.

Through their application of role theory as a conceptual framework, Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb (2007) first established that the “nursing role” can encapsulate several
discrete tasks: personal caretaker, clinician, educator, manager, administrator, and researcher (p. 147). Note that these tasks, themselves, may be understood as sub roles within the “nursing role.” The application of role theory is used by the researchers specifically to establish how the nursing role is established. They came to understand it through a “role episode” (Thomas & Biddle, 1966): “A role episode is a cycle of role sending, a response by the focal person, and the effects of that response on the role senders” (Brookes, Davison, Daly, & Halcomb, 2007, p. 149). Nurses, then, are understood by the researchers as role occupants who receive a sent role.

Role senders have particular expectations and anticipations of the role occupant’s response to the role expectations, in the case of Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb (2007), such a role sender may be a community nurse overseeing the role occupant. That supervisor has particular expectations of the role occupant that themselves comprise the “sent role.” Having received the “sent role,” the nurse/role occupant performs the role as enacted through behavior. That performance is judged by social norms, rules, demands, and the expectations of the role sender as well as society at large (p. 150). “In essence, this ‘role episode’ or ‘role negotiation’ is real-life behavior with all the complexities of genuine social situations” (p. 150). Simply, they argue that the role occupant does not just enact the role set, but, rather, participates with the other actors in creating a dynamic and ever shifting role interaction. In this way, the definition of a “mutually satisfactory definition of the role” is collaborative (p. 150).

Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb (2007) focused particularly on role conflict to help further develop understanding of nurse actors. They suggested that role conflict emerges when incompatible roles are required of the actor: “In meeting one set of expectations, the role occupant is unable to meet the expectations of another group” (p. 150). Further, the researchers
focused on a specific form of role conflict defined by Burke, et al. (1991). “Role overload” exists when the demands of a particular role exceed the individual’s capacity to undertake the given role” (Brookes, Davison, Daly, & Halcomb, 2007, p. 150). The role occupant understands what is required but lacks the ability to perform the role due to limitations on time, skill level, education or other such factors. In application to nurses, the researchers wrote,

This might occur when a newly graduated nurse is allocated a clinical case with a level of complexity beyond their clinical competence or when an experienced nurse with a complex clinical case load is given additional administrative duties and is unable to complete both aspects of the role. (p. 150)

Role problems can also arise, argued Brookes, Davison, Daly, & Halcomb (2007), when a role is ambiguous. Role ambiguity is understood as a lack of clarity regarding projected roles and expectations (Major, 2003; Schuler et al. 2007). Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb (2007) provided the following example of such role conflict caused by role ambiguity: “the traditional role and scope of practice of community nurses has become threatened by the increasing numbers of specialist services and there is an increasing potential for service duplication and conflict (p. 151). Simply, nurses may not understand what their expectations are.
It seems, in their example, that role ambiguity arises not just because of a lack of clarity on the part of the role sender, but because there may be a lack of clarity regarding the role sender itself. One may be unsure who the role sender actually is. In this way, role conflict and ambiguity may find themselves intertwined. The role occupant may be unsure as to which set of expectations to follow and conflict arises when those expectations are inconsistent with each other.

Both of these notions—role conflict and role ambiguity—may provide greater understanding of faculty roles as well. Understanding that role conflict may exist if the faculty roles of teacher and researcher require inconsistent acts would be revealing and concerning. It may also be the case that there is ambiguity regarding role expectations or role senders. Should occupant of the “teacher” role focus primarily on the expectations sent by students and professional associations, but researchers focus primarily on the expectations of the public at large and the institution? It may well be that such ambiguity leads to role conflict as well. If students send the expectation that faculty place their welfare first, but the institution expects that faculty will fail, regardless of pedagogical intervention, a certain percentage of students, then role conflict arises. Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Holcomb (2007) described the result of such conflicts and ambiguity in health care as “role stress and role strain” (p. 152).

According to Hardy and Conway (1998), role stress is a social condition in which the obligations of the role are poorly defined, conflicting, or impossible to meet. “Role stress precipitates role strain that manifests itself in frustration, tension or anxiety” (Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Holcomb, 2007, p. 152). Such role stress and strain may result in severe problems for an institution. “When role strain is prevalent, dissatisfied tension-ridden healthcare workers may be drained of energy and commitment to both the organization and their professional values” (p.
Certainly, then one may be concerned that potential role conflict between “teacher” and “researcher” leads to the above described problems. If it is the case that such role strain exists among faculty, perhaps by the very nature of the roles defined for them, then role theory provides a potential explanatory device for faculty actions. If, for example, there is an increase in unethical activity among faculty, role theory may suggest that it is due to the decrease in the commitment to organizational and professional values described above. Note that, as discussed in chapter 1, such an increase has been observed.

As a result of both the understanding developed of nurse roles through the application of role theory and the predictive power of role theory (particularly through the notions of role conflict and role stress) Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb (2007) argued that role theory is an effective means by which to understand nurse behavior. Moreover, role theory provides a means by which to understand role changes. To quote, “From a structuralist perspective, the role of the community nurse in Australia has evolved significantly over the last fifty years” (p. 153). That structuralist perspective enables researchers to make claims regarding why the role has changed: “The community nurse role has responded to social, political and economic perspectives together with changes in both global and national healthcare management” (p. 153). Moreover, they can make claims as to how such role changes explain changes in actor behavior: “An understanding of role perceptions and interactions can assist in the advancement of professional issues decreasing role conflict and role burden” (p. 153). As a result, the researchers suggested the need for further exploration and testing of models based on role theory in order to better “facilitate the professional development of community nurses” (p. 153). Such exploration
and conceptual testing of faculty models is the primary goal of this dissertation in order to better understand the best means by which to instantiate the role “faculty.”

Marginson and Bui (2009), in their “Examining the human cost of multiple expectations,” used a survey of middle-level managers to show that role conflict can lead to a decrease in performance. They considered, through field research, a series of coping strategies that may help alleviate the stress of such role conflict. In their analysis they suggest that “positive outcomes may result from establishing forces for ‘creative innovation’ alongside ‘predictable goal attainment’” (p. 59). It is important to note that these positive outcomes only resulted in cases in which the manager was able to “cope with multiple, conflicting role expectations” (p. 59). Their research, thus, to some degree suggests that the best way of alleviating the stress of role conflict is to hire managers who are good at dealing with role conflict.

Marginson and Bui (2009) argued that managers often confront multiple, often conflicting, role expectations. Moreover, they noted that managers are often expected to react positively to multiple, yet contrasting, role expectations. Such conflicts, the prevailing paradigm of business suggests, lead to “creative innovations” and “fruitful dynamic tensions” (p. 60). A manager may be required, for example, to acquire material that is unavailable through normal channels while at the same time being prohibited from using anything other than normal channels (Kahn et al., 1964, p. 20). Thus, the manager may find a way to acquire the material, but her stress results from the fact that said acquisition may be either dubbed “innovative” or “illegal” depending on the judgment of the role sender.

It is important to note, here, that the role stress experienced by the role occupant is in part the result of the inability to predict the response of the role sender in the role cycle. Because
there is a contradiction inherent to the expectations themselves, any response may result. In a philosophical sense this is known as “explosion.” Contractions, propositions such that both “A” and “Not A” are held to be true result in an infinite number of possible responses. To place the problem in ordinary language, if I am told to both write my dissertation in its entirety and not to write it at all, my response becomes difficult to predict because any response is warranted. I cannot tell if the expectation requires that I do or do not write my dissertation.¹ In the case of a manager who is required to take on conflicting roles, she cannot predict with any certainty the response of the role sender. The manager may examine the role of the sender and attempt to best articulate which expectations are associated with that role (Is my supervisor occupying a role that is more rule based or “innovative”?) but she cannot be sure. Either action may result in either dire consequence or significant reward, hence the role stress.

Such role conflict, argued Margison and Bui (2009), begins as objective role conflict but becomes psychological role conflict. “Psychological role conflict arises when the manager perceives objective role conflict and assesses that failure to comply with conflicting expectations may have potential negative consequences” (p. 61). Margison and Bui argued that psychological role conflict can lead to significantly diminished performance on the part of the individual actor. Resultant effects may include “job dissatisfaction, a perceived inability to influence decision-making, an unfavorable attitude toward the superior, and lower levels of reported performance” (p. 62). Khan (1974) argued that such psychological role conflict can harm one’s health. Moreover, as argued above in the discussion of Montgomery (2005), it can lead to a sense of broken personhood.

¹ See the work of Graham Priest for more detailed analysis on the problem of “explosion” and potential solutions to violations of the law of non-contradiction.
Margison and Bui (2009) collected data from a survey of managers of a major telecommunications corporation. In so doing they tested two hypotheses:

**H1:** Combining expectations of innovation with expectations of budget-goal attainment increases psychological role conflict, leading to a decrease in performance.

And

**H2:** Combining expectations of empowerment with expectations of budget-goal attainment increases psychological role conflict, leading to a decrease in performance. (p. 63)

Additionally, the researchers engaged in field study in order to better understand the organizational structure and hierarchy. The survey results were measured using qualitative analysis techniques in addition to the inclusion of in-person interviews with managers and narrative analysis. Kahn et al.’s (1964) instrument to measure role conflict was used to access the results of the survey for correlation at a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.71. The result of their factor analysis and SEM results present “significant path coefficients” suggesting modestly high reliability and internal consistency (p. 71). The survey then suggests a significant interactive effect on role conflict and an indirect negative effect on performance. The results also suggest that, aside from budget-goal attainment, expectations alone have no statistically significant impact on levels of role conflict. Thus, hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported.

The results of the interviews also supported the above conclusion, according to Margison and Bui (2009). Managers reported making budget “trade-offs” in order to meet the need for innovation. Those managers who were capable of making such tradeoffs described themselves as having low levels of psychological conflict. Those who were capable and willing to make such tradeoffs were also the ones who reported and were shown to be the highest performing
managers. The researchers reported, “Our study contributes evidence to suggest that... high performing managers may be better able to cope with multiple, conflicting role expectations involving budget-goal attainment” (p. 75). At no point in their research did Margison and Bui suggest that a potential solution to such objective role conflict and psychological role conflict may be generating consistent expectations of managers. Thus, their research supports that role conflict can lead to low performance, but also supports the best means by which to improve performance is to hire managers who demonstrate the ability to cope with conflicting role expectations.

One wonders, though, if such recommendations address the heart of the problem. Is the best means by which to deal with role stress hiring people who are good at dealing with that stress. If anything, this seems to suggest a kind of social comfort with the idea that agents should act in inconsistent ways. Such comfort is especially disconcerting in care professions, such as healthcare and teaching. I remain unconvinced that the best solution to the potential conflicts generated by inconsistent researcher and faculty roles is hiring faculty who are comfortable with harming students when the institution demands it while at the same time occupying a role in which the students as role sender expect to be treated benevolently. It would seem that such solutions, if anything, are likely to encourage deception and duplicity.

Biddle’s (1997) work seems to demonstrate that it is best if institutions provide consistent roles. Recall that Khan (1974) argued that such role conflicts can lead to health problems. It is of importance to note, then, the significant difference between the ways of dealing with role conflict between the healthcare paradigm and the management paradigm. In their 2007 research, Brookes, Davidson, Daly, and Holcomb suggested that the role sender should address the
concern of conflicting expectations. There is no discussion of hiring those nurses who are better able to deal with inconsistent expectations. In the corporate paradigm, however, Marginson and Bui (2007) made no mention of role senders assessing their inconsistent expectations and instead suggest that higher performance is correlated to the ability of managers to cope with differing expectations.

French’s (1995) discussion of Corporate Internal Decision (CID) structures illuminates the way differing institutions may address questions of inconsistency in role expectations. The CID structure is the summation of corporate policy, stated objectives, unstated objectives, and other such rules that comprise the decision making process of the corporation. Although new agents may enter and exit the corporation, the CID structure largely stays the same, as it is the foundational organizational belief set that governs the behavior of the institution. If the CID structure requires that its managers be both willing to be innovative and yet follow the rules, then the inconsistency is at the very heart of the corporation itself. If, on the other hand, the CID structure is care-centered and places the welfare of individuals as a primary concern of the institution, then such inconsistencies are undesirable if they lead to psychological role conflict as described by Khan (1974).

Note that while community nursing is not a corporation, it is an institution, which may also have a CID structure. Social institutions and vocations may not often be as explicitly defined by a written CID, yet they are governed by a series of norms and rules both explicit and implicit to the institution. It seems that Brookes, Davidson, Daly, and Halcomb’s (2007) research indicates that the flexibility of such institutional CID structures might be at the heart of the emerging role conflicts. Unlike a business CID structure, which may be more explicitly stated, a
community CID structure may change with the personalities that instantiate it, as it is not as clearly defined through written pronouncements, goals, and corporate philosophies. Thus, as the institution changes, new personalities occupy supervisory roles, new expectations may arise that conflict with old expectations or current expectations. The ideas put forth by Brookes, Davison, Daly, and Halcomb (2007) seem to suggest that such ambiguity is potentially harmful and the institution would do well to clarify its expectations.

Perhaps a bit disconcertingly, corporate CID structures may well be built with an assumed inconsistency. Whereas the more flexible CID structures of community organizations may result in greater numbers of role conflicts, the notion that inconsistency, particularly when it may bring harm to others, is undesirable provides industries such as health care with imperatives to remove the inconsistency. Conversely, the nature of corporations to embrace inconsistency in order to maximize profit while simultaneously maximizing efficiency and benefit does not result in an initial inclination to address the inconsistency at the heart of conflicting roles. Rather, the solution becomes to hire those who can deal with such conflict. Note, however, that Margison and Bui’s (2009) research suggests that managers who are most capable of coping with such role conflict know when to make tradeoffs. Simply, they know that they cannot meet both sets of expectations fully and are capable of—perhaps comfortable with—failing to meet those expectations. Certainly, this kind of risk-taking behavior is at the core of business and profit making, and may not be inherently harmful.

We must consider, though, in the context of this dissertation, if such tradeoffs are desirable if the roles of teacher and researcher lead to role conflict. Is the best solution one that matches the paradigm of health care, thusly suggesting that we change the institutional
requirements, or one that matches the paradigm of business, suggesting that we hire those who
are comfortable making tradeoffs? The obvious concern is how often such tradeoffs can lead to
unethical behavior. In the context of Margison and Bui’s (2009) research, such tradeoffs were
often in terms of budget. The manager was willing to risk lower profit in order to meet a long-
term goal or expectation. Making such tradeoff making may not always necessarily be so
innocuous. Consider the case of the Ford Pinto. The trade off in that case came at the cost of
human lives. Ford, once having conducted a cost/benefit analysis, determined that the tradeoff
should be paying lawsuit damages rather than recalling the explosive automobile. From the
perspective of the corporation, the tradeoff was entirely a financial one: should one take the cost
of refitting the bumpers or should one take the cost of paying lawsuits of families who lose loved
ones? That financial cost, though less in the case of the lawsuits, is not necessarily justifiable
ethically; moreover, it was likely inconsistent with the corporate philosophies espoused by the
corporation CID structure.

Consider recent allegations against General Motors (GM). With little difficulty, a brief
online web search locates numerous community initiative pages from 2001-2010, a time in
which the company repeatedly asserts its vested interest in the welfare of its consumers. Yet, at
the same time, the corporation was knowingly producing cars that did not meet safety
standards—resulting in numerous deaths. Such violation of their own claims to beneficence seem
only possible if their CID structure itself allows for contradiction, hence the danger of
contradiction in a CID structure. We must consider, therefore, the possibility that even if many
educational intuitions allow for inconsistency and role conflict in their role sending, such
inconsistency may be undesirable ethically. One would be especially cautious to embrace
inconsistency, as Margison and Bui (2009) seem to have done, when taking into consideration the health of the role takers (Kahn, 1974). Can we delineate when faculty should make ethical tradeoffs for the sake of research, pedagogy, or their careers? The research above seems to suggest that the answer itself will emerge, definitional, from the paradigm of the institution and its CID structure. If it is a care-oriented institution, unlike many corporations, then the structure may demand that such tradeoffs minimize harm to individuals. It is noteworthy, however, that educational institutions may be at a crossroads—as both Readings (1996) and Carter (2004) argued—as universities take on greater and greater business-like roles.

*Suggested Improvements to Role Theory for Contemporary Application.*

One may criticize role theory when it is used to understand organizations. For example, there is a lack of clarity or agreement regarding whether role conflict, role ambiguity, and role overload are separate constructs or if they exist as components of each other (King & King, 1990). Wickham and Parker (2006) concluded that organizational role theory (ORT), in particular, suffered from numerous difficulties. For example, ORT is currently insufficient for explaining the behavior of agents within organizations and must be buttressed with the inclusion of notions of multifaceted employees, employer recognition/facilitation, and compartmentalization. Perhaps most generally, role theory suffers from its status as an analog device. It is a means by which to make an analogy between agents in the world and theater, and, as such, is always subject to myriad interpretations and the danger of verification bias.

This work accepts the suggestion made by Marginson and Bui (2009): role conflict, role ambiguity, and role overload will be considered separate constructs that may exist in a subset relationship. Understanding them as distinct, though, provides the opportunity for greater clarity.
Thus, it may well be the case that role ambiguity is a form of role conflict, but in the discussion here clarity is facilitated by noting that a particular role ambiguity within the university creates role conflict that may lead to role overload rather than simply that, “there is role conflict.” This seems reasonable in light of the fact that role conflict need not be caused by ambiguity, but may be caused by conflicting expectations about which there is nothing ambiguous. In the parlance of logic, this is the distinction between problems of contradiction and problems of vagueness. The logical intuition that we should avoid contradiction is not endangered by our willingness to embrace the possibility that some of our ideas are vague. We should assume, then, that because an institution is vague regarding its expectations, the faculty are encouraged to act inconsistently. Similarly, if we discover that our expectations of teachers and researchers are inconsistent, we may not want to absolve universities for such inconsistency by attributing it to a “vagueness” problem.

In “Reconceptualising organizational role theory for contemporary organizational contexts,” Wikham and Parker (2006) argued that organizational role theory as it is currently understood is inadequate for application to contemporary organizations. They stated, “The source of the controversy stems from the observed difficulty firms have with integrating the work-role demands they place on their employees with the increasingly complex array of non-work roles employees enact for their overall well-being” (p. 441). Simply, Wikham and Parker contend that changes in the way we think about work and organizations make ORT outdated. Classical ORT, for example, cannot adequately address concerns regarding the integration of work life and home life due to technology. Many professionals—if not most—are now considered “on-call” at all times because we have email. An employee who neglects to answer
her email over the weekend, although she is not officially scheduled to work on those days, will likely find herself facing ridicule or discipline for her “oversight.” Members of organizations are multifaceted in ways that were not the case during the development of ORT.

As stated earlier in this chapter, ORT focuses on the roles that individuals enact in systems that are pre-planned, task-oriented, and hierarchical (Biddle, 1986). Work roles prescribe the behavior that employees are expected to enact effectively (Katz & Kahn, 1966). As a result, argued Wickham and Parker (2006), ORT implies two essential points: 1) each individual confers and accepts a “role” that is reflective of the organization’s CID structure and 2) in order for the organization to function efficiently the roles must be effectively communicated and understood (p. 443).

According to Biddle (1986), Organizational Role Theory hinges on four assumptions:

1) That an employee “take” a role given to them by members of the organization.

2) There is consensus regarding the expectations of the roles.

3) Role takers comply to the behavior expected of them.

4) Role-conflict will arise if expectations are not consensual.

The first assumption is that employees “take” a role conferred upon them by the organization. Wickham and Parker (2006) argued that this assumption is insufficiently robust argued because employees are now often required to take on multiple roles in the workplace. Those roles may not have been made clear, nor “taken” by the employee; they are simply expectations that the employee take both the explicit roles and the implicit roles in their multiplicity. Employees now multi-task in a way that requires that they enact multiple roles (Lindbeck & Snower, 2001). As a result, employees may take the following actions to address the conflicting demands: 1) choosing
between roles, 2) compromising the behavior expected in the role, or 3) withdrawing from the situation entirely. What was referred to by Marginson and Bui (2009) as a “trade-off” is a significant concern to theorists such as Wickham and Parker (2009), Lindbeck and Snower (2001), and Vliert, (1981). The assumption that employees take on a singular role given to them by an employer is too simple for contemporary work life. Thus, Wickham and Parker (2009) argue that ORT must now take into account the notion of a “multi-faceted” employee.

Wickham and Parker (2009) also took exception to the classical ORT assumption that employees and employers share the same understanding of role expectations. The idea that there is a pre-defined, agreed-upon consensus on role expectations does not take into account “the complexity of the array of non-work roles enacted by employees that impact at the workplace, and the fact that these roles necessarily change over time” (p. 446). The work-life balance as shifted and continues to shift as a result of technology that enables employers to contact employees at any time and any place, but also enables the employer to request that work be done at any time and any place. Long gone are the days where a boss was unable to reach an employee on vacation. Moreover, the employee would no longer have to leave the vacation in order to return to the workplace to complete some piece of emergency business. Now, one need not have one’s laptop to bring work on vacation, simply having a smart phone makes it not unreasonable for an employer to request that a vacationing employee answer a set of pressing emails or other such work. Thus, the classical ORT assumption that there is a pre-defined and static set of expectations for employees is insufficient. ORT must be updated in order to allow for a new understanding that employees upon entering employment will likely be asked to fulfill many different roles and meet many different expectations over time (Wickham & Parker, 2009).
Finally, Wickham and Parker (2009) took objection to the role-conflict assumption of ORT. To be clear, this is not to say that they argue against role conflict. They do argue that role conflict is the result of conflicting role expectations. However, they argue that those conflicting role expectations are insufficiently explicated in classical ORT. “An increasing body of research…indicates that role-conflict in the work place can actually result from conflict between work-roles and non-work roles” (p. 446). Thus, role conflict in ORT is not only the result of inconsistent roles or role ambiguity in the work place. One may find that one’s roles as father and as employee conflict, and as a result suffer great job dissatisfaction. One may also find that one’s roles as father and as employee cause role overload. Although this addendum to classical ORT seems obvious and intuitive, it is important to note that due to the shift in work and home life balance, the potential for such role conflicts has become even more prevalent.

The understanding of classical ORT as revised to integrate multifaceted roletaking situates ORT as perhaps the best means by which to understand the role of faculty. Initially, one may be concerned that ORT does not take into account the many obligations of teachers and researchers outside of the institution. ORT, though, that considers role taking as multifaceted is well suited to the consideration of faculty beyond just as described by the institution. This analysis, then, will rest heavily on organizational role theory, but as revised to understand faculty as multifaceted and engaged in a role that is constantly in flux, and defined by expectations that originate both from the university and outside of it.

The final concern mentioned at the beginning of this section is of role theory as particularly subject to confirmation bias as a result of its existence as a kind of analog tool. Like the face of a clock, role theory does not provide a direct and exact description of the state of
affairs; it provides an analogy through which to understand the current state of affairs. We understand role takers like actors who accept scripts that, as discussed above, are ever changing. We must therefore be careful to not simply use role theory as a way to explain behavior however we see fit. The best means by which to avoid the problem of confirmation bias in this case is to avoid the misuse of analogy in the first place. As discussed by Eisner (1991), the goal of qualitative research is not digits or facts about the world, but understanding. Analogies, as metaphorical devices, enable understanding rather than knowledge in the positivistic sense. For example, understanding that his “anger is a towering inferno” also requires the understanding that “his anger was not a towering inferno.” The metaphor clarifies the intensity of the anger while at the same time obfuscating the fact in the world.

When applying role theory to the world, one must keep in mind that one is applying a metaphor to the world in order to draw an analogous relationship. Those explanations that help generate more understanding are preferable, but not necessarily “right” in a factual sense. Rather, they simply help us better make sense of the world. Thus, I suggest a kind of coherentist picture of role theory rather than a correspondent one. Conclusions derived using role theory should not be judged based on their “correspondence” to reality, but rather by their coherence to the rest of what we know—how much sense they make when considered with the rest of our body of knowledge.

A final concern, previously unmentioned but of particular relevance to faculty roles, was examined by Jiao, Richards, and Hackett (2013). In their “Organizational citizenship behavior and role breadth: A meta-analytic and cross-cultural analysis” Jiao, Richards, and Hackett used role theory to analyze organizational citizenship—the importance placed on courtesy, initiative,
leadership and other behaviors for the good of the organization. Their research was a meta-analysis of thirty one studies in order to ascertain the perspectives of employees regarding the importance of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) to their jobs. In this analysis, the researchers determine that, to the detriment of our organizations, employees do consider OCB part of their job, but employers tend to narrow job expectations in regards to those behaviors. “Organizations relying heavily on OCB for their success may need to adopt HR practices that convey broader role expectations” (708). Jiao, Richards, and Hackett’s findings seem to echo the argument made by Wickham and Parker (2009) that classical organizational role theory needs to be adjusted to take into account the multi-faceted nature of contemporary work-life.

The meta-analysis suggests that role theory and those who apply it need to take more into account than only the requirements delineated by employers, again emphasizing that a dissertation such as this needs to take more into account than the expectations of employers as explained in handbooks or written job expectations. In fact, the actual roles of teachers and researchers may have very little in common with the roles as explicated by institutions. This project is not simply descriptive, but normative. Philosophical analysis, as will be discussed in depth in chapter three is not restrained to analysis of what the state of affairs is, but can consider both logically and ethically what the state of affairs should be. Thus, the analysis of faculty roles will take into account university documents, but will not be constrained by them as both Jaio, Richards, and Hackett (2013) and Wikham and Parker’s (2009) research suggests. Importantly, the research of Jaio, Richards, and Hackett (2013) also reminds us that faculty roles are not constrained to “teacher” and “researcher.” Faculty, at least so many institutions claim, are required to participate in “service.” Although interviews regarding whether or not faculty believe
they are required to place much importance on service and whether or not they do so falls beyond the scope of this project, it may well be that service will play an important role in understanding not “how” teaching and research are conjoined but “how should” they be so.

Organizational Role Theory Revised

Given the review of the literature, it is likely the case that organizational role theory provides the best theoretical framework upon which to ground the conceptual framework of this dissertation. ORT, though, as discussed above, is somewhat inadequate for understanding contemporary organizational relationships. Yes, organizational role theory is the most often applied theory and the one for which there is the most support in the literature. Additionally, ORT is, indeed, the best suited to discussions of organizational relationships, as it hinges on the relationships between role senders and role takers as understood in organizational paradigms. As discussed by Wickham and Parker (2009) and Jaio, Richards, and Hackett (2013), to be applicable to contemporary organizations, ORT must be adjusted for an understanding of multifaceted role takers who experience significant shifts in role expectations over time as well as a concept of ORT that encompasses those expectations and roles that are not clearly defined and, yet, are essential, such as organizational citizenship behaviors.

It is important to note that this dissertation is not focusing on universities, but rather on the roles of faculty, and, thus, ORT is not necessarily perfectly applicable to our analysis. In some ways the symbolic interactionist theory might be best suited for an understanding of roles that are developed through dialectic, interaction and interpretation. Thus, I propose that this work utilize role theory as “community-dialectical role theory.” To say that understanding faculty roles, here, uses organizational role theory is a bit disingenuous, as the revisions necessary to
generate a robust understanding change it significantly; moreover, the focus is not on the organization, but on the instantiated roles and how they should be instantiated. Roles, however, are not just individual instantiations. As discussed above, roles are social constructs—they are community constructs as developed through dialectic and symbolic interaction. Thus, this dissertation is using organizational role theory, but one heavily altered so as to not give primacy to the expectations as generated by the organization itself and the purpose of the work goes beyond understanding how members are situated, but how should they be situated and why.

Thus, the idea of community-dialectical role theory as the burgeoning conceptual framework emergent from the theoretical frame of role theory is one that can be used to understand organizations primarily as communities of dialectical agents that create their roles through symbolic interaction. This construct, then, is not reducible to symbolic interactionist role theory because the focus is not just on individual interpretation and understanding, but communal interpretation and understanding.

McKnight and Block (2010), in The Abundant Community, generated an effective means by which to ground such a conceptual framework. The understanding of “community” as “that which is constitutive of identity” is a communitarian notion well explicated by Charles Taylor (1989). As argued by Readings (1996), the university is quickly becoming a business-model enterprise. Understanding, though, the interaction of its faculty cannot, yet, be reduced to that simple classical ORT model. Faculty members remain dynamic participants in the university and as such, remain citizens of the university. Citizenship, as understood by McKnight and Block (2010), is the participation in a democracy. As long as some free voice is maintained by university faculty, they remain, at least to some degree, active participants in their institution as
citizens; thus, their roles cannot be reduced to purely organizational models. The faculty engage in dialectic with each other and the institution itself to develop a constantly shifting CID structure, the very *self* of the university. In this way, the faculty continue to participate in the definition of their own roles and the construction of their own identity through dialectic as described by Taylor (1989).

As discussed in chapter one, though, the shift in the university is a shift from a citizenship to a consumer model (McKnight & Block, 2010). This shift can be understood on both an individual level as discussed by McKnight and Block or on the university level as discussed by Readings (1996) and Carter (2004). To focus solely on ORT would be to focus on a “system life”—“a managed life, a life organized around products, services, and beliefs of systems” (McKnight & Block, 2010). However, the university is not yet completely understood in terms of a consumer society, though this trend towards a demand that our educational institutions “produce” something seems ever-increasing. As such, organizational role theory is not wholly incompatible with understanding faculty roles either and the roles cannot be best understood solely through symbolic interactionist role theory.

Organizational role theory and symbolic interactionist role theory parallel concepts used by the discoursed ethical frame that will be explicated in detail in chapter 3. This parallel suggests that organizational role theory and symbolic interactionist role theory are not separate and distinct, but, rather, that there is a supervenient relationship. The discourse ethical frame describes a systemsworld and a lifeworld that are used to understand human agency and society. The systemsworld is the world of organizational structure and bureaucracy and the lifeworld is the world engaged on the “human” level—the world of purposes, hopes, and emotional states.
Thus, one sees a clear parallel between forms of role theory and discourse ethical frames. Organizational role theory is a role theory that articulates understanding from the positioning of the systemsworld. It understands human agency as something participated in by members of bureaucratic, structured, and machine-like organizations. Symbolic interactionist role theory understands agents as embedded in language. Humans play the roles defined for them by others through communicative action. Thus, symbolic interactionist role theory is embedded in an understanding of human agency in the lifeworld of qualitative communicative states.

The relationship, though, between the systemsworld and the lifeworld is one of supervenience between them. The lifeworld and the systemsworld depend upon each other, but the lifeworld provides the more basic structures. From the lifeworld emerges the structures and organizations that seek to meet human purposes. The interactions of agents in the lifeworld give rise to those bureaucracies that seek to meet human ends. Thus the systemsworld is supervenient upon the lifeworld. Similarly, organizational role theory is supervenient upon symbolic interactionist role theory. While it may seem, prima facie, that organizational role theory would be the more basic, upon which symbolic interactionist role theory would rest, the realization is that symbolic interactionist role theory, while more complex, frames the more basic human interactions that result in the generation of organization. It is through communicative action that organizations are developed. Thus, organizations emerge as means by which to meet the symbolically communicated ends produced by humans. Due to the complexities of human symbolic exchange, its ever-shifting quality, and the opacity of human internality, understanding of human interaction as reduced to movement within organizational structures becomes a reductionist heuristic for understanding human interaction. Thus, the ability to understand human
action through organization emerges from the symbolic interactions that produce those organizations, and maintain them, in the first place. To understand human interaction in its fullness, then, as paralleled by the supervenient relationship of the systemsworld and lifeworld requires that one engage a conjunction of organizational role theory and symbolic interactionist role theory as similarly supervenient.

As this project began in chapter 1 with the discussion of the shift taking place in the university, it seems reasonable that the conceptual framework used to understand faculty roles can also describe that shift, leaving both organizational role theory and symbolic interactionist role theory insufficient. Community-dialectic role theory, as I have defined it, focuses on the shifts in dialogue that produce community and community change. That community can be understood as an institution, country, or university.

This project, then, will seek to understand faculty roles through dialectic, change and normativity. In order to do that, to first establish what faculty roles should look like, a methodology that both acts a means by which to examine and define constructs (rather than measure them) as well as develop them (rather than report perspectives on them) is necessary. For this reason philosophical analysis is the best means by which to conduct this research project. The goal is not to measure a construct, nor is it to simply to describe it. The goal is to create a construct by which such measurements can take place. Thusly, a conceptual framework such as community-dialectic role theory is necessary in order to understand faculty as more than that defined by the given and accepted roles of organizations, but as active dialectical citizens in the generation of their own multifaceted roles as faculty. The first step, then, is to establish
through dialectic with the literature what the conjoined teacher-faculty role should look like
given the demands of logical consistency, ethics, and selfhood as a community construction.

Explication of Theoretical Concepts

*Developments in Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory*

In order to best apply the conceptual framework of “community dialectical role theory,”
the components that comprise it should be well understood. The literature above demonstrates
that Organizational Role Theory is perhaps the most commonly used form of role theory.
Meade’s work, which is the heart of symbolic interactionist role theory, the other essential part to
community dialectical role theory, has received less attention as Meade described it. Instead, the
development and application of his intuitions was brought to its culmination in the work of
Jurgen Habermas. Thus, it is here that one finds a clear path from the role theoretical grounding
of this work to a methodology of discourse ethics as developed by Habermas and applied in this
dissertation. Habermas, a renowned sociologist and philosopher, developed a means by which to
understand agents’ actions in the world as both constructing and constructed by assumed norms
embedded in language. In his seminal text, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*
(1990), Habermas elaborated on his conception of discourse ethics and constructed a framework
by which moral norms can be impartially judged. He connected the idea of ethics through
discourse, as communicative ethics, to the theory of social action drawing much of the latter
from Meade’s work. The idea that world-making is the result of an intersubjective dialectic or
*interaction* is a philosophical refinement of role theory by Habermas. Herbert Blumer (1969)
coined the term “symbolic interactionism” when analyzing and applying Mead’s work. Blumer’s
interpretation of Mead continues to inform sociology and the social interactionist school of
thought. That perspective, that Agents are understand as active participants in the symbol making and symbol using that construct the roles that construct their identities and their institutions, is understood, in part because of Blumer as an interpretive act. Agents share and perceive symbols that they interpret in order to construct the roles they believe to be expected of them. That interpretive step is what connects discourse ethics to role theory. Habermas, in his own sociological work, understood dialectic to be an interpretive act of world making—an act so powerful that Habermas made a significant shift from description to proscription. In understanding the way one makes the world through the interpretation of others, and understands the roles instantiated by agents to be intersubjective construction through dialectic, one comes to realize the importance, if not primacy, of discourse in effective world-making.

Thus, it is through the work of Habermas that one sees role-theory cease to be only one of many ways to understand the grand sociological actions of humanity but as a means by which to understand how agents create not only their world, but the world for each other. As such, one comes to understand the normative import of discourse ethics. As symbolic interactionism is not just a means by which an agent comes to construct her role for herself, but constructs roles for others, there is normative implication as we are no longer simply suggesting that others play a role or instantiate an identity, but we are creating, with them, the identity of the other.

Habermas, in his text, *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume Two Lifeworld and system: A Critique of functionalist Reason*, said of communicative action:

Communicative action relies on a cooperative process of interpretation in which participants relate simultaneously to something in the objective, the social, and the subjective worlds, even when they thematically stress only one of the three components
in their utterances. Speaker and hearer use the reference system of the three worlds as an interpretive framework within which they work out their common situation definitions.

(1987, p. 120)

In the above quotation, one can see the influence of Meade’s symbolic interactionist intuitions as understanding actors as interpreters of symbolic action developed to a far greater degree. Habermas showed that our moral intuitions are not simply embedded in tradition or inscribed expectations, but rather are embedded in the presupposition of social interaction that are necessitated by the rules of discourse necessary for any society—thusly they have a universal quality. Discourse ethics, thus, aims to provide a means by which moral questions can be answered through engagement in authentic dialogue with other agents. This system of both understanding and normative application will be explicated in greater depth in chapter three through examination of the works of Amy Allen (2009) and Hans-Herbert Kögl (2012). Habermas’ work provides a robust means, if not a full metaphysic, for understanding why actors play particular roles and the embeddedness of their scripts in communicative action.

Both the normative framework of discourse ethics and the social theories developed by Habermas have found consistent application in the philosophy of education. Notably, Thomas J. Sergiovanni applied Habermas’ understanding of social systems to the development and analysis of the educational system in his text, *The Lifeworld of Leadership: Creating Culture, Community, and Personal Meaning in Our Schools* (2000). The text rests heavily on Habermas’ distinction between “the lifeworld” and “the systemsworld.” Sergiovanni says of the lifeworld and the systemsworld:
Habermas uses the language “systemsworld” and “lifeworld” to describe two mutually exclusive yet ideally interdependent domains of all of society’s enterprises from the family to the complex formal organization… When we talk about the stuff of culture, the essence of values and beliefs, the expression of needs, purposes, and desires of people, and about the sources of deep satisfaction in the form of meaning and significance, we are talking about the lifeworld… The systemsworld, by contrast, is a world of instrumentalities, of efficient means designed to achieve ends. (2000, p. 5)

It is through these social domains that interpretation occurs. One’s understanding of one’s situation within society, one’s very identity, is both understood through and constructed by the lifeworld and systemsworld. Thus, these domains are both constructive and normative.

Habermas, in *The Lifeworld of Leadership: Creating Culture, Community, and Personal Meaning in Our Schools*, said of the lifeworld and interpretation:

> Every new situation appears in a lifeworld composed of a cultural stock of knowledge that is “always already” familiar. Communicative actors can no more take up an extramundane position in relation to their lifeworld than they can in relation to language as the medium for the processes of reaching understanding through which their lifeworld maintains itself. In drawing upon a cultural tradition, they also continue it… Communicative actors are always moving within the horizon of their lifeworld; they cannot step outside of it. As interpreters, they themselves belong to the lifeworld, along with their speech acts, but they cannot refer to “something in the lifeworld” in the same way as they can to facts, norms, or experiences. The structures of the lifeworld lay down the forms of the intersubjectivity of possible understanding. (1987, pp. 125-126)
The systemsworld, conversely, is the foundation for the development of those things that are perhaps most commonly discussed in the context of educational leadership: management, organizational structure, allocation of capital, and systematization. To quote Sergiovanni, “the former [the lifeworld] is a world of purposes, norms, growth, and development, and the later [the systems world] is a world of efficiency, outcomes, and productivity” (2000. p. 5). It is therefore the lifeworld that should drive the systemsworld, as it is in the lifeworld that our norms are grounded.

The inclination to assume that one or the other is more or less valuable should be avoided. Perhaps one who is sympathetic to understanding the world as interpretive, intersubjective, and agent-driven would believe in the superiority of the lifeworld while, conversely, one who believes the world is best understood through the movement of capital through the systemization of organizational processes would argue for the primacy of the systemsworld. Both, however, are necessary for understanding the roles played by agents in society by virtue of the fact that agents do engage through the interpretive act of communicative action while also existing in a world that is determined and driven by systems and organizational frameworks that guide their actions. Thus we conjoin of organizational role theory and symbolic-interactionist role theory into “community dialectical role theory.”
Figure 3. Lifeworld and Systemsworld’s Symbiosis in Community Dialectical Role Theory

The result of the realization that both components are necessary for understanding agents’ actions in an educational institution was the development of Sergiovanni’s text. Although neither domain is valueless, Sergiovanni argued that the lifeworld must be generative; it should be the force that drives the systemsworld (2000, p. 6). He argued that when organizations are functioning properly the lifeworld is at the center of the organization. “When a school makes decision about means, structures, and policies designed to serve its purposes and values, the life world is at the center (Sergiovanni, 2000, p. 6). He argued the balance of a well-functioning organization is thrown off, however, if the school’s decision are about the school, rather than about the purposes and values of the school (p. 6).

Further clarification of Habermas’ notions were made when Sergiovanni demarcated within schools the Habermasian distinction between “expressive and normative action” and “teleological and strategic action” (2000, p. 6). Sergiovanni wrote,

Schools grow and maintain their lifeworlds by taking “expressive” and “normative” action.” Expressive action is when parents, teachers, and students express their individual needs, visions, values, and beliefs within the cultural context of the school. Normative action occurs when they seek to act in ways that embody the school’s shared values, visions, and beliefs. Schools grow and maintain their systemsworld by taking “teleological” action and “strategic” action. Teleological action involves the setting of objectives and the creation of systems necessary to achieve them. And strategic action involves making appropriate choices among alternative courses of action with the intent of maximizing value. (2000, pp. 6-7)
Consideration of the examples above suggests that when a school places the systemsworld as generative of the lifeworld, the norms and purposes of the school become to maintain the bureaucratic existence of the school rather than the bureaucracy existing for the flourishing of the students and agents that comprise the organization. The system becomes such that it seeks to maintain itself as a primary good and those agents that comprise the system become component parts to the systemworld. Habermas (1987) discussed the problem of the overtaking of the lifeworld by the systems world as the “colonization of the lifeworld” (pp. 173, 335-336). Both Habermas and Sergiovanni held that either the lifeworld or the systemsworld must be generative. “Either the lifeworld determines what the systemsworld will be like or the systemsworld will determine what the lifeworld will be like” (Sergiovanni, 2000, p. 7).

In a rather intuitive example, Sergiovanni discussed testing as an example of the colonization of the lifeworld by the systems world. “When the lifeworld dominates, testing reflects local passions, needs, values, and beliefs. Standards can remain rigorous and true but are not presumed to be standardized, universal, or all-encompassing” (2000, p. 8). Fourteen years later, as U.S. educational system moves into the “common core,” Sergiovanni’s concerns seem realized. Teachers are now provided with “curriculum maps” that determine, precisely, day-by-day, not only what standard students must master, but what objective must be completed. Regardless of individual student difference or need, the system presumes that good teachers will successfully move students through the objectively important mastery of standards. “As the systemsworld dominates, however, what counts is determined more narrowly by bureaucratic mandates, politics, and other outside forces” (Sergiovanni, 2000, p. 8). As the standards and
testing movements have gained greater purchase, one can see the colonization of the lifeworld by the systemsworld.

It is no longer the norms and purposes of the lifeworld, the flourishing of students for their own benefit and the benefit of the agents comprising the greater social scheme that drives education. Rather, students are now educated to benefit the system itself... as a commodity that needs certain skills in order to maintain the economic system that generates the school system. Thus, one can now determine the success of a school by virtue of its ability to produce students who can function as a component of the system itself, specifically as workers within a great economic device. Whether other lifeworld norms are achieved becomes unimportant; students need not be creative, critical, or healthy so long as they can, in a standardized fashion, demonstrate the skills necessary to work in the system and demonstrate only those values—such as patriotism, work ethic, and belief in the superiority of capitalism—necessary to maintain the system.

*Figure 4. Systemsworld Eventually Sublimates Lifeworld*

Other theorists have also argued for the importance of Habermas for the understanding of and development of educational systems. Interestingly, the focus, is not always on Habermas’
notions of lifeworld and systemsworld. Habermas’ concepts are so intricate and well-developed that one can read an entire text dedication to one application of Habermas’ ethics without encountering an essential aspect of that theory. Perhaps the best explanation for this phenomena is the fact that Habermas did not simply develop an applied ethic, nor did he only develop the normative framework upon which that applied ethic emerges. He developed, as well, the ontological grounding in language of ethics and a metaphysic of human social and psychological interaction that inform his normative ethic and its applications.

Patrick Jenlink (2004), for example, rested his work heavily on Habermas’ notions of dialectic and discourse ethics without reference to the lifeworld systems world approach. In his article, “Discourse ethics in the design of educational systems: Considerations for design praxis,” Jenlink argued for the importance of the application of discourse ethics to the design of educational systems. His work suggests that without such grounding in discourse, educational systems are likely to fail ethically because educational systems are dialogical by nature (2004, 0.237).

Praxis is of special importance to Jenlink. “Praxis is a state in which one engages critically, reflectively, and intentionally in an inquiry that belongs intrinsically to a project of self-understanding (Jenlink, 2004, p. 238). Education—an endeavor dedicated to the development of human beings—must engage praxis as the intersection of theory and practice requiring self-reflexivity. That reflexivity required by those systems are inherently based on the development of agents. Note, then, that without mention of it, Jenlink grounded his work in the social metaphysic of Habermas—systems must be grounded in the norms of the lifeworld in order to be ethical.
Jenlink was particularly motivated by the importance of democratic discourse explicated by Habermas. Jenlink wrote,

The ethical consequences of systems design rests in large part with whether or not the design process provided opportunity for authentic participation and was socially and culturally inclusive—active participation by all including marginalized populations and socially and politically disadvantages publics. (2004, p. 239)

Simply, design discourse is teleologically framed towards the inclusion of numerous perspectives, thus it is democratic in nature. This discourse, though, must be understood as praxis—as self-reflective through the dialogical process. “Design discourse seeks to ensure inclusive participation of those who are the benefactors and beneficiaries [of the system]” (2004, p. 239). All stakeholders must not only be taken into account, but must be able to participate in the dialogue in order to design the system ethically. Thus, it is essential to hear all voices—to care for all populations—in order to sustain the educational lifeworld, and the responsibility falls on the university to instantiate faculty roles in a way that incorporate the essentiality of the lifeworld.

Discourse ethics, therefore, particularly in the case of education, is well suited to the democratic teleological end of full inclusion in dialogue, and, thus, an effective means to both understand as well as construct faculty roles.

Discourse ethics realize the limits of an individual stance. The systems designer as moral agent will never truly be able to determine if moral actions are justifiable or not. In this sense, discourse ethics is an answer to designing systems in a pluralistic society where many diverse perspectives of what is ‘good’ exist… (Jenlink, 2004, p. 243-244)
Discourse ethics requires that we step outside of the boundaries of our solipsistic self and engage the Other in discourse for the purpose of generating understanding and meaningful ethical consensus. This process will be detailed further in the methodology. For the purposes of this chapter, however, one notes that Jenlink proceeds to engage a discourse between numerous ethical positions held by different theorists in order to mediate them through discourse ethics for the purpose of demonstrating the importance of discourse ethics in the development of an ethical educational system in a pluralistic society.

The importance of Habermas for social justice, as a means by which to include even marginalized voices, including the marginalized is furthered by the world of Rauno Huttunen and Mark Murhy (2012). In their “Discourse and recognition as normative ground for radical pedagogy: Habermasian and Honnethian ethics in the context of education,” Huttunen and Murphy argued for the importance of Habermas in grounding the work of Paolo Freire. Freire (1970), in his famous Pedagogy of the Oppressed, forwarded his thesis of “radical pedagogy,” both indicting and inciting the educational establishment. Freire argued that education acts as a means of oppression and must, instead, act as a means by which to producing flourishing in all students. Huttunen and Murphy, however, noted that Freire’s work—while normative—lacked grounding for that imperative. Habermas’ work, however, demonstrates the social necessity of the inclusion of all voices in ethical discourse. Thus, they argued that Habermas’ work functions as a solid foundation for radical pedagogy.

The details of Habermas’ discourse ethics will be developed further in chapter three. What is essential to Huttunen and Murphy’s work (2012) is the united effort of moral discourse that engages the voice of all participants. Habermas, through his process of immanent criticism,
provides a means by which to investigate the validity of morality claims based on those norms forwarded by the system itself. If dialectic with that system (from those who make up the system and propose its norms) demonstrates incoherence, then something is amiss. What Habermas’ work forces one to recognize is that a system may seem coherent if it omits some stakeholders from the dialectic. Hence Huttunen and Murphy’s (2012) argument that Habermas’ work helps to ground radical pedagogy: simply, one may come to recognize that once all stakeholder voices are engaged in the dialectic a seemingly coherent system is demonstrated to undermine the very values and norms the system seeks to support—discourse ethics requires that one not only engage the seeming objectivity of the systems world but also include the voices that make up the lifeworld. Thus, if the roles of faculty as teachers and as researchers are in tension, it may because of the sublimation of the lifeworld to the systemsworld resulting in the silencing of both students and faculty voicing.

Importantly, Huttunen and Murphy (2012) did not think that Habermas’ work was sufficient to support radical pedagogy in its fullness. They included the further development of Habermas’ work by his student Axel Honneth. Honneth’s work enables those who investigate educational systems to move beyond immanent criticism to a question of “recognition.” This move on the part of Huttunen and Murphy enables them to avoid the possible criticism that an internally coherent system that specifically excludes certain voices—not through incoherent error, but intentionally—remains incoherent externally. An institution, universities, for example, may then generate the roles of employees in an internally consistent way, while at the same time excluding some student voices (failing students for example), yet, remain externally inconsistent with the lifeworld praxis that teachers should seek to benefit all students.
Honneth (2007) developed a “theory of recognition” in which the recognition of oneself is dependent on recognition by the other. Kögler (2012) further expands on and addresses issues that arise from this notion of selfhood and will be explicated in chapter three. The notion, then, that selfhood requires not just the recognition of the self, but requires that one be recognized by others then further justifies the inclusion of other voices in ethical dialogue. Honneth’s (2007) work details the deep social embeddedness and dependence on the recognition of oneself by society in order to engage both oneself and society.

“To achieve a productive relationship toward oneself, human requires recognition of her ability and achievements. Indeed we can view the entire human life as a long struggle for recognition. That is why friendship, care and love constitute the basic level of recognition. That is why friendship, care, and love are the most importance forms for recognition in Honneth’s practical philosophy” (Huttunen & Murphy, 2007, p. 145).

In this way the application of Honneth to Habermas creates a kind of positive right teleology for the importance of care in normativity. It is insufficient to include all stakeholders; one must recognize the need for recognition, for care, as fundamental to human identity.

With Honneth’s addendum to Habermas in mind, and the grounding of radical pedagogy in a rational social metaphysic of care, one can now engage the process of developing a methodology for the philosophical investigation of educational systems. If Honneth is correct, then care will play an essential role in understanding education as a system that engages agent identity. As such, one can apply discourse ethics as a means by which to investigate the conceptual systemsworld and lifeworld of education in order to develop both an understanding
and a normative framework for a coherent paradigm grounded in care as essential to the identity of stakeholders in education.

Conceptual Framework

Applying Habermas

One comes to understand if any of the roles are what Bruce Biddle (1979) described *interdependent*—“the degree to which roles are mutually facilitative” (p. 78). If these roles are beyond commensurable, beyond coherent (insofar as they are consistent and can be shown to work together), and, in fact, depend on each other, conceptually, then the project of determining their interrelation is well-grounded. It may well be the case that the roles as we come to define them are inconsistent, or incoherent, but this would not imply that there is no normative result. If the role of teacher and the role of researcher are themselves *inconsistent*, then one should not, if one seeks to generate coherent notions of faculty that can be effectively applied in the real world, require that faculty occupy both roles. However, if one role—*teacher*, for example—is best situated in the lifeworld and the other—*researcher*—is best understood as part of the systemsworld then Habermas’ system provides an effective means by which to mediate those. They are *interdependent*, as Biddle uses the term. In either case, or any case that then lay between the ends of inconsistency and interdependence, then discourse regarding the best means by which to understand those who occupy those roles and generate expectations for them is necessary. Thus, Habermas’ discourse ethics, as a means by which to both understand and generate dialectical interdependence, should be explicated further.
Habermas and Kant

Habermas argued that morality exists in a community of selves. His work forwards the work of Immanuel Kant while at the same time boldly defying it. Kant argued that there can be reasoned to be a Categorical Imperative. Kant’s notion of this universal rule rested heavily on the importance of reason and the ability of one to logically develop moral rules. This imperative itself states, “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law” (1785/1993, p. 30). Simply, “ought implies can.” If one cannot apply the rule without the rule collapsing on itself, then it is an irrational rule and must be discarded. It is important to understand that the Kantian notion does not hinge on the importance that everyone understand the rule or dialogue about the rule, rather Kant is arguing that any rule, by virtue of being an imperative cannot be biased to one person or perspective. Thus, if I were to say, “I want to murder,” then I must assent to the proposition that “murder is right,” as suggesting that “murder is right only for me” is simply an irrational bias for oneself. Therefore, the rule must be applicable to everyone. The logical result of the application of such an imperative universally, though, is that it becomes impossible to murder because everyone is dead. Similarly, lying, stealing, and breaking contracts all result in the inability to follow the rule because universal application of the rule defeats the purpose of the rule, and, therefore, the rule is inconsistent with itself and is irrational.

Interestingly, the Categorical Imperative does not just apply to those things that we should not do. If one were to apply the question, “Should I use others only as means to my ends?” one quickly comes to realize that this is an impossible rule to universalize without making it impossible to get what one wants—which is not to be treated only as a means to
others’ ends. Thus, Kant was able to forward the second form of the Categorical Imperative, known as the principle of respect, which he believed to be equivalent to the first form: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (p. 30). Thus, the Categorical Imperative denies one the ability to do certain things while also requiring that one must also concern oneself with the welfare of the Other.

Habermas, though, noted that there were some significant problems with Kant’s formulations—notably, the lack of discourse. The Kantian rule system is one that is engaged from an armchair. This problem is similar to the problems Carol Gilligan (1982), author of *In a Different Voice*, noted in stage six—abstract moral reasoning—of Kohlberg’s system of moral development. Morality is discursive; one cannot simply ask the question, “How should I live?” That is not, despite common misconception, the central question of morality, which is, “How should I live with others?” Without others, the question of morality is moot and the answer is, simply, “However I want.” Habermas’ ideas require, therefore, that we take into account the viewpoints of everyone who could be affected by the adoption of an imperative. Kant’s system, one realizes, is deeply embedded in the systemsworld, ignoring the implicit norms and assumptions generated through the communicative action of the lifeworld. Note, however, that Kant’s system has an appealing cognitivism—it rests on the notion that there are moral truths. Habermas is able to maintain that cognitivism without appealing to abstract moral truths, but, rather, moral truths embedded in the rules of rational discourse.
Habermas and Rawls

In contrast to the way that John Rawls (1971) required that one imagine that one does not have any affiliations with the world, Habermas required that one consider the perspective of others. Habermas was critical of Rawls, noting that one should not simply stand behind the veil of ignorance and imagine oneself without any affiliation, but, rather that one should actually engage the perspective of others. Again, once considering the essential question of morality, Habermas was well grounded—to imagine that one is in no position, as Rawl’s suggested we should, is much like asking “How should I live?” but what Rawls neglected was that the power of his system requires discourse in his second step. One must imagine what it would like to occupy the position of the other. For example, realizing, “If I come into the world as x, I will be marginalized because of the social system, so we then should make a world in which being x is not marginalized, because I would not want to be marginalized.” This is not to say that Rawls did not point out that one must consider entering the world as other agents, it is that his system requires no discourse with them. Simply, how can one, from one’s armchair, engage the position of the Other? One is likely to think that the Other is fine as she is, and see no reason to make change.

Thus, a Habermasian perspective requires that we lift the veil and engage the position of the other through dialogue so that we can ask ourselves, “How will the application of this universal moral rule affect all agents?” One then can develop moral rules, rights, and duties based not just on what one imagines the effects to be based on a universal rule, but one that actually takes into the account the will of the Other as articulated through discourse. It is noteworthy that Kant’s system, itself, generates Habermas’ own system if Kant’s system is
applied without bias (which Kant failed to do). If one were to ask oneself what the implication, logically, of the rule, “I should make rules without considering the perspectives of others” would be, one would quickly realize this is impossible to do. To suggest the above as a universal rule makes the very notion of universal rules inconsistent. Everyone would then be required, logically, to begin making universally applied rules that cannot be actuated because they do not have sufficient understanding of those agents who are required to participate in the rules. Thus, the rule defeats itself and collapses. For that reason, it can be asserted that even Kant himself must acquiesce to Habermas’ thesis; universality requires discourse. We must tear down the veil and converse.

Habermas’ propositions

Habermas forwarded a series of propositions based on the realization that discourse is necessary for genuine engagement in moral reasoning and that there are rules that are implicit in the act of discourse itself. One realizes, quickly, that investigation of rational discourse reveals that there are imbedded assumptions in that discourse. One cannot have rational discourse without, for example, attending to the thesis of the Other. To ignore it is to not engage in rational discourse both by definition and by the implicit norms and values of discourse itself. Thus Habermas, when analyzing moral discourse, realized the following:

1) A universal rule that sets the conditions for impartial judgment must constrain “all affected to adopt the perspectives of all others in the balancing of inters” so that, “All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects [that] its [of a rule’s] general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternatives possibilities for regulation)” (p. 65).
2) “Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse” (p. 66).

3) All affected must be able to participate freely; we cannot expect their consent “unless all affected can freely accept the consequences and the side effects that the general observance of a controversial norm can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the interests of each individual” (p. 93).

Thus, given Habermas’ principles, one must take the perspective of everyone else, especially when generating moral imperatives. If one wishes to avoid the issue of 1) failing to take the perspectives of others and 2) engaging unbridled and unwarranted hubris, one must actually discourse with others in order to understand their perspective. The methodology of this philosophical analysis then, will apply Habermas’ discourse ethical position to the question of the normative framing of the roles teacher and researcher, however they are best defined and conjoined (or fail to conjoin). To ignore the propositions presented by Habermas is to not engage in rational discourse.

Performativity

Habermas also developed fully the means by which to critique a system or set of propositions through the application of immanent critique. This form of analysis, which focuses on the coherence or lack thereof of propositions that are proposed to constitute an epistemology, itself generates the need for discourse in order to best understand the actuation of the definition, particularly if those terms defined identify rational agents. Habermas’ work relies on and further justifies the work of Karl-Otto Apel, who explained the logical grounding of rational discourse and rule making. Much in the same way that Kant’s system explains that one cannot be expected
to follow rule (x) if rule (x) makes it impossible to follow rule (x), Apel argued that there are rules of discourse by virtue of the impossibility of engaging discourse without those rules.

Habermas explained Apel’s notion of a *performative contradiction*—a notion alluded to earlier in this chapter. The rules of dialogue suggest that performative contradictions can occur by virtue of our participation in dialogue. For example, as Habermas explained, I may argue that I do not currently exist. However, by virtue of uttering the statement, “I believe I do not exist,” I also assert my own existence. Thus, I am guilty of a performative contradiction and should not make the statement. In much the same way that Descartes’ *Cogito* cannot be syllogized without engaging contradiction (by virtue of *a priori* logic knowledge as already proven to be doubtful by the methodological skepticism, thus the *Cogito* is better understood as a meditation), one cannot assert one’s lack of existence in dialogue without performing one’s own existence. Thus, the rules of dialogue emerge from one’s performative contradiction.

Interestingly, a defense of dialetheism (that there can be true contradictions) articulated by Graham Priest (1998) in his, “What’s so bad about contradictions?” hinges on avoidance of performative contradiction. Of course for the dialethesist to avoid contradiction plays immediately into Habermas’ hands, even while demonstrating the possibility that true contradiction *may* exist. Priest notes that a fundamental argument against his proposition is the realization that if there can be true contradictions, then it may be argued that anything a dialetheist (one who believes in true contradictions) may say may itself be a contradiction and, therefore, this includes the statement “I am a dialetheist.” In other words, might we accuse the dialetheist when she says “I am a dialetheist” of potentially meaning, “I am a dialetheist, and I am not a dialetheist” if true contradictions exit? One might argue, then, that nothing that the
dialetheist says can be trusted. Priest argued, similarly to Apel, that one would not assume this of
the dialetheist because of the rules of ordinary language. One would not state only a conjunct
(truncate the full statement by saying “I am a dialetheist”) when the conjunct and its negation (I
am a dialetheist, and I am not a dialetheist) are known to be both true. I would not, in ordinary
language, say, “It is raining” if I also know “it is not raining.”

Similarly, I would not state a disjunction if I know which disjunction of an exclusive
disjunction is true. I would not say “It is raining or it is sunny outside,” if I know “it is raining” is
true. (Thus, I need not worry about the logical rule “add” resulting in nonsensical statements.) In
the same way, I would not state only part of a true contradiction either. It seems that both Priest
and Apel hinged their arguments on the embedded rules and norms of discourse as articulated by
Habermas. Importantly, those actions which generate lack of understanding by violation of those
norms, values, and rules do not generally thrive in language (if only because they themselves fail
to be understood). Thus, emergent from ordinary language, one finds logical and normative
rules—Habermas’ cognitivism, in other words.

Habermas and Honneth

Habermas’ work is further applied and developed by Axel Honneth. Two of Honneth’s
seminal texts, The fragmented world of the social: Essays in social and political philosophy
the development of social philosophy as it culminates in Habermas. Particularly, Honneth’s work
develops and further justifies the critical theory developed by Habermas and the Frankfurt
School.
Critical theory, of course, is known and appealing to educational circles. It can be understood as a rejection of the systematized and positivistic paradigm of sociology as an attempt to generate an objective “hard science” for the analysis of human interaction. Rather, critical theory, as explained by Max Horkheimer (1972) is oriented to both understanding and changing human interaction. Critical theory recognizes that objective observation is impossible. No observation of social interaction can take place without 1) impacting the social world and 2) being experienced and understood through the subjectivity of the agent observers. Horkheimer held that critical theory was at its best when it met three criteria: 1) it explains the problems in our current social paradigm 2) it identifies practical means by which to fix those problems and 3) it justifies why those problems are in fact problems and why they should be resolved. One comes to realize, then, that this dissertation itself is at least playing at critical theory. The work seeks to explain and identify faculty roles, identify if those roles are in fact commensurable, and seeks to identify the best possible constructions of those roles. One notes, however, that the dissertation may not meet Horkheimer’s criteria insofar as it may not address the practical means by which to fix the problem. If faculty roles are, in fact, incommensurable, there may be no way to mediate between them as constructed by our current social reality.

Honneth’s work develops the Habermasian approach to critical theory and situates it in a historical framework. Honneth (1995) wrote:

The idea of making the struggle for recognition into prescientific point of reference for critical social theory requires, namely, not only reflection in social theory and a diagnosis of the present era, but also a concept of the person that is capable of explaining how the
claim upon the recognition of one’s own identity is anchored within the particular subject (1995, p. xxii).

This notion of the recognition of one’s own identity is grounded by Honneth in Habermas and George Herbert Mead. What Honneth recognized is that the critique of society, particularly in the paradigm of critical theory, requires an understanding of the actor within society. The formation of identity, then, as introduced by Mead and developed by Habermas, understands actors as generated by intersubjective communicative activity. The roles are not simply played; they are, as my own community-dialectical role theory suggests, constitutive of identity. Much in the way that Charles Taylor (1989) developed his thesis of community as constitutive of identity, community-dialectical role theory, and more importantly Habermas, understands the actor as entirely a linguistic construction—a construction of intersubjective symbolic action.

The agent in the world exists as created not just by symbols, but by language. Her ontology is grounded in the social world. Whatever her “physical” instantiation may be, it cannot be understood, discussed, or perhaps even perceived without its creation (not merely description) in language. Thus, understanding roles, as they are linguistically inscribed, mediated, and generated, for Habermas and Honneth, would be to understand the very identity of the agent comprised of those roles. Honneth (1995) argued “In positivism, empirical knowledge of reality is reduced to a mere search for facts, since such knowledge is separated from any philosophical self-confirmation” (p. 64). Thus one comes to understand that our preconception of actors as separate “things” from their social world is an assumption grounded in positivism. The positivistic thesis, though, is one that is grounded in the assumptions and demands of societal labor: “the production of theoretical statements subserves the same interest of a mastery of
physical nature by which the activity of labour is already guided on a pre-scientific level” (Honneth, 2005, p. 64). What positivism, then, does is “cut them [the sciences] off both from the consciousness of their own societal roots and from the knowledge of their practical objectives” (p. 65). Honneth’s argument, then, suggests that understanding human interaction is undermined when attempting to use a tool that believes itself to be objectively separate without assumptions that both limit and define it—assumptions that will, particularly in the case of positivism, blind researchers as to their impact on and intersubjective connection to that being observed.

Habermas’ thesis, though, avoids many of the positivistic pitfalls that attempt to create separate and objective observes (both of external social environs and of the self):

Nevertheless, a theory has gradually emerged from Habermas’ works which is so clearly motivated by the original objectives of critical theory that it may be accepted as the only serious new approach within this tradition today; the anti-functionalist impulses detected in the thinking of the marginal members of the institute have reached theoretical self-awareness in this theory and hence have become the frame of references for a different conception of society. (Honneth, 1995, p. 86)

Linguistic understanding becomes necessary, both normatively and epistemically, for human interaction: “The life-form of human beings distinguishes itself by an intersubjectivity anchored in the structures of language; therefore, for the reproduction of social life, linguistic understanding between subjects represents a fundamental, indeed the most basic, presupposition” (p. 86). Thus one comes to recognize that any endeavor that seeks to understand the human actor either as a 1) means by which to represent (reproduce) the engagement of actors in the world or as 2) a means by which to change the engagement of actors in the world, must recognize the
fundamental import of symbolic (linguistic) interaction as the grounding and generator of human interaction as *actors*.

Moreover, the creation of identity itself, the generation of the actor herself, is a linguistically mediated event.

Because human beings by nature are only able to form a personal identity as long as they can grow and move within the intersubjectively shared world of a social group the interruption of the process of communicative understanding would violate a presupposition of human survival which is just as fundamental as that of the collective appropriation of nature. (Honneth, 1995, p. 87)

If one wishes to understand *faculty* not simply as a denotatively defined construct that can be objectively manipulated, one must engage the linguistic and symbolically mediated act of role creation through intersubjective dialectic. Roles are not simply defined in a positivistic and objective “faculty handbook” way, no matter how appealing that may be. Roles are generated, maintained, and reproduced through intersubjective role-formation with other actors and institutional entities that construct the social world. Thus, “culturally invariant validity claims are stored in the communicative speech acts through which individual actions are coordinated, and that these are historically differentiated gradually in the course of a process of cognitive rationalization” (p. 89). Understanding an agent’s role requires investigation, and, thus, participation, in the communicative speech acts that define that identity.

The importance of Horkheimer’s three criteria for effective critical theory becomes immediately clear when considering Honneth’s and Habermas’s construction of identity. To understand the role, one must participate in the intersubjective creation of the role, and to
participate in the intersubjective creation of the role is to participate, oneself, in the act of *generating the social construct*. Simply, one cannot observe the role and actually *understand* it without participating in the speech acts and commutative actions that themselves construct the role. To do so, though, then means that the “observer” is an active participant not just in “understanding” but in “generating” and, thus, helping to produce and maintain the role/construct. As such, the researcher cannot be morally distant from the social construct. The researcher is not simply *observing*; she is now *generating*, and, thus, if that role does harm, she is helping to perpetuate a role that itself does harm. For this reason, critical theory is normative: it notes the problems of constructs and seeks, through its own generativity, means by which to fix those problems.

The Habermasian argument, as explained by Honneth, is intuitively appealing to educational researchers. Consider a researcher who wishes to understand the interactions of students in Taiwan with their teacher. The researcher observes the teacher show the students how to draw a particular figure on the board. The teacher then asks the students to draw the figure on their own paper on their desks. Once having completed this assignment, the teacher then calls on the student who she observes *cannot* draw the figure to show everyone else how to draw the figure on the board. The student attempts to draw the figure, the teacher asks the class if the figure is correct, and the question is met with a resounding “No!” Of course, at this moment, the researcher may assume that this child will be in deep need of therapy for life, having been humiliated by her peers.

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2 This example is developed based on the following article: Li, J., Fung, H., Bakeman, R., Rae, K., & Wei, W.-C. (in press). How European American and Taiwanese mothers talk to their children about learning. Child Development.
What the researcher, though, as a “separate and objective” observer does not understand is the symbolic interactions of the class. She does not know that “intellectual struggle,” rather than “intellectual giftedness,” is how “intelligence” and “worth” is defined in the language and communicative actions of the Taiwanese. Thus, she does not understand the events that have unfolded before her. Had she known and observed further, she would have realized that the students value greatly the ability of their peers to come to knowledge rather than, as in the States, to be gifted with ability. The researcher would observe that the student stays in the front of the classroom, attempting to draw the figure correctly, until she does and is met with applause and accolades from her classmates. The child does not feel as if she is the “last one” to learn something, rather she feels that she has accomplished something fantastic in front of her peers and has been lauded appropriately for it having demonstrated her willingness to engage intellectual struggle.

Thus, one realizes that without embeddedness in the communicative actions that construct social environs, one does not actually understand what is observed. Moreover, once the researcher realizes that she has observed a radically different way of understanding intellectual struggle, is she not under the moral obligation to share this knowledge as a participant in education? Simply, critical theory as described by Horkheimer, would require that if students are in fact better off in educational environments that laud intellectual struggle rather than giftedness by birth, researchers are obligated to share that knowledge and help develop that understanding here in the States. Thus, it seems that Habermas and Honneth were correct: embeddedness in linguistic frames is required understanding, and that understanding necessitates normativity.
Habermas, therefore, identified a “pathology” in the paradigm in the development of “civilization” and social interaction.

Just as the aim of psychoanalysis in the theoretically guided interpretation of a life history is to liberate the individual from an unperceived pathology, critical social theory, along the way toward an enlightened interpretation of the history of civilization, is supposed to liberate the species from a disturbance, a “pathology” in its process of self-formation.

(Honneth, 1991)

The separation between the “lifeworld” and “systems world” is this pathology as a result of the attempt to separate agents from the lifeworld whether for scientific, capitalistic, academic, or perhaps even research ends. Engagement with the world, if it accrues significant ontological and moral baggage, is energy-demanding. One comes to realize that a philosophy, an economy, a research paradigm, or any system that does not acquiesce to the demands of both understanding and normative obligation will have to do far less. This describes a pathology as developed in human life: our systems seek separation from their embeddedness in identity formation and from moral obligation. Habermas, himself, largely focuses on the seeming automaticity that develops as the separation and differentiation of the systems world and lifeworld allows for an assembly-line approach to social life in which only that which is necessary is engaged, as if the systems world can be engaged without impact on the lifeworld. Moreover, “The rationalization of the lifeworld makes possible an increase in systems complexity which enlarges to such an extent that the released systemic imperatives outstrip the comprehensive ability of the lifeworld which is instrumentalized by them (Habermas, 1987, p. 232). One wonders: can critical theory provide the necessary resolution to the problem of the subjugation of the lifeworld to the systems world?
Honneth further argued that the distinction of systems-world and life-world is now meeting with opposition. The university system and its increasing systems-world approach to education seems to suggest that Honneth and Habermas are correct, the systems-world/life-world distinction is collapsing in such a way as to give primacy to the systems-world. Simply, the very academic tools that we use to identify the problems themselves are becoming lost to systems-world necessities and demands. The systems-world becomes the entirety of social life and agents can only be understood as participants in that system. Thus, the collapse of the humanities becomes inevitable and, now, understandable.

The humanities lack the language necessary to justify their world in the systems-world. They are not valuable to the systems-world; rather, the humanities generate, evaluate, and investigate the norms, values, and products of the life-world. The attempt to find systems-world justification of the humanities results in their collapse into systems-world, commodities-driven “systmanities.” A clear example of this event is the attempt of music teachers to justify the world of music courses to the system by arguing that music courses help increase math scores and thus are valuable in the paradigm of STEM. There is no language of value that music can speak that can be understood in the systems-world without appealing to systems-norms. The end result is the sublimation (which I will take to mean both “redirection” and “subjugation”) of music to STEM ends. Music courses are canceled in favor of more math courses, their teachers are co-opted for math tutoring, and their students are only valuable insofar as they can produce justifying STEM test scores.

This, then, requires that one consider perhaps the most common criticism of Habermas, a criticism explicated by Daniel Vokey (2008) in his “No remedy for cultural conflict: The
Inability of discourse ethics to resolve substantive moral disagreement.” Vokey’s concerns were primarily that 1) self-defeating relativist conclusions follow if Habermas collapses the distinction between what is justified and what is true and 2) that what should “count” are those arguments left to those who can engage in actual discourse. These concerns, though warranted, are not decimating to Habermas’ case.

Vokey (2008) acknowledged that moral reasoning seeks to be, and is best when it is, impartial. –Thus his concerns for relativistic contradictions. Honest and open consideration of all viewpoints seems to smack of relativism, potentially leaving open not just counter-intuitive moral permissibilities such as beating problematic students, but contradictory rules such as “do not beat students (in these cultures)” and “do beat students (in those cultures).” Ethical relativism would be especially problematic for a system like Habermas’, which is cognitivist and holds that there are universal moral truths.

The cultural relativistic concern, however, is not a pressing one. Habermas’ system does include all voices. However, those voices must engage in rational discourse. Those belief sets that cannot justify themselves without appeal to dogmatism or tautology would not survive the discursive process. Thus, Habermas need not capitulate to relativistic demands. Yes, all voices should be heard. No, not all voices are rational. Powerfully, this suggests that Habermasian discourse ethics acknowledges the value and import of every voice in the dialogue, while allowing for the possibility that some voices allow that their own arguments are irrational, if only based on their own internal inconsistencies.

More pressing is Vokey’s second concern—that there are those whose voices are given more value because of their ability to participate in dialogue. This problem may be exacerbated
by Habermas’ formation of identity thesis. Simply, one wonders if Habermas and Honneth—through their arguments for the formation of identity through interaction with the Other in the symbolic medium of dialogue—deny all entities who do not participate in dialogue identity. Thus, an odd result may be reached: those who cannot participate in dialogue are not even the Other, and, thus, merit no concern whatsoever. To be an Other is to have an identity, but to not have identity is simply to ____ . …There is no term for lack of identity that would not instantiate Otherness, so that we remain unable to articulate. This problem, however, is remedied through two potential answers: 1) bite the bullet ask assert that there is indeed no reason to concern oneself with those who lack identities, i.e. chairs, fetuses, and non-human animals, or 2) remind oneself that language and identity formation is not a Cartesian single-subject action. Rather it is an intersubjective action. As such, to engage any object in language is to begin to generate, within oneself, identity for that object. Thus, we have the ability to voice others, if we deem it rational to consider the genuine possibility that they are agents in the world. I suggest, through the investigation of Kögler’s (2012) work in chapter three, that this voicing will enable one to enlist the agreeance of the most obdurate solipsist through rational discourse.

Summary and Imperative

Organizational Role Theory and Symbolic-Interactionist Role Theory are, by themselves, insufficient for developing a robust understanding of faculty roles. In conjunction, however, as community-dialectical role theory mediated by the world of Habermas, role theory presents a viable option for developing understanding of faculty roles through engagement with the
linguistic, symbolic, and communicative actions that generate those roles. Such engagement requires discourse, as explicated through Habermasian discourse ethics.

Discourse ethics has a significant history in educational analysis in order to both understand changes that take place in education and to make suggestions regarding the form by which such changes should take place. Perhaps most notably, Sergiovanni’s (2008) analysis of the U.S. educational system applies Habermas’ understanding of the systemsworld and lifeworld in order to identify the pathology disturbing the equilibrium of our collective educational cognitive paradigm and its physical instantiation in the world. The systemsworld Sergiovanni notes has come to dominate the lifeworld of education, thus causing many of its problems—most pressingly, subjecting learners to the systemsworld, insidiously through the “beneficent” guise of education. True engagement in moral discourse would require, as Habermas explicated, the inclusion of the needs and voices of all stakeholders in education, especially the students, in the development of educational policy.

Honneth’s explication of Habermas suggests that the sublimation of the lifeworld by the systemsworld may take place without notice. The ever pressing redirection of social energy to that which bears the most fruit with the least effort seems to lead inexorably to greater systemification. Thus, in the context of this dissertation one wonders if the systemification, commodification, and commercialization of the university is similarly inexorable and the result of a larger sublimation of the lifeworld by the systemsworld. Understanding this phenomena requires a discourse-ethical investigation of faculty roles. One must engage the philosophical enterprise of deconstruction, immanent critique, definition, and normative evaluation through investigation of the communicative action that produces faculty roles. What the above research
makes clear is that the application of community-dialectical role theory cannot be done without the uncovering of norms embedded in our communicative action through cognitive dialectic with the symbolically expressed and norms (expectations) that construct faculty roles. Moreover, the research project itself must admit that in order to understand the roles it must participate in the generative linguistic process that produces the roles, and, thus, the moral imperative to change society for the better remains looming.
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The analysis of institutional roles requires that there be a means by which to uncover the norms assumed and, perhaps, inscribed, by our communicative action. Community-dialectical role theory suggests that roles are generated, explicitly and implicitly, through verbal interaction between agents as understood through symbolic-interactionist role theory and through the inscribed roles generated by institutions as understood through organizational role theory. Thus a means by which to uncover not only the inscribed roles, but the implicit norms governing those roles is necessitated. This dissertation itself seeks not only to understand the conjunction of faculty roles, but to develop a normative construct conjoining those roles rationally. Discourse ethics, I contend, is the best means by which to understand and uncover faculty roles as well as develop a normative framework for them.

In a philosophy dissertation, the next step would likely be to begin the analysis of faculty roles through discourse analysis. The paradigm of educational research, however, does not normally include philosophical analysis as a form of research in and of itself. Thusly, before moving forward into a deeper explication of Habermas whose work was introduced in chapter 2, one first must justify the application of philosophical analysis to the research questions established earlier.

Therefore, chapter three begins with a discussion of qualitative research and the ways in which philosophical analysis is always present in such research. Explication of philosophical analysis in educational research is developed beginning with Scriven, Flew, and Soltis, while at the same time reminding the reader that this chapter is both explication and an example of
philosophical analysis.

This chapter will then justify why discourse ethics, in particular, is so very applicable given the theoretical framework of role theory and the conceptual framework of community-dialectical role theory. This shift away from Scriven to Habermas is justified by noting that despite Scriven’s claims, the distinction between different forms of philosophy is nonsensical. Particularly of import is to note that in defining philosophy (in order to justify the move into philosophical analysis), philosophy itself is a “lived” science that requires holistic inquiry into various epistemologies. Thus, this work challenges the epistemological biases of educational research—particularly when solely positivistic. In this way, numerous epistemic inquiry methods are justifiable for the production of understanding, including narrative (though not used in this particular dissertation), narrative analysis, and dialogue form. In this way, the essential question, “What is the difference between conceptual analysis and philosophical analysis?” is answered by noting philosophy as lived, dialogue-based, and holistic in its epistemology.

I will suggest that a deconstruction of the term philosophy suggests a fundamental lived experience. I will then argue that review of our own underlying assumptions of the terms “philosophy” and “philosopher” suggest that philosophy is a lived experience and is best understood as part of the lifeworld rather than the systemsworld. Conversely, conceptual analysis is more a part of the systemsworld in which dialogue is subservient to the needs of the paradigm governing the analysis. Philosophy, I will argue, requires constant application through dialogue with the world, revision, and authenticity—particularly insofar as it requires that one

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3 The use of the term “systemsworld” emerges in this dissertation from Sergiovanni’s (2000) work The Lifeworld of Leadership. His own understanding of Habermas was of systems that themselves, like the lifeworld, cannot escape from their worldly embeddedness. The systemsworld is the world of instrumentalities that often emerge as management systems (p. 5).
participate in the world dialectic rather than coldly analyze the concepts as if one can separate oneself from their embeddedness in the lifeworld. I will do this to unveil the fact that the above meets the promise at the beginning that this chapter acts not just as an explication of philosophical analysis, but as a participatory demonstration of it, both deconstructing the terms and uncovering the norms governing our conventions when we even say “philosophy,” thus engaging Habermas.

The details of the methodological approach will then be elucidated. This elucidation expounds on the ways that the project will use role theory as a means by which to deconstruct the roles as we understand them and then use discourse ethics as a means by which to make sense of and uncover the norms and expectations of role theory with the intention of producing a normative construct. Essential literature is explored in order to unpack Habermas’ discourse ethics and consider not only its particular appropriateness to the project, but also potential criticisms to the methodology (paying special attention to Amy Allen’s work). Solipsistic concerns (to which the author is sympathetic) are addressed and set to rest noting (by a series of philosophical moves inspired by Allen, but also moving beyond them) that the solipsist has excellent reason to use discourse ethics, even if she refuses to reject solipsism. Having satisfied the skeptic, the chapter proceeds to consider researcher positionality, limitations of the dissertation, credibility, and warrant. The end game will note that philosophical analysis, in particular discourse ethics, is self-reflexive commentary, and, thus, that form of “rigor” is met to the highest degree by virtue of the methodology itself, given that the author remain transparent in his reasoning.
The Qualitative Paradigm

What is Philosophical in Qualitative Research?

This research project hinges on the development of definitions that, once clarified, can then be investigated for consistency and coherence when conjoined. Thus, it is philosophical analysis that best meets the needs of the research question. The project remains qualitative, as it is an understanding of those definitions and the ways in which they interact that is sought, but it will also engage the normative frame that is also a hallmark of philosophical inquiry. This is not to imply that qualitative research and philosophy are somehow exclusive, but, instead, to acknowledge that there is a paradigm of social science qualitative research and a paradigm of philosophical inquiry that are often treated as different disciplines. Research suggests that philosophical analysis is of particular use for a research project such as this one, and it is of particular importance to all research—particularly in education, as discussed by Michael Scriven (1997) and Jonas Soltis (1968).

To begin, there is little discussion of “philosophical analysis” as a research methodology in qualitative research in academic journals. Moreover, a quick review of the textbooks in qualitative research does not even suggest that philosophical analysis as a methodology exists. Patton’s (2001) Qualitative research & evaluation methods, Creswell’s (2012) Qualitative Inquiry & research design and Tracy’s (2013) Qualitative research methods: Collecting evidence, crafting analysis, communicating impact consider potential methodologies such as narrative research, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study without any mention of philosophical analysis. Interestingly, as the literature review demonstrates, it is not unusual for educational researchers to use Habermas or other philosophers, notably Dewey and
Noddings, as conceptual grounding for their work and as a means by which to generate a framework for teleological normativity. Despite the abundance of philosophy used by researchers, philosophical analysis itself is generally relegated to course-specific “Philosophy of Education” titles as if qualitative and quantitative analysis are themselves fundamentally distinct from philosophical analysis.

Interestingly, however, these texts do often use philosophy and analysis as part of their discussion of qualitative research. Philosophy and analysis are terms used by the textbooks to describe the way a methodology will be applied and conclusions drawn or, as in the case of the following quote, indicate a distinction between research and the abstract world of philosophy:

Exhibit 1.3 provides a sampling of contrasts between traditional tribe-centered initiations and modern youth-centered coming-of-age celebrations. These kinds of polar contrasts can sometimes set up a Hegelian dialectic of thesis and antithesis that leads to a new synthesis. In philosophy such contrasts derive from the ruminations of philosophers; in qualitative research such thematic contrasts emanate from and are grounded in fieldwork.

(Patton, 2001, p. 7)

Patton’s claim above, though, could not be made without a philosophical framework, nor could the fieldwork—that presumably cannot include document analysis and theoretical analysis—be examined without philosophical analysis. Patton cannot derive “such contrast” without the Hegelian dialectic to which he alludes as a framework through which to make sense of the data from the field research. Moreover, it cannot be said that the contrasts emanate from the fieldwork without an agent through which the data from the fieldwork are transposed and organized. This is all work of philosophical analysis. Qualitative researchers know, as argued by Eisner (1991) in
The Enlightened Eye, that in the case of qualitative research, “The self is the instrument that
engages the situation and makes sense of it” (p. 34). Patterns do not exist out in the world; the
researcher generates them through communicative action.

The interpretive act of seeing the data as patterned is a philosophical endeavor; it takes
place in field of the mind. It is philosophical analysis. Thusly, the distinction that Patton drew
between philosophy and qualitative research immediately collapses when considering two points:
1) the frameworks applied to data used in qualitative research (and perhaps all research) are
themselves philosophically defined constructs (gender, coming-of-age, celebration, role) and 2) the
data also are interpreted by the qualitative research instrument—the self. Here we see Mead’s
(1934) symbolic-interactionistic approach to selfhood and agency is both assumed by and
evidenced by the qualitative research paradigm. The construction of actors as mediated by their
social communicative understanding of “self” as that which is created by interaction with the
Other is reflected in the qualitative paradigm. The data that one interprets are not solely
interpreted by a separate and distinct “mind,” but by a self that is generated by what one
perceives as the self-construct and as perceived by others. That self, then, in conjunction with
other selves, develops through symbolic interaction the symbols themselves that are used to
communicate and act as the very grounding for communicative action—namely, social
constructs. One notes, therefore, that the very assumption that there are constructs that can be
analyzed is a philosophical assumption, and the belief that it is through agents that these
constructs are measured and understood is a philosophical thesis.

While it may be the case that quantitative researchers can argue that they do not need
philosophical analysis in order to make sense of their data because they have statistical tools for
analysis, qualitative researchers do not use mathematical systems to make sense of the data. Rather, they, using reason and logic, organize the data in such a way that they find makes sense by generating patterns they consider meaningful… All of which is philosophical analysis. As argued by Stubley (1992),

Herein lies the value of philosophy as a method of inquiry. Placing understanding as the ultimate end, philosophy works in the realm of ‘lenses.’ Whether the particular methodology is that of analytic or linguistic philosophy, process philosophy, experimentalism, or phenomenology, philosophy seeks to identify and evaluate the lenses through which we construct experience. (p. 44)

Thus, Patton and other textbook authors and researchers are on much more stable ground when they do not eliminate philosophical analysis from the research milieu and, rather, as they often do, engage it tacitly as the fundamental device used to analyze, interpret, and conclude. As Habermas would likely contend, examination of these texts would reveal a series of implicit assumptions about the most effective ways to analyze data meaningfully. Those assumptions, however, hinge on philo-logical axioms. What one comes to realize is that philosophical analysis is not absent from qualitative research, it is fundamental—so fundamental that it is often overlooked.

They are philosophers like Habermas who provide tools to engage, particularly, such overlooked embedded values and norms. Habermas, particularly, is noted for his “immanent critique” (also found in the work of Marx). Habermas’ refinement of that tool of analysis is a philosophical device wherein one uncovers assumed social norms and beliefs that themselves may be revealed to be incoherent or inconsistent when considered from the perspective of the
social frame that embeds those norms. For example, a society may claim to be altruistic and invested in the best interest of others, but one may realize that in that same society it would be considered inappropriate to bring a child to a mall Santa Claus to tell the jolly old saint what she will give rather than what she will get. Thus, one comes to realize that there are shared assumptions about appropriate action that need not be inscribed, and, yet, they reveal our shared social norms. An immanent critique would suggest that there is a clear inconsistency from the socially voiced claim that a society is altruistic while at the same time harboring the embedded assumption that children should tell Santa what they want rather than what they will give.

*Justifying Philosophical Analysis*

Jonas F. Soltis’s 1968 text, *An Introduction to the Analysis of Educational Concepts*, evidences the essential role philosophical analysis plays in educational research. His work is not just a justification of philosophical analysis, but it is also a model of the analytic techniques used by philosophers as applied to educational concepts. It can be difficult to explain analytical techniques, and, thus, Soltis aimed to participate with the reader in applying analytic techniques “to take advantage of the opportunity to view and evaluate the perspective on education offered by the application of the techniques of contemporary analytic philosophy” (p. xi). Similarly, in his argument for the importance of conceptual/philosophical analysis in his chapter in *Complementary Methods,* Michael Scriven (1997) stated,

Before I discuss these two interpretations let me call your attention once more to the fact that we are now doing conceptual analysis. This chapter is not a long-winded historical introduction to some examples; it is an example. And we are not only analyzing the
concept of definition itself, which is a key tool in any kind of research and, hence, in educational research, but also looking into the nature of language. (p. 137)

It may well be that qualitative inquiry often follows in that spirit—demonstrating rather than explicating philosophical analysis. Thus, in that spirit, this chapter on methodology will not simply act as a historical account of philosophical analysis, but will also act as an example of philosophical analysis by virtue of considering, comparing, and generating definitions, examining counter-examples, and grounding claims in evidence that has been structured to produce a coherent framework for understanding.

All qualitative analysis, if it engages in philosophical analysis to clarify, investigate, and examine concepts, terms and definitions, is an act of philosophical analysis. Michael Scriven (1997) stated, “Many researchers have thought that the first part of their job—analysis of the concepts that are going to be studied—could be done, or could be done better without any help from philosophers (p. 132). What is key here is the realization that the first part of the job is analysis. Perhaps because researchers often analyze information after they are collected, it can be easy to take for granted that the concepts to be researched must be analyzed first. One must clarify the constructs measured, explicate the nature of the constructs, and justify why such measurement will do something of interest and use. All of this, by Scriven’s definition of conceptual analysis, indicates that “one crucial part of philosophical expertise,” is a means by which to develop a “sound understanding and definition” of the concept in question (p. 132). Simply, one may inherit the construct to be researched from others and, thereby, assume that no analysis of the concept is necessary, yet it was that previous analysis that developed and defined that construct for use.
Consider, though, Anthony Flew’s (1960) discussion of supposedly intractable philosophical problems and the means by which they may be solved. In his edited volume, *Essays in Conceptual Analysis*, his paper “Philosophy and language” discusses the importance of clarifying terms:

> For in elucidating the ordinary uses (as opposed to philosophers’ suspected misuses) of some of the rather limited range of words around which our controversies tend to cluster, it has been noticed that the conceptual equipment provided by ordinary (here opposed particularly to technical) language is amazingly rich and subtle; and that even the classical puzzles cannot be fully resolved without elucidating not merely the formerly fashionable elite of notions but also all their neglected logical hangers-on.” (p.34)

Simply, the problems that arise between notions may be resolved by the examination and clarification of those terms that are assumed and, yes, support the notions in question. If there is a tension between *teacher* and *researcher* as chapter one suggests that there is, examination of the terms and notions that support those terms may suggest a resolution to the problem. Through examination of their use in ordinary language one may come to reveal that conceptual tensions are created by their misuse rather than any intrinsic meanings. This approach is, at its heart, both Derridian and Habermasian. The immanent critique of Habermas is perhaps one of the most obvious means by which to examine the use of ordinary language as a means by which to uncover the underlying norms and assumptions that govern our actions, as well as a means by which to identify contradiction and incoherence in those underlying assumptions.

Scriven warned that “lack of conceptual analysis may result in definitions that include many things [the researchers] wanted to exclude, and exclude things they wanted to include” (p.
132). Simply, how can one measure or apply a construct without first knowing what the
construct is or is not, or at least *positing* its definition for the purpose of challenging that
definition? Thus, it is philosophical analysis that undergirds every dissertation by virtue of, at
least, providing the definitions of the constructs to be used and by providing the tools necessary
to develop understanding or draw conclusions from the data that, itself, is presumed to be
reflective of those constructs.

Philosophical analysis *is* a method. According to Stubley (1992),

At the core of almost all of the different approaches [to the philosophical method] is an
analytical process, commonly described as conceptual analysis, which uses paradigmatic
examples to define and clarify the meanings of particular terms and concepts. Consistent
with the definition of philosophy as a method of inquiry which seeks understanding
through the juxtapositioning or challenging of ideas, examples which illustrate the core
meaning or most typical usage of a term are thrust against counter-examples that
illustrate what the term is not. (p. 45)

Stubley’s worry suggests that philosophical analysis is a means by which to apply tools such as
juxtaposition, presentation of counter-examples, and *reduction ad absurdum* to concepts,
constructs, ideas, and definitions in order to develop understanding. The data used, then, rather
than being interviews or documents, are concepts, ideas, and notions. (Arguably, so a
philosopher of language might suggest, all data whether transcribed interviews or even videos of
events are all actually concepts, ideas, and notions). The data, then, are concepts, and the tool is
analysis—examination, definition, and systematic investigation of those concepts’ meanings and
implications.
The result of the analysis is not just a breaking down, it is a development. To clarify a notion and identify what it is and is not is to unveil a construct—a concept or idea defined in a context that provides meaning when applied and investigated. As defined by SAGE publications in order to help define their engagement with quantitative research, “a construct is that abstract idea, underlying theme, or subject matter that one wishes to measure.” To measure a construct, however, one must have the construct—it does not appear *ex nihilo*. It falls under the purview of philosophical analysis to generate that construct, which itself the analysis must be able to justify.

Therefore, it is philosophical analysis that produces the constructs investigated and used by research. Moreover, philosophical analysis is a method that extrapolates data in the form of concepts and interprets that data using the tools of philosophy—definition, logic, narrative and linguistic analysis, all of which can be understood as lenses of experience, ways to construct understanding. Lens examination hinges on the examination of definition, as meaning is a fundamental way in which we construct our experience (Eisner, 1991). Thus, given the tools of the philosophical methodology, Stubley (1992) concluded that philosophical inquiry is “a reflective meditative activity which scrutinizes the lenses through which we construct experience” (p. 49). The common error, I suggest, is the assumption that reflective and meditative inquiry cannot scrutinize, that they must be so subjective as to lack rigor and access to knowledge. Clearly, this is false: the very act of scrutiny requires that one know what one is scrutinizing, which itself requires that one clarify one’s terms and categories and apply interpretive devices in order to make meaning.

Philosophical Analysis and Definition

There is a joke about philosophers:
Question: “How many philosophers does it take to change a light bulb?”

Answer: “Define change.”

This joke makes light of the philosopher’s need to define what one means before taking practical action. This hesitation to act before definition may well be why Scriven’s (1997) writing is preoccupied with justifying the importance of conceptual analysis. He argued that there is a lack of conceptual-analytic training in “virtually all programs for educational researchers,” which has doomed “conceptually incompetent researchers… to rush into building a lifetime of research on a foundation of conceptual sand” (p. 136). It is this fear of building upon conceptual sand that causes philosophers to hesitate to change the metaphorical light bulb.

Scriven wrote, revealingly,

Teaching is, in fact, a very difficult notion to define, and if you decide that you can define it any way you like or if you think it is a very simple notion to analyze, you will finish up doing a great deal of research on a process which is definitely not teaching, and is only related to it in some obscure way. (p. 136)

Moreover, I am willing to suggest that this hesitation is warranted not just when a concept is unclear, but especially when it is believed to be very clear.

Those concepts that we have trusted the longest are the ones that, by virtue of their familiarity, are now most likely challenged the least, and thereby conceptually dangerous as they may go unscrutinized when new knowledge, techniques, or minds enter the research arena.⁴ A

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⁴ Again, Gettier’s (1963) work comes to mind; the notion he challenged was a definition, a long established well respected definition in epistemology of knowledge as “justified, true belief.” It did not require the most renowned mind of the last two thousand years to demonstrate the invalid nature of the definition of knowledge, just a mind that was willing to ask a seemingly inane question that challenged the prevailing dogma. The result of Gettier’s questioning has been a continued resonance on the field of epistemology as philosophers desperately attempt to resolve what might be an intractable problem.
more pressing example than light bulbs is the definition of another commonly assumed and accepted construct—“man.” Many people assume that they can identify a man when they see one. They assume that they can define man, and need spend no time analyzing the concept man. One may then imagine that it is not unlikely that man and men are often constructs used in dissertations to help measure some other construct wherein man itself is never analyzed or even defined. This is exemplified in the case of measuring men’s preference for particular colors, wherein preference is the operative construct that the research will clarify and define before proceeding with the research. One is likely to assume that man need no definition, that the construct is sufficiently well defined, and the researcher need not even provide the definition—nonetheless justify the origin of the definition; it is simply an inherited and assumed cultural construct.

It is not difficult to imagine, though, a research project such that the construct man requires clarification and definition, if not justification. Consider a project that investigates the experience that self-identified men have with sexism and discrimination. If the men are self-identified men, there may be transgendered individuals who participate in the research who act as undesirable outliers in terms of their responses. The researcher may seek to avoid such problems by requiring that only “men” who were born genetically sexed as male can participate. I suggest that a justification for such exclusion is necessary. To exclude transgendered men without justification is to assume that they are not what they perceive themselves to be, which certainly seems antithetical to qualitative research, which is so heavily reliant on perception. Moreover, such exclusion, particularly if it is ad hoc, acts as a form of institutional genderism by
reinforcing the conceptions and norms that exclude transgendered individuals from the conversation by denying them voice.

One might argue that to engage such in depth definition analysis (particularly to the point of turning an entire dissertation into philosophical analysis) is to slow down the research process unnecessarily. One might argue that it would be far more expedient, and aesthetically simple, to use “operational definitions,” definitions that can be understood as simplifications or quantifications of what were once messy concepts, as is the case when describing someone as five feet seven inches tall rather than as short. One might wish to avoid engaging in philosophical argument pertaining to what short actually means, but measurement in feet and inches is easy to use, state, define, and defend.

So why not simply redefine “short” as being five feet seven inches tall or less, and move on? To quote Scriven (1997),

The people who favored the move towards operationalist redefinitions had virtually no training in the capacity to analyze the prior concept, so they really had no way in which to make the key test of the superiority of their prosed simplification. They just favored it because it was new and simpler, and they felt that the messiness of the old concept was an impediment to research (it was) and probably reflected many confusion of people with unscientific training (it probably did) and hence had no redeeming feature—which is where they made their mistake. For the messy concept contains all the subtlety that experience has forced upon it; it reflects the real phenomena, perhaps not clearly but usually rather comprehensively. Since the most important part of science is accurate reflection of reality, this part of the matter cannot be dismissed lightly. So, although some
limited trades of simplicity for accuracy are possible, you would have to do the homework first—or be very lucky. (p. 140)

The replacement of concepts with operationalized definitions that seemingly require no clarification or investigation does make research more expedient, but leaves open the possibility that we are not measuring what we claim and leaves us far less capable of justifying why we believe the measurement means something about the concept we have redefined in a positivistic way (e.g., to say that my measurements in inches says something about shortness is tenuous if I cannot explain the connection between a particular height in inches and shortness). It is for this very reason that researchers concern themselves with construct validity—“construct validation is the process of collecting evidence to support the assertion that a test measures the construct claimed by the test developer” (Worthern, White, Fan, & Sudweeks, 1999, p. 141). A construct is understood as that, “unobservable, postulated attribute of individuals that we create in our minds to help us explain or theorize” (Worthern, White, Fan, & Sudweeks, 1999, p. 141). Thus, as Scriven (1997) suggested, we cannot forget that the concepts, the constructs, we purport to measure are, at their core, unobservable concepts generated by human minds for the purpose of generating understanding.

It is important to note that Scriven argued that IQ and intelligence is one of the few cases in which operational definitions work and thus the positivist’s project does not collapse entirely. I remain unconvinced. He argued that the body of experts who judge intelligence will often fail to as accurately describe the intelligence of an agent as an IQ test will. I believe this begs the question. We have already assumed that IQ measures intelligence rather than being a measure that reports and translates the answering of questions and solving of problems into the ability to
answer questions and solve problems. While congruent, answering questions and the ability to answer questions are not identical.

Perhaps even more importantly, intelligence, as operationally defined, fails to take into account the arguments regarding the many kinds of intelligence, and thus, in a way best likened to Michael Foucault’s (1964) explication of madness and reason, creates for itself a paradigm of intelligence that is defined by the powerful (the definers of knowledge) who happen to be, coincidentally, those who are identified by the test as intelligent. To say that one is intelligent is deeply connected to what one knows and what one can do with knowledge, and knowledge is not best understood as a thing in the world, but rather, as a construct defined by those with the power to do so. Consider, for example, the definition of mental illness. Those with the power to define it do so. Thus, what we know about transgendered individuals is determined by the operational definitions generated by the medical community and their definition of transgender as a kind of mental disease.

The Positivist Critique of Philosophical Definition.

This is all to say that, as Scriven (1997) noted, the issue hinges on positivism. It would likely be the positivist who has the most to criticize about philosophical analysis as a methodology. Positivism has proved useful. It is a scientifically-minded, Occam’s razor-oriented tool that suggests the world can be understood in machine-like ways. Specifically, logical positivism holds that metaphysical problems can be ignored. The positivist suggests this not out of flippancy but due to the philosophically developed thesis proposed by the Vienna Circle of the 1920’s, comprised of such eminent members as Moritz Schlick, A.J. Ayer, Rudolf Carnap, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, who argued that only that which can be observed need be treated as true.
This observation thesis is generally known as the “principle of verification.” Unfortunately, though perhaps comically, the principle of verification cannot itself be verified, and, thus, positivism falls on its own sword and was criticized heavily, to the point of utter refutation, by Willard Van Quine (1951) in his *Two dogmas of empiricism*. That is not to say that there is no neo-positivistic philosophical revolution or that positivism is a dead theory. Rather, I suggest that positivism, thus far, has failed to eliminate the need for “messy definitions” of the world because it has failed yet to provide understanding.

Rather, as Quine suggested, there is good reason to believe that science—and, therefore—research is verified as a holism rather than through individual propositions. We cannot reduce our statements of truth to immediate empirical experience. Those statements only can be meaningful in a context of other statements regarding truth. Rather, understanding of given statements is generated through the connection one makes with other such statements within the domain. In a way reminiscent of Piaget’s learning theory, the field of research cannot be said to be one that exists in direct correspondence to empirical observation; rather, our beliefs are verified by virtue of their connection, or lack thereof to other beliefs—thus, they are judged not solely based in immediate experience, but on the holism of understanding generated by one’s experience schema.

Understanding and clarifying concepts, therefore, cannot be done in a vacuum. It cannot be done without language, without connection to other terms, and without definitions of those connecting terms. We verify the truth and falsity of new propositions by judging it against the whole of our belief schema. It may be argued that we generate a narrative of our experience/belief schema—an overarching arc of understanding that explains, justifies, and
clarifies the summation of our belief set. We do not just verify new information, as Piaget suggested, by comparison to particular beliefs, rather, as Quine implied, we verify them by virtue of ascertaining whether that information makes sense under that arc narrative. It is through narrative—the connection of events and facts—that we make sense of experience, not through individual events (which cannot even be called facts without context) of experience. The definition of a term is meaningless to us outside of the context of other terms and beliefs. The definition of teacher, without the context of education, student, and knowledge, will not make sense to us. Moreover, if we attempt to define a term and that definition does not make sense within the context of our arc narrative, we fail to understand it and may reject it rather than rewriting the story.

To say that gravity is caused by the exchange of gravitons is accurate and all that is necessary for us to understand gravity from a positivistic standpoint. Why, and how attraction is caused by the exchange of tiny particles, though, is hard to make sense of. In a Humean way, one fails to see how the conjunction of the events “a graviton is exchanged between particle A and particle B” and the event “the apple fell” equates with the causal story. The narrative is missing, and, thus, even if the positivist is right and the definition of gravity is accurate, without an understanding of the causal story it is a vacuous definition. Conversely, to define gravity as the warping of space such that objects make metaphorical dimples in space-time, and, thus, objects, much like marbles, roll into those dimples, seems to make much more sense—but it is a messier, more complex, and metaphorical definition. This sense making of messy definitions evidences Quine’s argument that the holism of context is necessary for understanding singular terms. As the purpose of this work is to understand the conjunction of faculty roles, we need more than
posited, operationalized definitions; we need definitions that connect to other terms that we can define, use metaphors that help make sense, and, when conjoined, generate a narrative that makes sense. We can be assured, then, that this project will be messy, thick and rich.

Definition Ad Infinitum

One might find that, very quickly, that one cannot act at all if one must define all terms used in one’s research as well as justify them before conducting research. As each concept itself is reliant on others, perhaps ad infinitum, one would find oneself unable to change what is now the proverbial light bulb. Scriven’s argument for the importance of conceptual analysis is not intended to prevent research, nor should it. Rather, the concepts used themselves to support our research are often ceteris paribus concepts—all things being equal, their definition is generally accepted and understood (Dancy, 1993). Thus, one is freed to examine, in detail, one concept without having to define all ceteris paribus concepts. One must also accept, though, the very real possibility that the constructs that support one’s research are themselves always revisable and may require redefinition. Moreover, as in the case with constructs such as men, as the earlier example demonstrated, the researcher would be wise to consider carefully that which (or who) she eliminates from a classification—particularly without explaining why. It behooves the researcher, therefore, to make certain, at the very least, that the constructs measured and used for measurement are themselves well defined, if one does not have an eternity to define all of the ceteris paribus concepts.

Avoiding the trap of building one’s research on a grounding of sand, then, at least Scriven (1997) and Soltis (1968) suggested, requires that one begin with definitions. Soltis wrote of educational concepts,
The ideas to be dealt with are quite ordinary and central to the educational enterprise. As such, they provide a basic point of departure for anyone concerned with education, from the layman and neophyte to the accomplished educational practitioner and scholar. Yet they quickly become puzzling ideas, which on careful examination lead to a chain of questions and answers in which the last link is more frequently another frustrating question than a pacifying answer. (1968, p. x)

Simply, as Soltis noted, there are many definitions of educational concepts; there is no shortage among politicians, the general populace, and even educators of conflicting ideas about what education is and what it should do. As a result, educational institutions, like the university, find themselves not only in flux but in contradiction with each other and themselves. Thus, to best understand where the institution should go—to engage the departure to which Soltis referred—requires not just that we know we are here, but to know how we should define “here.”

It is for this reason that I suggest that this work does not begin with definitions simply because Scriven and Soltis argue that this is what philosophical analysis does; rather, I suggest that the work should begin with definitions because it is, in this particular case, the best place to start. We understand that the university is changing; we also understand that education has tremendous power to do harm as well as benefit both learners and the society in which they participate. We understand that the role faculty play, as defined by society, as well as their lived instantiation of those roles as communicative action, has the potential to do the aforementioned harm and good. If we wish, then, to suggest that the roles should take a particular form, then we must, as we have done, define those roles and provide justification for that justification. This act,
the act of definition, deconstruction, and normative construction, is the heart of philosophical analysis.

Defining Definition

Ironically enough, the term *definition* itself is one that can mean many things. It would be useful to consider the field of semiotics—the study of signs and symbols and how they are used in communicative efforts—in order to provide a working definition for what we mean when we define a term. To take a discourse-ethical perspective, we need to review the way in which we use definition in order to begin to ascertain the underline assumptions that accompany our communication of the idea “definition.” To ask someone for a definition too often results in her proving a “dictionary” or denotative definition. Such denotations are often our first resort when asked to define a term. Further analysis, however, of our conversational conventions reveals that such Webster-que definitions are often insufficient to capture the holism of meanings that accompany a term: there are, of course, many *connotations* that construct the meaning of a term as well. If, in our conversation, we still find that we cannot grasp what the Other means when she says a thing, we may resort to ostension as a means by which to provide a direct example. Thus, a definition is constructed through a symbolic communicative process with the other by forwarding a series of denotative, connotative, and ostensive meanings that, in conjunction, define the term in our social framework.

As definition analysis and construction is essential to much philosophical inquiry, further clarification regarding the tools of definition is warranted. According to Nöth’s (1995) *Handbook of Semiotics* “denotation,” in traditional semiotics, indicates a primary meaning, whereas connotation indicates the secondary meanings. Nöth explained ostention in terms of
literally pointing to a thing. The three of these notions together provide a robust definition of a term by virtue of providing the primary meaning, the secondary meanings, and indicating an actual instance of that thing. Thus it can be suggested that one understands a term if one can provide all three definitions of that term.

For example, to provide a definition of “Earth” would likely require that one identify a dictionary definition which may inform one that “Earth is the 3rd celestial body orbiting the sun, Sol, at an approximate distance of 93 million miles.” The connotation, however, would allow for the implications, assumptions, and associations the term may inspire, such as “soil, Gaia, life, and home.” Finally, ostension requires that one actually indicate the thing—in essence to give an example. An example of “Earth” would not include a “globe, a map, or a picture” as these all are models or representations. To provide an example of the Earth, which of itself there is only one, would require that one point at the Earth. It is important to note that constructs, unlike proper nouns indicating singular subjects, can have many examples as the construct: it, in some sense, exists as a set of which there can be many members, as is the case with teacher. It seems that there is not much else that one could do to define a term. Moreover, when we, in our ordinary interaction with other humans, observe an agent engage all three forms of definition when explaining a concept, we assume that the agent understands the term. I suggest that is because the ability to provide those three definitions acts as evidence of understanding, perhaps even challenging Nöth’s (1995) suggestion that there is a kind of primacy to denotation. Given our communicative social frame, it may well be connotations that support the bulk of our meaning.
Definition, Intention, and Dialogue

There is something to be said, here, about the problem of intention and John Searle. Searle (1983) would likely argue that my above assertion is patently false by virtue of arguing that intention is essential for understanding and intention is not demonstrated by my above proposition. Intention in this case—not to be confused with purposefulness—refers to the idea that our thoughts are about something. In rebuttal, I suggest that there is no means by which to access intention inside the mind of another (certainly not “scientifically”) and that it is only through the rich connection of dialectical experience that one can presume intention on the part of an Other. As Derrida (1977) noted in his reply to Searle in his afterward to Limited Inc, “Toward an ethic of discussion,”

If by pragmatic concept you mean one that is empirical and approximative, I have trouble seeing how it would be able to found, theoretically, seriously, a theory (Searle’s, which is intentionalist through and through, treating intention as the founding principle of all speech acts that are serious, literal, and meaningful). Nonplentitude will be treated as though it were an extrinsic accident, even if it in fact occurs frequently, even if it takes place everywhere. This I call “fundamental intentionalism” –Searle’s. In this case, I do not believe that the concept of “intention” can be treated as “pragmatic concept,” not at least if by that you mean a concept that is empirically useful, provisionally convenient, constructed without great rigor. (p. 128)

Derrida (1977) suggested that one cannot simply divorce intention from its metaphysical plenitude, as it is metaphysical in its very teleology.
Perhaps a clever constructed machine could fool us into believing it understands definitions with one act of denotation, connotation, and ostension, as Searle suggested in refutation of Alan Turing. Turing, though, had a point if we interpret him as underscoring the centrality of dialogue to the mind. In the case of humans, we assume that repeated linguistic interaction, the robust dialectic itself of numerous cases of such definitions, that demonstrate the potentiality of a coherent belief-set constructed by such definitions held by the agent, is evidence of understanding. I suggest, therefore, that the ability to provide a denotative, connotative, and ostensive definition is the core evidence of understanding substantiated by a robust dialectic that continues to confirm the original proposition of understanding. Thus, it is in the context of dialectic (not humanness, English, or logic) that intention is evidenced.

Thus, if understanding is demonstrated, at least at the burgeoning fundamental degree necessary for engagement in full dialectic, by providing denotative, connotative, and ostensive definition, then the methodology of this philosophical analysis requires that we do so with the terms I will presume to define. Much of this has already been accomplished through the literature review and the development of the conceptual framework. Role, faculty, teacher, and researcher have all been defined through examination of documents, institutions, and theories that generate those roles. It will be the work of chapter four, though, to continue that process by synthesizing those definitions, examining them, ostensively pointing to them by virtue of examples, and justifying them. This final action of justification is a normative process. As such, philosophical analysis is not normative by virtue of arbitrarily asserting the value of one definition over the other, but rather by virtue of justifying the construct as valid through universally applicable logical and dialectical principles.
Normativity and Definition

Note that Scriven (1997), Soltis (1968), and Stubley (1992) did not spend time with the normative work of philosophical inquiry. Their work largely hinges on the philosophic tradition of parsing out concepts. Construction of concepts and normativity is just as central to the philosophical enterprise. Moreover, in his 1960 text, The Language of Education, Israel Scheffler argued that three types of definition are particularly useful when engaging educational concepts: stipulative, descriptive, and programmatic. Stipulative definitions are those that are suggested for use in a particular work, largely to avoid confusion. If one writes, “For the purposes of this work, term x will refer to instances of y,” then one is proposing a stipulative definition. Presumably, stipulative definitions are synonymous with Scriven’s operational definitions. Descriptive definitions are those that purport to describe the term in question. These definitions are commonly understood as the previously discussed denotative and connotative definitions, for which a given term may have a series of descriptive definitions due to common usage. Programmatic definitions are those that entail a normative value; they suggest that x should be the case. To say that “education is that endeavor that benefits students through learning,” is both descriptive and, implicitly, normative as it is suggesting that there is a certain rightness of or obligation of the educational enterprise to benefit learners.

Solits (1968) suggested that Scheffler’s above demarcations are particularly useful when engaging philosophical analysis in education specifically because of the importance of the programmatic notion of definition. He wrote,

[T]his is the intended upshot of this discussion: a search for the definition of education is most probably a quest for a statement of the right or the best program for education, and
as such is a prescription for certain valued means or ends to be sought in education (p. 11).

Such programmatic definitions may also be considered axiomatic: from them, by the rules of implication, other propositions can be derived, in this case as directives. Such programmatic definitions prove profoundly useful in drawing conclusions that are justified tautologically. If education is best understood, for example, as a social institution that exists for the benefit of agents through learning, then one can conclude, through the rules of equivalence, that education should benefit learners and should promote learning, by definition. Similarly, Peter Markie (1990) wrote, “to be a professor is to occupy a particular institutional role, and that role may be defined by certain duties so that claims attributing those duties are analytic (p. 134). By analytic, Markie was referencing the notion of knowledge gained by definition. Thus, we can say we know what duties are attributed to professors, by definition, and those duties are synonymous with the expectations of the role, thus, analytically speaking, to know the duties is to define the role explicated by Biddle’s explanation of organization role theory.

The Naturalistic Fallacy

Researchers might immediately balk and forward Moore’s (1903) argument regarding the naturalistic fallacy: “is does not imply ought.” Moore is correct about the category of “is” he discusses. One cannot rationally say, for instance, that because rape does exist it should exist. One can say, though, that a light bulb is an instrument that gives off light; therefore, that light bulb should give off light by virtue of the definition of light bulb. In this way, one should not equivocate between the kinds of shoulds involved in these two different instances.
The naturalistic fallacy is best understood in terms clarifying the distinction between existent phenomena and moral imperative, whereas programmatic definition is better understood in terms of conditionals generated by definitions: if x is defined as (equivalent to) y, then y should be equivalent to x. The _should_ does not emerge out of moral force somehow manifested by virtue of the existence of empirical truths; rather it emerges categorically from the form of definition itself— _a definition grounded in our symbolic action_. By this, I mean that programmatic definitions of the kind I am describing all share the same _should_—x should be an instance of y because x is defined as y as generated by our linguistic-social constructs. We may call these tautological programmatic definitions.

Sheffler’s (1960) definition, though, of programmatic definitions does not necessarily hinge on such tautological equivalencies. As demonstrated above, he is suggesting that certain endeavors, as is the case of defining _education_, hinge on certain moral imperatives, which themselves guide the construct (defining) process as _the norms that undergird our communicative action_. If I am a chef, for example, my search for _the_ definition of chocolate may hinge on the implied fact that I want the best possible tasting chocolate. Thus, the definition of chocolate that I produce may suggest that certain objects in the world normally classified as chocolate (Hershey’s Kisses, for example) should not be called _chocolate_ because they do not meet the implicit criteria of “exemplary taste sensation.”

Consider, as a further example, my own original misunderstanding of the definition of _critical theory_ when entering the doctoral program. Originally, upon reading the textbook definition of critical theory, I believed critical theory to be that educational research that seeks to benefit learners. Thus, I was able to define critical theory as having normative content and,
therefore, different from all other forms of educational methodologies that do not. I was immediately corrected, however, and informed that all educational research has, at its core, the goal of benefiting learners, by definition (simply because it is educational research) and, therefore, all of it is normative in that way. Thus there is a tautological programmatic definition imbedded in “education” and assumption of beneficence. Critical theory was not different because it was normative, I was told, but because of its focus on voice, hermeneutics, and focus on the marginalized; thus the whole of education research engages a tautological programmatic definition.

Moreover, further examination of the definition reveals that the implicit assumptions of critical theory are grounded in the philosophical and sociological works of Axel Honneth, Habermas, and Horkheimer. Thus, one comes to recognize the entire enterprise of education as supervening upon critical theory. Thus, Sheffler’s (1960) notion of programmatic definition gives way to Habermas’ unveiling of the fundamental grounding assumptions that mediate language and discourse. To say this, however, is not just to say that intersubjective linguistic events with external agents are mediated by logical rules, but even internal linguistic events, which themselves cannot happen without the symbolically mediated interpretation of language, necessitate and assume specific rules of dialogue and understanding. What Habermasian reasoning reveals when applied to Sheffler is that programmatic definitions are themselves programmatic because of their embeddedness in intersubjectivity. Thus, all definitions exist not in a vacuum, but carry with them normative force and the assumption that their definitions are understood. My realization regarding critical theory was that all education could only make sense in our symbolic framework if it was in its essence critical theoretical—a sociological
enterprise that is defined by the communicative action of explication, intersubjectivity, and social improvement.

Normativity, therefore, arises from the very defining process in many ways. The programmatic definitions, as Sheffler described them, are those that occur when our analysis leads us to say, “We should define teaching as x.” Moreover, tautological programmatic definitions emerge as we come to realize that there are hypothetical imperatives we can infer from the definition based in the definition—“If we define teaching as x then we should….” As I will be giving arguments for why particular roles should be defined in particular ways and considering the implications and imperatives that arise from those roles, this is a normative project. The largest normative force, though, will come from the construct developed by this project, from the holism of definitions and roles in conjunction that will suggest that understanding of roles as instantiated is best achieved through the lens of this construct and thus, by definition, the best way to instantiate those roles is described by the construct. This normative quality must itself be defensible and logically grounded. In fact, it may need to be best understood as a kind of moral fact, *qua* Habermas.

*Error in Exclusion*

One may have noted early on in this chapter that Soltis (1968) made reference to his placement in “analytic philosophy,” as if the act of analysis and rigorous concept analysis is specific to a particular field in philosophy. His work seems to further reject the idea that philosophy may have aesthetic or narrative qualities. To quote Soltis, “To make language of education work, we must be clear about its intent and meaning and not be swayed only by its imagery and poetry. The analytic temperament and techniques should prove most useful to any
practicing educator in getting him to think through with care…” (p. 74). It would seem, *prima facie*, that this preference for “the analytic temperament” over the imagery and poetry makes definitional sense. If the analytic tradition is dedicated to the rigorous, objective, and systematic parsing of terms as they can logically be related to each other, then *analysis* is an apt description of what analytics do. However, this distinction is simply outmoded and outdated. The philosophies of language to which Soltis may have been referring in this rather broad stroke do not assume poetic philosophical meandering; they are, themselves, conceptually rigorous.

It is immediately clear from a reading of Habermas and Honneth—both of whom will be explicated in more detail shortly—that there is little reason to concern oneself with a lack of rigor on their part. I suggest, however, for the purposes of this work, and out of the philosophical principle of charity, to consider Soltis’s criticism of poetic language, which may be understood as a rejection of anything considered “unnecessary” to the rhetorical process. Clearly, we lose the power of dialectical narratives such as Plato, and the importance of even those narratives generated by Einstein when he asked himself, “What would it be like to travel on a beam of light?” Human understanding seems to ground itself in analogy. Such analysis is found in narrative and figurative device. To assert that truth is only accessible through the parsing of concepts that themselves are *symbolic and mediated through communicative action* is an irrational bias.

This bias might find itself grounding the belief that the world can only be understood mathematically or through symbolic logic. It is difficult to suggest, though, that the semantic content generated by mathematical or physics-oriented descriptions of the world is itself not a kind of narrative framing of the world (as neither mathematics nor physics have been
demonstrated to be the fundamental truth of the world). Rather, they are narratives that help human agents make sense of the world—they assist in the production and justification of an agent’s narrative schema. For philosophy to ignore any tool that may generate understanding is incoherent with the very enterprise of philosophy, as a Habermasian immanent critique of the philosophical enterprise suggests.

**Narrative, metaphor, and analysis**

I do not say this to suggest the primacy or supremacy of narrative, only to suggest that it is, at the very least, essential to our understanding and our ability to comprehend. The emphasis placed on understanding the world through a logically grounded frame requires resting our discourse upon the idea that our beliefs should not be paradoxical or self-refuting (known as the law of non-contradiction) is overwhelmingly productive and useful. Thus, we see the usefulness and inclusion of Habermas’ ideas; it is in them that we see an in-depth explication of the inability to engage dialogue and discourse without the assumption of logical and rational rules of discourse.

To quote Habermas,

Just as someone interested in a theory of knowledge cannot adopt a standpoint outside his own cognitive acts (and thus remains caught in the self-referentiality of the subject of cognition), so too a person engaged in developing a theory of moral argumentation cannot adopt a standpoint outside the situation defined by the fact that he is taking part in a process of argumentation… For him, the situation of argumentation is just as inescapable as the process of cognition is for the transcendental philosopher. (1991, p. 81)
Having engaged the process of term clarification, the self-referentiality of that act (that there are terms, those terms have meanings, those terms should not self-negate), that meaning is shared through language, narrative produces understanding, discourse produces both rules and understanding, are all assumed. They were assumed as soon as I wrote down a sentence that I believed would communicate meaning to a potential reader. Thus, we are not simply examining Habermas' notion of dialectic, nor are we only using his notion of dialectic: we are currently performing his dialectic.

Finally, I suggest that the bias shown by Soltis (1968) against figurative language is a hindrance to philosophical analysis and, unlike the rest of his thesis, should be discarded as a simple but harmful bias. Understanding language without figurativeness is impossible. To engage in philosophical analysis of the kind described here is to investigate definitions, to attempt to connect terms to meanings. Terms, though—as Saussure (1972), Derrida (1977), and Scriven (1997) pointed out—do not have a metaphysical connection to the objects they identify. Those connections are arbitrary, though not meaningless or weak. According to Scriven (1997),

So there is some sense in which the world does not define what language has to be used in describing it; we do that defining; we create those languages. Moreover, these languages emerge in their respective cultures entirely as a result of the language building and language learning activities of those societies and individuals, not as a result of some law connecting the local climate or crops or social structure with language forms. Languages are obviously arbitrary in the sense of being conventions rather than laws of nature. All that, however, is not to say that these languages are now arbitrary. They now
have very strict rules, and if you take any one term from any one of them and give it a
new definition, you will not be speaking that language. (p. 138)

Thus, as Nietzsche wrote in “On truth and lie in an extra-moral sense,” all language hinges on
metaphor—connections between terms and ideas that themselves have no intrinsic connection,
but once juxtaposed are now connected and produce meaning. All language, not just the
commonly understood metaphor, requires the connection between two unlike things, and thus,
engaging figurative language is essential to understanding. I should think this would be of
special importance in qualitative research—as the claim is that understanding is the primary goal
of such research.

It is common that one does not understand a term or a concept until provided with a
metaphor. One might say, “I don’t understand what you mean when you say teachers, in the end,
cannot be held responsible for what learners choose to learn.” In reply, one might provide the
metaphor, “What I mean is—teaching is like being a salesman. In the end, the car salesperson
cannot force the customer to buy the car; the final decision, no matter how good the salesperson
is, is up to the customer. Just like the teacher cannot force the learner to buy the idea.” The light
bulb might then go off, and we hear, “Oh. I understand!” The irony is, of course, that
“salesmanship” is not what the explicator “meant,” even if she suggests, “what I mean is.”

Literally speaking, what she means is her first statement: teachers cannot be held responsible for
what learners learn. Teachers are not salespersons, and the connection between the two is purely
metaphorical.

Researchers might reply, “But I can give definitions by ostention, thereby ignoring the
need for narrative and metaphor.” Ostension will not suffice, however. Consider asking for
clarification for the word *chair*. I might then point to a particular object and say, “That is a chair.” What I have done is generate a performative metaphor. Literally, the word *chair* can only connote the word chair: a symbol, a series of squiggles. Figuratively, through the arbitrary connection between that sign and a concept, we then connect the concept to a particular object in the world. The object and the concept, though, are also not literally the same thing. So to say, “That is a chair” is inaccurate on every level except the metaphorical… the word *that* is not the word *a chair*; the object is not the word *chair*, and the word *chair* is not the concept chair, nor is the object. What we mean when we say, “That is a chair,” is none of those things listed above. We mean only, “That is a chair,” and understanding—through the metaphor—is generated, while literal analysis of the event leads only to confusion.

**Context of Methodology and Theoretical Framework**

Given the above, I suggest that Soltis did, in fact, more accurately make a distinction between conceptual analysis and philosophical analysis. Consider immanent and etymological critique of the term “philosophy.” The perhaps cliché definition of philosophy as *philia sophia* grounds the etymology in the ancient Greek “love of wisdom.” While over-quoted, the fact remains that the etymology of the term philosophy is useful. The definition reveals a grounding of philosophy in lived experience. Philosophy was not originally defined as a “study of.” While it may not be uncommon to encounter a “PHI 101” definition of philosophy such as “the study of the deepest questions humans can ask,” we realize that philosophy is not simply a domain of inquiry that remains separate and distinct from lived human experience. While current trends in academia seem to suggest that each mode of inquiry—physics, mathematics, social sciences, linguistics, and the like—are in fact separate studies of different phenomena, philosophy reminds
us that there is a binding drive behind inquiry: the search for understanding, and, thus, “wisdom.”

I suggest that philosophy is therefore not best defined as a kind of “Ivory Tower” enterprise where the philosopher locks herself away amongst her tomes never to be seen again. Rather, I suggest that even if locked away, the philosopher engages a constant life of inquiry. To seek wisdom would not be a nine-to-five job. Rather, seeking wisdom is a lifetime endeavor that results in the questioning of all assumptions and the investigation of all events. Simply, unless the philosopher is having her meals delivered to her and sleeps in the philosophy department, she must exit into a world that will present to her new questions and problems ad infinitum. If to be an artist is to live a life of art—to consume, produce, and live art, then a philosopher, by analogy, consumes, produces, and lives philosophy. The philosopher would not be simply satisfied with the parsing of definitions during work hours and then tunelessly whistle on her way home—each moment presents a new moment of artistic inquiry that requires engagement if one truly “loves wisdom.” Philosophers, like children, are likely to hear often from their friends, “Do you have to question everything?” to which the answer is, “Yes, of course, because I love to understand.”

Our immanent critique additionally reveals that our concept of philosophy may well be infected by the primacy of the systemsworld in contemporary western society. Commercialization places the value of the system before the value of the norms and agents who comprise the system. The world of academia, as chapter one has argued, is under tremendous pressure to capitulate to the demands of the commercialized systemsworld. Philosophy, as a lived experience that requires consistent dialectic with the world, is in direct opposition to the sublimation of the lifeworld by the systemsworld. If the goal of philosophy is one that is
inherently based on the value of wisdom then philosophy is, by definition, a *lifeworld* enterprise. Wisdom is not valued for its usefulness to the system, but, rather, for its intrinsic intersubjective worth.

Thus, it may be reasoned that “conceptual analysis” falls under the category of a tool that can be used from either a systemsworld or a lifeworld approach. It may either be the deconstruction of terms and concepts for the purpose of forwarding instrumental aims or as a tool for understanding the norms, values, and constructs created through our linguistic framework. Philosophy, then, often uses conceptual analysis as a means by which to engage the world more authentically. If the purpose of philosophy is to understand the world in order to more fully participate in and know it, then, as a lifeworld endeavor, it will have at its ready numerous epistemologies that enrich our understanding of existence. Similarly, the conceptual analysis of Soltis (1968), is one tool of many accessible to philosophy (including deconstruction, symbolic logic, hermeneutics, ethics and so on). I say this not only to justify moving beyond Soltis and Scriven so that we may engage normative philosophy, immanent critique, and deconstruction, but also to suggest that future dissertations *even in the paradigm of education* might consider using narrative frames to produce understanding. Although this work will stay fundamentally in the discourse-ethical frame, there are numerous tools available to philosophers of education in future dissertations and no tool should be excluded *ad hoc* if the aim is wisdom rather than confirmation of one’s bias.
Clarification of Discourse Ethics and Explication of Seminal Literature

*Habermas and the Paradigm of Education*

The work of Habermas is discussed in chapter 2. To clarify further, however, one must understand that the work generates discourse ethics through the recognition that dialogue itself requires certain shared presuppositions. To engage in discourse is to assume a series of grounding axioms that, while on one hand may seem obvious, are, on the other, often taken for granted as to be forgotten or ignored. We assume, for example, that in reading this work that we are capable of understanding each other, exist, and can generate arguments that will or will not prevail depending on the strength of the evidence. Thus, unique to discourse there are underlined presuppositions that structure our communication.

These assumptions, however, are also continent on objective rationality. A discourse-ethical presupposition for rational discourse is that everyone capable of engaging in the dialogue is equally entitled to participation in that dialogue. This is a rational presupposition hinging on the presupposition that we engage in discourse because we want to come to understanding or truth. Thus, Habermasian ideas may be understood as an immanent critique of dialectic itself. To investigate any particular instance of discourse is to begin revealing a series of assumptions that themselves are grounded in presuppositions that, while unstated, are necessary for rational discourse. Thus, we, by virtue of participating in the discussion tacitly agree to those presuppositions. This does not mean, that once faced with the presupposition we will agree, only that, according to Habermas, if we are engaging in open and rational discourse we will consent to the truth of the proposition by virtue of the fact that we have been accepting it, albeit tacitly, all along.
To engage in rational discourse, then is to assume that we are using language in the same or a similar way, to assume that we are unwilling to ignore any relevant argument, to assume that we will accente to the force of a better argument, but not to any other force, and, importantly, that we are motivated to dialogue in the first place because we wish to develop a better argument.

Notice, that these presuppositions run afield of both Michel Foucault and what seems to be actual practical engagement in argument. The notion of force and power, of great importance to Foucault’s work, would be one he would take special issue with insofar as he argued it was power that generated “rationality” in the first place. In other words, Habermas’ ideas may have difficulty justifying what rationality is without begging the question or appealing to some authority.

Secondly, actual human engagement in argumentation seems to include often a great deal of ignoring other arguments and acceding to worse arguments for some invalid reason. In other words, humans seem to be rather irrational. It is important to realize, however, that both of these concerns ignore the crux of Habermas’ argument which is a hypothetical imperative… if we wish to engage in rational discourse… then we should. The concern of begging the question is alleviated through the recognition that it is our own embedded norms of communication that generate the defining characteristics of rational discourse in the first place for practical reason.

Simply, we would not engage in discourse if we did not believe it was possible for a better argument to prevail. While it may be true that we engage in such discourse with great irrationality, we also must assent to the fact that we are, contradictorily, presupposing that the discourse can lead to the elevation of a better argument. As such, we are bound, by our own presuppositions to put aside our biases and irrationality in order to engage in the discourse that
we have, by virtue of engaging in discourse, of which we have already accepted the rational precepts.

Such thinking lead Habermas to fundamental conclusions regarding not just dialectic, but normativity. To engage in rational discourse is to accept that the consequences of the discourse must be to the satisfactions of everyone’s interests. The dialectic must include everyone who has an interest in the discourse, and it may not exclude any relevant argument. Thus, this cognitivism, this foundational moral truth, is one of inclusiveness. We find at the heart of our intersubjectivity the assumption that others should be included, otherwise dialectic would not be rational. We know this, in part, because when our own interests are excluded from the dialectic, we recognize both it as unfair and irrational. To ignore a relevant argument is not to engage in rational discourse, if I have an interest affected by the discourse, to ignore me is to ignore my relevant arguments, and thus engage in irrationality. Thus, Habermas’ principle may be considered one of “universalization.” It is a universal principle of inclusion of everyone’s interests.

The rational result of that principle is Habermas’ contention that norms can be considered valid when they meet with the approval of all affected. Notice, then the grounding of morality in rationality. The questions of “rightness” and “wrongness” can be understood in terms “validity.” A norm is invalid, logically untenable if it does not meet with the approval of all affected for rational reasons. To reject a norm because one wishes to engage in a way that excludes the arguments of others or establishes a norm that is not to the satisfaction of others is to engage in irrationality. Thus, we all must accept, argued Habermas, that to engage in ethical discourse is to assent to the truth of the proposition that 1) we must consider the consequences of all affected,
include all relevant arguments and voices and 2) the validity of norms are not determined by moral intuition but instead its rational acceptability of all affected.

The work of Øjvind Larsen (2009) in his *The Right to Dissent: The Critical Principle in Discourse Ethics and Deliberative Democracy* clearly illuminates the applicability of discourse ethics to the educational paradigm. Of the many modes of philosophical analysis, Discourse Ethics enables one to engage immanent critique, ontological grounding, and normativity, perhaps most robustly. Larsen’s work applies discourse ethics to the general problems of modern society in order to both better understand those problems and suggest resolutions to those problems, much in the same way this dissertation proposes to do.

Larsen (2009) stated that his work, in fact, emerges from a problem similar to the one described in this dissertation in chapter one. In much the same way as the roles of teaching and research are finding themselves separated and “homeless,” he suggests that so does ethics in regards to society:

> My thesis is that this is because [ethics] does not have a natural place in the production of modern society. To the contrary, the transformation of modern society results in ethical relationships being limited to a particular circumstance that can only be integrated with difficulty into modern social institutions. (p. 37)

One can see the similarity in projects, then. As the University continues to shift towards greater and greater commercialization and commodification, care and invested teaching and research are finding that they do not fit naturally into the social reality. “To the contrary,” the transformation of the modern university results in invested teaching and research being limited to particular circumstances that can only be integrated with difficulty into modern *educational* institutions.
Larsen then applied discourse ethics to the problem of modernity in order to determine both why ethics no longer fits in social reproduction and how its bifurcation from social norms is best understood.

[Habermas’] discourse principle “D” assumes that norms for action must be deemed as valid, something to which all possibly affected parties will be able to consent as participants in a rational discourse… The discourse principle is a universal non-partisan and neutral principle for argument, which can then be differentiated and operationalized in a number of different discourses, including moral discourse and discourse on democracy. (p.199)

Larsen was then, having distinguished between democracy and discourse ethics, able to apply discourse ethics to modern society and democracy itself because rational discourse is not synonymous with majority rule. Democracy seems to suggest that all voices can be heard and heard just once (insofar as voting is concerned); rational discourse, however, suggests that all voices should be heard and considered without bias.

One realizes, then, that the question of faculty roles is not just one of description nor is it one of dictation or majority rule. Faculty roles should not just be determined by some seemingly democratic process and they should not just be investigated; they should be formed through rational discourse—thus the application of discourse ethics. “Moral problems touch on universal problems that, in principle, concern all human beings” (Larsen, 2009, p. 204). If this is the case then the question, “How should faculty roles be constructed?” is a moral problem that touches on universal problems that, in principle, concern all human beings. Faculty as they educate vulnerable populations and are the generators of our social epistemology have significant
societal impact. Thus, the way their roles *should* be constructed touches on broad human concerns, just as Larsen suggests and, “To these correspond moral discourse in which moral problems are subject to a universal trial through rational discussion about the validity of the moral statements and thereby whether they are right or wrong” (p. 204). Simply, Habermas affords us the ability to 1) construct and reconstruct faculty roles in a way that make rational sense given the rule of discourse itself and 2) include the import of all voices without bias in the construction of those roles.

Finally, as Larsen’s (2009) text suggests through its application of Habermas, the right to dissent is effectively empowered and respected through discourse ethics. “The right to dissent is not only the critical principle of discourse ethics and deliberative democracy – it is the basis of freedom in modern society” (italics my own, p. 9). This ability to include not only assenting voices in deliberative practice, but dissenting voices is a power that is particularly useful when considering normative assembly of constructs. When engaging the instantiation of roles as well as the form those roles *should take* it is essential that the ethical perspective not just acknowledge dissenting voices, *but incorporate them fully into the deliberative process*. Thus, as demonstrated analogously through Larsen’s work, discourse ethics as engaging rational deliberative processes in order to both understand and generate normative constructs is particularly *apropos* to a process that is already hinged on Mead’s (1934) understanding of roles as generated through symbolic (dialectical) interaction.
To apply Habermas will require that we engage three fundamental steps. 1) To engage in immanent critique of the social construct as a means by which to reveal the norms and values embedded through symbolic interaction 2) To consider the existence of the construct and its components within the life and systems world and 3) To engage the process of discourse ethics as a means by which to both evaluate and generate a normative framework through dialectic.

The first step will also take on a Derridian deconstructionistic methodology. Habermas’ immanent critique is powerful and revealing and will be made more so through the engagement of etymology and investigation of narrative framing. The symbolically mediated framework of Habermas’ construction of identity can be understood as the construction of self-narrative through participation with others in dialectic. Thus, the Derridian perspective enables one to further parse out the norms and concepts identified through Habermas through investigation of their interaction with other terms and their own potentially contradictory self-reference. Simply, the deconstructionistic addition to the Habermasian immanent critique will enable the investigation of definitions within the domain as both socially mediated (in the search for Habermasian coherence) and narratively consistent through their adherence to other terms. Note that it is the Habermasian critique, however, that remains dominant as the adherence of terms, their différence to each other, is the result of social interaction.

The second step requires that we consider the understanding of the definitions we have developed as part of the lifeworld and systems world. The roles, as they are both inscribed and symbolically mediated through discourse, must emanate from the lifeworld of subjects and
intersubjectivity and/or the systemsworld of applications and instrumentality. Understanding faculty roles, as well as how they will continue to develop, requires understanding the ways those roles are expressed as components and generators of life- and systemsworld values. This analysis, then, requires close consideration of the communicative actions that produce faculty roles. Examination, as organizational role theory would have it, of the inscribed expectations of faculty roles will be insufficient; consideration of the full dialectic, both external and internal, that generates faculty roles is necessary. This dialectic includes those norms assumed by the terms, the assumed as well as inscribed expectations in faculty handbooks, and the actual lived experiences reported in research by faculty who are exploring the shifting paradigm of faculty existence.

The third step requires the application of discourse ethics to the process of understanding how faculty roles should be constructed. Analysis of faculty roles, as well as analysis of their participation in the life- and systemsworld (as both generative of and generated by those worlds), enables one to consider then how those roles should be constructed by agents in the world. Thus, the analysis of faculty roles requires not only abstract reasoning regarding the most consistent expression of faculty roles, but a dialectic that assumes Habermas’ cognitivist universalized principles of dialectic. These assumptions not only provide rules for dialogue, but are likely to act as norms that should be embedded in the expression of faculty roles as linguistically mediated actions. Simply, to understand how faculty roles should be incorporated will require not only that one voice all stakeholders in the university, but that one also construct faculty roles as honest dialectical constructs supporting the lifeworld—in other words as constructs that themselves promote the inclusion of all voices.
Further analysis of the construct developed will consider, though perhaps briefly, Honneth’s *Theory of Recognition*. This notion will be justified by the engagement with Amy Allen (2009) and Hans-Herbert Kögler (2012) that will take place when considering the problems of skepticism for Habermas. Honneth’s and Kögler’s concepts of identity formation act as means by which to move beyond the immanent critique of Habermas into the ability to voice the Other as a means by which to include the marginalized in normative dialectic. The Theory of Recognition enables the development of a normative framework for faculty roles that include the voices of those who are constitutive of the “I” yet remain voiceless in the systems-world development of faculty roles—despite both being generative of the university and being participants in the lifeworld of the University. The recognition of these voiceless generators of identity, as, for example, in the case of adjuncts, is a particular strength of Honneth’s Theory of Recognition. Whilst the dialectical domain generated by the university permits the silencing of adjunct voices, and thus, there is not internal inconsistency, as the very dialectic of the university defines adjuncts as voiceless, Honneth’s system recognizes them, nonetheless.

*Potential Problems*

Some skeptics raise questions for Habermas. By this, I mean those who believe knowledge to be fundamentally elusive. Foucault raised concerns that may be shared by consistent skeptics regarding the ontological claims made by Habermas regarding the nature of individual and societal identity. These are both concerns addressed by Amy Allen (2009) in her “Discourse, power, and subjectivism: The Foucault/Habermas Debate.” The questions Allen addressed are immediately relevant to Vokey’s (2008) concerns mentioned in the previous chapter, specifically, the concern regarding solipsism and the ability to include the voiceless in
the moral dialectic. The work of Hans-Herbert Kögler (2012) demonstrates, however, a means by which to address the solipsist concerns, while maintaining the integrity of discourse ethics.

Allen constructs the tension between Foucault and Habermas in the following way: …the entanglement of power and validity only poses a serious problem if one assumes that there are only two possible ways of understanding the relationship between power and validity: *either* validity is reduced to nothing more than power and autonomy to nothing more than disciplinary subjection—a position that Habermas rightly sees as normatively and politically disastrous but wrongly imputes to Foucault—*or* validity is understood as wholly distinct from and unsullied by power relations—in which case the purity of pure reason slips in through the back door, a position that Habermas himself aims to avoid. (p.26)

Allen understood that Foucault’s thesis seems to require that all validity—truth—be reduced to power relations, a thesis that seems to be anathema to Habermas. The Habermasian ontology hinges itself on the cognitivist factualism of the existence of true moral statements. It would seem, then, that Foucault and Habermas are incommensurable, as one asserts that truth is nothing more than power relationships (those in power determine truth) and the other asserts that the truth of moral statements is revealed in the embedded necessities of rational discourse.

Firstly, it should be noted, however, that Allen (2009) recognized that Foucaultian understanding of power and power-relations as they construct society is a viable thesis. She stated, “With respect to Habermas, overcoming the one-sided emphasis on communicative rationality in his account of subjectiviation would require Habermas to confront more directly the implications of the necessary and unavoidable role that power plays in subjectivation
processes” (2009, p. 25). She also, notes, however, that Foucault’s own understanding and
discussion of communicative rationality and its import for power relations is *heavily*
underdeveloped:

In order to overcome the one-sided emphasis on power in his account of subjectivation,
Foucaultians would need to develop some of the very underdeveloped ideas about
communication, reciprocity, and the distinction between power and domination that are
mentioned in Foucault’s late work and to think through how these ideas bear on the issue
of subjectivation. (p. 24)

This is all to say that Allen noted a significant missing component in Foucault’s power thesis that
can be made more sense of when understood within the dynamics of communicative rationality.
Habermas’ own thesis, however, is buttressed by an acceptance and consideration of the
importance of power relations in the construction of dialectic. Simply, what is considered
“rational” may as Foucault stated, be determined by those in power. Habermas need not concede
that this power-defining of “rational” be epistemically true, only that it acts as a communicative
barrier to *genuine* rational discourse.

Allen was, however, able to (interestingly, through rational discourse) bring together
Habermas and Foucault, despite their apparently significant differences. “There is a third, and
better, possibility: to give up on the demand for purity altogether. Doing so would mean
acknowledging the unavoidable entanglement of validity and power, but without reducing the
former to the latter,” (Allen, 2009, p. 28). It is there, in her statement “without reducing the
former to the latter” that the tension between the two thinkers can be resolved. Allen suggested
that one can recognize the “entanglement” of validity and power without suggesting that power
is validity. Allen recognized, however, that in so doing one must take a more pragmatic and contextualist perspective of Habermas. I suggest that Allen’s shift enables a problematic skeptical question: “How does one know that power and validity are not one and the same, if they are so often “entangled?” Simply, there seems to be a problem of an epistemic gap. Allen contended that validity is not reducible to power, yet one is hard-pressed to find any situation in which validity is not determined (seemingly) by power relations. Thus, even if there is a difference between the two, we seem to lack epistemic access to that difference.

The Habermasian response to the skeptical question is to note that the very asking of that question requires the assumption of certain norms and conventions that assume rational discourse is possible and is hinged upon the belief in truth external to power relations. Allen carefully addressed each iteration of the skeptical argument, noting its failure, the details of which are unnecessary here. What I will address is the one argument Allen noted may gain some traction, but moves past quickly, noting that Habermas himself may address the entirety of the argument: “It is not obvious that the skeptic could not opt out of argumentation without opting out of communication action in general” (Allen, 2009, p. 13). Simply, the consistent skeptic who notes the Habermasian critique of her performative contradiction in engaging the argument in the first place may withdraw from the argument. Habermas suggests that this results in an impossible withdraw from the totality of communicative action. Allen was not so sure, but she did not have the time to exhaustively engage the details of the Habermasian reply to such an extreme claim that “the Foucaultian skeptic would no doubt want to question” (p. 13). I suggest, however, that there is another tactic that can be taken to answer all such skeptical concerns in a way that satisfies both the intellectually honest skeptic and the Habermasian.
I intend to prove that cognitivism is not necessary for the rational adoption and application of discourse ethics. The reason I seek to do this is as a means by which to reach out to those who may be fictionalists, anti-theorists, and skeptics. I do not want the application of my own work to be limited to those who are willing to take on the commitments of cognitivism. Rather, I suggest that a discourse ethic is so powerful, so rational, as to motivate the rational skeptic to consider seriously its use in applied ethics, as we will engage in chapter four.

Consider the Habermasian account: “Indeed, Habermas maintains that we might ‘call moral only those norms that are strictly universalizable, i.e., those that are invariable over historical time and across social groups’” (Allen, 2009, p. 8). This notion is appealing, yet it seems to rest on a strict cognitivism regarding moral truths. Habermas, however, suggests a means by which to escape the problems of asserting that there are “moral truths” through analogy:

Habermas notes a prima facie analogy between truth claims—claims about what the objective world is like—and normative rightness claims—claims about how the intersubjective world should be ordered: Truth claims are to facts as normative claims are to legitimately ordered interpersonal relations. (p. 9)

Moreover, “… [Habermas] argued that cognitivism can be successfully defended if we give up the strong claim that normative claims are truth candidates and instead adopt the weaker position that normative claims are analogous to truth claims” (p. 9). Normative claims, then, act similarly to truth claims. Normative claims’ connection to the structure of interpersonal relations is like the relationships between facts and truth. I take this to mean that in a way similar to how our “factual” statements’ validity are contingent upon their connection to the truth, normative
claims’ validity rest upon the structure of interpersonal relations. I suggest, however, that Habermas does not need this analogy. In fact, the analogy seems dangerously close to an acceptance of positivism if we suggest that truth claims are made true by their correspondence to the truth. Clearly, this is not what Habermas must mean. Rather, in his analogy he seems to suggest that the truth coheres in the same way interpersonal norms cohere to each other through relationships and symbolic interaction. –Thus Allen’s (2009) claim that acceptance of Foucaultian power dynamics requires something of a pragmatic reading of Habermas. I suggest that pragmatism is a more coherentist picture.

Simply, one of the skeptic’s major concerns is the ability to connect statements about truth to truth. Habermas does not need this. Truth, instead, becomes a matter of interpersonal relations, not so dissimilar from the way Foucault understood truth through power relations. If the Habermasian argument is taken to mean that interpersonal relations generate truth (that which we claim to be true) and is made understandable through the coherence of norms to each other through symbolic interaction, there is no need for a cognitivism that the skeptic would find problematic. Simply, our interpersonal relations do generate truth, insofar as they generate all of the rules, norms, and even logical laws that we use to communicate and understand truth. Even laws such as the “Law of Noncontradiction,” which may be considered laws of thought rather than laws of nature, would be better understood as rules that emerge necessarily from dialectic—understandable interaction between others is impossible without them. Truth, then, is reduced to “necessary for understanding between agents.”

Both the Habermasian and the skeptic may take affront to the above. I suggest, however, that both the Habermasian and the skeptic have good reason to engage the genuine possibility
that the other is correct and consider a palatable middle ground. There is something of a subtle and intuitive assumption in the criticism of the skeptic for being inconsistent. If she engages argumentation, she is acknowledging that she can understand the other and that she is part of a communicative web. This statement, though, assumes already an external point of view that the skeptic cannot take—and if she does so, she is simply falling into the cognitivist’s trap. Rather, the skeptic must maintain that she does not know that she is having the conversation, that she does not know that what she is saying is understood, that in fact, she does not know that she is saying. Rather, she engages a seemingly insane solipsistic positioning.

What if were to play the consistent skeptic and maintain that I do not know that what I am writing is understood? I would recognize that others may claim that in my writing I acknowledge their existence, yet, I do not. Rather, I maintain that I may be delusional in believing that others are engaging my writing or even that I am writing at all. Moreover, I recognize that in using the term “I” I am engaging in a communicative action. However, I also recognize that this “I” is vacuous and theoretically could be used by any agent in order to indicate her subjectivity. Thusly, that “I” does not belong to “me.” Saying “I” is, potentially, a delusional act of self-voicing by an agent that does not genuinely exist. Surly, such statements seem insane, but I suggest that they merit acknowledgement, if not consideration, for reasons that should be listed shortly. Moreover, I maintain that the solipsist has good reason to adopt a discourse ethics perspective, even without accepting Habermasian cognitivism.

Firstly, the skeptic’s insane position is one that enables learning. By this, I mean that skeptical challenges, if they are honest rather than obdurate, require that we revisit and revise our beliefs. This genuine praxis is one that is necessary to Habermasian dialectic. So, though one
need not acknowledge that the skeptic is “right,” one should consider the possibility that, insanely, the skeptic is presenting a belief that she believes could be right.

Secondly, the skeptic’s position is one that enables the rejection of assumed culturally beloved beliefs. This is perhaps, in regards to the importance to Habermas of including all voices in the generation of universal moral rules, the best reason for the Habermasian to engage the skeptic. As stated by Allen (2009),

Foucault acknowledges that communicative relationships can and do play a role in disciplinary institutions such as the educational system, but these relationships and their connections to disciplinary power remain under developed. Moreover, the one-sidedness of these account helps to explain certain persistent features of the critical reception of their respective authors. Habermas’ relative inattention to the power-ladenness of subjectivication arguably makes it difficult for him to offer a satisfactory critical-theoretical account of some of the most pressing social problems of our time, including sexism and racism, which are reproduced and maintained, in large part, through the production of subordinating modes of identity. (p. 24)

Simply, skeptical positioning enables one to question beliefs that are deeply held or defined as rational by a culture, as in the case with sexism and racism. Although Habermasian rationality would seem to suggest that within even a biased domain, regardless of power imbalance, rational agents could recognize the importance of including the marginalized in discourse, this is not always the case. A skeptical position, while somewhat annoyingly willing to ignore that which seems to be most rational, by its very nature, must question all beliefs, and, thus, positions one to consider criticism of social inequity that is considered rationally grounded by an unjust society.
In essence, the skeptical argument acts as a means by which to prepare the way for a Habermasian immanent critique of such a society.

Finally, the skeptic, if Habermas is correct, should be included in the moral dialogue. It would be fruitless to spend our time trying to prove Habermas incorrect in his dealing with the skeptic, as Allen effectively reconciles Habermasian cognitivism and the Foucaultian skeptic.

Let us consider a different tact. Consider, instead, that the skeptic’s argument does gain traction with Habermas. In fact, let us assume, just for the sake of devilish advocacy, that Habermas must acknowledge that some solipsists will not be swayed by his arguments. What then?

Habermas argued that in order to engage in argumentation at all, speakers must presuppose that all participants understand that argument to be a cooperative search for that truth and are motivated to agree or disagree solely on the basis of the unforced force of the better argument. (Allen, 2009, p. 11)

I suggest that the honest skeptic hopes that Habermas is correct. Though she may not engage the discourse because she believes it is true, she may do so because she hopes it is true and that, through dialogue, she is, in fact, talking with someone other than herself. Thus, given the importance of inclusion of all voices in moral discourse by Habermas, even those skeptics who remain consistent should be included in moral discourse. Those skeptics, however, are under the onus to engage in intellectually honest discourse because it is in their communicative interest to engage dialogue as if there is the hope that there are others and those others understand the skeptic. The skeptic may put this in terms of a useful, though potentially fictional, narrative one tells oneself—it may be delusional, yet, it produces understanding. Whether, through rational discourse, the skeptic believes that she is coming to better understanding of externality or if she
believes she is coming to better understanding of herself is irrelevant. Discourse ethics aims towards inclusion and assumes a *cooperative* search for truth, and the honest skeptic must genuinely consider the possibility (as she is a skeptic) that she is *wrong* about skepticism and is rationally warranted in *hoping* she is wrong and, thus, is warranted in engaging in rational discourse.

Thus the skeptic has good reason to engage discourse and engage it rationally, though she may not accept the cognitive premise. She can recognize that the rules of communication, whether rules of language, the mind, or of symbolic action, are rules that define her ability to *understand*; thus, in her honest search for understanding (and potentially truth), she is rationally motivated to engage in rational discourse as illuminated by Habermas. What, though, of the problem of the elimination of those who do not have voices as discussed by Volkey (2008), who argued that such exclusion is decimating to the discourse ethic, so decimating as to result in “no remedy for cultural conflict”?

Volkey’s (2008) concern, which I believe is reduced to a solipsistic question, is best answered in “Agency and the Other: On the intersubjective roots of self-identity” (Kögler, 2012). Kögler returned us to the work of G.H. Mead, significantly developing it to the conclusion that “*the Other’s irreducible agency is constitutive of the self’s capacity to establish an identity***” (2009, p. 47). This identity was understood by Kögler as a “socially situated narrative self-interpreting process” (p. 47). In this way Kögler’s work seeks to maintain an understanding of human agency that 1) has the capacity to affect real change in the world 2) has the ability to understand its own effects vis-à-vis the world and 3) and has the ability to differentiate between
her or his causal powers by reconstructing the “intersubjective roots of self-identity” to help “enhance and improve our understanding of reflexivity and self-identity” (p. 48).

Kögler’s work rests on Mead’s (1934) understanding of the self as its own object. Of course, it is the ability to make sense of selfhood as such without the “objectification” of the self. If the self holds itself as an object, how can it engage in reflexive self-understanding without removing itself from the 1st person immediacy of experience? Intersubjectivity becomes the key to selfhood, insofar as agents represent to themselves the Other that is expressed of themselves by other agents. Selfhood emerges when one can recognize the Otherness inherent in the experience of oneself by other Agents, understand that object as an Other represented by the Other and thus can create a shared domain of perspective exchange. “This is so because each agent is now, so to speak, able to leave their practically assigned role in the intersubjective action-circle and switch, in an imaginary act, his or her perspective with that of the other” (Kögler, 2012, p. 52). They become capable of sharing perspectives and understanding their own Otherness as experienced by the Other. It is, in the context of role theory, “an explicit mode of role-taking, such that ‘taking-the-attitude-of-the-other’ now becomes an explicit cognitive act for the agent, another desideratum for a theory of self-consciousness can be provided” (p. 52). Through this articulation, Kögler demonstrated the means by which agency is dependent on intersubjective relation and perspective-taking. To exist is to be known by the Other.

The lynch-pin of Kögler’s argument is what presents the solution to the voiceless mind problem brought to light by Volger (2008). Simply, there is an ethical debt that is created by the self to the other because of the necessity of the other for the self.
If the self thus understands her own full creative-reflexive agency as enabled by the
tother, she now has to extend the very mode of recognition that makes her own existence
as agent possible to the other… ethical recognition demands in addition that the other is
always essentially projected as a reflexive agent who is capable to critically distance
herself from her own context, who is able to transcend and transform the given beliefs
and assumptions, and who is herself able to take the perspective of the other vis-à-vis
herself. (Kögler, 2012, p. 61)

Thus Kögler’s work requires that we do more than “voice” the other, it requires that we
recognize the agency of the other as it not just necessary but causally responsible for our own
agency through the exchanging of perspectives.

Volger’s (2008) concern, then, is addressed by arguing that those who cannot speak up
for themselves must be voiced, to the very best and most honest of our ability. While the concern
that this simply amounts to “speaking for” the marginalized could not be “spoken over” in this
way. Rather, they must be voiced, if they cannot speak for themselves in such a way that
acknowledges the ethical debt established by Kögler for agency itself. Thus, those who are less
rational or who cannot voice themselves, for whatever reason, remain part of the ethical dialectic
as voiced by those who have the ability to do so in such a way that recognizes their importance
for the existence of both 1) the self and 2) the dialectic.

I suggest, further, that this notion established by Kögler, while it may seem incompatible
with solipsism, is not. I suggest this by virtue of a “perspective taking” on the part of solipsism.
The solipsist who is skeptical about other minds would recognize that all conversations are acts
of “voicing.” The honest solipsist must acknowledge that she is at the very least generating all
voices. Given the Habermasian realization of the essential characteristics of rational dialogue, there is no reason to believe such rules simply disappear if one is only in dialectic with herself. The rules that govern understanding remain embedded in dialectic regardless of one’s engagement with others or with the self. Proper skeptical positioning would require that the solipsist acknowledge that either her agency is generated by herself, and thus all voices are generated by herself, and thus all voices are her own, and thus she has no rational reason to choose some voices as having greater important than others (and in so doing accept the Habermasian notion of discourse), or she must acknowledge, as Kögl contended, that her agency is generated by others.

More importantly, the perspective-taking described by Kögl (2012) can be understood through the perspective of Mead’s symbolic interactionism as a kind of an “imaginary game” in which one imagines the perspective of the other. In so doing, the agent must acknowledge that she does not know for sure what the thoughts, perspectives, and feelings are of the other and always be prepared to revise her assumptions of those thoughts, perspectives and feelings. In this way, the agent recognizes that she is voicing the other as the other is voicing her, and it is through this exchange of voices and iteration of self-reflexivity that dialectic is created. One accepts what the other has to say, and remains prepared to revise that perspective upon further interaction with the voiced Other. As such, I see no reason to require that only those who can speak or who seem sufficiently rational can be included in the dialectic, as Vokey’s argument seems to suggest. Rather, honest self-reflexivity would require that one remain open to the constant perspective making of the Other when generating the Other (namely the self). Thus, when given sufficient reason, the rational self engages in the attempt to perspective-take with
non-self others. This act of constant attempts to perspective-take mimics Mead’s developmental account of childhood. Children attempt to generate selfhood through others and for others, often finding that their attempt to perspective-take for chairs, teddy bears, and cartoon characters bears no fruit. Yet, that honestly skeptical position *that there may be others like myself who generate myself, for whom I am an Other* is a perspective we learn to distance ourselves from through societal imperative, and, I argue, through a rejection of the rational and democratic inclusion articulated by Habermas.

This is all to say that discourse ethics need not fall prey to skeptical or solipsistic claims. Rather, a discourse ethic is one of few philosophies that allows for *full engagement with such skeptical positionings*; it, through the primacy of the lifeworld, remains constantly prepared to engage the perspective of others for the purpose of rational discourse. One must acknowledge that rational discourse must be revisable as new perspectives are brought to bear. This revisability is not in conflict with skepticism, but, rather, embraces the skeptical willingness to consider that one’s perspective is not the *sole* perspective. Moreover, the ethical indebtedness owed by the self to the other requires that the Habermasian acknowledge her own voicing of others and consistently consider the perspective others who are not yet voiced, *but yet may generate through some unknown means one’s own selfhood*. In so doing, the Habermasian system does not just avoid Volkey’s concern for marginalization; Habermas actively combats marginalization through an ever-present attempt to include all voices.

Thus, we have established not just the clear and logical link from the work of Soltis in educational philosophy to the application of Habermas to educational philosophy; we have effectively practiced the act of philosophical analysis. This chapter, thus far, has engaged the
process of concept analysis as detailed through Scriven, Flew, and Soltis in order to understand better what we mean when we say “definition.” Having accomplished this, we then deconstructed terms such as “philosophy” in order to identify why philosophical analysis is not simply a tool used by qualitative research, but is a lived experience that is practiced, as well, on its own for the purpose of living a life of wisdom. Finally, the work deliberated on both the strengths of Habermas as his work relates to this dissertation and those who might dissent such as Foucault and the “consistent skeptic.” Having addressed the concerns of both Foucault and the skeptic, discourse ethics demonstrates and ability not simply to deconstruct and eliminate those concerns but rationally incorporate those concerns in the act of deliberative rationality. Thus, the chapter mimics the process of self-reflexivity, acknowledging its “Otherness” in light of critical works, and generating agency through the process of perspective sharing, rather than perspective eliminating. In this way, the methodology has critically engaged the process of immanent critique, engaged the situation of itself in the social schemes of life and systemsworld, and engaged critical and rational discourse while voicing the dissent of the Other in order to produce a consistent holism. As such, the work acts as not just an explication of, but an example of, philosophical analysis.

Researcher Positionality

As has been discussed throughout the methodology, the researcher’s positionality is that of skepticism. However, that position is also a one of prudence. Prudent skepticism suggests that one need not be restricted in one’s dialectic by skepticism. One engages what may, or may not be the world, not because has reason to believe in “Truth” but because one hopes that there is more
to existence than solipsism, and, if there is a world, it is more prudent to attempt to engage it, than to remain constrained by the epistemic void.

Ethically, the researcher is deeply sympathetic to care theory. He is especially motivated by care theory when it is applied to education. The care theoretical perspective is one that he believes is essential to an inclusive holism of dialectic that moves beyond world making into worth making for the betterment of the community. It is his positioning that students, and there welfare, should be always the primary directive of educational discourse.

The researcher has been a student at the University of North Florida for seventeen years, most of those years as a full time graduate student. The impact of that time as a student has been such that it is left the researcher often cynical regarding the intention of educational institutions to benefit all students. While an institution may place before incoming students mottos and catch phrases that suggest the importance of each individual student, he has found that there are occasions in which educational institutions place their own welfare first.

Conversely, however, the researcher has also experienced the power of education and elected to remain in an educational setting, as a college student for over 17 years. He has been profoundly impacted by a few individual professors who demonstrate tremendous devotion to their students and to the development of knowledge. It is because of his observation of professorial care reason in conjunction with the observation of institutional harm and deception that the researcher first noted that, for some professors, there is a tension in the academy. These brilliant and dedicated educators seemed trapped between meeting institutional demands while also meeting their own personal mandate to educate each student as if she is intrinsically valuable as a learner.
During his time as a student the researcher has also acted as a graduate teaching assistant, adjunct instructor, and currently teaches high school English. Both teaching experiences, as well as his long term engagement with the university as a student, inform his analysis in this dissertation. It is important to note that the researcher has not been a professor. He has not been expected to publish research nor engage in service. He has experienced the pressures associate with attempting to work full time as an adjunct across multiple institutions, in some cases teaching as many as nine classes a semester. His experience as an educator has informed the analysis of his findings. He cannot understand the role tension experienced by the professoriate, he does however have practical experience with learners. As such, he has discovered that the most effective means by which to educate has been through creating a highly invested classroom environment in which the students know that the instructor cares about them and the material.

Thus, as a student and as a teacher the researcher found the work of Habermas particularly compelling as a means by which to generate understanding faculty roles. The inclusive nature of discourse ethics fits neatly on the dialectical frame generate both inside the classroom and throughout the collegial institution. The process of knowledge production through constructive and intersubjective inquiry is a personal experience had by the researcher that he found powerful and effective. Similarly, his personal experience with learners has led him to the belief that care is a necessary condition for effective education. While his observation has been that some institutions allow for the fact, and perhaps expect, that some students will fail, he believes that, if the knowledge is truly important, the caring educator considers every failure, her own. As such, the researcher’s analysis of the data incorporates the Care Ethics of Nel Noddings.
Credibility and Ensuring Rigor

Credibility and Trustworthiness

To ensure the credibility and trustworthiness of this dissertation, a number of measures have been taken. Firstly, the dissertation has adopted a series of well-established methods. As evidenced here, in the methodology, philosophical analysis as a well-respected mode of inquiry. The work of Anthony Scriven and Jonas Soltis both provide foundational groundwork not just in the tradition of philosophy, but in the tradition of exploring education through the application of philosophical analysis. Philosophical theory, particularly in conjunction with sociological theory has a history of productive application in educational research. The work of Habermas, in particular, has been demonstrated to have a productive history both in educational theory and research as well as in organizational research.

To further ensure credibility, the researcher has had frequent debriefing sessions with his dissertation chair and methodologist, both in person and via email. The researcher has met regularly with the dissertation chair to ensure that the process of the dissertation, particularly the development of the methodology, maintains a high level of rigor and quality. Dr. Kögler, both a professional philosopher and a foremost expert on the work of Habermas, has been actively engaged in every step of the dissertation to ensure that the process is philosophically sound and that the researcher engages the application of Habermas accurately.

The dissertation endeavors to follow a clear line of reasoning. Often at the expense of brevity, the researcher has taken great care to ensure trustworthiness by explaining each logical inference. This step is taken not only to provide a clear line of reasoning, but because the expectation of philosophical investigation is to provide the reader with the mean by which she
both can follow the line of reasoning in order to come to the same conclusions and in order to provide complete transparency to that every logical step can be questioned.

The final chapter will provide “reflective commentary.” This reflective commentary is yet another means by which the dissertation seeks to provide trustworthiness as well as transparency. Moreover, this particular credibility tool is especially appropriate for philosophy as such reflective commentary has a long history as an essential philosophical component. To engage in reflective commentary will also be a moment of hermeneutic participation with the reader. In so doing, the researcher will reach out to the reader with his own internality articulated in prose in order to engage the heart of the discourse ethical enterprise. Essential to this project is the realization that, to “apply discourse ethics” requires more than following Habermasian principles of universalization, it requires engaging others in active dialectic in order to produce the best possible argument. This dissertation will attempt to engage other theorists and researchers dialectically through their presentation, here, but that does not suffice. The reflective commentary is the moment when the reader becomes actively involved in not just the theoretical dialectic, but the personal reflective reasoning presented by the researcher through his reflective commentary.

The researcher’s background is particularly useful for this project. He has experience as an educator both on the post-secondary level and as a high school teacher. The researcher also as an MA in practical philosophy and applied ethics, and so he is particularly well suited for the exploration of ethical concepts afforded by this investigation. As such, he is well positioned to provide a thick description of the constructs investigated in this dissertation, and has attempted to
demonstrate the process of thick description through the detailed analysis of philosophical methodology presented here in chapter 3.

In order to provide a level of external examination of the credibility of this project the work of Thomas Kuhn (1977) will be used in chapter 6 to help ensure the quality of the construct developed in chapter 5. In his work “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice” Kuhn detailed 5 criteria for theory evaluation, particularly in science. Kuhn, whose work is seminal in the philosophy of science, provides a well-recognized, well-grounded, means by which to evaluate the quality of a theory. Although this work is not a scientific one, the criteria presented by Kuhn remain applicable to any theory when attempting to gauge its usefulness as a theory. Thus, to the degree it is applicable, Kuhn will be used here to evaluate the construct developed through this dissertation.

Transferability

The data presented here are highly transferable. The questions explored here will lead to numerous other questions for future research because of the highly transferable nature of the project. Although the project focuses on the roles of faculty in post-secondary institutions, the concepts and construct developed here are applicable to the entirety of the educational discipline. This investigation, because it engages the nature of teaching, the nature of research, and the nature of philosophical inquiry can be applied to any question regarding education, research, or philosophical analysis. This work because of its engagement with role theory and development of a role theoretical model that relies on discourse ethics, can be used to develop understanding of roles in any organizational or social context.


**Dependability**

The methodology discussed here in chapter 3 provides dependability in so far as there is the employment of overlapping methods, such as role theory and philosophical inquiry, and detailed description of the method employed so that this investigation can be repeated. The documents analyzed here, in order to investigate the nature of our discourse regarding faculty roles, are accessible to anyone who wishes to similarly review them, and the modes of investigation are all richly detailed.

As mentioned previously, the researcher’s beliefs and assumptions are grounded in Foucault and skepticism. His own intuitions are such that knowledge remains elusive and human construction of knowledge is deeply embedded in power relations. As such, the potential shortcoming of bias in this work is particularly concerning as the traditional empirical means used in educational research to evaluate data are set aside in order to engage philosophical analysis. However, this project seeks to provide a construct that itself can be evaluated through empirical means.

The research here does not involve subjects of any kind, human or otherwise. All investigation has been of documents and theories that are available to the general public either as published online by institutional websites, published in academic journals, or published as texts. The University of North Florida Institutional Review Board was consulted and they determined that this research project was not subject to IRB review.

**Chapter summary/conclusions**

This chapter firstly sought to exemplify the practice of philosophical analysis. The presentation of the work was such that it both detailed the arguments laid out by theorists who
argue for the application of philosophy to education and acted, itself, as an example of 
philosophical analysis. The arguments made by Scriven and Soltis were given special attention in 
order to better understand how philosophers of education conceptualize the role of philosophy in 
educational discourse. Their thinking, though, was largely focused on analytic definitions of 
philosophy, but the philosophical analysis, here, demonstrated that philosophy is more robust 
than analysis and is best understood as a “lived experience.” Thus, the analytic definition of 
philosophical analysis may be best understood as “conceptual analysis” while philosophical 
analysis, itself, includes the holism of lived discourse—it is a life of inquiry through dialectical 
engagement. The questions posed in this dissertation are especially appropriate for a 
philosophical methodology as they require, first, the establishment of clear constructs that 
themselves can be investigated and examined. The research questions, however, also 
demonstrate a need for normativity—for a theory of best understanding and practice. This 
analysis, therefore, is one such that it requires a philosophical thesis such that one can both 
develop a defined construct for the purposes of theoretical and empirical examination and such 
that one can suggest a best framework for understanding the roles in question. Thus, this chapter 
argued that it is discourse analysis that is best suited for the development of the construct, as 
discourse analysis provides both an ontological and logical frame for understanding the way 
social discourse produces phenomena and because the normative force of Habermas’ work 
provides a grounding set of imperatives that guide the development of a construct that itself has 
normative force.
CHAPTER 4: DATA, ANALYSIS, AND RESULTS

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the presentation of data. In the case of philosophical inquiry, “data” often means “ideas.” Some of the material presented here may be considered data in the more commonly-used qualitative sense. Specifically, some of the information here may be considered similar to document analysis. The goal, however, has not been to create an empirical study in which a selected sample of documents can be analyzed to generate understanding of a certain construct as created through those documents. Rather, a larger scope of documents will be analyzed for the purpose of generating the construct “faculty roles.”

Presented here will be the roles of faculty as inscribed by universities. Six research/teaching university faculty handbooks have been examined for their inscription of faculty roles and responsibly in terms of teaching and research. According to the Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education, there are 99 institutions that are classified as “high research activity” (RU/H). There are also those considered to be “very high research activity” (RU/VH). For the purposes of this dissertation, those institutions were limited to those that are considered to be “high research activity” that also have a strong teaching emphasis. “Very high research activity” universities were omitted from examination due to the fact that the potential unequal emphasis on research over teaching may create a skewed view of the general inscription of faculty roles in favor of research. It should be noted, however, that there are currently eight more universities classified as RU/VH, thus there may be reason to believe that more faculty are required to engage in “very high” amounts of research as opposed to “high” amounts of research.
This dissertation, however, applies the philosophical Principle of Charity. The Principle of Charity suggests that when engaging in analysis or discourse it is most logical to assume that the ideas analyzed or one’s opponent is coming from the strongest and most rational positioning, rather than from the most easily-refuted position. If part of the researcher’s assumption in this work is that universities will be more research-driven more than teaching-driven (due to the numerous articles reporting the intense pressure to publish), then it is important that when collecting data the researcher does not seek out data to act as confirmation for his bias. Rather, the Principle of Charity should be applied, and we will assume that universities do not emphasize research over teaching.

Rather than analyze the handbooks of “RU/VH” research universities, we will analyze the handbooks of those that are only “RU/H” universities under the assumption that those that are only “highly” research-focused also focus heavily on teaching. In this way, the researcher bias that universities focus more on research can be addressed, and, also, if those universities that claim to also be teaching-focused show a tendency to prefer research over teaching, then one may conclude that those universities deemed “very high” in research activity are even less focused on teaching in preference for research. Thus, we will engage the generation of faculty roles as if it is true that universities do engage in an honest attempt to require faculty be both teachers and researchers to the best of their ability. The universities were chosen randomly, but only those that had online handbooks freely available to the public were considered. Note that the goal is not to understand how faculty handbooks at universities understand faculty roles; rather, examination of these handbooks will assist the researcher in developing a broader picture of faculty roles as inscribed by those institutions.
A series of professional research associations’ ethical codes are also presented and analyzed here. Again a broad spectrum of research associations have been included, including the AERA, APA, and the MLA. In order to understand the role “researcher,” it is important to understand how the professional associations of researchers inscribe researcher responsibilities. As universities expect faculty to be active participants in research and in the professional associations governing their particular disciplines, the examination of these documents emerges from the roles of faculty as described by their institutions. To be researchers at the university means to participate in professional associations, conduct their research in ways that are approved by those professional associations, and publish in formats and journals associated with those professional associations.

To uncover the culturally embedded assumptions that generate faculty roles, we must move beyond organizational role theory and organizationally inscribed roles. Thus, we will also consider the work of seminal theorists as they describe the ethical obligations of teachers and professors. Effort has been made by the researcher to focus on ethical discussion particular to the professoriate, but focus has not been limited to such discussions. Again, the social construct of “teacher” must be considered in order to uncover the embedded assumptions that construct our concept of teacher. The theorists who discuss this work play an important role in this work, as we must acknowledge that what a teacher does and what she should do are two different things. The first two categories of data examined here are inscribed roles that must be followed by faculty and researchers in order to continue performing those roles. The ethical obligations described by these theorists, however, are suggestions and arguments, enunciated expectations, but they may not describe what we as a society actually inscribe and require of our teachers in a
codified way. Thus, we may see a tension between the inscribed roles and the ethical obligations required by ethical theory. Effort will be made, however, to analyze these works in a way to find as much consistency and coherence as possible between the data sets. This final data set, however, will provide the groundwork for developing the Habermasian analysis of the faculty construct as a whole. As the work is developed, the researcher will note ways in which the ideas presented can be understood as coherent. Preliminary analysis will be conducted as well in order to provide the basic philosophical groundwork for chapter 5.

Particular attention will be given here in chapter 4 to the Habermasian notions of lifeworld and systemsworld. The data will be considered from the lifeworld/systemsworld dichotomy, while at the same time remembering that this binary generates a whole construct. However, as discussed by various theorists, understanding different roles and role responsibilities as more or less focused on the lifeworld or the systemsworld will provide an insight into potential conflicts between the roles. Moreover, as discussed by Habermas, understanding of whether or not more primacy is given to those aspects of a role that are associated with the systemsworld may provide insight into difficulties society has with incorporating that role into the lifeworld. Full synthesis and generation of the most coherent construct conjoining “teacher” and “researcher” is reserved for chapter 5.

Given the above, a hypothesis can be formulated about the data: as mentioned previously in regards to concerns about bias, I suspect the definitions and inscriptions of faculty roles by institutions in the handbooks and in research guidelines to be dominated by a systemsworld epistemology. Thus, the researcher can further avoid concerns about bias, as that bias is now formalized as a hypothesis as opposed to a general intuition that may consciously or
unconsciously guide the collection of data. Rather, I will seek evidence that disproves that hypothesis. If, however, the evidence seems to support the hypothesis, then the normative shift taken by this dissertation as the “ought” will bring back to mind—for faculty as well as for administrators—the lifeworldly grounding or definitions of faculty roles, as this grounding is what ultimately defines the educational process as a dialogical interaction focused on growth in knowledge, skill, and character.

Faculty Roles as Inscribed in University Handbooks

In discussing the inscription of faculty roles, it is important to note that not all universities make their faculty handbooks available to the general public. The documents discussed here include only those universities that provide access to their faculty handbooks to the general public through their .edu websites, for free. So we cannot say that the analysis is comprehensive. Rather, in the case of discourse analysis, we can view it as an investigation into a slice of the discourse. We will examine some of the dialectic and investigate the imbedded assumptions of that dialectic. In some ways, the work here is akin to reconstructing a dialogue when one only has a transcript of one of the two speakers. One can develop at least a limited understanding of what both speakers are saying by using logic to infer from the responses of the known speaker. In this way, we engage a discourse-ethical and hermeneutic move; we assume that the documents are meant to be understood by a public that shares similar grounding assumptions about discourse and ethics. In so doing, we can reconstruct the model of faculty generated by these documents in such a way as to make a coherent picture.
The University of Memphis

Of the university handbooks reviewed, The University of Memphis provides some of the most detailed requirements of their faculty in its faculty handbook. The handbook clearly discusses teaching and researching roles in its presentation of tenure and promotion guidelines. The University of Memphis’ handbook also provides definitions of teaching and research as applicable to the university. However, like most of the handbooks reviewed, The University of Memphis emphasizes the fact that tenure and promotion also follow guidelines laid out by particular departments. What counts as “good research” may differ from department to department not because of quality, but because of medium. For example, journal publication may be most appropriate for a philosophy department, while creative writing may require publication of books, and the music department may prefer international concerts.

The University of Memphis, like all of the institutions whose handbooks were reviewed, is largely focused on describing the hierarchy and structure of the university. It begins with a brief history of the university and then details the committee structure, bureaucratic structure, and academic organization. The handbook then addresses faculty roles. The role discussion, however, does not include the roles of teacher and researcher. Rather, the roles discussed are hierarchical: chairperson, administrators, ombudsperson, grievance committee, graduate faculty, and faculty senate. Similarly, the handbook addresses issues of policy and procedure: how to file grievances, language requirements, benefits, leaves of absence, compensation, and awards.

The handbook does spend some time addressing issues of instruction and research. In the section titled “instruction,” the handbook details the requirements of faculty in the classroom. Largely, this section addresses legal issues such as student confidentiality and academic
dishonesty. The grading system is also explained, as are class rolls. It is explained that faculty members must attend class and keep office hours. The rest of the section addresses how to deal with inclement weather, faculty absences, and commencement. There is also brief mention of services to which faculty can refer students who are in need of help.

The section titled “research and service” also does not clarify the roles of faculty members as researchers. Rather, it provides the framework of bureaucracy for them in order to assist them in navigating the research system of the university. Faculty members are provided information regarding the hierarchy of the university in regards to research and details the administration. Requirements regarding copyrights and patents are also addressed. The research and service section closes by addressing regulatory issues, consulting, centers of excellence, and the appropriate use of technology resources.

Most of the documents reviewed restrict their discussion of faculty and researcher roles to their sections on promotion and tenure. There are some that also discuss faculty responsibilities outside of tenure and promotion, and those will be discussed here. It is important to note, however, that the focuses on promotion and tenure are likely the result of the fact that promotion and tenure usually require that the faculty member excel in the two roles the university requires them to play. To quote the University of Memphis handbook: “The quality of the faculty of any university is maintained primarily through the appraisal, by competent faculty, and administrative officers, of each candidate for tenure and promotion” (p. 57). Thus, as promotion and tenure require that a faculty member has been both an effective teacher and researcher, it is there that these documents most often discuss what is required of faculty in terms
of teaching and research. Unlike the other faculty handbooks reviewed here, the University of Memphis provides “definitions” of teaching and research. The handbook states of teaching:

Teaching is central to the purposes and objectives of the University of Memphis. It encompasses classroom instruction, course development, mentoring students in academic projects including dissertations, testing, grading, and the professional development of the faculty member as a teacher. Mentoring students at all levels is an important aspect of teaching; creative and effective use of innovative teaching methods and curricular innovations is encouraged. (p. 59)

The document then goes on to remind the reader that the definition of teaching should be “adapted to different disciplines” (p. 59). It appears, here, that mentorship is central to the “definition” generated by the university. While this is not an actual definition, as it does not identify denotatively, connotatively, or ostensively what a teacher is, the paragraph does explain the expectations of a teacher, thus meeting some of the need to understand how faculty roles are inscribed through faculty handbooks.

The embedded assumption in the description of the teaching role is the idea of mentorship. The university assumes that one knows what mentorship means. “Mentoring students at all levels” brings to mind an idea of a kind academic relationship in which the faculty member guides the student through difficult work. Of the handbooks reviewed, it is the only one that implies a kind of care on the part of the faculty member. To be a mentor suggests more than a cold, distant grading relationship, and brings to mind an in-depth relationship in which the faculty member is invested in the welfare of the student. The document does not state this directly, however. The mention of mentorship is brief, and is couched in language that is far
more systems-oriented, focusing on requirements that the faculty member hold class for the entire class time, that she engage in professional development, and that she prove her effectiveness through student success.

Similarly, the University of Memphis handbook defines scholarship by what it *does* rather than what it *is*. Due to the multi-disciplinary nature of the university, the handbook takes a multi-disciplinary approach to the presentation of the different means by which faculty can meet their research requirement.

Scholarship is a discipline-based, multidisciplinary activity that advances knowledge and learning by producing new ideas and understanding. Scholarly contributions include peer-evaluated, discipline-appropriate works such as books, articles, chapters, films, paintings, performances, and choreographic or theatrical design. Scholarship can be divided into five sub-categories: application, creative activity, inquiry, integration, and the scholarship of teaching. Each department, considering its relevant discipline or disciplines, may emphasize contributions in some subcategories more than others, as described in its mission statement and other relevant departmental documents. Individual faculty are not expected to contribute in all five subcategories of scholarship. Some overlap in the meaning of the five subcategories is inevitable, and a particular scholarly contribution may fall under more than one subcategory. These subcategories are:

- **Creative activity** should be fully accepted as scholarship in departments where such work is appropriate to both professional specialization and teaching. It includes, but is not limited to, choreography and dance performance; creative writing; direction and design of
plays; exhibitions of visual arts such as paintings, sculpture, and photography; direction
of film and video; and musical composition and performance.

- **Inquiry** involves rigorous investigation aimed at the discovery of new knowledge
  within one's own discipline or area of study; it often serves as the basis for other forms of
  scholarship and may result in scholarly publications, funded research, and presentations
  at professional meetings.

- **Integration** makes meaningful connections between previously unrelated topics, facts,
  or observations, such as cross-disciplinary synthesis or an integrative framework within a
  discipline that results in a publication or presentation in a suitable forum.

- The scholarship of **teaching** focuses on transforming and extending knowledge about
  pedagogy, including appropriate textbooks or educational articles in one's own discipline.
  Innovative contributions to teaching, if published or presented in a peer-reviewed forum,
  also constitute scholarship of teaching. The "*scholarship of teaching*" is **not** equivalent to
  teaching. Classroom teaching and staying current in one's field are **not** relevant criteria
  for evaluating faculty on the "*scholarship of teaching.***"

- **Engaged scholarship** now subsumes the scholarship of application. It adds to existing
  knowledge in the process of applying intellectual expertise to collaborative problem-
  solving with urban, regional, state, national and/or global communities and results in a
  written work shared with others in the discipline or field of study. Engaged scholarship
  conceptualizes "community groups" as all those outside of academe and requires shared
  authority at all stages of the research process from defining the research problem,
  choosing theoretical and methodological approaches, conducting the research, developing
the final product(s), to participating in peer evaluation. Departments should refine the
definition as appropriate for their disciplines and incorporate evaluation guidelines in
departmental tenure and promotion criteria. (p. 60)

Note that much more time is given to the discussion of scholarship by the handbook than of research. This may be only due to the fact that the university seeks to clarify the numerous ways faculty can meet their research obligations, while teaching can only be done as “teaching.” Just a moment’s research into “teaching,” though, reveals that there are many different ways in which teachers can engage their profession as educators. Thus, this suggests that the university is either a) not concerned with or b) unaware of the many different modes of teaching. Regardless, what emerges is a document that focuses more on the details of research than on the details of teaching.

What remains unclear in reviewing the document is exactly how much research is required of the professor. Specifics regarding whether the professor has contributed enough to knowledge are left undiscussed, likely in order to allow the individual departments to make its own determinations regarding scholarship. Similarly, what counts as a “good teacher” is not discussed in the handbook. Promotion and tenure are granted to those faculty members who demonstrate “good teaching” through student success, departmental evaluations, and student evaluations. The exact requirements for teaching and research are left to the department.

Members of the faculty are required to conduct themselves ethically, particularly in terms of research, by avoiding plagiarism, but the requirements for teaching roles and researching roles remain unclear despite the driven definitions. The work is largely one that engages the
systems; it seeks to set down policies and address bureaucratic issues, and there is little engagement with the lifeworld of leadership and learning.

Oklahoma State University

The other handbooks reviewed do not attempt to give definitions of teaching and research. They are all similar to the University of Memphis faculty handbook in their discussion of policy and administrative hierarchy, but the University of Memphis faculty handbook provides the most information regarding how faculty should approach teaching and research in order to gain promotion and tenure. The Oklahoma State University faculty handbook provides no definitions of teaching or research. It also provides very little information regarding how the faculty gains promotion and tenure. This is to say that despite the length of the appendix dedicated to promotion and tenure, very little information is given regarding what faculty must do to earn promotion or tenure. Rather, the section is dedicated to detailing the ways in which committees are appointed, explaining the hierarchy of professors and promotion, and the benefits of promotion and tenure. The expectations of faculty as teachers and researchers are encapsulated in two paragraphs:

1. **Effective classroom teaching and classroom related duties**: Teaching is the primary duty of instructional faculty. Faculty are charged with the responsibility to challenge and motivate students, to maintain high academic standards, and to help students think independently in order to understand concepts and solve problems. Faculty must also work with a diverse student body and instill in them the confidence to be successful. To accomplish these objectives, faculty must remain current in their respective fields, must
continually improve their teaching methods, and must contribute to the development of
the curriculum.

2. Scholarship: Faculty are expected to remain current and active in their fields of study.
This may be accomplished by pursuing advanced courses or degrees, continuing
education, or obtaining special license of certification. Faculty are encouraged to attend
and make presentations at professional meetings. (p. 96)
The above two paragraphs seem to once again suggest that teaching is connected to the idea of
free and “independent” thought. Note that primacy appears to be given to teaching over research:
“Teaching is the primary duty of instructional faculty.” Scholarship also does not emphasize
publication, but rather continuing education and participation in professional meetings. The
document also does include the brief statement: “Faculty have the professional responsibility to
provide quality learning experiences for the student. Faculty are expected to meet their classes at
scheduled times. In cases of illness or any other emergency, the faculty will notify the
department head so that appropriate action may be taken” (p. 23). Thus, there is an expectation
of “quality teaching,” though what the phrase means, exactly, is never clarified. Additionally, no
mention is made of journal publication, unlike some of the other documents reviewed here.

Like the University of Memphis, faculty are encouraged to engage in a mentorship, as
seen in the selection from the handbook below:

Active participation in the OSU-Oklahoma City student experience: Faculty need to
be concerned with developing the whole potential in the students as future leaders.
Faculty must be willing to serve as role models, academic advisors, mentors, and
sponsors of student organizations. Faculty should also take advantage of any
opportunities to recruit students and promote the institution. (p. 96)

We see, then, a repeated emphasis on the idea that faculty members should in some way
“mentor” students. It is important to note that this idea falls neatly into the lifeworld. The idea
that students should be addressed as whole people for the purpose of their personal betterment is
an idea that is not reducible to purely systemsworld organization. What is missing is detailed
discussion of mentorship and what it entails. Moreover, note the systemsworld commitment of
these handbooks: while they do take the time to explain how faculty will be evaluated, they do
not ever include how that evaluation will include mentorship. Rather, the evaluations are
restricted to student success ratings, student reported evaluations on surveys, and classroom
visits. So on the one hand, the handbooks seem to suggest the importance of the lifeworld; on the
other, they create a system of measurement that emphasizes the systemsworld and does not seem
to consider the lifeworld notions expounded as sufficiently essential to good teaching as to be
included in evaluation of faculty.

Interestingly, in the case of Oklahoma State University, the only evidence of the
importance of research and scholarship is mentioned briefly when discussing appointment of
instructors: “Individuals must present evidence of scholarship, teaching ability, and practical
experience” (p. 97). This requirement seems to carry over to the appointment of assistant,
associate, and full professors, but that implication is not stated directly. The handbook, however,
does state a professional ethic that reveals the university’s stance on scholarship far more than
the discussion of promotion and tenure: the fact that promotion and tenure are heavily influenced
by individual departmental requirements and individual committee evaluations suggests that although scholarship may seem under-emphasized, it may not be so.

The statement of ethics suggests that scholarship is rather important to the university: The handbook claims that the faculty endorses the “American Association of University Professors’ 1966 statement on Professional Ethics” (p. 109). The Statement on Professional Ethics is rich with information regarding perspectives on teaching and researching that are omitted from the discussion of tenure and promotion. However, given that tenure and promotion require that the faculty member be professionally ethical, it stands to reason that promotion and tenure, in the case of Oklahoma State University, require that faculty display the qualities expressed in the Statement. The statement is quoted below:

The following statement was drafted by the American Association of University Professors and was edited by Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, to make it gender neutral.

1. Professors, guided by a deep conviction of the worth and dignity of the advancement of knowledge, recognize the special responsibilities placed upon them. Their primary responsibility to their subject is to seek and to state the truth as they see it. To this end they devote their energies to developing and improving their scholarly competence. They accept the obligation to exercise critical self-discipline and judgment in using, extending, and transmitting knowledge. They practice intellectual honesty. Although they may follow subsidiary interests, these interests must never seriously hamper or compromise their freedom of inquiry.
2. As teachers, professors encourage the free pursuit of learning in their students. They hold before them the best scholarly standards of their discipline. They demonstrate respect for students as individuals, and adhere to the proper roles of intellectual guides and counselors. They make every reasonable effort to foster honest academic conduct and to assure that the evaluation of students reflects their true merit. They respect the confidential nature of the relationship between professor and student. They avoid any exploitation of students for their private advantage and acknowledge significant assistance from them. They protect their academic freedom.

3. As colleagues, professors have obligations that derive from common membership in the community of scholars. They respect and defend the free inquiry of their associates. In the exchange of criticism and ideas, they show due respect for the opinions of others. They acknowledge their academic debts and strive to be objective in their professional judgment of colleagues. They accept their share of faculty responsibilities for the governance of their institution.

4. As members of their institution, professors seek above all to be effective teachers and scholars. Although they observe the stated regulations of the institution, provided they do not contravene academic freedom, they maintain their right to criticize and seek revision. When considering the interruption or termination of their service, they recognize the effect of their decision upon the program of the institution and give due notice of their intentions.

5. As members of their community, professors have the rights and obligations of any citizen. They measure the urgency of these obligations in the light of their responsibilities
to their subject, to their students, to their profession, and to their institution. When they speak or act as private persons, they avoid creating the impression that they speak or act for their college or University. As citizens engaged in a profession that depends upon freedom for its health and integrity, professors have a particular obligation to promote conditions of free inquiry and to further public understanding of academic freedom. (pp. 133-134)

Above, one sees a work rich with enunciated teacher and researcher roles. Note, firstly, that the role of faculty as researcher is stated first. It is stated in paragraph four that “professors seek above all to be effective teachers and scholars.” Thus, primacy is given to research as the first stated responsibility of faculty members, but then placed second in primacy when document articulates what faculty should “seek above all.” The statement on professional ethics therefore seems to place equal emphasis on the importance of teaching and researcher.

There is no discussion in the statement on professional ethics of the ways research and teaching should buttress each other. The connection between the two, however, is not difficult to uncover. Faculty are required to develop and improve their “scholarly competence,” while at the same time they are required to “encourage the free pursuit of learning” in their students. These two imperatives are consistent. In order to most effectively encourage learning in her students, the professor must herself be competent. Moreover, as the document suggests, she models scholarly endeavor for her students, both through her teaching and in her professional endeavors.

One may assume that being “effective scholars” indicates that some level of publication is required, as participation in and contribution to the body of knowledge is expected. One also sees some of the implications of the mentorship roles expected of the faculty. To be a mentor, in
this case, seems to mean that one guides students toward academic freedom. Moreover, the document is a lifeworld document that includes the importance of community dialectic. The emphasis is not on hierarchy, structure, or system evaluation, but, instead, on normative performance—specifically the dialectical participation in a community that includes scholars, students, and general stakeholders.

An important assumption also revealed through a Habermasian analysis of these documents is the realization that faculty, according to the Statement on Professional Ethics to which the university proscribes, are expected to pursue “truth as they see it,” yet, there is no mention of “teaching” that truth. Rather, faculty members are encouraged to foster free learning, and are, repeatedly, admonished to respect students. Thus, one realizes that the document suggests that professors are obligated to become as knowledgeable as possible, and that one should engage in the production of knowledge with her colleagues. Simultaneously, the faculty member should not be indoctrinating students with what she “sees” as knowledge, but, instead, through her teaching and through her example, should foster the same voracious pursuit of knowledge exhibited by the professor herself. Teaching, thus, is not—at least suggests the Statement on Professional ethics—a profession dedicated to enforcing knowledge, but, rather, the action of helping others find it for themselves.

The Oklahoma State University handbook, thus, does present a picture of faculty in a lifeworld way, albeit only in the appendix. The handbook itself is focused largely on the systemsworld and the establishment of policy for the purposes of managing, organizing, and structuring the university. The handbook seems to emphasize research less than the other handbooks considered here, but, again, that focus shifts when considering the Statement on
Professional Ethics included in the appendix. Without further research into actual departmental policy, one cannot ascertain through the handbook if professors are simply not expected to publish. However, the designation of the university as a high research university suggests that this is not the case. Rather, the document may simply assume a synonymy between “scholarship” and “publication.” That embedded synonymy, however, would suggest not just a systemsworld perspective on teaching, but a systemsworld perspective on publication. Yet, to be a scholar must mean more than to produce quantifiable articles and books that can be evaluated by the system.

To be a “scholar” connotes a broader holism of participation in knowledge through dialectic, reading, discourse, presentation, teaching, and contribution to the world of knowledge. If the university has created a synonymy between scholarship and publication, then much lifeworld connotation of scholarship has been lost.

*The University of Miami*

The University of Miami provides a handbook that details a great deal of policy and procedure. It is rather detailed in regards to the hierarchical nature of the university and in regards to university policy on benefits, appointments, termination, administration, and so on. Always, however, these issues are addressed from the perspective of a generalized procedure. Details regarding what would cause termination are omitted in favor of discussion that only details the procedure if one terminates her contract or it is terminated by the university. Due to its detailed nature, the University of Miami handbook provides a useful definition of tenure for its faculty that illuminates the systems nature of the university. Insofar as this is the case, the handbook provides the “meaning” of tenure. To say that one will provide the “meaning” of a term connotes a robust and rich description. However, one may, instead, infer that “meaning”
may reflect, only, a legalized terminology restricting what a term means by virtue of indicating “this term does not entitle you to anything beyond…” as a predicate. Interestingly, the definition of tenure provided by the University of Miami seems to avoid providing meaning in any sense other than in the most legalized and systematized way. It does, however, mention briefly the expectation that faculty should participate in teaching and research:

**Meaning of Tenure**

(a) Faculty members having tenure shall have appointments continued from year to year without necessity for annual or other renewal.

(b) Tenure implies that the faculty member shall accede to reasonable requests to redistribute efforts among various duties including teaching, research, and clinical service where appropriate, to accept classes assigned, whether in day or evening hours, and, in an emergency and for the period thereof, to accept such other reasonable assignments as may be deemed necessary by the University.

(c) Tenure does not imply any promise of promotion or any regular increase in salary, but it does assure the faculty member of participation in any general change in the salary scale. It also assures the faculty member of provisions for general working conditions on the same basis as other faculty members in the same academic areas who have similar professional activities and duties. (pp. 56-57)

The above says little about the connotations of tenure. It does not reflect on the importance of tenure. Other handbooks, we have noted and will note again, connect tenure to freedom of expression and inquiry. The University of Miami, however, is careful to understand tenure as part of an organization, a way of providing benefits that must be clarified, defined, and limited.
Similarly, the University of Miami also defines scholarship and tenure in terms of tenure and promotion. Like the definition of “tenure,” the definitions are not robust in the sense of the lifeworld. The definitions provided below are specifically intended to express what is expected of faculty if they are to achieve promotion. In so doing, they effectively inscribe faculty roles as scholars and teachers.

Scholarship

Scholarship embraces inquiry, research, and creative professional performance and activity. Scholarship is required for effective teaching and is the obligation of all members of the faculty. Scholarship may be judged by the character of the advanced degree, by contributions to knowledge in the form of publication and instruction, by reputation among other scholars and professionals, and by the performance of students. The scholarly function of a university requires the appointment of faculty members devoted to inquiry and research. Among the criteria for evaluating research are the publication of books by nationally recognized presses and of articles and reviews of a scholarly nature in books, periodicals, technical reports, and other forms of publication nationally recognized in the profession; the direction of scholarly work by students working on advanced degrees; professional awards and fellowships; membership on boards and commissions devoted to inquiry; and the judgment of professional colleagues.

Scholarship may be demonstrated by significant achievement in an art related to a faculty member’s discipline, such as creative works, original designs, or original procedures. National recognition of such activities is demonstrated by: commissions, awards and prizes from nationally recognized bodies; performances with nationally
recognized companies; invited presentations, exhibitions, lectures and performances before nationally recognized bodies; invitations to teach master classes or lead intensive workshops at nationally recognized institutions; and reviews of performance and creative works in nationally recognized journals, magazines and newspapers.

Promotion, tenure, and merit salary increases should recognize these scholarly achievements. Whenever possible, chairs shall reduce other duties for faculty engaged in these activities.

C9.3 Teaching

The educational function of a university requires the appointment of faculty who are effective teachers. The means of evaluating teaching effectiveness include: (1) the informed judgment of colleagues; (2) the performance of students; and (3) student opinion of teaching effectiveness. Promotion, tenure, and merit salary increases should recognize outstanding achievements in teaching. (pp. 57-59)

Perhaps most noticeable is the much greater detail regarding research and what constitutes research as described by the University of Miami than given to teaching. The discussion of teaching is almost a passing reference in comparison with the details on research. Note that the discussion of scholarship also provides a justification for the importance of scholarship as “[t]he scholarly function of a university requires the appointment of faculty members devoted to inquiry and research” (p.57). Moreover, note that scholarship is further emphasized as also essential for effective teaching. However, no such statement is made about teaching as essential to good scholarship. Thus, the handbook seems to suggest a relationship in which scholarship is supervenient upon effective teaching.
It is made clear in the handbook that publication is one of the means by which faculty members are evaluated, if appropriate to their field of scholarship; otherwise, creative works are considered instead. Effectiveness in teaching, rather than a series of disjunctive research opportunities, is determined by a conjunction of colleague evaluation, student performance, and student evaluation of the professor. Note, however, that no discussion is given to how such evaluations will be conducted. It is unclear what qualities of teaching will be evaluated by colleagues. It is also unclear what student performance means. Likely it means student success on examinations. This may lead to standardization of end of course examinations in order to provide a means by which to judge faculty success against each other. If student performance suggests quantifiable achievement on examinations, then the emphasis is again on the systemsworld. However, student performance may mean student success in the world outside of college, the ability of students to think for themselves, or evaluation of student-generated projects, creative works, and their contribution to the body of knowledge. If so, such performance would suggest a lifeworld perspective on the part of the university.

Some further clarification regarding the role of faculty as constructed by the University of Miami faculty handbook is achieved by examination of tenure candidate files. In order to earn tenure, faculty must develop a file containing the following:

1) Teaching evaluation- student evaluations, peer review through classroom visits by tenured faculty

2) External evaluations- five letters from experts in the field of scholarship

3) Candidate’s statement-written statement of contribution to knowledge of the profession.

(p. 63)
Notice that firstly faculty members must demonstrate effective teaching. Again, this effectiveness is determined through student and tenured faculty evaluations. Note also, however, that the second and third requirements both hinge on the professor’s scholarship. Both require evidence of the professor’s contribution to scholarship. There seems to be an assumption, then, that teaching itself is not a contribution to scholarship. While the third requirement may allow for a professor to assert that she has contributed to knowledge of the profession by teaching the profession, there seems to be an implicit assumption that to contribute to the knowledge of the profession means to publish. That focus on publication is further emphasized by the fact that the candidate’s statement does not require an explication of one’s teaching goals, teaching ethic, or personal teaching philosophy. The sole focus of the statement is the clarification of one’s contribution to the field. This quantifiable, utilitarian—and somewhat capitalistic—focus on the production of tangible contribution falls neatly into the systemsworld epistemology.

Clemson University

The focus of the Clemson University Faculty handbook is largely on the structure of the university and the makeup of various committees. There is little discussion of the intricacies of promotion and tenure. The work does, however, provide some information about the means by which faculty are evaluated. As in previous cases, one can assume that the standards of evaluation reflect the expectations of the roles performed by faculty. While these roles are then not inscribed in the most literal sense, they are performance-expectations that fit neatly into an understanding of faculty roles as understood through organizational role theory.

Thus far, much of the data are best understood and organized through the lens of organizational role theory. Inscribed expectations through a systemsworld approach as well as
performance expectations of actors reflect an understanding of actors as agents in the world who are given scripts and must act out those scripts within the organizational setting. Note, however, that symbolic-interactionist role theory is also necessary for understanding the roles as they are presented through the university handbooks. As in the case with Clemson University, some roles are not inscribed, but instead are represented or constructed through a defining epistemology that guides the university. This is to say that while Clemson University does not provide much in the way of details regarding the inscribed roles of faculty for promotion and tenure, they do provide a “General Philosophy” that acts as a means by which to understand the symbolic gestures that generate the faculty roles. Presented below is the General Philosophy of Clemson University.

**General Philosophy**

Institutions of higher learning are communities of scholars in which faculty gather to seek, teach, and disseminate knowledge for its own sake rather than for any immediate political, social, or economic goal. Such institutions are conducted for the common good and not to further the interests of either the individual faculty member or the institution as a whole. The attainment of that common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free expression.

Academic freedom is essential to these purposes. Colleges and universities can fulfill their missions only when their faculties enjoy the academic freedom to pursue knowledge without fear of pressure from sources inside or outside their institutions. For this reason, academic freedom is a right and not a privilege to be granted or withheld. As will be indicated below, however, such freedom carries with it commensurate duties and responsibilities.
It is the policy of Clemson University to preserve and defend academic freedom by vigorously resisting all efforts from whatever source to encroach upon or restrict it. In policy and in practice, the University and its accrediting agency, the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, adhere to the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), which has long been recognized as providing reasonable and authoritative guidelines for American institutions of higher learning. The section on academic freedom below essentially reiterates the principles set forth in this statement, with some modification and extension consistent with its intent and with later declarations by the Association. (p.10)

Notice that Clemson University firstly begins with the assertion that universities exist as entities in which the actors who comprise it “seek, teach, and disseminate knowledge for its own sake.” The charge to “seek” knowledge is given primacy, here, and it can be understand that it means scholarship. Interestingly, however, this particular philosophy preserves the notion that scholarship can be distinct from research, as the third telos is “disseminate.” One often assumes that to “disseminate” knowledge means to “teach;” however, Clemson University states teaching as well. This distinction, then, between “teach” and “disseminate” may suggest that disseminating means producing knowledge and casting it out into the world for consumption while teaching means actively participating with students in knowledge inquiry. Thus, it may well be that Clemson University’s philosophy places learning on the part of faculty first, (perhaps because such knowledge is a prerequisite for teaching) then requires that faculty teach,
and then, finally, requires that they share that knowledge with the public at large not for any political purpose, but only because knowledge itself is intrinsically valuable.

The statement of philosophy then focuses the rest of its efforts on the instantiation of academic freedom as fundamental to the overall university ethic and telos. The statement, in some ways, is less a philosophy and more a declaration of independence and of intent. The General Philosophy states that Clemson University will resist “all efforts” to restrict it. Thus, we see, again, the emphasis by a university on the importance of academic freedom. This emphasis was an unexpected result of the analysis of faculty roles. Repeatedly, the documents charge faculty with the mandate that they should generate a world of free thought and unfettered learning. The general philosophy of Clemson University may be understood as generating faculty roles of teaching and research as two expressions of the belief that free thought and unfettered learning are intrinsic goods entrusted to the professoriate.

Perhaps as a result of its philosophy, the Clemson University faculty handbook provides a more robust picture of what teaching entails than some of the other handbooks. Consider the “evidence of student learning” as a multi-faceted tool for understanding faculty teaching as described by the handbook:

**Evidence of Student Learning in Evaluation of Faculty Teaching** is an important process requiring a multi-faceted approach. Research supports the use of multiple sources of evidence in evaluation, and effective evaluations should include at least three of the following:

- Evidence-based measurements of student learning (such as pre- and post-testing or student work samples) that meet defined student learning outcomes;
b) Evaluation (by peers and/or administrators) of course materials, learning objectives, and examinations;
c) In-class visitation by peers and/or administrators;
d) A statement by the faculty member describing the faculty member’s methods and/or a teaching philosophy;
e) Exit interview/surveys with current graduates/alumni;
f) Additional criteria as appropriate for the discipline and degree level of the students; and,
g) A statement by the faculty member of methods or philosophy that also describes and documents how feedback from student rating of course experiences or evaluation instruments above were used to improve teaching.

The University provides a standard form that meets the minimum requirements of current research-based practices for student rating of course experiences. This form must be approved by the Scholastic Policies Committee of the Faculty Senate. Individual departments and faculty may develop questions supplemental to the University’s minimum standard questions or employ comprehensive supplemental questions, but the standard questions are required. (p. 72)

Note, here, the repeated mention of philosophy in the above evaluative construct. Although “philosophy” as they use it has little in common with the term as we use it in this dissertation, it does suggest that faculty should be metacognitive in regards to the guiding beliefs that ground their pedagogy. Faculty should be able to articulate why they do what they do and the teleology that guides them as teachers. The above evaluative construct allows for both systemsworld and
lifeworld understandings of faculty as teachers. While there are structured surveys that measure student success and “evidence-based” measurements using pre-and post-testing, there are also exit interviews and statements of philosophy that act as qualitative data sets. Simply, to evaluate a faculty member using the above construct, one would be unable to simply look at a chart or a set of numbers that represent the effectiveness of her teaching. Rather, one would have to investigate many forms of representation in order to understand the faculty member’s effectiveness not just in terms of a set of grades given or a graduate rate, but as a holism of epistemology, pedagogy teleology and ethics.

In its brief explication of the expectations of faculty in promotion and tenure, faculty roles are largely defined from a systems world perspective. There does not seem to be primacy given to research over teaching or teaching over research, but the expectations of faculty to do research are significant. The documents outline the set of teaching expectations as follows:

Teaching

• Identification of course needs and the development of curriculum, plans, course outlines and educational objectives.

• Incorporation of new knowledge and teaching techniques into course, laboratories, short courses and other educational endeavors.

• Presentation of subject matter in an effective manner through lectures, discussions, examinations, etc.

• Motivation of students and establishment of rapport with students to improve the learning process.
• Attention to responsibilities such as meeting classes promptly, maintaining office hours and filling out reports.

• Professional growth and scholarly achievements as evidenced by experience, educational attainments, commitments to reading and study, productive scholarship and professional contributions beyond the scope of regular duties.

• Advising of students on academic matters. (p. 91)

Note that the expectations require both that faculty meet clear organizational ends as well as a vague gesturing towards the import of new knowledge. Teaching, however, is not treated solely as an industrial enterprise; faculty members, for example, are expected to develop a “rapport with students to improve the learning process.” So while the understanding of teaching and its multi-faceted intricacies remains vague, there is allowance here for an understanding of teaching that includes the lifeworld. The presentation of research expectations is similar:

Research

• Identification of specific research projects contributing to priority research needs.

• Development of sound research proposals culminating in funding.

• Execution of research in competent manner.

• Completion of research and reporting of findings in appropriate publications and/or at professional meetings.

• Attention to responsibilities such as providing timely reports, supervision of graduate students and technicians, and development of research facilities.
• Professional growth and scholarly achievements as evidenced by experience, educational attainments, commitment to reading and study, productive scholarship and professional contributions beyond the scope of regular duties. (p. 91)

Two immediate conclusions emerge from analysis of the research expectations: 1) Research is understood in part as deeply connected to publication and/or the dissemination of knowledge through professional meetings; and 2) Scholarly achievement is expected to be an integral part of a faculty member’s participation in the university. Note, interestingly, that “scholarly achievement” in addition to “professional growth” are emphasized heavily. An emphasis on “scholarship” would allow for the possibility that faculty could perform their role as researcher by acquiring knowledge through meticulous and methodological research, but the expectation here is not only that this acquired knowledge should be disseminated, it should be noteworthy. Thus, while on one hand the Clemson University faculty handbook presents faculty roles from a broader lifeworld perspective than other handbooks reviewed here, the handbook also understands faculty roles as requiring significant and praiseworthy scholastic “attainment.” Thus, we note that a lifeworld understanding does not preclude an understanding of faculty that places heavy emphasis on publication. What is perhaps is most significant, then, is the understanding of a lifeworld focus as one that emerges from the belief that publication should be conducted for the betterment of the community and due to the intrinsic worth of knowledge while the systemsworld perspective views publication as a quantifiable means by which to evaluate faculty.
Florida Atlantic University’s handbook is the second shortest of the documents reviewed. At only 86 pages, the document focuses almost exclusively on delineation of the university hierarchy. The document explicates the divisions between various campuses, the administrative structure, and the policies that govern the university. The expectations of faculty are restricted to a section designated for university policies. The breakdown of that section is below:

INSTRUCTIONAL POLICIES

- Academic Calendar
- Course Syllabi
- Class Meetings
- Classroom Requests
- Student Attendance
- Office Hours
- Examinations
- Final Examination Schedules
- Grades
- Posting Grades
- Instructions for Faculty to Input Grades
- Classrooms
- Grade Reviews
- Course Evaluation
- Academic Program Assessment
• Academic Honesty
• Dealing with Disruption
• Disruptive Behavior
• Threatening Behavior
• Anti-Discrimination and Anti-Harassment
• Fees for Course Materials and Supplies
• Textbooks and Materials
• Accommodations for Disabilities (pp. 3-4)

The instructional policies, as they are policies, never discuss teaching philosophy, pedagogy, or expectations of the faculty as facilitators of free thought. Rather, the discussion of instructional expectations is restricted specifically to university policy in the systems world—expectations of timeliness, policy on disability, requirements for office hours, and so on. It is unclear what is expected of faculty as teachers beyond that they should attend class, teach, and meet the legal requirements expected by the university.

Similarly, the discussion of research is vague. The document presents research in terms of a basic structure and presents avenues for assistance in conducting research. The document presents research as follows.

RESEARCH
• Faculty Research Programs
• Centers and Institutes
• Sponsored Programs
• Research Integrity
Use of Human Subjects in Research
Use of Animals in Research and Teaching
Research Accounting
Intellectual Property
Florida Atlantic University Research Corporation
Research Communications (p. 4)

There are no definitions given. Why and how research should be conducted is left outside of the document. Researchers are expected to conduct themselves ethically and are expected to follow university policy in conducting that research. They are provided information regarding policies on human subjects, non-human animal subjects, intellectual property, and other legal issues. As presented by the handbook, Florida Atlantic University seems to follow a systemsworld model of the construction of faculty roles. Faculty are expected to perform their roles within a structure that they must maintain.

This is not to say the university handbook is entirely without teleology or ethical grounding, only that the discussion of teaching and research themselves are solely discussed from the systems perspective. Early in the document, there is an expression of teleology through “mission” and “values.” To quote,

Florida Atlantic University is a public research university with multiple campuses along the southeast Florida coast serving a uniquely diverse community. It promotes academic and personal development, discovery, and lifelong learning. FAU fulfills its mission through excellence and innovation in teaching, outstanding research and creative
activities, public engagement and distinctive scientific and cultural alliances, all within an environment that fosters inclusiveness. (p.12)

Here we see an emphasis on the idea that faculty should engage innovating teaching and “outstanding research.” It is left unclear what exactly such teaching and research entail, however.

The document continues to present its values:

Florida Atlantic University values an academic environment that facilitates intellectual growth through open and honest expression. The University is committed to excellence at all levels of the educational and creative experience, to success for all students, and to development of the capacity to make reasoned and discriminating judgments with respect for differences and diversity in ideas. Lifelong learning encourages the continual use of the mind. The University plays a vital role in the life of the surrounding community, in society, and as an engine for economic development. (p. 12)

The document continues to elucidate a series of values that include community participation and a significant emphasis on academic freedom, while also focusing on economic and systems-world concerns. Thus, we see again the focus on the idea that universities are deeply dependent on academic freedom. Florida Atlantic University, as stated in its values, also encourages free thought and creative expression on the part of its faculty and students. The presentation of values fits neatly into a lifeworld understanding of the university.

There is also the inclusion of a brief mention of annual evaluation. The document discusses the importance of the annual evaluation for the purposes of promotion and tenure, but does not include any details regarding the expectations of faculty or how they will be evaluated other than by tenured faculty and the administration. The document states, “The basic purpose of
the annual evaluation is faculty improvement in the functions of teaching, research, service and other duties that may be assigned” (p. 61). Thus, we can conclude that faculty are expected to perform, effectively, the roles of teacher and researcher, but as to what exactly comprises those roles, the document remains unclear. One may infer, however, from the university mission and values, that those roles include innovative teaching, facilitation of knowledge acquisition and creative work on the part of the students, as well as faculty participation in publication and contribution to the general body of knowledge.

Temple University

The Temple University faculty handbook is the shortest of all those reviewed here. The document is only twenty-one pages long. Interestingly, however, a significant portion of the document is not dedicated to the discussion of hierarchy or organization. Rather, the document focuses largely promotion and tenure, faculty ethics, and condition of employment. Given the length of the document itself, it cannot be said that the document discusses those topics in more detail than the other handbooks, but proportionally, significantly more time is given to them than in the other handbooks.

The document does not go into great detail regarding the promotion and tenure process. Basic structure is laid out and then the document details the basic expectations of faculty in a lifewordly way. Consider the explication of teaching as an expectation for promotion and tenure:

a. Effective teaching has many manifestations. It comprehends classroom instruction and a broad range of faculty-student relationships. The following are among the traits valued in the teacher: command of subject, familiarity with advances in the field, ability to organize material and to present it with force and logic, capacity to awaken in students an
awareness of the relation of the subject to other fields of knowledge, grasp of general
objectives, ability to vitalize learning, ability to arouse curiosity toward further and more
independent learning, ability to stimulate advanced students to highly creative work,
maintaining a sufficiently high standard of achievement, and fairness and judgment in
grading. The teacher’s personal attributes such as social graciousness and sense of humor
are also important.
b. The extent and skill of the faculty member’s participation in the general guidance and
advising of students and his or her contribution to student welfare are of importance in
the appraisal of the teacher’s value to the University. (p. 7)
Thus, the document recognizes effective teaching as multi-faceted and deeply embedded in
faculty-student relationships. The document says little about evaluation in terms of
standardization or performance, and focuses on ideas such as “awakening” and “awareness.”
Perhaps most unusually, there is even a brief mention of a “sense of humor” amongst effective
faculty. This presentation then is almost without explication of the system of organization and
evaluation and focuses heavily on the personal qualities of effective teaching that are expected of
faculty. Also important is the inclusion in (b) of student welfare. Student wellbeing is only
mentioned on occasion in any of the other documents in terms of student academic achievement.
The Temple University faculty handbook, however, makes no such distinction. Faculty are
required to contribute to student welfare—one assumes first academically, but not necessarily
solely.

The document similarly addresses faculty scholarship in a way that can be understood as
integrated with the epistemology of the lifeworld. The document states,
2. Scholarship and Creative Work

a. Research and Publication. In most of the fields represented in the program of the University, publications in media of quality are expected as evidence of scholarly interest. Quality of production is more important than quantity. Each of the following is valued according to its quality and significance: scholarly books, textbooks, reviews, reports, articles in scholarly and professional journals, and participation in projects of scholarly interest.

b. Works of Art. In certain fields such as art, music, and literature, distinguished creation receives consideration equivalent to distinction attained in research. Public recognition as reflected in professional awards; the assignment of unusual tasks and commissions; the acceptance of the faculty member’s work in permanent collections or its publication in leading professional journals; invitations to participate in significant exhibits; and any other public honor on the local, national, or international scene are valued.

c. Professional Recognition. Demonstrated professional distinction is recognized as a criterion for promotion. In certain areas as music, drama, and speech, distinguished performance is considered. The faculty member’s record is scrutinized for evidence of achievement, leadership, and the development of new ideas. (pp. 7-8)

Thus, again, one sees a similarity between this treatment of scholarship to that of the Clemson University faculty handbook. Faculty members are expected to achieve distinction in their fields of expertise, but not necessarily as a matter of publication for the purpose of systemic evaluation, but for the purpose of participation in the world of knowledge. It is made clear that a qualitative perspective will be taken when evaluating faculty scholarship: “quality of production is more
important than quantity.” Regardless of the medium in which the faculty member works, she is expected to produce work of worth and note by the scholastic or creative community. Thus, one notes, again, that a lifewardly orientation does not necessitate one in which scholarship is placed secondary to teaching or undervalued. Quite the contrary: it seems as if Temple University places heavy emphasis on faculty scholarship and publication as necessary for promotion and tenure, but specifically because such work meets the fundamental purpose of the University as a perpetuator of academic freedom.

Note that the Temple University handbook does not present a guiding philosophy, mission, or set of values. The work is generally, as was the case with the Clemson University Handbook, made up of clearly inscribed expectations in favor of enunciated expectations. That does not mean that the university does not have a guiding philosophy or values but, rather, in presentation of the faculty expectations, much greater emphasis is given to academic freedom. The document begins, in fact, with this statement on academic freedom:

All members of the faculty, whether tenured or not, are entitled to academic freedom as set forth in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure*, formulated by the Association of American Colleges and the American Association of University Professors, as follows:

(a) Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the adequate performance of their other academic duties; but research for pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the institution.
(b) Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment.

(c) College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned profession, and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but their special position in the community imposes special obligations. As scholars and educational officers, they should remember that the public may judge their profession and their institution by their utterances. Hence they should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the institution.” (p. 1)

Faculty members are given full freedom to research and publish while at the same time are asked to show “appropriate restraint” and respect the opinions of others. Participation in the university requires that teachers remain pertinent to the topics relevant to the class itself, but at the same time there is emphasis on the idea that they should be free from institutional censorship. They have special obligations which, rather than being restrictive, require that faculty be as educated, thoughtful, and accurate as possible. Taken in conjunction with the explication of faculty teaching and researching roles, it seems reasonable to conclude that faculty members are expected to participate in teaching and scholarship in a way that frees students and the community in general to think broadly, deeply, and effectively for themselves. Academic freedom is only curtailed insofar as it should not restrict the learning and free thought of others.
Of all of the documents reviewed, the Temple University faculty handbook focuses the most on the lifeworld, perhaps even problematically, to the exclusion of explication of the systemsworld, as much regarding the intricacies of faculty evaluation is left unclear. What is not left unclear is that faculty members are expected to be active, meritorious participants in the perpetuation of free thought and the construction of knowledge of others.

*Summary of Data Collected from University Handbooks*

These documents in conjunction suggest that, at least for these six universities, both teaching and research are essential. Teaching is not undervalued, though it is often under-defined and under-explained. Perhaps because of the complexity of teaching, or out of respect for individual freedom in the classroom, evaluation of teaching is left vague and generally restricted to quantifiable evaluative measures such as surveys and student success. Research is clearly a primary goal of most of these universities and the idea of scholarship, as presented by the handbooks, which assume faculty publish work or produce creative works that are acknowledgement worthy and are articulated as inscribed expectations. Heavy emphasis, however, is given to the import of academic freedom as both a fundamental necessity and as a fundamental goal of the university through enunciated expectations insofar as those expectations are written down, but do not act as codified rules. They are stated, but not measured. Faculty members are expected to be perpetuators of academic freedom both as teachers and as researchers.

It also seems clear that most of these handbooks describe the role of the faculty in terms of the systemsworld. The very universities, themselves, are usually presented with a brief historical narrative and then much more time is given to the actual explication of the
organization system itself. The evaluation of faculty, as belonging to a well-defined hierarchy, is also systematized in a way that is most easily quantifiable. While the tenure and promotion processes remain qualitative to greater and lesser degrees depending on the university—as such decisions are made by committees—there seems to be evidence that this committee decision making process is becoming less a discussion of a holism of teaching and research and instead heavily reliant upon the quantifications of annual evaluations. These evaluations most often emphasize the importance of research. There seems to be difficulty in articulating exactly how good teaching should be evaluated, and thus evaluation of such teaching is relegated to vague gestures towards colleague observation and student evaluations. Research, however, often receives a good deal more detailed discussion both in regards to what counts as research for the universities’ purposes and in regards to the ways in which research should be conducted.

It becomes clear that professors are expected to produce work that is recognized as important by their academic community, but it is unclear if they must be similarly excellent teachers. This is to say that while “innovation in teaching” and “teaching excellence” are discussed in some of the documents, there is little discussion of what that means, how it can be evaluated holistically, and why it is important. Conversely, for most of the handbooks, there is no question that faculty members must not just publish, but that they must publish in top-level journals, win awards, and receive acknowledgement from the community. There is far less discussion of similar excellence in the classroom. The handbooks do not include expectations such as, our faculty should be “some of the best teachers in the world,” “receive accolades from the community for their teaching achievements,” or “regularly receive acknowledgement and praise from students for teaching life-changing classes.” Rather, faculty are expected to engage
in professional development, display effective teaching, and engage innovation (often through technology).

There remains, however, an expectation amongst some of the universities that faculty participate in a mentorship role as teachers. For example, when the requirements of tenure and promotion of these universities are taken in conjunction with the University of Memphis ethical statement, an emphasis on faculty members as expert guides is revealed. The brief, but repeated, mention of faculty as mentors as well as the statement that they should foster free learning both suggest that faculty members should guide learners without indoctrinating them. Repeatedly through these documents one sees an emphasis in mentorship through the production of and participation in knowledge by the students.

In some ways, however, the handbooks do not seem to be in synonymy with the importance of mentorship that they themselves require. Rather, the focus seems to be particularly on evaluation of professors by virtue of student performance, on the students having gained particular knowledge. Little information is given regarding how individual departments should evaluate students, but there is no mention in the discussion of evaluation of the idea that faculty should be, at least in part, evaluated on whether or not they foster a “free learning community.” One sees that the creation of faculty roles by the universities may be in some tension: the lifeworld epistemologies that guide some of them require that teachers engage in a robust, community-driven, holistic enterprise of mentorship and free thought facilitation, while at the same time the means by which those same faculty members are evaluated for their performance is often heavily limited to systemsworld gauges of effectiveness.
The next consideration in this document is of professional associations in which professors are expected to participate. As in the case of handbooks, there are many associations, and not all of them can be addressed here. Rather, this work will focus on some of those most pertinent to educational leadership. The work will address those professional associations that are most recognized by and relied on by faculty, as those associations have the greatest impact on how faculty members are expected to perform their roles. These associations are specifically research associations. Questions of teaching expectations and the generation of teacher roles will be addressed later. These associations will be specifically reviewed for their construction of researcher roles in order to better understand the way the community constructs the faculty through the holism of its dialectic.

The American Psychological Association

The first professional association ethical code addressed here is that of the American Psychological Association (APA). It is APA guidelines for citation that structure this dissertation. The APA standards guide much of educational leadership and educational research in general. The full statement of ethical principles of the APA is included in the appendix. The following principles are articulated by the APA in its Code of Conduct:

Principle A: Beneficence and Nonmalficence

Principle B: Fidelity and Responsibility

Principle C: Integrity

Principle D: Justice
Principle E: Respect for People’s Rights and Dignity

The document makes it clear that these are general principles rather than ethical standards, because they are “aspirational” in nature. APA members are expected to be inspired by these principles rather than view them as obligations.

According to the APA principles, members are expected to aspire to benefiting research participants. The goal should not just be to do no harm (certainly no intentional harm); it is also to benefit others. It is important to note that this does not mean that research is justified when it benefits *someone*. The principles state that psychologists “strive to benefit those with whom they work and take care to do no harm” (2010, p. 3). Thus one is unlikely to justify research that does harm, or does nothing for the participant. Members should aspire to benefit participants, not just use them to achieve a “greater good.” The principles also state that members should aspire to work well with each other and develop collegiality. They should strive to be persons of integrity—thus they should be honest and trustworthy. Justice requires that members strive to benefit all people who can benefit from their work, and the final principle encourages them to respect the personhood of everyone with whom they work and everyone who can be impacted by their work.

Thus, an understanding of researchers and practitioners who are members of the APA recognizes the importance of research as a form of beneficence. To engage in the improvement of the world with participants through research means to attempt to benefit as many as possible, including the participants. This idea echoes the beneficence requirements of the Belmont Report, a document that moderates all research conducted on human participants in the United States. The Belmont report, a grounding document for APA guidelines of the treatment of human
participants (which will be discussed more in depth shortly), requires that research be conducted with respect for persons, with beneficence, and with respect for justice, which are all expectations echoed by the APA. Research, thusly, must not be conducted for the sole benefit of the researcher or one particular group. It should be conducted in a way that is just and brings benefit to all to whom the research applies; it should also respect the rights and dignity, the personhood, of the participants. Participants should never be used to the researcher’s end. She must always recognize that participants are full moral agents entitled to informed consent, respect, autonomy, and honesty. The conjunctions of beneficence and justice act to push research beyond just a means by which to gather knowledge; researchers become mandated to conduct research for the purpose of benefiting as many others as possible.

The Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR).

The APA also follows a series of principles designated Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR). These principles include “most of the professional activities that are part and parcel of a research career, as defined by federal agencies” (p. 1). The document is included as an additional resource on the APA webpage for the code of ethics. It is expected that APA researchers use the RCR specifically to guide them in conducting research. The ethical principles discussed above are intended for all members of the APA and psychologists in particular. The RCR, however, is specifically intended to structure research activity. The RCR states the following nine principals:

- Collaborative Science
Collaborations take place in a variety of forms, including the borrowing and lending of supplies, resources and equipment between researchers; seeking input from experts in different disciplines; and partnering with colleagues who have similar backgrounds or fields of knowledge for fresh ideas and abilities.

- **Conflicts of Interest and Commitments**

Conflicts of interests or commitments are not inherently negative; rather, the way in which the conflict is managed is important.

- **Data Acquisition, Management, Sharing and Ownership**

This site is designed as a central location for viewing and retrieving shared data archives relevant to psychological science.

- **Human Research Protections**

Research with human participants plays a central role in advancing knowledge in the biomedical, behavioral and social sciences.

- **Lab Animal Welfare**

APA has supported and continues to support efforts to improve laboratory animal welfare through the implementation of policies and regulations that both maintain the integrity of scientific research and sustain the welfare of such animals.

- **Mentoring**

Mentoring less-experienced researchers is a professional responsibility of all scientists. The ultimate goal of the mentor is to establish the trainee as an independent researcher.

- **Peer Review**
Positive peer reviews contribute to increased funding opportunities, academic advancement and a good reputation.

• Publications Practices and Responsible Authorship

Although researchers can disseminate their findings through many different avenues, results are most likely to be published as an article in a scholarly journal.

• Research Misconduct

Institutions should have procedures in place to investigate—and, when appropriate, report—findings of misconduct to the Office of Research Integrity (ORI). They should also have policies that protect both the whistleblower and the accused until a determination is made. (p. 1)

Note that these expectations are rather lifeworldly in nature. Rather than presenting a set of rules and procedures, they act as a set of enunciations that guide the process of research. That lifeworld epistemology is reflected in the inclusion of other persons and their welfare into a dialectic in which collaboration and mutual respect are desirable.

Each facet of responsible conduct is further detailed by the APA and paraphrased here. Collaboration, which is an ever-increasing aspect of research, should be well planned and documented. Researchers should take care to be open and honest with each other, keeping all researchers fully informed regarding the research process. Conflicts of interest may be inevitable. However, those conflicts should not be ignored or dealt with in silence. Researchers should seek outside observation and honestly report conflicts of interest in order to maintain objectivity. Human research, while invaluable to the acquisition of knowledge, is also capable of great harm. For that reason, the APA references the Belmont Report as a grounding document for the
treatment of human subjects. Unlike the charge of beneficence to human participants, the
treatment of non-human animals does not require beneficence. Moreover, harm may be done to
laboratory non-human animals if necessary. However, researchers should endeavor to do as little
harm as possible and seek alternative avenues when possible.

Mentoring is a responsibility of all research scientists, according to the APA. Researchers
and their students should develop an agreement early on, detailing the responsibilities and
structure of their research arrangement. The process should be to the benefit of the student, and
the researcher should prepare the student to go forth and conduct their own research once having
acquired the knowledge provided by their mentor. It is essential that peer-reviewers have the
necessary expertise to provide useful information about the research they review. Impartiality is
essential, and reviewers should seek to be as objective as possible; if they cannot do so, or are
unable to separate themselves from a conflict of interest, they should not act as a reviewer in that
case. Accurate and honest reporting of research is essential and particularly the purview of the
primary author of a research article. It is expected that the researcher be open regarding the
methodology and procedures used, and all those responsible for authorship should be credited for
their work accordingly. Research misconduct occurs when a researcher purposefully fabricates,
plagiarizes, or misrepresents data. This conduct should be reported by any who are made aware
of it, and the consequences can be severe, especially in regards to one’s employment at a
research institution and participation in the APA.

The APA RCR further instantiates the idea that researchers should at the very least do no
harm. Although the imperative for general beneficence may seem less than in the guiding
principles of the APA, it is not. It is important to note this especially because one may read these
documents and conclude that if one is a psychologist one must be beneficent, but if one is simply a researcher that uses APA guidelines, one need not be so concerned. Note, however, that the treatment of human participants directly references the Belmont Report. Although the RCR does not, itself, discuss beneficence, it directs the reader to the Belmont Report for details regarding human treatment. As noted previously, the Belmont Report does clearly require both beneficence and justice. Thus, the APA RCR is making a general statement about researchers that is not necessarily applied only to APA researchers: good research follows ethical practices, particularly beneficence.

Interestingly, the RCR also pushes researchers to be outwardly beneficial in two other ways as well. Firstly, there is the consistent theme of honesty and openness. Researchers should provide as much information as is relevant to not only their colleges, but to the public. Their research should be revealing in terms of their own methodologies and provide the means by which others can reconstruct their work. The work should be published so as to be available and beneficial to the public. Secondly, researchers are not only encouraged, but almost admonished to act as mentors. The document makes it exceedingly clear that an essential responsibility of research is teaching others. Moreover, while that mentorship may be beneficial to the researcher, it should be conducted with the ultimate goal of enabling the mentored to conduct her or his own research independently. Thus, we see again a directive that researchers be outwardly focused on beneficence and lifeworldly values.

The Belmont Report

Some brief discussion of the Belmont Report is warranted, as it governs much—though not all—of faculty research. The Belmont Report was written as the result of the National
Research Act (1974). The National Research Act created the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavior Research. The Commission was charged with identifying basic ethical principles that ground the conduct of research involving human subjects and developing guidelines for researchers to follow to maintain ethical standards. The Belmont Report does not make recommendations for administrative action; it is largely intended to be a statement of departmental ethical policy.

The Report, published in 1979, uncovered three basic underlying ethical principles that should ground ethical research. I suggest that this effort on the part of the Commission was, in fact (though not intentionally), a Habermasian one. The Commission was not charged with “generating” principles; it was charged with determining the underlying principles of ethical research. The result of this search for basic underlying assumptions that govern our actions resulted in a lengthy appendix to the Belmont Report that includes the thoughts of experts and specialists in many fields of ethics and research. This conglomeration of thoughts creates a dialectic; the result of that dialectic, when analyzed and investigated, is a discourse ethical understanding of ethical principles that results from uncovering the basic rules that governed the ethical dialectic. I suggest that, in the same way that one can uncover the basic rules of dialogue through investigation of dialogue, one can uncover the basic rules of ethics—insofar as they are an assumed part of our dialectic—through the investigation of dialogue about ethics. This is not to say something so mundane as that one discovers the ethical beliefs of others through conversation about ethics, but rather that one can uncover the normative assumptions that govern how we think about ethics when we discourse about ethics. One may realize that throughout the dialogue there is just a basic assumption that one should not purposefully do harm. No one may
directly state that belief in the course of the conversation; that assumption just guides the
dialectic and acts as a basic axiom upon which the conversation rests.

Through a perhaps Habermasian investigation, the Commission uncovered three
principles that govern the way experts think about ethics and research:

1) Respect for Persons
2) Beneficence
3) Justice

Respect for persons, as described by the Belmont Report, incorporates two ethical principles: 1) We should respect the autonomy of others; and 2) Those who are not autonomous should be protected. The Belmont Report cashes out respect for autonomy as giving “weight to autonomous persons’ considered opinions and choices while refraining from obstructing their actions” (part B, para. 3). Simply, we should not force others to participate in research and we need to respect their choice not to do so. One should avoid coercive measures, including denying participants information pertinent to the research project that may have caused them not to participate in the project if they had known. One may understand this principle of recognizing the personhood of others in terms of them being more than objects of our research. One should respect other agents as capable of decision-making processes that deserve our consideration: “Respect for persons demands that subjects enter into the research voluntarily and with adequate information” (part B, para. 6). Moreover, if the agent is not autonomous—i.e. a child, a student, a prisoner and so on—we should protect them rather than use them as an easier means by which to accomplish our goals. As SoTL research has been a significant consideration in this
dissertation, it is important to note that SoTL, as it often uses one’s own classroom population, must be careful not to violate the “respect for persons” principle.

Beneficence is defined in the following way by the Belmont Report: “Persons are treated in an ethical manner not only by respecting their decisions and protecting them from harm, but also by making efforts to secure their well-being” (part B, para. 7). The document suggests that one must go beyond normal obligations when conducting research with participants: one must firstly do no harm and secondly maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harms. This requirement not only means that researchers must move outward in their scope by virtue of making sure that their work does good; it also means they must also be forward-looking in regards to the outcomes of their research. One cannot simply meddle in the lives of others without considering the impact of the research project on those lives. Moreover, one cannot just assume that the research is harmless and, thus, not problematic. One must also make sure that engagement with participants is such that one foresees benefit to participants through their participation.

Anecdotally, I have noted among some university administration the tendency to assume that this beneficence need only mean that: 1) The research does not harm the participant; and 2) Someone, though not necessarily the participant, is benefited. Such an interpretation of beneficence not only seems intuitively short-sighted, but it also does not take entire set of the ethical principles espoused by the Belmont Report into account. Respect for persons suggests that we are aware that others wish to be benefited and often hope that their participation in research will benefit themselves in some way, if only by virtue of knowing that the information gleaned through them will help others. Note, though, that to receive this benefit, they must know
what they are doing. At the very least, the beneficence principle requires that researchers try to
benefit participants, particularly in conjunction with the respect for persons principle, as we
cannot just use participants as means to our ends.

Again, in the case of SoTL, research examples present themselves immediately. A
professor may wish to use a class assignment for research purposes. She hopes to improve her
chances for tenure by publishing the results of the study. She may, for example, teach two
sections of the same class in two different ways but use the same assessments in both classes. In
one class she may use lecture, and in the other a Socratic questioning style. She knows from
previous experience that the students respond better to the Socratic style, but she wants clear
evidence that she can publish. She has no intention of ever telling the students what she is doing
or why she is doing it, so the students are just a ready sample to use for her SoTL research. In
conversation, when asked if she is violating the principle of beneficence, she argued that she is
benefiting many other students through this project. The publication will help improve the
effectiveness of many other teachers in her field. Her rationale is insufficient, though; she
violates, here, respect for persons.

The students are being used solely as a means to the professor’s ends. She is not taking
the students’ autonomy into account, and is thus violating the principle of respect for persons.
She cannot be said to be following the principle of beneficence, either, as she is not “maximizing
the possible benefit.” The same may be said for those who justify research in an institution as
being beneficial for the degree as a whole, though not necessarily beneficial for student
participants. The institution is neither respecting those students’ autonomy if it engages research
using the student population without their consent, nor acting beneficently if it does not seek to
maximize the benefit to those student participants. Moreover, in such cases, if there is a population that is being used solely for the purpose of benefiting someone else, regardless of the impact on them, it is also unjust.

Justice, according to the Belmont Report, requires that benefits be fair in their distribution. “An injustice occurs when some benefit to which a person is entitled is denied without good reason or when some burden is imposed unduly” (part B, para. 11). The justice principle, of course, engages a great deal of complexity. Defining what is equal and unequal, and what equal treatment means, is often unclear. What is clear is that researchers should endeavor to equally distribute the potential benefits of research. They should not choose populations, for example, to benefit from the research simply out of personal preference. The professor in the example above may choose to engage the Socratic dialectic with the class she likes better, knowing that they in fact will perform better; in so doing, she is violating the principle of justice. We must take into account whether or not populations are “being systematically selected simply because of their easy availability, their compromised position, or their manipulability, rather than for reasons directly related to the problem being studied” (part B, para. 13) In the case of research involving students, these concerns seem to be always relevant and should be given careful consideration.

It is important to note, however, that much of the research that faculty members conduct does not involve human participants at all. Much research conducted by faculty is, rather, a creative endeavor involving either the creation of art or the development of articles that rest upon investigation and analysis of literature, philosophy, history, and the humanities. So it may stand to reason that the Belmont Report may not apply to those faculty members. The Report,
however, does reveal much of the ethical grounding that guides our conversations about research. At its core is not just the idea that researchers should not do harm, but that they should benefit others. That core assumption applies to all research, regardless of human participation: the work researchers do should benefit the community in some way.

In many ways the Belmont Report is a systemsworld document. As a document generated by the government, it details a great deal regarding policy and practice. However, from the very beginning of the work, it engages lifeworld epistemology through the series of its three enunciated principles. The ethics described by the Belmont Report cannot be clearly codified. One cannot say exactly how much beneficence one has shown or the amount of justice that has been met. Rather, the work requires that researchers focus on a larger picture of their actions and their impact on the world as well as reflect on their own motivations. One can never know if another is truly beneficent or simply presenting a spurious image of beneficence in order to gain trust. It is thus the onus of the moral agent to reflexively examine her own conscience and align herself with principles such as beneficence. This reflexive act that is mediated by engagement with the world is a discourse ethical one—one that requires one to mediate the actions of the self through engagement with the social dialectic of the lifeworld.

*The American Educational Research Association*

The American Educational Research Association (AERA) is an association specifically dedicated to research. While it is APA style that is most often used by education in citation and paper format, it is in the AERA that educational researchers are most likely to have membership. As perhaps the premier organization in educational research, the AERA has a considerable
influence over educational research and researchers. Thus, the ethical code of the AERA has a substantial normative force in education.

The ethical code of the AERA sets forward five principles that guide the action of educational researchers. These principles, moreover, are the axioms from which the more specific ethical standards emerge. Thus, the principles that are most fundamental will be discussed here, as those principles describe not just what one should do, but what kind of person one should be. One will note numerous similarities to the principles set by the APA, particularly insofar as the principles act as a set of lifelong guiding values.

The AERA firstly commits itself to “Professional Competence.” According to the AERA, educational researchers should “adhere to the highest possible standards that are reasonable and responsible in their research teaching, practice, and service activities” (p. 3). Note that the preceding statement references the three role requirements of faculty at most universities. Thus, the AERA code of ethics specifically orients itself to the entirety of the education professoriate. Competence, then, according to the AERA, is achieved through the consistent growth of the researcher in her field. She should stay abreast of new information and technologies and remain at the forefront of education. She must use the competence in ways that accurately represents her expertise, and never misuse it for personal gain.

The second principle of the AERA is “Integrity.” Integrity to the AERA is deeply connected to fairness, and thus to justice. Educational researchers should be worthy of “trust and confidence” (p. 2) Thus, they must not purposefully do harm or jeopardize the welfare of others. Integrity also suggests that educational researchers do not falsify, plagiarize, or misrepresent data. They should be transparent in their research practices. To be a person of integrity,
according to the AERA, all aspects of one’s professional life demonstrate the qualities of honesty, fairness, and respect. The notion of integrity—to be consistent, stable, and trustworthy—by definition seems to require that one be trustworthy not just in one area of one’s life, but in all. If one is only trustworthy when conducting research, but not when teaching, then one lacks integrity, if the notion includes consistency. Arguably, to be a person of integrity would suggest that this trustworthiness extends beyond one’s professional life into one’s personal life, but the AERA does not require this.

The third principle is “Professional, Scientific, and Scholarly Responsibility.” This standard requires that educational researchers maintain the highest possible standards. In so doing, those standards include the standards of science as well as of their university. Researchers must take responsibility for their work. Thus, they must do all they can to make sure that their work does no harm. Educational researchers have responsibility to each other and are responsible for the trust given to the domain of educational research. In this way, educational researchers are a community and must maintain within that community the highest possible standards of conduct, regulating each other and themselves. In so doing, they review each other’s research and act as objective judges of that research, even when in disagreement. Researchers must be willing to consult with other researchers for assistance in research as well as when ethical concerns arise.

Fourthly, Educational Researchers must have “Respect for People’s Rights, Dignity, and Diversity.” This principle incorporates both notions of justice and respect for persons. As stated by the AERA, “Educational researchers respect the rights, dignity, and worth of all people and take care to do no harm” (p. 3). Researchers have, then, a special obligation to protect
participants. In respecting diversity, there should be no bias against one group or in favor of another, and the benefits of research should be distributed among as many participants and greater community members as possible. This respect for persons requires that participants not be used solely as a means to the researchers’ ends. It also requires that researchers respect the fact that others have differing values, attitudes and opinions from their own. Respect for the dignity of others suggests that educational researchers should not use coercion or force. They must respect the autonomy of others, even if they disagree in some way with those others. Notice again the importance of “do no harm” as an emergent imperative from this principle.

The final principle, “Social Responsibility” emphasizes the importance of community. Community is a notion that is twice underscored through the discussion of grounding ethical principles of the AERA. Educational researchers are required to be aware of their responsibilities to the many communities in which they participate, including scientific and professional. They must make their knowledge public in order to benefit as many as possible. They must “strive to advance scientific and scholarly knowledge and to serve the public good” (p. 3). Note, here, that educational researchers are not just under the imperative to do no harm, nor are they only required to benefit their community; they are required to make public their work so that it is available to all.

The AERA also provides a list of professional standards that emerge from their guiding principles. The first standard, “Scientific, Scholarly, and Professional Standards,” is a self-referential statement that applies to all of the standards. It states, “Education researchers adhere to the highest possible standards that are reasonable and responsible in their research, teaching, practice, and service activities. They rely on scientifically, scholarly, and professionally derived
knowledge and act with honesty and integrity” (p. 3). This first standard clearly emerges from the first principle stated by the AERA, and as it requires that educational researchers follow the highest possible standards, guides the formulation of the rest of the standards:

2. Competence
3. Use and Misuse of Expertise
4. Fabrication, Falsification, and Plagiarism
5. Avoiding Harm
6. Nondiscrimination
7. Nonexploitation
8. Harassment
9. Employment Decisions
10. Conflicts of Interest
11. Public Communications
12. Confidentiality
13. Informed Consent
14. Research Planning
15. Authorship Credit
16. Publication Process
17. Responsibilities of Reviewers.

The above is presented very much as part of the systemsworld. The AERA provides clear guidelines that require that the researcher note her place in the system and the ways in which she
should and should not engage in that system. Even so, one notes that in every aspect of research the AERA requires that researchers place the welfare of others before their own professional success, maintain transparency, respect the autonomy of others, participate fully in the research community, and distribute the benefits of their work to the largest population possible.

Thus, the principles, unlike the standards, of the AERA are importantly focused on community in a lifeworldly way. Twice emphasized in the five principles, community plays an essential role in the research process. Immediately eliminated from the imagination is the picture of a lone researcher toiling madly for her own unfathomable purposes. Rather, she is part of a community of researchers who seek to benefit as many as possible through their combined efforts. Moreover, she is a member of a community of scholars, the scientific community, and her professional community. Assumed in these principles is the responsibility one has to one’s communities. The work seems to suggest that by virtue of membership, one takes on responsibility both for the welfare of those communities, as well as for the impact on others by those communities. Perhaps because of the power of the scientific community to both do harm and to sway the public at large, the research community is tasked repeatedly with its responsibility to others. It must do no harm, as we are reminded by the APA and by the Belmont Report.

Perhaps most underscored by the ethical principles of the AERA is the notion of respect. Researchers are tasked with respecting their community, respecting the welfare of others, respecting differing opinions, respecting their colleagues, respecting the dignity of participants, and respecting research. Every principle either explicitly or implicitly requires that researchers respect something. Interestingly, this notion of respect allows for two imperatives: one must
“take care” to not harm a thing, as well as “be careful of” that thing. To respect research, for example, requires that one be open and transparent about research and seek to always improve the body of knowledge, but also that one respect the dangers and power of research to do harm. Similarly, one who is respectful of the dignity of others does not infringe on that dignity but also recognizes the importance and power of dignity. Thus, respect is emphasized repeatedly as a means by which to reduce harm, but also to recognize danger and worth.

This notion of respect may well emerge from the importance in research of avoiding paternalism, and thus the work lacks clearly codified inscribed expectations. Given the power of the scientific domains to manipulate the public and the great knowledge collected by its practitioners, it can be easy to assume one knows what is best for others regardless of their values, opinions, and beliefs. Instances like the Milgram Experiment, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, and the Willowbrook Study all serve as reminders of the harm that can be done by researchers in the name of knowledge. The confidence that one knows what is best for others or that one is in a superior position and thus can ignore the autonomy of others has been repeatedly shown to be a danger faced by researchers. Thus, the AERA does not just require researchers to do no harm and be beneficent, but also to show respect. They must acknowledge the power and dignity of others, respect their differences, and acknowledge their worth.

Note, once again, that there is an outwardly-driven standard of beneficence required by an ethical standard. The AERA standards do not allow researchers to benefit only themselves or their own community of knowledge. There is a consistent reminder that their work must benefit the public good. Thus, although the term “beneficence” is not used, beneficence is nonetheless required. The researchers are required to benefit others through their work and must seek to
avoid all potential jeopardy to their participants and to society as a whole. Their work must expand outward and benefit others outside of the research community. As researchers must respect the dignity and rights of others, they are under the obligation to make good any assurances of benefit to their participants. One cannot promise participants that the research will benefit them in order to coerce their participation, knowing that such a benefit is unlikely. Although the focus of the principles is on the “public good,” the requirement of respect for dignity of participants also requires that the benefits of research include participants, as they do not exist solely as a means by which to produce knowledge for others. Participants are recognized for their dignity as individual agents of worth, as we have seen in the previous documents as well.

Modern Language Association

Finally, here we will briefly consider the Modern Language Association MLA “Statement of Professional Ethics.” The MLA statement is included here in order to incorporate the roles of professors as researchers who do not usually conduct research on participants. One may find a radically different set of axioms governing an ethical code that does not emerge out of the Belmont Report, as the others do. The MLA is the association to which many English professors belong. The citation and style guide is overwhelmingly used by those writing in English and in many other disciplines. Thus, the MLA has tremendous sway amongst the professoriate.

The MLA Statement begins with the following preamble:

As a community of teachers and scholars, the members of the MLA serve the larger society by promoting the study and teaching of the modern languages and literatures. In
order to embrace this enterprise, we require freedom of inquiry. However, this freedom carries with it the responsibilities of professional conduct. We intend this statement to embody reasonable norms for ethical conduct in teaching and learning as well as in scholarship. (para. 1)

Note that the MLA firstly begins with a statement regarding the scope of research. The members of the MLA are expected to recognize their responsibility to promote the study of modern languages and literature as a service to society as a whole. The wording, “the members of the MLA serve the larger society” assumes that the members are required to serve, to benefit, society, and the means by which they do so is through the advancement of language and literature. Note also, similar to the discussion of university handbooks, there is an emphasis on free inquiry. Yet, the recognition of this free inquiry also brings on responsibility of “professional conduct.”

The Statement of Professional Ethics holds six premises to be true. To paraphrase,

1) Tenured faculty members are responsible for protecting free inquiry. Faculty members have ethical obligations to everyone including students, colleagues, institutions, their communities, the profession, and society.

2) Intellectual integrity. As teachers and scholars, they must responsibly use evidence in argumentation and maintain fairness in judging the arguments of others.

3) Because the MLA values free inquiry, members should not exploit, harm, harass, discriminate, or misuse others.

4) Members must respect the free inquiry and diversity of inquiry of others.

5) Teaching and inquiry must respect culture and diversity
6) Judgment of the usefulness of inquiry should not be used to limit freedom of research.

(para. 2-7)
These statements repeatedly remind members of the importance of free inquiry. However, that free inquiry should not harm others. Members are also reminded that they have a responsibility to the welfare of others. In fact, the scope of the MLA premises includes the whole of society. Thus, despite the lack of human participants, MLA scholars are reminded that they should not harm others but should use their research in ways that best benefit society.

The MLA also includes descriptions of ethical conduct in teaching and learning and in scholarship. The descriptions are lengthy lists of expectations for teachers and scholars. These lists provide a useful picture of the expectations of teachers and scholars, and, thus, of the roles of teachers and scholars. The lists of expectations are included in the appendix.

The descriptions of ethical conduct in teaching and learning by the MLA include the requirement that teachers represent the value of free inquiry to their students, evaluate their students fairly, respect their students’ privacy, provide direction to students, provide continuing guidance, and provide career counseling to students. Notice that the ethical statement heavily rests on the idea that teachers are guides. This idea of being a guide through intellectual development, to free thought, and to a career reminds one of the mentorship required by some of the handbooks. Teachers, reminds the MLA, guide students for their own benefit. Teachers are required to help students and never misuse them. The responsibility that teachers have to their students requires that faculty members always seek to benefit the students intellectually. Moreover, teachers are required to be objective and fair. They should be just in their dealings with students, not favoring some over others. Teachers must be unbiased and professional in
their evaluation of students for the students’ benefit. The aim of teaching appears to be the production of free thinkers who themselves will be able to mentor others similarly.

The document then continues to list the requirements of ethical conduct in service and scholarship. The full list is also included in the appendix. The document requires that scholars assist their institutions, acknowledge their intellectual debts, reflect well on their institution, judge the work of others fairly, and keep the confidentiality of others. In this section, one sees once again the importance of integrity in scholarship. Scholars are required to be transparent regarding where ideas come from, and out of respect acknowledge those who help them. There is no discussion of whether or not research itself should benefit the community, but there is emphasis on the idea that faculty members have responsibility to others. Confidentiality must be maintained, respect for the institution and colleagues must be maintained, and fairness must be maintained. Thus, in all aspects of the researcher’s life, she must have integrity—she must maintain respect for others and for her community.

There is a notable difference between the MLA Statement of Professional Ethics and the others discussed here. The MLA document says nothing about the treatment of human participants. One can only assume that if an MLA researcher were to include human participants in her work she must consult with her IRB and would be required to follow the standards of the Belmont Report as well as of her institution. Despite this lack of discussion, there remains the heavily-embedded assumption that MLA members should benefit others. Their scholarship, it seems, must be directed toward the promotion of free thought; members are required that they serve society as a whole.
As teachers, members are reminded of the vulnerability of their students and the importance of mentoring them toward an autonomous state of intellectual excellence. The highest standards of research and scholarship require that members engage objective and respectful argumentation. Thus, one sees again the importance of fairness as well as respect. These are themes found in all of the statements of ethics discussed here: respect, integrity, and community. Respect is engaged whenever there is discussion of dignity and autonomy. Issues of intellectual freedom and transparency also evidence the importance of respect, both for knowledge and for the work of others. The notion of respect carries with it the importance of doing no harm and never using others selfishly. Integrity is required whenever there is discussion of the importance of justice, fairness, and objectivity. Integrity is uniformly required, as all of the ethical codes require consistent ethical action in all parts of one’s professional life. Integrity assumes that agents are honest and fair. Community emerges in all discussion of social responsibility, the treatment of institutions and colleagues, and the perpetuation and dissemination of knowledge and free thought. This notion of community carries with it the importance of beneficence: one must recognize the importance of others and seek to benefit the community.

This community focus is most effectively understood as a lifeworld expectation of the MLA. There is not clear positioning of the professoriate or the precise expectations of its members as inscribed by their association. Rather, the MLA enunciates the roles and responsibilities of professors as part of a self-reflective communitarian act.
Summary of Data Collected from Professional Associations’ Guidelines for Ethical Research

This self-reflective communitarian act is common of all of the documents examined in section two—likely the tendency of the ethical codes of professional associations to rest upon lifeworld epistemology—whereas the handbooks in section one were often grounded in systemsworld epistemology. This is likely the result of the fact that one cannot ground ethics in the systemsworld. One can ground expectations in a systems way, requiring specific actions in relationship to the larger system as a whole, but the very notion of ethics expands outward in a way that requires the consideration of the community in a way that cannot be firmly codified. One cannot determine the needs of others without engagement with others in communal and self-reflective dialectic, and those needs and responsibilities shift as the individual needs of the members of the community shift. One, thus, must engage the ethical world from a holistic perspective that engages agents and their needs, rather than just systems and policy. Thus, the ethical codes here remain vague in some ways in regards to how, exactly, members will meet their responsibilities. Members are, instead, asked to be virtuous agents who can use their self-reflexive agency to determine the best course of action.

Faculty Roles as Discussed by Philosophers of Education

This final section will address the perspectives presented by philosophers of education on the roles of professors and teachers. Four philosophical works will provide a non-institutional picture of faculty roles. The works discussed previously, in sections one and two of this chapter, emerged from universities themselves or were generated by associations that meet the scholastic ends of universities. As a result, despite the goals of universities and professional associations
being grounded in the lifeworld, much of the data presented thus far are best understood through the systemsworld epistemology and organizational role theory. The philosophers discussed below, however, assist in understanding faculty roles beyond the systemsworld, as roles deeply embedded in the lifeworld as well.


The first text addressed here, The Ethics of teaching by Kenneth Strike and Jonas F. Soltis (2004), provides a practical approach to ethical deliberation in the field of education. Of primary focus in the text is the ability to present means by which teachers may solve ethical questions pertinent to education. The text takes the time to address some traditional ethical methodologies such as utilitarianism and deontology, but rests its final consensus on practical deliberation and community dialectic as the most appropriate means by which for educators to address questions of ethics in education.

The authors rely heavily upon reflective equilibrium as a motivation and methodology for ethical deliberation. Note, however, that this reflective equilibrium as discussed by Strike and Soltis is externalized as community dialectic, rather than relying solely on a Rawlsian tendency towards internalized reflective equilibrium that needs to engage community dialogue. The externalizing move made by Strike and Soltis, however, is coherent with Habermas and discourse ethics. Strike and Soltis wrote,

We see the purpose of ethical deliberation as seeking to achieve agreement on principles that regulate human action while respecting the equal worth and the interests of all. We suggest that reflective equilibrium in the appropriate standard for such activity and that extensive dialogue is a requirement for its achievement. (2004, p. 97)
It is this “extensive dialogue” that is of the greatest import to Strike and Soltis’ text in addressing ethical concerns in teaching.

The engagement in the profession of teaching requires a particular focus on the interest of others. According to Strike and Soltis, professionalism should include service to the community, in part because it is the community that provides them with the authority to make decisions for the best interest of individuals in the community:

When authority over decision is transferred to professionals, how are we to be sure that it is exercised in the interests of the people? The usual response to this question is that professionals are taught an ethic that emphasizes maintaining professional standards and client welfare. Thus it is the training of professionals, their initiation into an ethic of professional responsibility and service, which primarily serves to ensure that professionals serve the public. (2004, p. 102)

Professors, thus, as professionals entrusted not only with the welfare of individual students, but with the generation of knowledge and the development of understanding, are under a special obligation; they must “serve the public.” Moreover, the academy itself is in a particular position of generating professionals and professionalism, both through the university’s production of professionals and by virtue of the fact that it is through the university metanarrative that professionalism in individual fields is defined.

[T]he case for professionalism rested not only on the idea that professionals possess knowledge that puts them in a position to make good decisions, but also on the belief that the practice of professionals is governed by an ethic that emphasized professional responsibility and client welfare. (2004, p. 108)
Thus, faculty members are under a special onus to exemplify professionalism, and, if Strike and Soltis were right, to serve the community as those entrusted, as professionals, with the public good.

The text, however, does not solely focus on the ethical obligations engendered by professionalism. Strike and Soltis (2004) focused specifically on the means by which teachers can meet their ethical obligation through ethical dialogue. That dialogue should not remain internal. Rather, ethical dialogue that is intended to meet the professional obligation to do public good must include the public. In so doing, educators internalize themselves as part of the community and reduce the paternalistic problems associated with Otherness and marginalization:

Dialogue often strengthens community. It can reinforce a sense of common enterprise and thereby create a sense of membership. Through dialogue the school can be transformed into my school, its goals into my goals, its activities into my activities. When decisions are achieved through dialogue, individuals who participate are more likely to own decisions and to care conscientiously for their implementation. Even when dialogue fails to achieve agreement, it may foster respect and understanding. (2004, p.110)

This dialogue is driven by the fundamental onus on the teaching professional to do good. Notice, however, that she is not doing good for them; she is now, through dialectic, through the Habermasian process of discourse, generating for herself an internality of the other upon whom the self is now supervenient. This reflective dialectic places the self as indebted to, in need of, and as generated by the community in which she has become an instrumental piece—a piece that has been trusted with great responsibility to do good and great potential to do harm.
In engaging in community dialectic, one seeks—argued Strike and Soltis (2004)—reflective equilibrium. Again, note the Habermasian ideal: the theorists suggest that one does not seek solely the equilibrium experienced by a Cartesian self, excised from the dialectical world, but the equilibrium of a dialectical and symbolic actor who shares in the act of world-making.

These ideas suggest that discussion is essential to ethical deliberation. Ethical deliberation should be thought of as a social activity conducted cooperatively. The reflective equilibrium that is sought in ethical dialogue is a social outcome. Persistent disagreement indicates that reflective equilibrium has not been achieved (2004, p. 113)

As a result, ethical deliberation by teachers

… should be seen as a social and dialogical activity leading to two observations about the ethical lives of teaching in schools… First, the character of schools in our society typically makes the ethical reflection that teachers engage in a solitary affair. Teachers work in self-contained classrooms. There are few forums in schools where it is natural to discuss ethical issues. Moreover, many schools are hierarchically structured in ways that interfere with any real dialogical process. As a consequence, teachers are unlikely to have much opportunity to engage in open and undominated ethical dialogue. (Strike & Soltis, 2004, p. 113)

Note, here, that this first observation may not necessarily apply to the university. Theoretically, universities are built in order to promote dialogue. Questions of ethics and policy are often under discussion both in and outside of university classrooms. However, the point regarding hierarchy remains true in the university system. There are those who are invited to department meetings to participate in discussions of policymaking and ethics, and those who are not—adjuncts, for
example. Whose voice is heard, who is invited into the conversation, and how dissent is treated is heavily institutionalized and grounded in the hierarchy of the university. It may well be that there are those who teach in the university system who are not welcome to speak on questions of policy or ethics by virtue of their low placement in the hierarchy.

Strike and Soltis’ second observation seems especially appropriate to the university system and faculty roles:

Second, teachers need to be careful in how they think about their own integrity in ethical decision-making. If one thinks of ethical deliberation as something one does alone, one may also think of the resulting choices in an uncompromising way… People who draw this [kind of uncompromising] conclusion run the risk of irreconcilable conflict with others who may have reflected with equal conscientiousness but reached different conclusions. (2004, pp. 113-114)

Those who are accustomed to “professing” may find themselves especially in danger of the pitfalls of uncompromising ethical positions. While one may not be wrong, one may find that such tenacity is death to dialogue. If one wishes to engage in the development of a communal reflective equilibrium, one must recognize that ethical decision-making is not something one can do by oneself for the community. Professors are especially in danger of such uncompromising views, as it is their very intellectual excellence that has led them to a career focused specifically oriented towards the development of knowledge itself. Thus, there is a tremendous chance that a professor has spent much more time thinking about questions (particular meta-level, teleological, and ethical questions) than those outside of the university. This does not, however, negate the argument made by Strike and Soltis. The professor’s expertise is exactly why she should engage
in community ethical deliberation. Her goal is not to develop answers only for herself, but to develop answers that can be shared for the public good. Doing so, however, requires engaging the public—both in order to assist the public in developing that knowledge and understanding, and in order to understand the public good and what that very phrase means and necessitates.

It is through the emphasis on reflective dialectic that Strike and Soltis (2004) developed their answer to the question, “What is the fundamental aim of teaching?” The development of knowledge and understanding for the public good as a professional dedicated to that good results in the conclusion that promotion of dialogue is the fundamental goal of education if education is a domain oriented to the doing of public good through the generation of knowledge.

In our view, the compelling matter is growth as a moral agent, as someone who cares about others and is willing and able to accept responsibility for one’s self, as someone who can engage in open, undominated dialogue with others about a common life and accept shared responsibility for the group’s life. Promoting this kind of development is what teachers ought to be fundamentally about, whatever else it is that they are about. We are first and foremost in the business of creating persons. It is our first duty to respect the dignity and value of our students and help them to achieve their status as free, rational, and feeling moral agents. (p.120)

Note that what one sees echoed throughout the various texts analyzed here is the notion of free agency. The ability and skillsets necessary to engage in free thought that enhances the agent’s ability to flourish is a key component of education as described by Strike and Soltis (2004). The promotion of the community’s welfare—beneficence—similarly remains a primary focus of these philosophers, as it did in much of the work previously discussed. Generation of that
welfare again takes on the quality of mentorship and the lifeworld through the notion that teachers should, while respecting the dignity and value of students, help them to achieve a status as free, rational thinkers. There is no question, then, that the role of teacher as defined by Strike and Soltis carries with it significant expectations for teachers generated through their community dialectic. These expectations may not be inscribed, but they are embedded in the cultural discourse itself—the fact that teachers must guide others to a flourishing state of free thought emerges from the basic premise that teachers should help produce knowledge in others that benefits the student as well as the community.

*Peter Markie (1994)*

Peter Markie (1994), in his edited volume *Professor’s duties: Ethical issues in college teaching*, began very much in a philosophical vein: He addresses the most basic definition of terms.

Professors teach, and the verb is transitive; what we teach is the subject matter and those to whom we teach it are the students… Teaching produces knowledge, and knowledge is true belief based upon good reasons. To teach is to guide students through the course material in such a way that they come to form a series of rationally based true beliefs with regard to it. (p. 3)

Note that to Markie (1994), teaching is less a matter of generating understanding or free thought, and more a direction towards the acquisition of justified, true, belief—a fairly common, if not somewhat antiquated, philosophical definition of knowledge. Interestingly, Markie argued that teaching itself produces knowledge, rather than scholarship or inquiry. His epistemic picture seems to be very much a correspondence concept. There is truth, and it is the responsibility of
teachers to illuminate that truth for students. By virtue of exposing students to the truth, teachers produce in them a belief that is both true and justified, and thus teaching literally produces knowledge.

Markie (1994) also noted that it is the responsibility of professors to engender particular virtuous qualities of character in their students. “Professors also represent certain values. We are supposed to inspire our students by communicating a vision of intellectual excellence and to help them acquire the qualities needed to make that vision a reality in their lives” (1994, p. 4). It is here, then, that we find Markie also emphasized a notion akin to free thought and inquiry. This free thought, however, is not directed toward a picture of dialectic or communal production of knowledge, but rather the best means by which to help students guide themselves to the truth.

It is especially important in Markie’s argument that professors engage in scholarship. He argued that scholarship was essential to the teaching enterprise, not for some “production of publication” reason, but because scholarship means to be an actual practitioner of the field one teaches about: “Finally, to be a professor is to be engaged actively in one’s intellectual discipline in a way that support one’s teaching. To be a professor of philosophy is to be a philosopher, to be a professor of mathematics is to be a mathematician, and so on” (Markie, 1994, p.4). It is essential to Markie that professors be both experts and exemplars. Expertise is required for active participation in the field, and that expertise is consistently improved upon by that same active participation. Moreover, for students the professor acts as an exemplar in the field; in order to guide the students to excellence in the field, the professors themselves must model that excellence and participation. Beyond acting as exemplars, Markie argued that it is the role of professors to use their participation in their disciplines in a way that improves their pedagogy.
“...the expectation is not simply that professors actively engage in their disciplines; it is that we engage in our disciplines in a way that supports our teaching. Professors bring the practice of their discipline into the classroom” (1994, p. 5). Thus, if she does not practice her discipline, the professor cannot bring it into her classroom.

Sidney Hook (1994) and Peter Markie (1994)

Not every philosopher in his volume agrees with Markie, however, regarding the import of active practice in a discipline for professional competence. For example, Sidney Hook (1994) wrote,

The primary function... of the liberal arts teacher is to help young men and women to achieve intellectual and emotional maturity by learning to handle certain ideas and intellectual tools. This requires scholarship, and familiarity with current research but not necessarily the capacity to engage productively in it. (p.88)

Note the importance to Hook of intellectual guidance. Hook’s notion is a good deal more in line with the mentorship and lifeworld instantiation of teaching alluded to by some of the other works analyzed here. In the juxtaposition of Markie and Hook, one sees the dichotomy that categorizes many of the handbooks reviewed here: On one hand, teaching is a systemsworld enterprise that is oriented toward a quantifiable production of knowledge and thus one’s own participation in research helps further establish one’s competence to teach; on the other, teaching is a lifeworld engagement for the purpose of helping guide others to the most fulfilling participation in their own lives beyond participation as part of a system.

Hook (1994) argued that there were four basic characteristics of a good teacher as professor:
1) Intellectual Competence

2) Patience for the Incompetence of Others

3) Improvisation

4) Knowledge of Human Beings

It is absolutely necessary to be an expert in the field one teaches, according to Hook. One cannot teach without being competent on multiple levels: not only must one know the field, one must be competent enough to engage students effectively. Moreover, the professor must be so competent that she can help guide students to success in the field. Notice, however, Hook moved beyond the somewhat austere correspondence picture painted by Markie (1994) by continuing on to describe the qualitative competencies of good teacher from a lifeworld perspective: a good teacher realizes that students do not know the material as she does and is willing to help guide them through their experience. She does not believe that the truth is so obvious that students should simply grasp it. Students must construct the truth for themselves and, thus, good professors can tolerate and engage disagreement.

The classroom is an ever changing and consistently shifting environment. Thus, the most competent professors can improvise in regards to shifting pedagogical needs of their students but in terms of their curricula, as well. A rigid lesson plan may ignore the individual learning needs of students, and result in class that lacks engagement.

What the teacher must aim at is to make each class hour an integrated experience with an aesthetic, if possible a dramatic, unity of its own. Without a spontaneity that can point up the give and take of discussion and a skill in weaving together what the students
themselves contribute, preparation will not save the hour from dullness. (Hook, 1994, p. 94)

The curriculum, thus, must be flexible to the aesthetic whole produced by the class. The construction of knowledge, rather than the presentation of knowledge, requires that the teacher be prepared to go where the class takes her, while at the same time using that impetus to guide the class to free thought and understanding. The picture drawn by Hook brings to mind the way sailors use competing winds to their advantage to drive their boats.

Finally, Hook (1994) described teachers as practical psychologists. Being an effective professor of any subject means to be a studier of students. One must come to know the motivations in the class and what pedagogical tack will best facilitate learning for that class and those students. Hook argued that often college teaching is not on the frontier of research. To teach college courses often means to present information that is well-established and old. Thus, intellectual vitality cannot always come from scholarship; at times it must come from the new discovery of old information.

[When a theorem is being derived for the twentieth time or when an elementary point in the grammar of a foreign language is being explained or when the nerve an old philosophic argument is being laid bare, [intellectual vitality] lies in experiencing the situation as a fresh problem in communication rather than one in personal discovery…it consists in getting the students to reach the familiar conclusion with a sense of having made their own discovery. (Hook, 1994, p. 95)
Again, one sees Hook emphasize the importance of knowledge construction. Professors engage students in a process of free thought that creates its own vitality even if the problems discussed have, seemingly, already been solved long ago.

This is not to say that the correspondence epistemology of Markie and the coherence epistemology of Hook are necessarily incompatible in their practical application. Granted, the result of their deferring epistemologies seems to result in the generation of an age-old opposition between philosophical models of learning that are behavioristic and constructivist. However, regardless of the learning model, professors must be engaged with students in an active pursuit of inquiry. Whether that inquiry is the literal production of knowledge or the constructivist generation of understanding is not nearly as important as acknowledging the communal and dialectical core of the teaching endeavor as presented by both models. Good professors engage learners and must be so competent in both their discipline and in teaching that they can guide those learners to what are often, for the learner, radical new ideas.

There is more to be said by Markie, however, regarding the enunciated roles of professors beyond the onus to be good teachers. As somewhat more systems-theoretical in his approach, Markie—perhaps more than any other theorist discussed here—was very clear regarding professorial responsibilities. He stated,

…each university, and so each professor, has an obligation to serve the goal of intellectual advancement and knowledge. Professors in the sciences have an obligation to guide students to knowledge of true theories in the sciences. Professors in the arts have an obligation to guide students to knowledge of excellent works in the arts. (p. 23)
Again, one sees the emphasis on knowledge production and “truth.” Markie, however, is not unaware of community and the role it can play in education. He also wrote, “Fine teaching, active scholarship, and regular publishing are ideally connected in each professor’s career: teaching is informed by scholarship, which is shared with the community of scholars through publication and presentations at professional conferences” (1994, p.76). Good scholarship provides a role model for students both in regards to the pursuit of knowledge and to participation in the particular field being taught.

*Theodore Benditt (1990)*

The belief that good professors engage in rigorous scholarship is echoed by Benditt (1990) in *Morality, responsibility, and the university*. While some may argue that teaching, itself, generates knowledge and is a form of scholarship, Benditt stated, “Teaching does not absolve professors of conducting their own research and scholarship” (1990, p. 101) because teaching cannot be separated from making truth claims (p.102). Because professors are evidencing truth claims that they hope others will come to believe, they must be foremost advocates of inquiry into the truth, argued Benditt. He expressed something of a concern that professors will use their teaching as an excuse to not to make sure that the truth they espouse is in fact *true*, the result of which being that “a professor cannot teach conscientiously while escaping the need to conduct what amounts to a research program” (p.102). Thus, one sees both in Markie and in Benditt considerable emphasis on the expectation that faculty members should be scholars in the sense that they should engage in research activity for their consumption and intellectual betterment and for the purpose of illustrating to their students the best means by which to pursue truth.
There is an interesting minor correlation insofar as both of the theorists who espouse the importance of research and publication also describe truth in a correspondence way. While a coherentist picture allows for scholarship in the classroom with students, even when engaging age-old ideas, the correspondence theory of truth seems to drive theorists to believe that professors must be at the forefront of the identification and acquisition of knowledge. This acquisition of knowledge, however, described by both Markie and Benditt, does not ignore the importance of teaching. In fact, the importance of scholarship is couched *in terms of the importance of teaching.*

…a professor has an obligation to engage in research and scholarship because these are integral to conscientious teaching. A professor at the very least must make choices about what set of ideas is most nearly correct and therefore worth teaching, and research and scholarship are required in making such choices. … Part of the educational enterprise is to promote growth and development of students. … Therefore, students should be shown, as part of their education, how knowledge advances, and the best way for professors to do so is to demonstrate it, to show themselves to student as engaged, in small and appropriate ways, in the advancement of knowledge. (Benditt, 1994, p. 103)

Thus, research may not necessarily be best understood in the professoriate as an end in and of itself, but as a servant to effective education. This is not to say that the generation of knowledge and understanding is not an intrinsic good, but that when one chooses to add to the responsibility of researcher by electing to take on the solemn duties of the professor, there are significant additional expectations to do individual good in addition to communal good.
Kenneth Eble (1994)

Not all theorists are in complete agreement with Markie (1994) and Benditt (1994). There are some significant concerns that pressure to publish causes tension between research and teaching. Kenneth Eble (1994) wrote,

…scholarship must, to some degree, be broken away from the mere doing of, piling up of, research. As regards the teaching faculty, the mere counting of articles and citation deserves the hostility it has aroused. What I would ask for is more vigorous and specific examining of the intellectual activities of a faculty member as they have outcomes in teaching. (p. 222)

Notice that the quotation above is not in direct contradiction to Markie. Eble did not advocate against scholarship, just against the needless piling up of publications for no pedagogical purpose. Like Markie, Eble advocated for research that demonstrates beneficial outcomes for teaching. He went on to state, “[C]ooperation need[s to] gain a larger place against the present competitive, free enterprise model. Departments must function as part of the common enterprise of educating students who are human beings before and after they are engineers, English majors, or physicists” (1994, p. 223). Simply, the quantifiable, systemsworld approach (particularly when structuring education as a competitive free market) to publication conflicts with the “common enterprise of education” that recognizes students as full human agents who both serve and are served by the community. To conduct research as a means by which to forward one’s career and present students with a model of excellence in the discipline forgets that students are whole persons who need to be addressed as whole persons first, suggests the work of Eble and
Hook. One may become so enamored with the pursuit of knowledge that one becomes comfortable with leaving students who “just don’t get it” behind.

Eble was passionate in concerns regarding the treatment of research as the primary goal of scholarship and the professoriate:

I accept scholarship as a necessary part of teaching but please for scholarship broadly interpreted to be maintained as the word rather than research. Research is surely a subcategory of the many ways a human mind seeks understanding of the world it occupies” (1994, p.218).

Eble’s work, thusly, suggests that a lifeworldly view of education should take primacy over a systemsworldly one, as students should be first recognized as full human persons who have thoughts, needs, and feelings of their own, before being consumed by the university as potential doctors, lawyers, and engineers. It is the students’ capacity for a flourishing human life that must take primacy if research and scholarship are going to serve their most effective pedagogical functions. Otherwise, the risk becomes that the professor’s research, as well as the students themselves, become the means to an end of a system that is primarily built to produce workers—graduating students prepared for work and diminishing the activity of professors to only those activities that make the system function.

Peter Markie (1990) on Objectivity

In Morality, responsibility, and the university, Markie additionally emphasizes a final essential duty of professors—objectivity—which causes Markie to be a staunch advocate against professors being friends with students. Such friendships, Markie contended, potentially interfere
with a truly invested classroom in which all students are given the best possible chance to learn and succeed. He stated,

> The first premise is the general principle that we are prima facie obligated not to engage in any activity likely to limit severely our ability to honor our moral obligations…each professor has a prima facie duty to give all students equal consideration in instruction, advising, and evaluation.” (1990 p. 141)

To be friends with students is to choose particular students in whom the professor will invest more than others. Friendship, as understood by Markie, means to have, or choose to have, duties to a particular person *before* one’s duty to others. Such primacy of duty to one student over another would violate his premise that professors are obligated to not limit their ability to honor their moral obligations. Markie did not argue against friendship between students and professors because of a cold and uncaring focus on academia, but because such friendships prevent one from engaging all of one’s students justly and fairly as agents who each deserve the teacher’s best self.

This question, of care, though, is an important one. One wonders if Markie’s picture is heavily embedded in the systemsworld understanding of friendship as generated in the rather individualistic United States, where, as such, being friends with “me” assumes that one must be willing to do things to benefit me before and above others. This picture, though, is not necessarily the best picture of care and friendship. It may well be that educators should be “friends” with *all* of their students if “friendship” means that the professor is deeply invested in every students’ welfare. Moreover, that friendship is not a mutual friendship, and need not be. It is possible for one to care a great deal for something that cannot or does not care in return. To
teach means that one wants to see one’s students unharmed, successful, and happy. These are all qualities of friendship, but a non-reciprocal friendship, and the teacher must be as deeply invested in the uncaring student as in the caring student. Thus, this is not to say that Markie is wrong in his belief in objectivity, but, rather, that not all philosophers of education agree that such objectivity precludes friendship, if one does not mean a mutual friendship that requires special dispensation, unjust obligation, or exclusion of care for others.

*Nel Noddings (2005)*

Nel Noddings (2005) is one of the premier philosophers in the field of the “ethics of care,” particularly in conjunction with education. The work discussed here focuses specifically on teacher responsibilities. In the article, “Caring in Education,” Noddings (2005) addressed the particular challenges to the role of teacher in the United States because of the U.S. focus on individualization, which, she argued can impede care relationships. This impediment, however, is particularly problematic in education, as she argued that care is essential to effective teaching relationships.

Effective care requires what Noddings termed “engrossment.” This engrossment means that the “carer” is receptive, he “receives what the cared-for is feeling and trying to express” (Noddings, 2005, para. 5). This means that a care relationship is more than a “virtue” care relationship in which one cares about another’s success. One can be a caring teacher, for example, if one wants her students to do well on their exams. This does not mean, however, that the students feel as if the teacher cares about them.

When I care, my motive energy begins to flow toward the needs and wants of the cared-for. This does not mean that I will always approve of what the other wants, nor does it
mean that I will never try to lead him or her to a better set of values, but I must take into account the feelings and desires that are actually there and respond as positively as my values and capacities allow. (2005, para. 5)

Note, then, that care is distinguished from concern for another’s ability to succeed. There is a kind of communication of emotional content; the teacher is invested in the thoughts and needs of the student.

One wonders, however, why this kind of care is necessary, particularly in light of Markie’s arguments. Nodding’s argument hinges in the importance of trust in a teaching relationship. Students who do not trust that the teacher cares about them are less likely to learn. In the States, however, our individualist picture often interferes with such trust. We find it difficult to believe that anyone else is genuinely concerned for our welfare.

The relational view is hard for some American thinkers to accept because the Western tradition puts such great emphasis on individualism. In that tradition, it is almost instinctive to regard virtues as personal possessions, hard-won through a grueling process of character building. John Dewey rejected this view and urged us to consider virtues as “working adaptations of personal capacities with environing forces.” (Noddings, 2005, para. 7)

Notice that this notion of “environing forces” and the idea of relational care falls neatly in line with the community dialectical picture painted by Strike and Soltis (2004). However, Noddings, hinging her thesis on Dewey, pushed the notion further: it is through communicative action that students become virtuous—the educator’s concern for students’ welfare moves beyond their academic performance, and even beyond them being free thinkers. This idea, though, that we
learn in communities through invested dialogue and care with others, is not well accepted in the United States.

The immediate, ruggedly individualistic response is likely to be one akin to, “Hugs don’t teach Math.” The idea that teachers should be deeply invested in their students beyond their test scores concerns us. We wonder what insidious motives a teacher may have for caring for her students. Notice, however, that the concern we expect teachers to show for students only makes sense in the individualistic mindset when displays of care are not genuinely beneficent. We understand teachers who want students to do well on tests because those tests reflect well on the teacher. We understand teachers who want students to do well in class because it is essential that students learn the material so they can contribute to society. Beyond that, we begin worrying, as Markie did, about friendship, lack of objectivity, and unfairness, especially with regard to friendships between teachers and older students who are unlikely to need affection from their teacher during the school day. Caring, one might argue, does not cause learning, and likely may just distract from the teacher’s true responsibilities.

Noddings, however, argued against the strawperson treatment of care. She was not advocating that care accomplishes everything necessary in education: “I do not mean to suggest that the establishment of caring relations will accomplish everything that must be done in education, but these relations provide the foundation for successful pedagogical activity” (Noddings, 2005, para 12). The foundation of successful pedagogy is one built on genuine trust. Thus, by her view all of the rest of successful teaching requires the care necessary to engender trust.
Consider what we ask of students. Even if we leave aside questions of, “How is it possible to be a genuine mentor without genuine care for the whole person?” we realize that we ask our students to trust us. We ask them do to work they don’t want to do, learn things that often are contrary to their intuitions, and believe us when we claim to know the information we share with them. These requests we make of our students are especially true in the University. These students are no longer compelled to be in school; they elect to be in school because they believe the professoriate when it says it can help them. How does one, however, encourage students to do the work, take the classes, and open their mind to dangerous and counter-intuitive ideas, if they believe we are only interested in ourselves?

First, as we listen to our students, we gain their trust and, in an on-going relation of care and trust, it is more likely that students will accept what we try to teach. They will not see our efforts as ‘interference’ but, rather, as cooperative work proceeding from the integrity of the relation. (Noddings, 2005, para 9)

Consider the fact that we know that car salespersons don’t care about us, and, in fact, we know they probably want to take advantage of us. Yet, we are still most likely to buy a car from the salesperson who is able to convince us that she is really invested in us. Otherwise, if they do not engender our trust, we are far more hesitant that we are being sold a lemon. How much more so is that the case for a teacher who sees the student over the course of a semester, or a year? Teaching requires trust, and it seems that engendering trust in others requires care, or at least the deception of care.

Additionally, Noddings (2005) again emphasized the importance of dialogue so heavily emphasized by Strike and Soltis (2004). “[A]s we engage our students in dialogue, we learn
about their needs, working habits, interests, and talents. We gain important ideas from them about how to build our lessons and plan for their individual progress” (Noddings, 2005, para 12). We realize, then, that the process of teaching and learning is one that should be reciprocal. Perhaps what is most missing from the discussion of professorial roles that is included in Noddings’ discussion of teaching in general is the idea that teachers should learn from their students. One would think this would be especially possible and necessary in the university. Markie, for example, spends a great deal of time discussing the importance of research as a means by which to inform one’s teaching. What one forgets is that a holistic dialectical kind of teaching is also an act of learning and scholarship. To quote Noddings, “Finally, as we acquire knowledge about our students’ needs and realize how much more than the standard curriculum is needed, we are inspired to increase our own competence” (Noddings, 2005, para. 12). Thus, Nodding’s work implies that teaching is an effective means by which to grow as a scholar.

In conjunction with the other theorists, Nodding’s picture of teaching drives the responsibility of teachers to a new high. Teachers become more than mentors, guides, and exemplary scholars; they become deeply invested care-givers for their students. This does not indicate a paternal relationship; paternalistic relationships between professors and students may preclude effective teaching, particularly as it is dangerous to free inquiry and the construction of knowledge through honest engagement with dissenting opinions. Rather, the relationship is one in which professors are required to engage their scholarship in a way that informs their teaching for the purpose of bettering the life of every student. To engage such a significant burden requires that one must care for two reasons: 1) As Noddings noted, in order to establish the trust necessary for effective teaching; and 2) Because the amount of effort in terms of scholarship,
professional development, emotional investment, grading, and other such demands on time and intellect are so significant that one is unlikely to meet all of the enunciated expectations of professorship as well as the inscribed responsibilities of professorship without genuine care. It is that genuine care that engages the fullness of professorship as both part of the systemsworld and as a lifeworld engagement. To be a professor beyond meeting inscribed systemsworld expectations means to engage the lifeworld of teaching as well as the lifeworld of scholarship—an understanding of teaching and scholarship as one deeply embedded in others and community relationships.

Summary of Findings

The data presented here cover three fundamental portions of the dialogue that constructs the role of faculty as teachers and researchers: faculty handbooks, codes of ethics of professional associations, and philosophical perspectives on teacher and professor responsibilities. Thus, one may now begin the process of integrating the data in such a way as to generate a coherent picture of professorship. We have established, at least insofar as the roles of teachers are presented by handbooks, professional associations, and philosophers, that my original hypothesis is not supported. Research is not given primacy over teaching, at least insofar as the articulation of inscribed roles in concerned. One wonders, then: Why is there so much documentation that suggests research is given primacy over teaching, and that professors are placed in the unenviable position of violating their expectations as teachers in favor of meeting ever-increasing demands to produce?

The researcher’s intuition is that the answer lies in the systemsworld and lifeworld dichotomy, and that dichotomy will be explored further in chapter 5. Established thus far is that
there are numerous coherent themes that emerge from an analysis of the discourse. One uncovers the importance of mentorship as both essential to teaching and scholarship, as well as a consistent belief that free inquiry and free thought are essential to the university and professorship. Moreover, there is a consistent theme that scholarship should inform one’s teaching, leading the researcher to consider the possibility that scholarship, in the professoriate, is supervenient upon teaching, as one’s scholarship should not be self-interested, but consistently oriented towards the betterment of one’s ability to educate.

The importance of beneficence cannot be over-emphasized in the analysis of these documents. Repeatedly, it is seen that the acts of research and teaching should be acts that benefit others and engage the lifeworld of the community actively and with care. Teachers and researchers must seek diligently to do no harm and, moreover, work conscientiously to benefit others through the work that they do. Their professionalization is also a kind of yoke that binds professors to the service of the community, as both teachers who must serve the student population and as researchers who must serve the entirety of the community. To be a professor who does not want to help others seems to rest in direct contradiction to many of the embedded assumptions that are fundamental to our communal construction of faculty roles.

Finally, although there is argument regarding whether or not active participation in a discipline as a publishing researcher is necessary for being a “good professor,” there is a consensus that scholarship itself is an intrinsic good that benefits teaching. While there is disagreement whether scholarship must mean research (and thusly means one is further obligated to produce knowledge that helps others) or the production of knowledge through learning and engagement personally and with students in the classroom, there is little disagreement that
professors must be scholars. They must be experts who can show others more than information—they must be able to show others what expertise means. There are those who believe, as Noddings (2005) does, that such mentorship and education can only take place when one genuinely cares about one’s students. To be an expert is insufficient. One must be an expert who wants to facilitate the flourishing of full human persons.
CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Summary and Purpose

This chapter addresses the fundamental questions developed through analysis of the data presented in chapter 4 and will attempt to draw conclusions from those data. Although preliminary analysis of the data was conducted in chapter 4, the philosophical analysis and then synthesis of data will take place here in chapter 5. The data—the depictions, descriptions, and expectations of faculty roles—presented in chapter five will be considered from the Habermasian frame in order to both understand the presentation of the roles through our intersubjective generation of human agency and in order to generate a normative construct for future development of those roles. The primary goal of this chapter, once the roles are understood, is to generate a “best construct” that reflects the roles in their most coherent, mutually beneficial, and ethical formulation.

The handbooks, professional association codes of ethics, and philosophical definitions and explications of faculty roles presented in chapter 4 will be analyzed in order to ascertain their commensurability, coherence, and interdependence, if indeed any of which are the case. Chapter 4 has already illuminated those connections and consistencies found between the documents, though they will be reiterated here. Again, in order to apply the principle of charity, effort has been made to consider the roles, as presented in these various texts and forms, with the assumption that they are in fact commensurable. This should not suggest to the reader, then, that the actual instantiation of the roles by universities are similarly commensurable.
The endeavor, here, is to understand what ways the roles can be consistent in order to develop a coherent construct undergirded by the teleology of beneficence revealed by the analysis in chapter 4. If the educational medium is itself grounded in the assumption that education should be beneficial to students and society, then we must recognize that the same teleology also guides the normative thrust of this work. Thus, the application of the principle of charity towards the end of producing a construct that integrates the roles as coherently as possible while at the same time seeks to produce a construct that is grounded in education as a beneficent domain. Other potential philosophies of education—that students should be miseducated for governmental purposes, that women should not be educated, or that education is in fact bad for learners—may be argumentatively tenable, but violate the grounding assumptions of our own educational discourse to such a great degree that incorporating them here would require a radically different understanding of education that would no longer be recognizable as education, given the grounding presuppositions that emerge from the analysis of our educational discourse. Rather, as revealed by the analysis of data in chapter 4, education is undergirded by the assumption that education it is beneficent and seeks to benefit as many learners as possible.

In order to meet these ends, this chapter will firstly address the hypothesis forwarded in chapter 4. The hypothesis was forwarded that the presentation by the faculty handbooks, in particular, would place teaching as secondary to research. This hypothesis was forwarded for the sake of transparency (in order to illuminate and eliminate researcher bias), as well as to maintain the principle of charity. One goal of the chapter, then, will be to demonstrate that hypothesis as unsupported. As such, this chapter will begin where chapter 4 left off by considering that hypothesis and the conclusion reached regarding it in chapter 4.
The chapter will apply discourse ethics to further unpack the roles of teacher and researcher and uncover the embedded assumptions that undergird our understanding of those roles. We will engage Habermasian immanent critique to understand “professor” as constructed by our conceptual and policy discourse. Further, the researcher will use this social dialectic to consider if either of the roles—“researcher” and “teacher”—are supervenient upon the other in order to determine their exact conceptual relationship. Doing so will enable one to consider possible explanations for tensions that arise when the roles are instantiated and practically-lived, particularly when the expectations of the roles may be in conflict.

Understanding these possible conflicts will be considered from the perspective of the lifeworld and systemsworld. As noted already, the data indicate that conflict between the two roles should not be attributed to an inherent inconsistency between them. Rather, explanation for the conflict articulated in chapter 1 must be found elsewhere and will likely be found in the sublimation of the lifeworld to the systemsworld, which is especially problematic, as education itself is fundamentally a lifeworld engagement.

Finally, the chapter will produce a normative construct, formed both through the conjunction of the roles in the most coherent way possible and in a way that best instantiates the fundamental concepts defining those roles. As the embedded assumptions undergirding the roles of teacher and researcher are revealed, those same embedded assumptions can be used as a means by which to guide a construct conjoining those roles. The final hermeneutic synthesis, then, should be one that provides both an insight into the fundamental nature of the roles of “teacher” and “researcher,” while at the same creating a “best conjunction” that brings those roles into alignment under the fusion “professor.” I will suggest that an entirely new
understanding of “professor” is created by this construct that rejects the etymological grounding of its seemingly symbolically identical homonym.

The Hypothesis

Chapter 4 forwarded the hypothesis that the documents investigated—the faculty handbooks in particular—would place teaching as secondary to research. This hypothesis was demonstrably false. The falsity of the hypothesis is especially clear in the case of the philosophers examined in chapter 4. While some of the philosophers, particularly Markie and Benditt, argued for the essential nature of research to good professorship, by no means did they suggest that teaching was unimportant; quite the contrary. The importance of teaching is made clear by virtue of the fact that Markie and Benditt noted the importance of research in part because *good researching informs good pedagogy*. Professors’ research enables them to maintain excellence in their field; thus, they are able to teach students material that is current and accurate to the best of their knowledge. Moreover, the professor should be an exemplar to the students of what it is that members of a particular profession do. Finally, Markie and Benditt argued that the pursuit of knowledge is itself is an intrinsic good, and good professors model the importance of inquiry through their own active pursuit of inquiry.

Interestingly, while one would think that the professional associations (which are primarily focused on research) would emphasize, at least implicitly, research over teaching. Again, this was not the case; the APA, the AERA, and the MLA seem to recognize that their members are, in fact, often educators. Thus, they take careful effort to make ethical constraints of research not only in terms of research, but also in terms of teaching. For example, both the APA and MLA discuss mentoring. The APA recognized the importance of teaching even for those
scientists who are not professors, insofar as the APA mandates that they should actively mentor others in the field. The AERA gestures to the importance of educating in its repeated emphasis on sharing knowledge with the community. The AERA places special emphasis on sharing research with as many people as who can be benefited by it. The MLA similarly takes time to discuss the importance of educating the community, but also specifically discusses expectations of teachers and the importance of enabling free inquiry in students. Thus, is cannot be said that even professional research organizations fail to articulate the importance of teaching, and, most clearly, they certainly cannot be said to approve of any harm done to others for the sake of research.

Given the research discussed in chapter 1, however, there seems to be some reason to believe that universities themselves give primacy to research over teaching. As such, that primacy could evidence itself through the expectations of faculty expressed through faculty handbooks. The faculty handbooks did, in fact, focus heavily on research, but made no mention of the importance of research over teaching. Thus, in terms of inscribed expectations, the handbooks do not place teaching as secondary to research. One wonders, however, if unwritten enunciated expectations, or hidden expectations, may communicate the primacy of research, and, to some degree, the handbooks may imply the primacy of research insofar as there is often much more detail regarding research expectations presented in the handbooks than regarding teaching expectations. However, the handbooks also regularly mention the primacy of teaching as a goal of the university, the importance of promoting free inquiry in students, and the active mentoring of learners by their professors. In discussion of evaluation and expectation, research is often
discussed in greater detail than teaching, but in discussion of goals, values, and philosophies of the intuitions, teaching is given a primary position.

The treatment of teaching and research by universities through their handbooks seems to suggest that evaluation of research may currently lend itself more easily to the systems-world and teaching to the lifeworld. Simply, handbooks, themselves, are already predisposed to a systems-world epistemology by virtue of the fact that the handbook is intended to articulate the structure and the hierarchy of the institution. There is no question that most of the handbooks discussed here dedicate significant pagination to the policies and processes that support and generate the institutional bureaucracy. Perhaps, then, the handbooks, already embedded in the systems-world, often detail the systems-world requirements of research in greater depth than teaching simply because research lends itself more easily to tangible and quantitative products.

While the handbooks never note a particular number of publications required for tenure and promotion, the handbooks seem to articulate the requirements of research in tangible ways: the handbooks make mention of the importance of “journal publications, book authorship, creative works, and performances,” all of which can be enumerated. More tellingly, such quantifiability in terms of publication lends itself more easily to systems-world expression when attempting to articulate what “good research” means than when attempting to articulate what “good teaching” does. Simply, one wonders, how does an institution systematize and quantify “good teaching?” Of course, the institutions do attempt to do so. The documents quantify good teaching in terms of student evaluations and “student success and performance.” Perhaps, then, the fact that the institutions often emphasize teaching excellence as a primary goal, yet under-discuss what the expectations are, is the result of the difficulty of expressing the lifeworld of
teaching using systemsworld language. Regardless of the reason, and regardless of their failure to clearly illustrate balanced expectations, it cannot be said that the institutions value teaching less than research, at least insofar as articulated in their faculty handbooks.

*The Question Emergent from the Failure of the Hypothesis*

What becomes, then, a primary question in this dissertation is the question, “Why, then, does so much research seem to indicate that good teaching is threatened by institutional emphasis on research?” If the documents reviewed here are reflective of the way faculty roles are generated by our communal dialectic, then teaching should not be threatened by primacy of research. The ethical questions raised by the practice of faculty research, particularly by SoTL research, would be a non-issue. If good teaching were truly the most fundamental goal of the university and research were truly only used in service of that goal, there would be little evidence, one would think, that professors would be willing to use students as research participants in order to promote their own research agenda knowing that it is not in the best interest of the students. However, as Neill (2008) noted, there *has* been an increased professor engagement in “ethical gray areas,” which suggests that there is a tension between teaching and research that is not made clear in faculty handbooks alone. Thus, despite the evidence presented in chapter 4, one cannot simply shrug one’s shoulders and suggest, “Clearly, teaching and research are deeply connected, and there is no tension.” The holism of the dialectic suggests that the tension is very real.

The answer is likely found through Habermas. The lifeworld at the core of human existence can be structured and organized, but not reduced to the systemsworld. As the lifeworld is the essence of human experience, the systemsworld cannot actually replace the lifeworld;
without the lifeworld, there can be no systemsworld. A problem exists, though: because the systemsworld is more easily quantifiable and easily fits a system in which human life is also quantified for purposes of organization and institutional advancement, the systemsworld can gain social primacy over the lifeworld. We have ample evidence in the U.S. that the institutions that organize human life focus on the hierarchical and logistical aspects of social participation over the dialectical and personal ones. Simply, the systemsworld fits, thought does not justify, a capitalist notion in which persons are treated as “resources” that should be managed and organized in a way that best suits the organization. Thus, there is reason to believe that a tension exists between the genuine human need to be an active participant as a person in the lifeworld and the organizational preference for dealing with human agency in a systemsworld way.

I suggest that part of the way in which systemsworld-oriented organizations and societies attempt to address the need of persons to live in the lifeworld, yet at the same time the organization’s preference to engage only in the quantifiable simplicity of the systemsworld, is by feigning lifeworldly instantiation.

Consider as a simple analogy the requirement that when customers enter certain stores, the employees are required to greet them. That requirement does not meet systemsworld needs. It takes time and focus away from whatever organizational activity the employee could be doing in order to engage a needless, “Hello! Welcome to…” Yet, many companies require that the employees do so. Why are employees required to do something that distracts them from the system needs of a company? Likely, the greeting fills a lifeworldly need on the part of customers to feel welcomed and treated as full persons in the life of the company; because the systemsworld cannot replace the lifeworld, the human actor does not want to believe—despite
the obvious evidence that she is nothing more than a wallet to the company—that she is only part of the systemsworld. Thus, in order to achieve its systemworld ends, the company must participate—at least superficially—in the lifeworld.

Notice the result, in the example above, when lifeworld participation is grounded in, and motivated by, systemsworld needs. In the case of the employee who must welcome customers, she often does so in a distracted way. She is not saying, “Welcome!” because she is genuinely glad to see the customer; she is doing so because she is required to in order to meet the systemsworld needs of the company. The customer is likely to respond similarly, or not at all. Thus, the lifeworld dialectic has never been actually engaged. The systemsworld has only feigned a lifeworld engagement. Simply, there is reason to believe that because human actors wish to be treated as full lifeworldly persons, organizations that are embedded in the systemsworld will feign lifeworldly processes and interactions in order to achieve desirable actions from actors.

I suggest, then, that part of the seeming discrepancy between the results of the data in chapter 4 and the theorists discussed in chapter 1 is the result of the fact that organizations like universities, even if they are embedded in the systemsworld, cannot gain the full participation they desire from their members without at least feigning participation in the lifeworld. This accounts for the many actions organizations take that make it appear as if they are deeply invested in the individual welfare of their members while at the same time taking actions that they know are not in those same interests. True grounding in the lifeworld, however, would likely require a community investment and a kind of qualitative calculus of success that would
often mean immediate failure in a systemsworld economy competing with those organizations that wholly structure themselves in alignment with systemsworld values.

Universities, as they are pressured to orient themselves further and further to an economic system that does not recognize the values of the lifeworld, must also maintain that they serve the lifeworldly values that led to their establishment in the first place, but survival in a system that cannot measure the worth of an education of free inquiry, critical thought, and personal growth requires that the universities take actions in direct contradiction to the lifeworld claims of their university philosophies, missions, and values. Perhaps it is as simple as this: the university, in order to continue to draw actual human students and faculty who are oriented to the lifeworld must espouse the values of the lifeworld, but cannot fully actuate those values without endangering their positioning in the systemsworld.

In order to justify their value to a public that demands accountability in terms of student performance on standardized examinations, conferral of degrees that promote employment in high-paying jobs, and high “customer satisfaction” as displayed by faculty evaluations and “ratemyteacher.com,” universities must require that faculty take actions that are, in fact, in contradiction to a holistic education focused on student flourishing regardless of monetary gain. Moreover, as evidenced by the common U.S. assumption of “a happy life” as synonymous with “great personal wealth,” one can see that as the populous becomes further and further acclimated to the synonymy of personal lifeworld success with quantifiable financial systemsworld success, universities begin orienting their faculty handbooks to definitions of teaching and teaching success in ways that focus on standardized systemsworld values. The conflict arises because they must also claim to promote free thought—by definition, free thought cannot be standardized.
Thus, perhaps there is a contradiction between the practical lived experiences of professors who report a tremendous tension between their teaching and research expectations and the presentation of faculty roles by university handbooks.

Regardless, the falsity of the hypothesis suggests that, at least as they are presented by institutional documents, the roles of teacher and researcher need not be inconsistent. It is true that due to the fundamentally student-driven onus of teaching, if research were given primacy in faculty expectations, an immediate incoherence may arise—if faculty are expected to give primacy to publication, they may have good reason to use their students as research subjects, resulting in role conflict. Similarly, if teaching is given primacy, role conflict may arise if faculty are unable to meet the primary demands of their teaching load while at the same time being expected to publish. Interestingly, however, although some institutions may seem to focus more one role than another, there is good reason to believe, given the data, that even in those institutions that heavily emphasize publication, it is expected that the research benefit students. Thus, as both teaching and researching are expected to be teleologically grounded in beneficence, as became clear in chapter 4, they share a consistent grounding. As such, this chapter, having discussed the failure of the hypothesis and its implications, can now begin the work of developing an understanding of teacher and research roles such that a coherent, and normatively grounded, construct conjoining the roles can be developed.

Habermasian Immanent Critique of the Data

To conduct immanent critique of the data analyzed in chapter 4 means to engage the works self-reflexively from the perspective of their own domain-presentations. Thus, the works are examined using their own axiomatic claims as the foundation for identifying the
consistencies—and perhaps inconsistencies—that construct, from the perspective of each work, particular domains of understanding. Key to this analysis is identifying the embedded assumptions that structure the dialogue. These embedded assumptions may be understood to some degree as enunciated expectations insofar as they are fundamental to the dialogue (they could be made clear, but need not be articulated or inscribed). Similarly, the embedded assumptions may also be understood in terms of logical inference. For example, assumptions may act in conditional ways, suggesting that a series of inscribed expectations logically necessitates a particular embedded assumption to ground those expectations. The goal in this section, then, is to complete the work begun in chapter 4—to understand the expectations both articulated and silently embedded into our social dialogue that generate faculty roles.

Much of the discussion of the works in chapter 4 is best understood through the perspective of organizational role theory: understanding the roles as presented by the handbooks is often a matter of considering issues of organization and inscribed roles. This is not true for all of the documents discussed in chapter 4, however. Within the handbooks, statements of philosophy and codes of ethics are often better understood in a symbolic-interactional way that enables one to consider the embedded expectations that are not stated explicitly, yet are clear implications of the inscribed role expectations.

Markie notably discusses professorial roles in a very systemsworld way that is best understood through organizational role theory. Professors have responsibilities to organizations—both as institutions and as communities—and those responsibilities can be clearly inscribed and enunciated. Professorial roles fall neatly into a hierarchy of responsibilities and duties from a Markiean perspective. However, neither organizational role theory nor
symbolic-interactionist role theory allows for a multiple-perspective consideration of these various works as different voices within the same community dialectic. Organizational role theory would require reduction of the roles discussed to a kind of hierarchy, understanding faculty as actors performing organizational scripts, and symbolic interactionist role theory would incorporate the Mead-like frame of actors as participating with each other in a role-making symbolic event. To bring the two together, and view the entirety of the conjunctions of the work as an act of discourse, requires a new perspective of role theory—community-dialectical role theory—that understands actors as active participants in their own rolemaking and in the rolemaking of others through a multifaceted dialectic that incorporates both organizational structure and symbolic interaction.

Community-dialectical role theory enables us to do more than investigate the roles of actors in organizations or examine the interactions of those actors as generators of scripts and perspectives: it enables us to conjoin disparate epistemologies of human agency to create a robust picture of the role expectations. Simply, organizational role theory enables the understanding of faculty handbooks, symbolic-interactionist role theory enables the understanding of the codes of ethics as they are symbolically mediated cultural constructs, discourse ethics enables us to understand the philosophers who discourse about education, and it is in community-dialectical role theory in the Habermasian-grounded epistemology that these disparate perspectives can be conjoined into a dialectical holism.
Figure 5. The Habermasian Conjunction of Disparate Perspectives into a Dialectical Whole.

This is all to say that this immanent critique will move beyond the immanence of individual documents, each of which is grounded in a different ontological and epistemic understanding of role-making, into the immanence of domain generated through the conjunction of different kinds of documents,. This section, then, will briefly revisit the presentation of roles by each document, consider the implications of each domain, and then consider the dialectic produced by their conjunction.

The faculty handbooks discussed in the first section of chapter 4 largely focus on the bureaucracy of their corresponding universities. There is a heavy systemsworld emphasis, as the universities dedicate significant pagination to the organizational structure and the placement of faculty within that structure. The handbooks, given that evidence, exist largely for the purpose of maintaining the system-generated organization by the interaction not of persons, but of roles in a hierarchical structure. Thus, there is minimal discussion of teaching and the expectations of
teaching within that structure. Teaching expectations are, in most cases, relegated to those sections that articulate the requirements for promotion and tenure. Similarly, research is also most often discussed in those sections of the handbooks dedicated to promotion and tenure. There is, however, more lifeworldy mention of teaching and researching in the statements of philosophy and value in the documents.

The University of Memphis does emphasize teaching excellence and research excellence. The handbook discusses mentoring as an integral part of teaching, and it is expected that professors mentor students at all levels. There is a heavy systemsworld emphasis on research and scholarship as publication. Faculty are expected to publish and forward knowledge in their domain. They are expected to collaborate for the betterment of their urban, regional, state, national, and global communities. In so doing, faculty should seek knowledge and produce knowledge.

Oklahoma State University detailed the expectations of research less than the University of Memphis and the University of Miami. Teaching, although expectations are left underdiscussed, is considered “the primary duty of instructional faculty.” Similar to the University of Memphis, there is emphasis of mentorship as an expectation of faculty. Although scholarship is somewhat underemphasized in the handbook, the faculty’s social responsibility to knowledge is articulated. Faculty should seek and state the truth and they must develop their scholarship in order to do that. Faculty are expected, as teachers, to promote the free pursuit of knowledge. The expectations of teacher roles are made most clear in the appendix on professional ethics. Interestingly, the handbook seems to treat scholarship and research as
synonymous and, thus, as reducible to the systemsworld, while at the same time treating teaching as a scholarly activity that produces knowledge.

The University of Miami, much like the University of Memphis, places emphasis on faculty as devoted to scholarship and research. Teaching is not a kind of scholarship, whereas in the case of Oklahoma State University, it may be inferred from the language of the document that teaching is so essential to the university goal to produce knowledge, that teaching is a scholarly activity, though not necessarily scholarship. The University of Miami, however, is clear regarding the importance of publication. The Faculty must publish, or the equivalent in their field, in order to be successful. This handbook, in particular of those discussed here, fits neatly into the systemsworld frame.

The Clemson University faculty handbook clearly articulates that faculty should seek, teach, and disseminate knowledge. As such, the Clemson University handbook—more than the other handbooks—allows for the possibility of distinguishing between scholarship, teaching, and publication. Whereas the other handbooks often allow for a conflation between scholarship and publication, in particular, Clemson seems to suggest that seeking knowledge may be different from disseminating knowledge, and to disseminate knowledge does not necessarily mean that one is engaged in teaching. There is heavy emphasis on academic freedom both on the part of the faculty and in terms of promoting free inquiry in the students. Of particular interest, there is a more lifeworldly approach to teaching evaluation in the Clemson University handbook than in the other handbooks through the use of a holistic portfolio… Moreover, similarly lifeworldly, Clemson emphasizes the importance of scholarship for the betterment of the community, a theme that begins to emerge across the handbooks along with teaching as mentorship.
The Florida Atlantic University faculty handbook returns to a systemsworld approach, particularly in the discussion of faculty expectations. Faculty expectations are specifically oriented to the rules and requirements of faculty in terms of grading, timeliness, and attendance procedures. However, the mission and values presented by Florida Atlantic University are lifeworldly; they emphasize community, inclusiveness, recognition of diversity, and excellence. Again, the theme of academic freedom emerges through this handbook and is further underscored in the handbook by the valuing of “honest expression” and “lifelong learning.”

The Temple University handbook, more than any of the other handbooks discussed here, presents itself through a lifeworld epistemology. The handbook emphasizes the development of caring relationships with students as essential to teaching role. Similar to other lifeworld values of the other handbooks, there is discussion of free learning, though in the case of Temple University, there is more proportional time given to the responsibilities of professors to promote critical thought, creativity, and inquiry. Of particular lifeworldly interest is the fact that Temple University is the only institution to mention the importance of a sense of humor and “awakening” amongst their faculty. It is incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to quantify and systematize a teacher’s ability to have a sense of humor or promote awakening. In order to promote student awakening scholarship is couched in terms of faculty responsibility to perpetuate academic field and advancing knowledge.

From the handbooks one can infer that teaching is integral to the purposes of the universities discussed here. To a greater or lesser degree, these universities expect teachers to be excellent, though they are unclear what “excellence” means. In many cases, excellence is measured through systemsworld thinking (student evaluations and performance on
examinations), but some institutions engage a more robust notion of excellence as a matter of enabling lifelong learning and awakening. Shared amongst almost all of the institutions, often at the forefront of their missions, is free inquiry and academic freedom. The institutions seem to position themselves as bastions of discussion and discourse in which ideas can be engaged without fear of censorship.

One can also infer from the handbooks that while teaching is often evaluated in a systemsworld way, there remains an expectation that teaching be deeply invested and care-related. The emphasis on mentorship, academic advising, and investment throughout the handbooks suggests that, at least in terms of inscribed roles, teachers should invest in students as persons not simply as receptacles for professor knowledge. Thus, faculty should be available to students as resources for academic and professional development. To ignore a student who asks for assistance in application to graduate school, for advice in pursuing a career in the professor’s field, or for help with academic struggles is to fail to meet the expectations of the handbooks. The teacher must demonstrate care for students by investing in each student as a person with genuine potential to participate in the world of inquiry.

Similar themes emerge from analysis of the guidelines for researchers established by professional associations. The APA requires that researchers be beneficent, collaborative, honest, open, and invested in their communities. Furthermore, researchers must actively participate in mentorship. The Belmont Report similarly requires beneficence and justice, as well as investment in others as autonomous persons. Moreover, researchers must engage in research in ways that benefit as many in the community as possible. The AERA requires competence, integrity, and social responsibility. In requiring integrity, the AERA requires that the research be
worthy of trust by virtue of seeking to do no harm. Social responsibility, as is the case with the APA, requires that the researcher engage the community in a beneficial way reminiscent of the justice criterion of the Belmont Report. The MLA, which engages little, if any, research with human participants, also requires an active focus on the benefit the research can do for society. Moreover, the MLA values free inquiry, a value regularly espoused in the faculty handbooks, and aligns itself with the APA with an emphasis on the importance of mentorship.

Thus, the analysis of our community dialectic as inscribed through documents produced by universities and professional organizations reveals the expectations that professors be mentors who promote free agency through the development of lifelong learners with passion for free thought and intellectual inquiry in order to best promote the welfare of the community and to bring the whole of humanity to greater understanding of the world. Those Habermasian themes of mentorship, free thought, and community are at the core of the inscribed expectations of teachers. I suggest that this mentorship notion, itself, is a care-laden concept that requires professors to invest in their students as full and autonomous persons deserving of respect. Thus, embedded deeply into the lifeworld of teaching is the belief that those who teach should benefit the student, the community, and our understanding of the world because they care. There is, of course, also a systemsworld of teaching which requires that faculty follow the rules and procedures established by their organizations, but those systemsworld processes, as Habermas contended, are supervenient upon there being a teacher who is already sufficiently invested in the students, in the university, and in the community that such fundamental expectations can be taken for granted.
I suggest, revealed by a Habermasian immanent critique, that the danger of the systemsworld is not the fact that it is organizational. Quite the contrary: organization is wholly necessary for an effective university system. It is, rather, that because the systemsworld cannot account for or evaluate the lifeworld, that the lifeworld can be forgotten and taken for granted because lifeworld assumptions are so embedded, so tautologically assumed, that they can be forgotten. In the case of invested professors who care deeply for their students and for the generation of knowledge and understanding, one assumes that the professor should have those qualities; thus, the concern becomes evaluation of those qualities that may not come so naturally and are far more easily evaluated and observable. In the same way that one assumes that a rational agent engages in a conversation because she truly does want to communicate, she wants to understand and to be understood (otherwise there would be no point in her participation in the first place), we may well assume that those who elect to engage in teaching care, because care is so fundamental not just to the role expectations of teachers, but to the definition of teaching itself.

Concerningly, however, the deep embeddedness of such assumptions does not sufficiently maintain the truth of those definitions if the lifeworld becomes secondary to the systemsworld. The necessary organization and structuring of the systemsworld becomes the focal point of evaluation, measurement, and judgment of value, and the grounding assumptions that generated the need for the system in the first place become forgotten and, perhaps, even cast aside. The inscribed expectations of professors—for example, that they produce a certain percentage of students with a certain range of scores on end-of-course evaluations, produce a certain number of published articles, and participate in a certain number of university
committees—become the focus, if only because they are inscribed, far easier to evaluate, and quantifiable. Inscribing the fact that the university requires all of this in order to make sure that the faculty member is an active scholar who engages the world of knowledge with students in a way that better enables them to participate in a world of free thought with respect and dignity for their personhood because she cares about them and the community would be both onerous and, one would hope, unnecessary, as it is assumed that this is the person she is by virtue of electing to be a professor in the first place. Thus, the lifeworld of the professoriate becomes sublimated to the systems world not because the lifeworld is unimportant but because it is assumed and difficult to quantify.

The expectations of the professoriate articulated by the philosophers examined in chapter 4 further underscores the importance of understanding faculty as firstly lifeworld participants. Beneficence, a non-quantifiable, qualitative requirement that one do a hazily defined “good,” again immediately appears, as discussed by Strike and Soltis (2004). Community similarly immediately emerges, both an enunciated and inscribed expectation. Moreover, Strike and Soltis dug far more deeply into the lifeworld of the professoriate in their emphasis on the importance of community dialectic for the solving of ethical problems in teaching. Teachers should engage in dialectic for the purpose of solving problems. This problem-solving capacity need not be restrained to immediate applied ethical problems that emerge in the world of teaching, but it is a cornerstone of inquiry itself. Thus, scholarship emerges as a dialectical process, a kind of community engagement, through Strike and Soltis, which incorporates many voices for the beneficent purpose of helping all agents generate understanding.
Srike and Soltis (2004) seemingly suggested that it the onus of the teacher to be not just an active participant in a dialectical and community epistemology, but a beneficent guide through the process of that inquiry. Note that I say here a beneficent guide through the process of inquiry rather than a beneficent guide to the truth. Free inquiry is likely hindered by the professorial belief that one has truth and others should believe it. Rather, the emergent assumption of teaching from analysis of the handouts and the ethical guidelines is that free inquiry is something mentors enable and foster rather than define and demand. One sends students out into the world with the ability to find or generate truth, rather than with the truth itself. To assume that one has truth is likely to result in one’s unwillingness to engage students in an active process of communal learning—a process deeply embedded in an understanding of professors as scholars who themselves are constantly and consistently seeking to learn more.

Markie’s correspondence theoretical approach to teaching is perhaps more sympathetic to an understanding of professors as disseminators of knowledge. Professors have a duty to produce knowledge, and they do so by bringing students to the truth. The “having” of truth, then, is knowledge. This production of knowledge is of such fundamental import to Markie’s work that professors must do nothing to endanger that production. Thus, one sees the importance of justice as a theme emerge again, as professors must be objective and provide all students with equal access to truth. The professor, as the exemplar in her field of study, must be a scholar in order to provide a true example to the student of what it means to be a participant in that discipline. Even so, note that this more correspondent notion of truth still places the professor in a position of mentorship and guidance. She must use every tool at her disposal to help students achieve truth.
Moreover, Markie did not necessarily say that professors are keepers of the truth. If professors are scholars, that means that they remain actively invested in finding the truth. Their job, then, is to be scholars with their students. And thus, something of an equivalency emerges from a correspondence truth understanding of professorship and a coherentist truth understanding of professorship—both understand professors as learners who themselves have developed their own excellent inquiry to the point where now their pursuit of knowledge and understanding can include guiding others through their own trials of inquiry. Embedded in this understanding of professorship is a normative strand—that because they have the ability, and because knowledge is so very valuable and beneficial to the community, professors should assist others in their pursuit of learning. Moreover, even if that normative push fails, it remains true that robust and holistic learning is more likely to occur in dialectic with others; thus, the professor, if she truly is invested in understanding, is rationally mandated to engage others in a learning dialectical process, if only to forward her own development and understanding.

The repeated theme of community, then, emerges from an immanent critique of the philosophical work: Strike, Soltis, and Markie can be understood as proponents of both knowledge as essential to community and the obligation of teachers to serve the community. Similarly, Noddings’ work can be understood in a communal way. The production of trust through care in order to develop a classroom environment of beneficent learning is a communally-embedded notion. Embedded in Noddings’ work is the presupposition that one should want to benefit the community, and thus one will endeavor to engender the trust necessary to do so. That teachers should care, I suggest, is an inscribed expectation for teachers in line with Noddings’ care ethic in order to maximize learning, but there is also the enunciated
expectation, embedded and assumed through her discourse, that a teacher has an obligation to her students and it is through her recognition of that obligation that she gains the students’ trust—*because the students recognize the teacher has that obligation as well*. In other words, to couch Noddings only in terms of caring about students in order to maximize learning potential does her work a disservice; she reveals, implicitly, the teacher as a servant to the community of learners who have opened themselves to her and the tremendous harm she can do, because they believe her when she tells them that she is there to help and that what she is teaching can and will benefit them. While she says little about research, one cannot escape the community obligation engendered by those who can do research. Repeatedly through these documents one sees the requirement that those who teach share as much beneficial knowledge as possible with others, and, thus, Noddings may be read as one who also, particularly as she is a scholar herself, supports the notion that professors should publicize their knowledge to the benefit of the community.

Something of a tension does arise between theorists like Hood and Benditt, who disagreed regarding the requirement that professors conduct research. Benditt argued that professors must conduct what amounts to a research program in order to exist as an exemplar in her field for her students. Hood, however, argued that the nature of free thought is such that the professor engages scholarship by virtue of creating knowledge with the students. While Benditt’s correspondence picture requires that faculty engage research in order to constantly validate the truth claims they espouse, Hook argued that intellectual vitality does not require research, but rather active discovery, which may occur in the classroom as well as in the laboratory. Thus, once again, one sees a potential tension between teaching and research. Note, however, that it is
not a tension between the importance of teaching and the importance of research. Rather, it is a tension between whether or not good teaching can take place without engagement in research on the part of the professor.

_Scholarship as a Dialectical Holism_

This tension between the two thinkers, however, may not be incommensurable. I suggest—and am supported by Eble (1994)—that the problem is one that results from the lack of distinction in terms. Habermasian critique enables us to unravel the terms and their meanings as revealed by the discourse, and to reconstruct them coherently, given the axioms grounded by their own dialectical domain generation. Recall that Eble wrote, “I accept scholarship as a necessary part of teaching but please for scholarship broadly interpreted to be maintained as the word rather than research. Research is surely a subcategory of the many ways a human mind seeks understanding of the world it occupies” (1994, p.218). Thus, the Hook-Benditt tension may be resolved by understanding scholarship as a broader term that incorporates both research and teaching.

If scholarship is the active engagement in the world of inquiry and knowledge in order to produce understanding, then teaching is a form of scholarship. Teaching is a process for which the teleology is understanding and the form is inquiry—professors ask questions and suggest answers and provide guidance in the inquiry investigations of their students. Thus, teaching is a scholarly activity. Research, similarly, is scholarship if to do research means to engage the world through inquiry in order to understand. Researchers ask questions, produce potential answers and investigate the tenability of those answers through dialectic with the community of scholars and through application of their thoughts and theories to the world. Thus, again, we see a teaching
role subsumed under scholarship. That professors should be good scholars is a given, as both the role of teacher and the role of researcher are forms of scholarship.

That teachers must know the truth seems unnecessary, but that they must be scholars, that they must understand scholarship, that they must understand how to pursue knowledge, particularly knowledge in the domain they teach, seems to be of the utmost import. While there are numerous reasons it would be unreasonable to assert that teachers must “have” truth, as what we “know” is often spurious and revisable, it is not unreasonable to assert that they should be excellent scholars insofar as they understand how to pursue knowledge, how to investigate meaning, how one may attempt to distinguish between truth and falsity, and how to establish at least tentative truth claims within the defining confines of a particular intellectual domain. Thus, it is possible that, as scholars, teachers do research yet do not necessarily publish.

This is all to say that a discourse analysis of the works presented in chapter 4 reveals that research and publication are not necessarily the same thing. The understanding of scholarship revealed above, embedded in the very ways we think about and dialogue about professorship, suggests that to publish means to do a particular thing with the information produced through research. The systemsworld definition of research as requiring publication ignores the lifeworldly embedded axiom that research is published not for publication sake but for the benefit of others and to broaden our communal understanding of the world. Thus, to do research means to engage in inquiry, to try to understand through active and rigorous investigation, and to publish means to present that understanding.

Publication, however, should not be relegated to only the dissemination of that understanding through a few highly respected journals read by very few members of the
populace. If publication in those highly respected journals results in the dissemination of that understanding to other experts who then use that knowledge to benefit the community and share that knowledge with the community, then the requirements of the codes of ethics discussed here are met. If, however, that knowledge stays locked in the journal and is read only by a few other professors, then it does not meet the normative requirements of the codes of ethics guiding researchers discussed here.

The problem of doing as much good as possible, interestingly, places the humanities in a potentially different position that many of the sciences. A medical practitioner may publish in a highly respected journal read by a very small percentage of the populous. That small percentage, however, uses that knowledge in a way to benefit the community at large in immediate and significant ways. The English professor who publishes her work on Samuel Beckett cannot make the same claim to the general good done by her publication if her work in a top tier journal is read by a few who will similarly read and cite her work only to publish in the same journal. Would she be better able to meet her publication responsibility by discussing that idea in community seminars, writing layperson-accessible texts that summarize her idea, or holding literary debates on campus? Given that even the systemsworld-oriented handbook recognized that different academic domains may have different means of publication—music and performance for example—even within the world of literature, there are different means by which to “publicize” one’s work.

The question of whether professors are doing enough to bring their understanding to the community is a good one, though beyond the scope of this project. Perhaps something of a mediating realization, however, is that by continuing to participate in inquiry through academic
publication, the professor is also participating with her peers in a rigorous process of argumentation and idea building that propels them all to greater excellence as scholars, and thus, potentially propels them to greater excellence as teachers, and, thus, though the journal publication may not reach as many people, it does still do significant intellectual and pedagogical good. Either way, what we come to realize is that publication can take on numerous forms, and, thus, the guiding frame for that publication should be scholarship, insofar as the normative force of scholarship is the betterment of one’s understanding and the understanding of others. What I am suggesting here is not new and is far more thoroughly discussed by Ernest L. Boyer (1990) in his Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professorate. Boyer was similarly motivated to understand scholarship, particularly in the professorial context, because of “competing obligations” that are emerging in universities. I contend, further, that these competing obligations, as discussed in chapter 1, are beginning to result in role crisis for some professors who find themselves torn between conflicting—not just disparate—expectations. Boyer developed the distinction between various forms of scholarship as the scholarships of discovery, integration, application, and of teaching (p. 16). “Scholarship of discovery” is that scholarship that produces new knowledge and is that to which I am referring when I discuss research. Scholarship of integration is “serious disciplined work that seeks to interpret, draw together, and bring new insight to bear on original research” (p. 19). This dissertation itself may be an example of “scholarship of integration.” Much publication, particularly in the humanities, falls into this form. “Scholarship of application” seeks to understand the ways knowledge can be applied to benefit the community, and, in many cases, actively does so. Research in the field of education often falls into this category.
[T]eaching begins with what the teacher knows. Those who teach must, above all, be well informed, and steeped in the knowledge of their fields. Teaching can be well regarded only as professors are widely read and intellectually engaged….great teachers create a common ground of intellectual commitment. They stimulate active, not passive, learning and encourage students to be critical, creative thinkers, with the capacity to go on learning after their college days are over. (pp. 23-24)

To redefine teaching as a scholarly practice, then, is not a new idea, and, suggested Boyer, is grounded at least as far back as Aristotle. I suggest, then, that engaging the lifeworld of the professorship requires evaluating professors not in terms of publication, but in terms of scholarship.

Although far more cumbersome than simply evaluating professors based on journal publication, understanding professors as scholars in a full and robust sense requires the possibility that some professors—by virtue of their dynamic activity with their students—are in fact meeting their scholarly expectations. Consider a professor who is actively engaged in community projects with her students. Such “community learning” may be something she does not have the time to write about and publish in a journal. However, she and her students spend a significant amount of time engaging the community in ways that bring knowledge to the community as well as result in growth and learning on the part of the students and the professor. We would be remiss to suggest that she is not a scholar: she is an active scholar engaged in the scholarship of application. Moreover, the potential response, “She is not meeting her research responsibility, because although her research may be beneficent, it is unjust as its benefits are localized to that one community,” is inconsistent with our patience with and the encouragement
of professors who publish in small but highly respected journals in their own obscure fields of endeavor.

The field of philosophy, for example, is proportionally small. I believe, for example, my own publication on the treatment of disability by Samuel Beckett in three of his short stories is important. While I hope it is read, I do not delude myself in the belief that even if I were to publish it in a highly respected journal in philosophy or English, that it would have a significant impact on even my home community of Jacksonville. I would be content, however, knowing that the understanding I attempted to generate benefited some who will use that knowledge to benefit others, who will do similarly, and so on. I would be mistaken, however, if I believe that my publication in that journal makes me a scholar of greater import or greater impact than the community-action scholar who engages the homeless community of Jacksonville, Florida. To quote Boyer (1990),

> We need scholars who not only skillfully explore the frontiers of knowledge, but also integrate ideas, connect thought to action, and inspire students. The very complexity of modern life requires more, not less, information; more, not less participation. If the nation’s colleges and universities cannot help students see beyond themselves and better understand the interdependent nature of our world, each new generation’s capacity to live responsibly will be dangerously diminished. (p. 77)

Thus, I suggest that a more inclusive dialogue regarding scholarship and professorship is not just warranted by virtue of the potential benefits to knowledge and human life, but also because the very grounding of scholarship as revealed by our dialectic is one that suggests scholarship is not
publication, but the engagement in active inquiry for the production of understanding to the benefit of as many possible.

Synthesis: The Normative-Beneficence Teleology of Teaching as a Care

This understanding of scholarship and teaching in a correspondence theoretical way is consistent with community-dialectical role theory as defining of professor as a holistic scholar, not creating a dichotomy. While creating greater distinctions and relying on Boyer to better understand the different kinds of scholarship has proved incredibly valuable, it is important to note, at the same time, that what is occurring here is a Hegelian synthesis, a collapsing of distinctions at the same time as a recognition of the ways in which concepts, through thesis and antithesis, propel each other towards new understanding. Teaching and scholarship are integrated, not two different roles. That realization is perhaps the most important revelation gleaned from our Habermasian investigation. Perhaps, yes, they exist in a supervenient relationship, but it is complex and interwoven. Teaching is a kind of scholarship, yet, at the same time, scholarship in the professoriate is supervenient on teaching insofar as being a good scholar emerges from the requirement that one be a good teacher. I recognize that the preceding statement leads to a series of objections, most obviously, “What of the researcher who does not teach?” I suggest that there is no such thing. To write, to engage others in the dialectical intercourse of prose, is to provide others with the potential to gain greater understanding of the world. It is one’s prose, one’s ability to coherently communicate with others, which determines if such publication is simply dissemination or if it is teaching. Yet, even that understanding of teaching and dissemination may not be sufficient to distinguish between those who publish as teachers and those who just publish.
Perhaps the difference between dissemination and teaching may be couched in Noddings’ understanding of teaching as a care-driven endeavor. Those who disseminate do not care all that much, but those who teach do care. It may be only intention that truly, at its core, makes the difference. “What of all of the evidence that good teaching also involves…?” one may reply and fill the blank with one of an innumerable pedagogical recommendations for effective teaching (from wait time, to 1-3 positive feedback, to aligned instruction, and so on). To that question, I say that anything with which we can fill the blank evidences the teacher’s caring, as she is endeavoring to find a best practice that benefits students. Caring is not a “best practice”; it is an affective state, a status of being that requires a complete commitment to that which is cared about. We have not been able to find one final and simple answer to the question of, “How can we teach most effectively?” because there is no one answer to the question. There are too many different kinds of knowledge and too many different kinds of learners to say, “All good education requires this particular pedagogical device.” However, we can say with fair confidence, if Noddings is correct, that good education requires care and is defined by it, and when we find an effective strategy used by a teacher it is also synonymously used by a teacher who has struggled to find a strategy that works for her with those particular students—in other words, she cares.

What emerges, then, from this project is a kind of “dialogical care ethic.” Nodding’s concept of the care ethic when shaped by discourse ethics suggests that the best means by which to generate the outcome of care, assuming that one who cares wishes to benefit the other, is to engage in a holistic dialectic in order to produce understanding of the other through reflective voicing. In the same way that one requests that research participants review interview transcripts,
review conclusions, and suggest improvement to one’s research, one should, when engaging care relationships with others seek to voice them, *benefit them*, through an act that is not just self-reflective, but is guided by the other. The product of such a beneficent dialectic is an understanding that is greater than the sum of the solipsistic positionings of the agents trying to understand. Perhaps inexpressible in literal language, one comes to understand the other in way that may be best analogous to metaphor. The “what-it-is-likeness” of the other’s experience cannot be reduced to the utterances of the “understanding” other, but the dialectical act, the process itself, produces an understanding that, if only for a brief moment, fuses the horizons of the engaged agents who seek dialogue for beneficent aims.

To then answer the question, “What should a professor do with this knowledge?” becomes “She should engage in robust dialectic, particularly with one’s students.” The separation between faculty and students often may seem insurmountable. The production of understanding, though, seems to require that one engage one’s student not only in dialectic for the production of knowledge on the part of the student, but for the purpose of producing understanding with a teleology of beneficence. The critical pedagogue would then be under the onus to seek to understand her students through dialectic because she cannot assume that her professorship alone is sufficient to determine what is in the best interest of the students. Education through a dialogical care ethic becomes a manifold epistemology—a series of outwardly spiraling redefinitions of what is best educational practice through a holistic, and yet singular, rich engagement with each student in a fusion of horizons.

What one should do, then, is recognize that the understanding one seeks cannot be expressed through dissertation, but must be individually reached. I cannot profess to know what
one takes from this experience, exactly. Nor can I divine the readers’ context or understand her original positioning. I can only suggest that each professor, if she seeks to end role ambiguity, engage in a self-reflective, critical-etymological journey through dialectic with others. To ask one’s students, “How do you define professor?” is not a wholly insane proposition. If we are to serve our students, why is it that we let our institutions define our role, rather than those whom we can do the most harm and those who have placed their trust in us? My intuition is that such dialectic will lead many educators to a realization of servant leadership, to an understanding of one’s role as not one of mastery but rather of service. We serve the students, and thus, we must engage them in our ethical discourse if we wish to truly generate an understanding of how we can best instantiate our roles as educators.

Thus, perhaps, the core assumption, before we can understand any other expectations of teachers, is simply the assumption of caring; one researcher may publish her numbers and not care about the impact her work will have on her publication’s intended audience, while another does the exact same thing but does care, and I suggest that the ontological status of those seemingly equivalent actions is radically changed by the intent, converting the latter into a “teacher.” Moreover, because the second researcher cares, if the intention argument is insufficient to make my case, there is good reason to believe that she will continue to struggle to find ways to make those data do good. She will not be satisfied with that one moment of publication; she will apply and pursue that data and their consequences to the greatest possible good, thus leaving us with the ever-present evidence of effectiveness that our systemsworld approach to the world demands of us and, again, find herself defined as a teacher, as one dedicated to beneficence.
To apply Kögler’s (2012) work on Otherness and self-identity, one may consider an analogy between the self-reflective creation of identity through recognition of Otherness and the generation of the definition of education through our intersubjective social consciousness as necessitating beneficence. Thus, I suggest, we cannot understand teaching as teaching without understanding it as teleologically beneficent—not only for Habermasian reasons concerning the nature of discourse and the generation of terms through discourse, but because as students, our recognition of the Other as teacher presupposes our own existence as student for whom the teacher seeks to do good, and as teachers the recognition of the Other as student presupposes one’s existence for the purpose of benefitting students.

The Habermasian frame further provides guidance in the teleology and normativity of this chapter, particularly insofar as reflection on the data reveals that both the roles of teacher and researcher throughout the various role presentations in multiple documents assert the importance of beneficence. I will argue that this reflection rests the importance of beneficence on the necessity of the lifeworld. In other words, one need not feel that an illicit move has been made by virtue of allowing the teleology of beneficence to guide the development of the construct, as the embedded assumptions revealed through analysis of the works suggest that benefiting others is essential to our very understanding of teaching, education, and research. Though, perhaps, teaching could be defined differently, the role expectations embedded into the very dialectic that constructs the roles of “teacher” and “researcher” are infused with the idea that teaching, and thus the research supervenient upon it, should do good.
The Decoupling of Teaching and Scholarship

Problematically, the systemsworld approach bifurcates the scholar as teacher and researcher, perhaps in order to make evaluation easier, but leaving open the question of the researcher’s obligation to students. If she is separate from “teacher,” this separation causes role conflict between the roles of beneficent teacher and prolific teacher. As the data demonstrate, however, that bifurcation is not rational: it is not emergent from examination of the presuppositions that ground professorship and does not best met the community obligations, research obligations, or teaching obligations of professorship. There are numerous ways the holism of a professor as a generator of knowledge with students could be instantiated. The question of how one may effectively evaluate that holism in a qualitative way would likely be a massive research undertaking on its own.

What suffices for this project, however, is the realization that as one attempts to uncover the assumptions that lead to the teaching-research tension established by the discussion in chapter 1, one comes to recognize the problems of the attempt to separate teaching and research from scholarship for systemsworld purposes. Note, for example, how such thinking could misuse philosophies discussed here. Markie and Benditt, in particular, could be misused to justify the trend of looking down at K-12 teachers from the ivory tower: if being a good scholar cannot include being an excellent teacher as a generator of knowledge, than any teacher who is not conducting a research program is not a scholar. This idea, though, that teachers are not scholars, is particular to the West, and, I argue, the result of the demands of the systemworld to make evaluation and quantification easier.
The systemsworld approach—particularly the capitalistic approach to agents as quantifiable goods who can be used to the benefit of the economy—has resulted in a hierarchical perspective not just of teaching and research, but of dialectic as well. Notice, for example, that the argument being constructed here allows for the possibility that teaching and research need not be understood hierarchically. If, however, the discourse of capitalism, of “betterness than others,” is the foundational form of discourse used to produce understanding in a society, then the members of that society will not be able to conceive of disjunctions, of Derridian binaries, without Othering one member of the set in favor of another.

The very structure of our thought requires that we view every distinction, every binary, as one that must have a more important and a less important; thus, the bifurcation of teaching and research, must—given the capitalist discourse of U.S. society—result in placing one over the other. Given the systemsworld preference of U.S. capitalism, it only stands to reason that the more quantifiable “research” will emerge as the preferred, and “teaching” will become the othered—a distinction I believe we see borne out in society as researchers are generally considered erudite and are well respected, while teachers (particularly in k-12) are often treated as the incompetent disseminators of the knowledge generated by their far more competent colleagues (“Those who can, do. Those who can’t, teach.”).

Perhaps the only treatment for such a problem is greater inclusiveness and the reintegration of teaching and research. Perhaps, if universities truly wish to continue to promote the values they espouse in their handbooks, despite the cumbersome systemsworld consequences, they should eliminate the distinction between teaching and research and instead discuss “scholars.” The Habermasian inclusion of all voices for the generation of knowledge is a
lifeworldly value that grounds the very free thought espoused by universities. Without it, universities are redefined, as Slevin (2001) described, as diploma markets. To quote Boyer (1990), however,

The aim of education is not only to prepare students for productive careers, but also to enable them to live lives of dignity and purpose; not only to generate new knowledge, but to channel that knowledge to humane ends; not merely to study government, but to help shape a citizenry that can promote the public good. (p. 78)

Such communal and holistic dialectic, however, is increasingly interpreted as communist in the States. The constant undergirding belief that competition makes all things better, and that improvement always means that one must be better than another, does not allow for the possibility that learning can take place communally and that all students should benefit from it. Yet, our demand that research be just and benefit everyone causes a role conflict for us. We want teachers who do the best they can to teach equally, so we standardize both curriculum and evaluation, doing a disservice to the lifeworld realities that each person learns and flourishes differently and that an effective, caring teacher does what she can to aid her students in these quests. This is all at the same time that we ground our definitions and dialectic in the idea that there must always be a winner. Thus, policy initiatives like “Race to the Top” take place. The very notion of “Race to the Top” is capitalistic—students compete for resources and those institutions that provide the best education win those resources, as they have evidenced their superiority by producing winning students. Yet, at the same time, what teacher in her right mind actually wants her students to compete for the basic necessities for their success? The idea that some students get “to the top” suggests that other students do not get to the top. What purpose is
served by rewarding these successes, given that the reasons other students lose the “race” may include abuse, poverty, lack of resources, mental disability, and so on?

Our supposedly just society is in tension with itself, and that tension is borne out in the dichotomy we have produced between “teacher” and “researcher,” which is resulting in role crisis for those professors who wish to be amazing teachers while at the same time meet the competing demands that they produce tangible research. To use Habermas’ terminology, there is an “uncoupling” of teaching from research, and of teaching and research from scholarship. This traumatic uncoupling of roles that are dependent on each other both ontologically and normatively occurs because of the default assumptions that undergird U.S. discourse—that there must be a distinction, that scholarship cannot be a holism, and that we must be evaluate those individual components in quantitative ways that demonstrate a benefit not to people but to the economy, to the system.

This uncoupling discussed above mimics the uncoupling Habermas describes when discussing the ways in which the systemsworld may begin to drive the lifeworld. The agents engaged in the horizons of the lifeworld are left devoid of meaning and understanding, as that which gives their lives purpose is placed second to systemsworld drives.

To quote Habermas (1985),

On this plane of analysis the uncoupling of system and lifeworld is depicted in such a way that the lifeworld, which is at first co-extensive with a scarcely differentiated social system, gets cut down more and more to one subsystem among others. In the process, system mechanisms get further and further detached from the social structures through which social integration takes place. As we shall see, modern societies attain a level of
system differentiation at which increasingly autonomous organizations are connected with one another via delinguistified media of communication: these systemic mechanisms – for example, money – steer a social intercourse that has been largely disconnected from norms and values, above all those subsystems of purposive rational economic and administrative action that, on Weber’s diagnosis, have become independent of their moral-political foundations. (p.154)

Where, once, agents participated in a lifeworld of work and generated meaning through it which resulted in the accomplishment of the goals of the systemsworld (those quantifiable and necessary ends that themselves do not have meaning), now they pursue the quantifiable ends as a means by which to produce meaning. Anecdotally, I have noticed this phenomena when engaging students with the question, “What do you want to do with your life?” This question is uniformly answered with, “I want to be happy.” Upon probing students to explain what will make them happy, they will most often, “Making money and having a good job.” Notice that not even the secondary lifeworldly value of “having a good job” gains primacy over the systemsworld functional value of money. It is the quantifiable, yet vacuous, meaning provided by money that they seek, because they have been taught that it provides happiness.

The idea that one should pursue a flourishing life, which may or may not involve making money, is absurd to my students. This is a phenomena described by Habermas (1985):

The transfer of action coordination from language over to steering media means an uncoupling of interaction from lifeworld contexts. Media such as money and power attach to empirical ties; they encode a purposive-rational attitude toward calculable amounts of value and make it possible to exert generalized, strategic influence on the
decisions of other participants while bypassing processes of consensus-oriented communication. Inasmuch as they do not merely simplify linguistic communication, but replace it with a symbolic generalization of rewards and punishments, the lifeworld contexts in which processes of reaching understanding are always embedded are devalued in favor of mediasteered interactions; the lifeworld is no longer needed for the coordination of action. (p. 183)

Students no longer need robust and rich human concepts to justify action or to generate meaning. To ask my students what a story is about always results in a description of the plot. Students do not answer the question with, “It is about love” or “It is about the nature of human existence.” The stories they read are reduced to their necessary, yet meaningless, systems components, the actions and events—the functional components of the work. As Habermas contends, perhaps this shift is necessary and productive, insofar as it enables modernity. The decoupling of the system and the lifeworld produces a freedom for the system that enables much greater efficiency, while at the same time enabling the system to reach back into the lifeworld and marginalize it.

Thus, my engagement with my students has revealed to me the deep decoupling described by Habermas of the lifeworld from the systemsworld. Students do not read to gain meaning, to understand life, or to better understand themselves; they do so to ingest a plot that they can regurgitate for systemsworld ends. The question of, “Yes, but what does this all mean?” has become absurd and unnecessarily cumbersome in a world—a systemsworld—in which such qualitative concerns only slow down the functional capacities of the system: getting grades, graduating, and finding work that will hopefully result in having the money they so hope will make them happy.
Note that the lifeworld and the systemsworld are both essential. There is only a question of supervenience: “Which should drive the other?” If the lifeworld drives the systemsworld, then the structures, hierarchies, quantifiabilities, and systems are oriented towards the generation of meaning, for the purpose of creating value and generating flourishing human lives. When the systemsworld drives the lifeworld, meaning is forgotten because it is unnecessary for describing the functionality of a system. In the case of the university, one need not discuss student “awakening,” as Temple University does, if the systemsworld drives the lifeworld; “awakening” becomes evidenced through student success on quantifiable measures, and shortly the purpose of the entire endeavor is forgotten in favor of the functions which are recognizable by a systemsworld epistemology.

We can sum up by saying that tendencies toward bureaucratization are represented from the internal perspective of organizations as growing independence from elements of the lifeworld that have been shoved out into systems environments. From the opposite perspective of the lifeworld the same process presents itself as one increasing autonomization, for areas of action converted over to communication media and systemically integrated are withdrawn from the institutional order of the lifeworld. This constitution of action contexts that are no longer socially integrated means that social relations are separated off from the identities of the actors involved. (Habermas, 1985, p.311)

While this separation allows for inclusion and distance from lifeworldly power, the lifeworld drives the systemsworld, the awakening of students may be the primary goal, and numerous forms of evaluation are used to evidence that awakening, while at the same time, it is recognized
that only through our intersubjective dialectic that this “awakening” can be communicated. Moreover, it cannot be enumerated in a functional way. It can be described through metaphor and expressed through narrative, but the experience of it is a qualitative state that we can only hope and trust our dialogue can communicate to some degree. Without the narrative that gives purpose to our systemsworld actions, “[t]he objective meaning of a functionally stabilized nexus of action can no longer be brought into the intersubjective context of relevance of subjectively meaningful action” (Habermas, 1985, p.311). If the intersubjective context of self-making and meaning-making through authentic human interaction is the ontological nexus of our university life, then whatever teleology emerges will be grounded in human flourishing. Simply, if the lifeworld drives the systemsworld of the university, a goal such as “awakening,” despite the numerous necessary quantifiable and systemsworld oriented measures used to evidence it, is never forgotten.

One sees, then, something of a correlation between the sublimation of the lifeworld to the systemsworld and the sublimation of teaching to research. Teaching is a lifeworldly form of scholarship that engages other actors in a holistic dialectic in order to develop communal understanding. Research often takes on the systemsworld connotation of a quantifiable process of producing information for consumption by the public. Teaching and research, like the lifeworld and the systemsworld, are both essential. They depend on each other; they are symbiotic. Good teaching requires knowledge—the production of knowledge, the pursuit of knowledge—both in regards to the specific discipline being taught and in regards to the knowledge of pedagogy for best educating students. Research, similarly, requires teaching, as it must be expressed and shared with others. The consumption of knowledge by the public requires
that it be taught, even if only in the most narrow sense of being shared. More broadly, research as understood through our communal dialectic as evidenced by the codes of ethics of professional associations discussed in this dissertation, is wholly grounded in teaching. Simply, the drive to be a good teacher necessitates the drive to be a good researcher. Thus, being a good researcher is similarly contingent on being a good teacher, because teaching drives the need for research. This mutual interdependence that cannot rationally be uncoupled mimics the interdependence of the lifeworld and the systemsworld.

It is important to note that an understanding of Habermas suggests that the uncoupling of the lifeworld and the systemsworld is not necessarily bad, insofar as it is productive, and entails modernity. Moreover, the freedom from social identity itself allows for engagement with the lifeworld that is impossible without reflection on the lifeworld through the systems perspective. Consideration of the potential analogous relationship constructed here, however, gives one pause in regards to Habermas’ own perspective of such decoupling. Given the damage done to education and to the notion of educator when such decoupling becomes more than a useful heuristic device, perhaps review of the decoupling of the lifeworld and the systemsworld is similarly, and innately, harmful. It may well be that our observation of the damages done in education by the numerous systems segregation—teaching from scholarship, research from teaching, the lifeworld of scholarship from the systemsworld of research, and so on—is only the result of the commodification greed that seems to motivate most—if not all—social systems in the world. I suggest, however, that the decoupling may act as an evacuating device: to view the lifeworld through the systemsworld is to view it through a lens that cannot grant meaning. Thus, the primacy of the systemsworld in the States has evacuated what should be the dialectical
productivity of modernity of meaning. Meanwhile, to view the systemsworld through the lifeworld perspective is to infuse it with meaning, perhaps even inaccurately so, yet such meaning-making is necessary for human purpose-making and understanding.

In the same way in which the unchecked and un-reflected uncoupling of the lifeworld and the systemsworld is damaging, so is the uncoupling of teaching and research. The colonization of the lifeworld of teaching by the systemsworld has ramifications that reverberate far beyond concerns for the role crisis experienced by the professoriate and into the policymaking that determines the treatment of students by an institution.

For a public domain such as the schools, the analogous demand for deregulation and debureaucratization meets with resistance. The call for a more strictly pedagogical approach to instruction and for a democratization of decision-making structures is not immediately compatible with the neutralization of the citizen's role; it is even less compatible with the economic system-imperative to uncouple the school system from the fundamental right to education and to closecircuit it with the employment system. From the perspective of social theory, the present controversy concerning the basic orientations of school policy can be understood as a fight for or against the colonization of the lifeworld. (Habermas, 1985, p. 371)

Moreover, in the context of teaching and research, when it is the systemsworld that drives the lifeworld, meaning is lost and the horizons of the lifeworld diminish, and when it is research that drives teaching, the value of knowledge and the value of students can be forgotten in favor of the demand that as much knowledge be produced as possible. This knowledge production would no longer be understood even in Markie’s correspondence sense of justified true beliefs acquired by
students, but instead as marks and statistics on paper of interest. When teaching drives research, students are not in danger of misuse by professors because it is never forgotten that the value of research is to benefit students and the community. Conversely, when the systemsworld of research drives the lifeworld of teaching, professors may lose sight of the value and meaning that established the need for research in the first place.

Praxis

This correlation between the lifeworld-systemsworld and teaching-research pairs of course treats this particular understanding of research as a functional producer of information. This understanding of research, however, should not be confused with “scholarship.” I suggest that scholarship is a lifeworldly endeavor invested in numerous values such as the worth of knowledge, understanding existence, producing purpose, and the establishment of meaning. Thus, it may be possible to reduce one’s understanding of teaching to a systemsworld “dissemination” and find a similar correlation and series of problems that arise when the systemsworld of “teaching dissemination” drives the lifeworld of scholarship. The reduction of teaching to a systemsworld dissemination is more difficult because of the Habermasian assumptions that undergird teaching and care. I mention it, however, because, as the U.S. system is becoming increasingly systemsworld-oriented, such a reduction may be taking place and merits further research.

Particularly, one realizes that the popularity of online education, particularly mass-online education, may result a sublimation of scholarship to a dissemination, or diploma-market, end. Thus, the reduction of the import of good scholarship found in many schools that are under increasing pressure to graduate students for quantifiable purposes may be understood as the
result of decoupling teaching from the lifeworld of scholarship. Moreover, this understanding may explain why such a decoupling has already taken place in the k-12 system. Because teaching is not recognized as scholarship and because k-12 teachers are under greater and greater pressure to produce students who can perform certain functions on standardized exams, and graduate students regardless of any concerns for the students’ whole educational welfare, fewer and fewer primary and secondary school teachers live in the lifeworld of scholarship. This is not to say that they do not exist in the horizons of scholarship as a teaching enterprise, but one does note that as the demand and respect for scholarly activity diminishes, teachers seem less and less motivated by education and knowledge and are more and more motivated by quantifiable ends such as pay and student pass rates.

Consider for example, anecdotally, my shock at how many teachers simply show movies during the last week of high school. My own students were incensed that I continued to work with them for educational purposes; we continued to teach and learn. The rationale behind my colleagues’ behavior seemed to waver between fatigue and the fact that there were no more exams for the students to take—thus further embedding in the students’ minds that, despite our claims to the contrary, that it really is only the exams that matter. Once having completed the exam, there is no more reason to learn. I suggest that this reduction of the worth of learning is due to the sublimation of scholarship to the systemsworld of dissemination, an activity that is now confused with teaching. It also explains why students who do poorly and are in danger of not graduating high school may still be granted a diploma by removing them from their nonacademic courses, removing them from the courses that are not necessary for graduation, and removing them from the course that they do need to graduate (most often English 4) so that they
can complete the “course” using a computer program. Having done so, the student demonstrates that sufficient information has been disseminated and a high school diploma can be conferred. This is all to say that the role of teacher and the role of researcher are, to use Biddle’s terminology, interdependent. We can parse the definitions out in many ways, but if they are both forms of scholarship, each definition is only a single perspective of a greater whole that cannot actually be broken apart without evacuating the components of meaning.

The normative implications for faculty roles then begin to emerge and praxis reached—the theoretical becomes embodied, and in this case the embedded suppositions become the driving normative force of applied ethical action. The foundational necessity of the lifeworld and the supervenience of the systemsworld upon it creates a series of rational normative implications for the roles of teacher and researcher. If the systemsworld cannot drive the lifeworld without the evacuation of meaning of the lifeworld, and there is an analogous connection between the roles of teacher and of researcher, then researcher roles cannot drive teacher roles. This is simply evidenced, again, by results such as researchers using their own students for research purposes to the detriment of their students. If the professor is driven by a systemsworld perspective of researcher, and the lifeworldly value of the students is lost or forgotten, then harm may be done to the students, and the very purpose of teaching is lost.

The foundational nature of the lifeworld results in a series of foundational axiomatic presuppositions that ground the lifeworld of teaching and of scholarship. Teaching, as the intersubjective dialectic analyzed through chapter 4 indicates, must

- include all voices
- be oriented toward the welfare of the community
be beneficent—oriented towards doing good selflessly for individuals, and
foster free thought and inquiry.

To eliminate any of these is to create a definition of teaching that is contradictory to the very essence of what we mean when we say “teacher.” To understand teaching as lifeworldly is then to recognize teaching as dependent on research but also that which drives research, as is evidenced by the codes of ethics established by professional associations discussed here.

Teaching, in the epistemology of the lifeworld, is, I suggest, best understood as “caring scholarship.” One may engage in scholarship without care, but one may not do so and be a teacher. The very impetus for teaching is care, and that care is absolutely essential for the effectiveness of the teacher, and for maintaining the lifeworldly beneficence embedded in our notion of teacher. Thus, there are many ways to engage scholarship, but when done so with care, one is doing so as a teacher.

One may reply, “But if scholarship includes scholarship of discovery, then that would assume that one is teaching even when one reads something of interest.” I am willing to assent to that proposition without losing any of the meaning or power of the idea of caring scholarship. One can be a teacher of oneself, and there is a great deal of Eastern philosophy that supports the notion that finding enlightenment often requires silencing external voices. Moreover, one is engaging with a teacher through the act of caring about the knowledge. Even if the “disseminator” of the information was not a teacher, and did not care, the reader, through the act of caring, turns the work into a teaching work; she creates for herself a teacher in the same way that Marcel Duchamp looked at a snow shovel and turned it into art, not by changing the snow shovel, but by changing perspective. The disseminator is thus transformed, perhaps unwillingly,
into a teacher—the intersubjective roots of agency and selfhood go far deeper than a prima facie understanding of meaning-making through conversation, but reach into the rich earth of the plurality of voices generated by minds that understand themselves as Self and Other. We are reminded of Mead and the heart of symbolic interactionism, that the world is generated through our dialogical interpretation of symbols, our social definitions of reality. It is the perception that is key to the construction of meaning, and it is our perception, though communally defined, that grounds our world creation.

It is essential to remember that it is through our intersubjective dialogue that we voice others. That voicing brings with it tremendous power, as well as danger. That power is the power to experience a work of art and its intention in ways never intended by the artist, who now “speaks to you” in a radically new way. The artist is voiced, and the intersubjective dialogue continues, as we seek to include others and their perspectives. This Habermasian intersubjectivity is at the heart of professorship. Through both the act of teaching and the act of research, the professor reaches out into the world to both share and acquire knowledge and understanding. She voices her students in order to empathize with them, recognize their needs, and provide the right mentor for them, and she voices the often long-dead scholars who share new insight with her through her prose.

Her own publication is a teaching act, driven by care for the community in order to meet the needs of others. Recall the rational result of the dialectical logic of discourse ethics:

All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects that general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests, and the consequences
are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation. (Habermas, 1985, p. 65)

The understanding of the caring scholar as one who engages the multiplicity of voices, the chorus that constructs the lifeworld in order to facilitate the production of meaningful human agency, is grounded in the course conclusion of discourse ethics—that all affected, and I suggest all potentially affected, matter. Caring scholarship is a way of meeting the Habermasian principle of universality in order to understand the needs of others, to give them a place in the dialectic through research (perhaps through interviews, perhaps through reading, perhaps through observation), and it is an attempt to provide for them the scholar’s own voice, to be voiced by them in order to either meet with their approval or become subject to their correction.

This work is such a voicing. It is my attempt to both voice numerous other theorists, while at the same time sharing my own voice for the purposes of bringing the work of Biddle, Noddings, Habermas, and the others into our communal dialectic, while at the same time opening myself to the corrections of others who find flaws in this rationality or who determine the norms prescribed to be invalid because I have not taken into account the needs of all.

The final synthesis must take into account Habermas’ own potential failure to include all voices as indicated by Honneth. The production of identity, through Honneth’s theory of recognition, requires that we not only engage others in dialectic but that we seek to recognize our own dependence on the recognition of others for the formation of the self. Our identity formation through our communal dialectic is not just a matter of engagement in others in rational discourse; it is the recognition of our collective interdependence on the Other for our very existence. As argued by Kögler, it is the agency of the Other that allows for our existence as an Other through
the exchange of perspectives. Thus, the conjunction of professor roles as established through the
dialectical analysis here suggests that professors do not just voice their students, do not just
recognize their students, but they exchange perspectives with their students and with the
community that constructs their identity as professors. That perspective exchange, that shared
voicing, enables the professor to empathize with and care for the students more effectively, but
also enables her to understand how she is experienced and created not just by her students but by
the communal dialectic and the Others who construct and recognize her—hence the dependence
and obligation engendered through the act of professorship.

Like all agents, professors are dependent on others for identity formation. That identity,
however, takes on additional obligations, as it includes the scholar roles of teacher and
researcher. A professor is formed as an advocate for knowledge, a mentor for students, a
producer of understanding. She is required, by the very definitions that bind her, and the agents
who create her, to do good for the community as a scholar, and thus as a teacher and as a
researcher.

The result of the conclusions reached here is a radical reconstruction, a new etymology of
professorship. The construct of professor, informed by the presuppositions revealed by the
reviewed text that professors promote free thought and inquiry, respect all voices, and follow a
teleology of beneficence oriented toward the welfare of the community, results in an
understanding of professor grounded in robust care—care for students, care for knowledge, care
for colleges, care for the institutions that promote free thought, and care for the many
communities not only in which she participates, but for which she has the potential to do good.
The new etymology bursts a Derridian understanding of the professor as “one who professes”
and replaces it with a notion that remains outwardly engaged, but grounded in lifeworldly intention. She who professes, she who disseminates, is vulnerable to the uncoupling of the lifeworld from the systemsworld; she is vulnerable to the colonization of the lifeworld by systemsworld functional values because she is not necessarily professing for a narrative. Our linguistic constructs need not have correlation between their signifier and their signified, between the speech act and the concept to which it refers. Thus, I propose critical etymology—the revisioning of language to meet critical theoretical ends. By “critical etymology” I gesture toward Paulo Freire (1970) and Habermas simultaneously. Freire’s 1970 *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* generates the construct of “critical pedagogy” by conjoining the pedagogical act with the passion-driven intellectual freedom production of critical theory in action. Thus, education, by Freire’s, and other critical pedagog’s, lights was an action that should be grounded in helping student uncover the hidden meanings, authorities, and frameworks that generate their epistemology, thereby enabling students to recognize marginalization, manipulation, and both obvert and subtle acts of control.

Critical etymology, like critical theory and critical pedagogy, engages examination of the intersubjective dialectic that produces constructs while also engaging the perspective that critical pedagogy, vis-à-vis Freire, should be a constructive engagement driven by a teleology of beneficence—to engage research that itself seeks to better the lot of the marginalized. So by “critical etymology” I mean to conjoin the Derridian deconstructive act of term analysis with a normative intersubjective beneficent enterprise. To engage in critical etymology is to both seek to define and redefine terms that 1) produce better understanding in the context of our
hermeneutic dialectical frame and 2) produces normative definitions—“should” definitions that can acknowledge “this is not what term x does mean, but this is what it could and should mean.”

If “professor” is defined through the conglomeration of faculty handbooks, the role is one largely best described as a series of institutional responsibilities. To deconstruct the term suggests that professors “profess.” There is little to suggest, then, that, in tandem, these two definitional understandings of professorship move beyond the systemsworld and engage the rich intersubjectivity of the lifeworld. Simply, that a professor should care, foster learning, and engage in an interdependent dialectic of knowledge building with students is relegated to connotative implications and associations of the term “professor.” Problematically, our understanding of “professor” leads to tremendous role ambiguity. Professors are denotatively defined in one way, but connotatively defined in others. Professors find themselves most clearly defined through the systemsworld of their institutions while, potentially, motivated to teach for lifeworldly motivations. Let us redefine professorship, then, untether it from its systemsworld groundings, and ground it once again in the lifeworld—ground it in a notion of scholarship that is inclusive, holistic, free, and most importantly, beneficent. Simply, let us engage in a critical theoretical act, an act of critical etymology, and take hold of our definitions and mold them for the purpose of generating the best possible social outcome. If it is language that constructs the world, there is no reason to ignore the power one has to shape the world through language.

This notion of critical etymology hinges on more than a kind of post hoc prima facie understanding of speech acts as reflecting the world. Rather, what is proposed here is a redefining, and thus re-constructing, of the world hinged upon declarative speech acts and performativity. To redefine oneself, for example, as “American” in order to exit British rule, is to
do more than provide a new name to an old object; it is to generate an entirely new construct. Constructs, recall, are not physically instantiated; their construction hinges on our social interaction, and it is through that symbolic mediation and dialectic that they are created and destroyed. We are reminded of our previous discussion of Hacking’s discussion of social constructs. As such a construct, the formulation developed here not only describes an existing reality—the construction of “teacher” and “researcher” as generated through our embedded presuppositions—but also constructively produces a new integrated reality of existing faculty. The construct is a radical, yet backward-looking, reconstruction of a physical instantiation in the world: faculty members. I suggest that those agents, however, who also participate in the construct “professor” while simultaneously being the construct “professor” should encompass “teacher” and “researcher” roles through the mediating concept of “scholarship” as the praxis correlated term to professor thus alleviating much role ambiguity for a beneficent purpose. “Professor,” thus, is not just redefined, nor is it just deconstructed; it is re-constructed, critically, to the end of benefiting the agents who co-create its reality, instantiation, and meaning.
CHAPTER 6: IMPLICATIONS, SUGGESTIONS, AND REFLECTIONS

Summary of Concerns and Analysis Established in Previous Chapters

In the case of philosophical analysis it is often appropriate to go a step beyond the summarization of findings. Philosophy, as a self-reflective enterprise, requires of the thinker that she consider the implications of her ideas for others as well as for herself. Thus, this work warrants a sixth chapter that itself specifically focuses on the “What now?” that results from the findings discussed previously. Not only does the self-reflective gesture act as additional means by which to establish credibility, it acts as further demonstration of the very hermeneutic inclusive dialectic discussed throughout the dissertation. Simply, this final chapter seeks to include the reader in the communicative positioning of the author in such a way that both acknowledge the author’s phenomenal epistemology while acknowledging the externality of the reader to that positioning. I seek to include you in what, hopefully, becomes less a didactic statement of my own thoughts and more a dialectical engagement with other minds.

This work has attempted to understand the conjunction of faculty roles of “teacher” and “researcher” as well as generate a best construct for the generation of those roles. The dissertation has, firstly, established the developing tension between the roles of faculty as “teacher” and as “researcher.” An increasing number of articles engage the role conflict between the two, particularly as constructed by post-secondary institutions. Conflicts range from ethical concerns about the misuse of students for SoTL research to the reduction of quality research and institutional pressure to graduate more students. These tensions seem to be the result of conflicting societal, economic, and academic pressures that require institutions to hold the professoriate to greater accountability by requiring faculty to publish more and demonstrate their
worth through significant and quantifiable publication while professors receive pressure from institutions to fail fewer students, teach more, and focus on the practical endeavor of bringing as many students to educational institutions in order to maintain funding. The result of these tensions highlights the need for more research concerning the consequences of dividing teaching and research and pitting them against each other, as well as for establishing what the best vision for the conjunction of faculty roles should look like.

Review of the literature established that there is significant development in sociological and philosophical understandings of roles. The work of Bruce J. Biddle has established role theory as a mainstream model for understanding humans as actors who participate in and perform societal scripts. The theoretical models for role theory, however, remain divided and often are limited to particular perspectives of human interaction, noticeably leaving out the importance of dialectic and community in the understanding of script performance. In light of the development of communitarian and hermeneutic understandings of identity formation, this work forwards a new perspective on role theory—“community dialectical” role theory, a conjunction of organizational role theory and symbolic interactionist role theory. Community-dialectical role theory understands human actors as engaged in numerous roles established through numerous community constructs, each of which providing inscribed, enunciated, and covert scripts that govern human action while at the same time understanding those actors as developers of the scripts of the Other through symbolic interaction through the holism of social dialectic. Thus, the dissertation established “role theory” as the theoretical framework and “community-dialectical” role theory as the conceptual framework.
In identifying the best methodological means by which to answer the research questions posed by the dissertation, it was established that it would need to first delve into the most basic understandings of roles as generated by social definition and discourse. Thus, the method of “philosophical analysis” was determined to be the best means by which to develop understanding of roles while at the same time generating a construct that could be applied to the generation of those roles and a means by which to reduce role ambiguity both in terms of those who seek to understand faculty roles. It was also determined to be the best means by which to reduce the very role ambiguity potentially experienced by those in the professoriate who find themselves, as agents manifested through the symbolic interactions that generate their role expectations, defined in a multiplicity of conflicting ways. Due to the fact that philosophical analysis is an under-discussed research methodology in educational leadership, the dissertation both justified and demonstrated the use of philosophical analysis in chapter 3.

The dissertation explored what “philosophical analysis” means and established that there is a history of educational work that uses philosophical methodology. That work, however, often limits itself to conceptual analysis, focusing solely on the rigorous development of and understanding of definitions. After the linguistic turn, however, a broader understanding of philosophy is possible: philosophy is not limited to being a tool for definition, but is also the holistic lived-experience of rigorous inquiry. Thus, discourse ethics and hermeneutic understandings of human experience through engagement in the robust social dialectic that comprises human life was determined to be the best means by which to pursue this research project. Discourse ethics enabled the researcher to both investigate the presuppositions that axiomatically ground and generate faculty roles while at the same time providing a framework
for developing a normative construct that can guide institutional formation of those roles and reduce the role ambiguity that results, conceptually, from the tensions generated by the systems world and lifeworld when placed in irrational opposition.

In order to engage a robust picture of faculty roles the dissertation engaged in a philosophical document analysis. A series of texts including faculty handbooks, professional association ethical codes, and philosophical writings on professorial responsibilities were analyzed. As these works were analyzed, a series of themes emerged. Perhaps most obvious was the disjunction between the tendency of the handbooks to engage a systems-approach to the presentation of roles and the tendency of the philosophical documents to engage the lifeworld perspective. The handbooks often focused on hierarchical and organizational necessities of institutional life, spending very little time understanding faculty in terms of broad relationships with each other, the institution, and the students. Interestingly, however, they tended to engage the lifeworld when discussing the mission, values, and philosophies of the institutions. Still, the longer documents, in particular, did little to exhibit that concern for those lifeworldly values in the actual inscription of faculty expectations.

The importance of lifeworld values, however—as presuppositions that regulate the generation of faculty roles—became even clearer when the handbooks were considered in conjunction with the professional codes of ethics. The codes of ethics inscribe the requirements of beneficence, free thought, and community engagement as essential to the role of the professor. When reflecting on the handbooks, one finds that expectations of mentorship, the promotion of free thought, and responsibility are similarly presuppositions espoused, particularly in the values statements of the universities. These themes were further emphasized by the philosophers
considered in chapter 4 who, without exception, had extremely high standards of the professoriate as both invested teachers and scholars. The sole tension between them was concern for the definition of scholarship—as requiring journal publication or as a broader engagement in the world of knowledge and inquiry. The data do establish, however, that the construction of faculty roles through these documents does not give researching prominence over teaching. The documents present the two roles as deeply integrated and mutually interdependent—as roles that, through their conjunction, act to continually better each other thus eliminating much role ambiguity.

To speak to the individual leaders who guide an institution, my home institution of the University of North Florida, for example, would be to suggest to them that reconceptualization and reframing of the organizational philosophy might be warranted. By this, I do not mean that the mission statement or the philosophy as stated by the university are themselves flawed. Rather, I suggest that to engage in a discourse analysis of the actual behaviors of the university may reveal that the institution does not, as it claims, place students first. Moreover, it may be acting in tension to its own primary research goal of adding to the general body of knowledge by virtue of losing focus on the very purposes of research themselves. Simply, review of UNF would encourage its leaders to examine whether the institution has placed systemsworld goals first under the assumption that the institution’s admirable lifeworldly goals are met through the systemworld aims. In the same way that a high school may mistakenly place standardized test scores as more important than the holistic education of its students for their flourishing under the assumption that success on the standardized test is indicative of that flourishing, UNF may find that emphasis on quality control, quantifiable teacher evaluations, numbers of research
publications, retention, and graduation rates place secondary the most significant lifeworld goals for which the institution exists—the benefit leaners and through that benefit contribute to the knowledges that themselves serve humanity.

If, for instance, the university is disinclined to categorize students as “a vulnerable population” due to the fact that such a categorization may make quality control more difficult insofar as a vulnerable population should not be subject to an institution’s research aims, it has lost direction and now acts contrary to its core purpose. –The result of which is likely to be faculty members who experience role ambiguity, cognitive dissonance, and career dissatisfaction, and they may be unsure why. Similarly, students may express that they feel manipulated and used by the institution. They may feel that despite the claims of the university, they are not placed first, and that they are savvy enough to know that such claims are only another manipulation used to accomplish university ends. Thus, the findings here encourage university leaders to engage in deep self-reflection regarding the very nature of their enterprise, to engage in robust dialectic with both the students and faculty, and to reexamine whether or not the institution is in fact that which it claims to be. Research suggests, though not necessarily at UNF, that faculty are experiencing such tension and ambiguity to greater and greater degrees as discussed in chapter 1. The goal of institutional leadership, to at least some degree, should be to resolve role tensions and role ambiguity.

Philosophical analysis of the data suggests that the role of faculty is in a tension that must be resolved before further role conflict divides the construct “professor” further. It is unclear why, given the data, there seems to be an increasing tension between the two roles, particularly the tendency to subjugate the role of teacher to that of researcher, but it may be due to an
analogous relationship between the pair “teacher” and “researcher” and the pair “systems-world” and “lifeworld.” The systems-world and the lifeworld are mutually interdependent, but the system may “colonize” the lifeworld when needed to organize the lifeworld and understand the lifeworld through the clear and efficient systems-world lens obfuscates the necessity of the lifeworld as the driving force behind the generation of the system in the first place. The lifeworld values that generate the system may be so assumed as to be, at times, forgotten, in addition to being complex and difficult to quantify for economic aims. Regardless, what is most fundamental is the realization that, like the systems-world-lifeworld dichotomy, the distinction between teacher and researcher is purely heuristic. Even more than the systems-world and lifeworld understandings of human life, the roles of teacher and researcher are mutually dependent and inseparable, particularly when one understands “researcher” to mean scholar.

Scholarship is a necessity of teaching, and is at its best when, like the systems-world, the lifeworld drives its instantiation. Scholarship, as more robustly defined in this dissertation, takes on the lifeworldly characteristics of dialectical inquiry and production of knowledge through participation with the community. Thus, there may be reason to believe that the production of knowledge through effective teaching in the classroom may, itself, qualify as scholarship. This gives us reason to conclude that institutions that emphasize scholarship as essential to the role of the professor should engage a more holistic and qualitative evaluation format for understanding their faculty as scholars. While perhaps messier and less efficient, such evaluation would better capture a robust understanding of the scholarship of their faculty while at the same time maintaining the primacy of the lifeworld of inquiry as a driving force behind the existence of the university. To do otherwise is to potentially lose the philosophical foundations of the institution
to the systemsworld perspective of management and organization, thus divorcing the university from the very scholarly values it seeks to uphold. To investigate the roles of the faculty from the discourse ethical and hermeneutic frames is to reveal the professor as best defined as a “caring scholar.”

The definition of “teacher” is far too broad when understood through the context of the lifeworld to omit active and invested researchers from our understanding of “teacher.” Perhaps they are not in a classroom, but neither was Socrates, and to require that teaching be understood in such a limited way is to once again allow systemsworld efficiencies to dictate the values that are best driven by the lifeworld. The caring scholar, then, is a perspective of professor that understands her role as one of beneficence driven by care, free and rigorous inquiry, and respect for and participation in the community. This understanding of professor not only emerges from the examination of the presuppositions that govern our dialectical understanding of professor, but emerge logically from an understanding of the Habermasian principle of universality: all voices must be included in the dialectical understanding of the professor, who, in order to ensure this, must be invested in the welfare of those voices, and through her scholarly engagement seeks to both understand and benefit those voices. This final stage of redefinition of the term “professor,” I term “critical etymology”—the defining of terms both through the investigation of the most basic dialectical axioms that govern our term-making while at the same time purposefully driving that term-making in a way as to better society. This critical etymology, I believe, emerges directly from discourse ethics as both a means by which to develop understanding through the investigation of the assumptions that govern our discourse and a means by which to engage the world ethically and logically through the inclusion of all voices.
Limitations of the Study

The limitations of this study are largely empirical. Although empirical data are analyzed, no experiment is conducted, and understanding is generated largely through logical analysis and engaged discourse. Thus, we cannot make any substantive conclusions regarding the actual instantiations of faculty roles by universities, nor can we articulate how faculty feel about those roles or live them. We are limited to an understanding of the roles as generated through analysis of a limited section of our social discourse. The work is primarily focused on construct development, and, as such, is itself a theoretical model that may be used by other works in order to understand how faculty roles are lived and actualized. As a theoretical model, the construct developed here carries with it the limitations of any theory and should be evaluated based on its conceptual merits. Thus, the work of Thomas Kuhn (1977), here, is used to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the developed construct and the understanding of faculty as “caring scholars.”

Kuhn articulated the following criteria for evaluation of theoretical models in science:

1. Accurate: The theory is grounded in empirically sufficient observations and experimentation.
2. Consistent: The theory is internally consistent and externally consistent with our other theories
3. Broad Scope: The consequences of the theory extend beyond its original intention
4. Simple: The theory is a simplest explanation; it does not multiply unnecessary variables
5. Fruitful: The theory reveals new phenomena or relationships between them.

Kuhn’s criteria demonstrate, again, that the greatest limitation of this work is empirical experimentation. The work is grounded in a great deal of observation, however. Numerous
documents were reviewed and analyzed. Thus, although the work is not lacking in empirical grounding, the true test of its validity will be the application of the theory to lived world of faculty roles. Whether or not theorists determine the construct developed here to be sufficient for the explanation of their own observations cannot yet be determined. The work has specifically sought to produce a construct that is both internally consistent and consistent with the dialectical presuppositions that ground our role making. The work has sought to resolve unnecessary inconsistencies between the roles of teacher and researcher, as there need not be any. As the work is grounded in the embedded assumptions that generate faculty roles, the work is externally consistent.

Implications of the Study

The scope of the work is yet to be determined, yet there seems to be good reason to believe the work extends beyond the formation of faculty roles in post-secondary institutions. The work likely has implications for the evaluation of and importance of scholarship amongst k-12 teachers, the understanding of researchers as teachers, and the use of philosophical analysis in educational research. The work has sought simplicity insofar as it has identified the common grounding axioms that emerge through an analysis of our discourse. In the redefinition of professor as “caring scholar,” the work seeks to ground professorship in the most fundamental lifeworld values possible without the inclusion of extraneous variables that, themselves, can be addressed through consistent application of the construct. Upon reflection, I do believe the work to be fruitful, though that conclusion is better determined by other theorists. It does, at least, shed light on our communal understanding of and generation of faculty roles. Thus, using Kuhn’s
criteria, the work does appear to, within the limitations of philosophical analysis, address those limitations and provide a functional construct that itself can be evaluated and used to evaluate.

Implications for Theory Development

There are tremendous implications for theory development as a result of this dissertation. There are numerous theoretical models that have been proposed by the author that themselves may be revised, expanded, criticized, and rejected. The notions of community-dialectical role theory, philosophy as a lived experienced of inquiry, professor as defined as “caring scholar,” and critical etymology are all themselves grounding for the development of theories that either rely upon those notions as constructs or axioms or ground themselves in the rejection of those concepts. Regardless, the work provides rich ground for other theorists to do significant work in developing their own models in response to the ideas forwarded here.

Implications for Research

The implications for research are significant. The work challenges the systemsworld model of research and forwards instead a lifeworld epistemology of research that understands researchers as invested scholars—as teachers. The work challenges the systemsworld trend toward the use of students as participants in research—their work in particular—without their knowledge and consent. It reminds researchers that the very grounding of their enterprise is beneficence itself, and that if research uses others as a means to an end and does not seek to better the welfare of the community, as well as the participants, it is inherently flawed. The work challenges researchers to accept the heavy mantle of teacher in their work so that they are themselves reminded that care should be a primary drive behind human inquiry. The lust for knowledge is well-respected in this document, but we must remind ourselves, as Habermas did,
that it is the inclusion of voices in our dialectic that makes such dialogue possible in the first place. If our research is not inclusive, if it does not participate in the community, it is at odds with the very core of what it means to be a scholar.

**Implications for Leadership, Policy Formulation, and Implementation**

As a dissertation completed within a department of educational leadership, it is important to note its implications for leadership. Of course, prima facie, the answer is obvious: “teachers are leaders; therefore this work applies to leaders insofar as they are teachers.” Such an answer, however, glosses over the depth of the discourse ethical construct and its implications for leadership. What kind of leaders are teachers? Moreover, what are the implications for administrators and leaders in education who do not, at least as we commonly define it, teach? I will consider below that a way to frame this question is to understand teaching and those who participate in the teaching enterprise through administration as engaged in what our embedded assumptions reveals to be “servant leadership.” Simply, to analyze our dialectical framing of teaching reveals that teaching is a kind of service—it seeks to benefit those who are taught. In service to students, teachers act as mentors (as the analysis of university handbooks has repeatedly revealed) guiding students on paths that the teachers themselves have already begun to clear. Thus, both serving and leading are implicit and embedded in our most basic dialectical understanding of teacher, and those who administrate cannot administrate effectively without recognizing that service is the goal and leading is the means.

Servant leadership as discussed by Robert K. Greenleaf (1991) described the servant-leader as a “servant first” (p. 13). The desire to lead, or perhaps the necessity of it, emerges from the desire to serve. According to Greenleaf, servant leadership “begins with the natural feeling
that one wants to serve, to serve first. Then conscious choice brings on to aspire to lead. That person is sharply different from one who is leader first, perhaps because of the need to assuage an unusual power drive or to acquire material possessions” (p. 13). The goals of the servant leader, therefore, are to benefit those whom they serve, rather than themselves. Greenleaf suggested that the best test for such leadership was to ask,

Do those who are being served grow as persons? Do they, while being served, become healthier, wiser, freer, more autonomous, more likely themselves to become servants?

And, what is the effect on the least privileged in society; will they benefit, or, at least, not be further deprived? (pp. 13-14)

Thus, Greenleaf suggested, the best means by which to ascertain if one is in fact a servant leader is to examine impact one has on followers and all stakeholders.

Greenleaf’s criteria clarify a potential tension created by those totalitarian leaders who seem to benefit their own people. Perhaps through that leader’s actions, the national will of the people is enacted, though Greenleaf suggested that one must also take into account the least privileged in society. The impact on other stakeholders, even outside of the scope of one’s “official” leadership capacity matters. Without stating it as such, Greenleaf’s work gestures towards the inclusion of the Other.

The implications, then, for this work on our understanding of educational leadership is to recognize that the professor, as a teacher, is defined at her conceptual core as a servant leader. The implication of service, however, goes beyond serving students in the case of professorship, as the previous works discussed here also suggest that the professor has role obligations to knowledge and to her community. Thus, as a leader she remains a servant to her students, to
knowledge, and to the community. That service is verbalized through the university faculty handbooks and the philosophies of thinkers like Markie and Noddings as descriptions of the roles that should be played by faculty. Discourse analysis suggests that service defines professorship, and perhaps this is where some tensions and role ambiguity for professors lie. If professors are treated as if they are better and more important than the students, or if, implicitly or explicitly, professors are encouraged to place their research (and thus their own prestige and the prestige of the university) above the welfare of the students, then the professor fails to be a servant both to the students and, I contend, to knowledge itself.

Publication for the purpose of tenure, prestige, and institutional obligation is not service to discourse, understanding, or even to some vague notion of truth. It is service to ends that can compromise the integrity of one’s research. Hastily written articles published out of desperation, requirement, and greed are far less likely to engage the deep, diligent, and highly reflective inquiry that best helps promote human understanding. Furthermore, such a shift in focus away from service to students and their community engages the students as subjects rather than participants in professors’ research projects as well as decreases the likelihood of a truly robust and engaged communicative action between students and teachers as builders of knowledge together. What is lost is the idea of the servant leader, according to the discourse-ethical framework, which transforms the leader into someone who empowers the other, who is both leader and servant, who is willing to exchange the roles between all participants so as create the conditions for building a truly shared and rational community. Caring scholarship is lost; one cares less about student welfare, generative understanding, and community welfare and more
about systemsworld bureaucratic ends for the perpetuation of an institution and a career that may no longer serve the primary ends of education.

The obligations that define professorship suggest that Greenleaf’s criteria may be an effective means by which to ascertain the effectiveness of a professor as servant leader as well as of an institution insofar as it promotes, enables, and actualizes service. One only need ask oneself if the professor or the institution in fact benefit students and the community robustly and holistically; conferral of degrees is insufficient. Consider the fact that Thomas Jefferson would not allow the conferral of degrees at the University of Virginia. He believed them to be pretentious and argued that truly devoted learners would learn to better themselves regardless of a degree. The tendency of institutions to justify their actions by the belief that “students are benefited by the conferral of a degree, and to increase the prestige of the degree is to increase that benefit” moves away from our own deeply embedded understanding of the import of educational pursuits—that education itself is valuable. Learning is essential to flourishing. I would like to suggest the ever-increasingly contentious proposition that students are more benefited by learning than they are by degrees. This is not to say that institutions should not be concerned about taking students’ money without providing a genuine benefit. This may, rather, suggest that at its core education is harmed insofar as it becomes profit-seeking.

To educate for the purpose of money, to charge students, compromises the intrinsic value of education. The educational act becomes a capitalistic exchange wherein if students cannot make their money back, their education has been a waste. The simple solution, conceptually, is to make post-secondary education free. Thus, even those students who exit their institutions without high-paying jobs have not financially indebted themselves for “no reason.” One wonders
if institutions will, for much longer, be able to continue to justify their worth beyond degrees. As general education requirements are cut, humanities eliminated, and students rushed through their degree programs, one wonders if our institutions of “higher-learning” can continue to justify such a lofty (and rather offensive to k-12 institutions) label. Perhaps “institutions of the fewest number of years possible in order to attain a degree that will make you money” would be a better descriptor.

This document, then, promotes the idea that service is one of the most effective means by which to evaluate the effectiveness of a professor and of educational institutions. However, even to recognize teaching as a kind of servant leadership is insufficient for understanding the full depth of the implications of this work for leadership; reflection on teaching as a kind of service in which one places the needs of others in primacy over one’s own needs (particularly as those whom are served are a vulnerable population) is insufficient, as one still wonders, “How do the findings reflect on leadership in general?”

The answer to the question, “What are the implications for this work on leadership?” emerges when one reflects on the fact that leadership, itself, can be understood from either a systemsworld or a lifeworld perspective not unlike professorship. Simply, more positivist notions of charismatic leadership like those explored by Max Weber (1922/1958) place the systemsworld as primary. Other concepts of leadership such as servant leadership and authentic leadership engage the idea that at the core of the leadership construct is the imperative to do good and to help those who are led. Thus, the same tensions that challenge the university challenge the very notion of leadership. If the prevailing notion of leadership is one grounded in the idea that one
should serve the system rather than the lifeworld a conceptual crisis arises because the core motivation for leadership is placed as secondary to systemworld aims.

In saying this, one recognizes that the world seems motivated by systemsworld leaders. Greenleaf argued that, “we live in the age of the anti-leader, and our vast educational structure devotes very little care to nurturing leaders or to understanding followership” (1991, p. 4). Both research and anecdotal experience seem to suggest that we desire charismatic, powerful leaders who will place the good of the system over individual needs. Certainly the shift in linguistic understanding of *The* United States from *These* United states after the Civil War suggests that our general social impetus is towards unification and our glorification of leaders often hinges on their ability to sacrifice the needs of some in order to maintain, for example, “The Union.” While in the case of *The* United States the preservation of the Union had the tremendously beneficial (if not unintended) consequence of ending legalized slavery in the United States, other examples of the willingness of the population to embrace “unity” and charismatic leaders do not always end so happily. Napoleon, in particular, was so beloved for his power of unification that after both failure and exile the French people were willing to follow him once again into disaster.

The above is noted because it is a natural counter to the claim that leadership is, at its core, oriented toward doing good and service. To engage in a brief analysis, however, reveals that the underlying assumptions that motivate followers are beneficence-based, as they are oriented towards their well-being. Those who follow even inauthentic transformational leaders such as Hitler and Napoleon presumably do so because they believe it is in their own best interest, however much their true interest may either be distorted (as with racism or other abhorrent ideologies). The rise of nationalism in Europe during the Enlightenment only adds
credence to that claim. The very nationalism that would become twisted into fascism had its origins in the French revolution and German social philosophy. Thinkers such as Herder (1784), Fitch (1807) and Hegel (1820/1991) constructed arguments based on observation and reason to suggest that there were in fact groups of individuals that are best understood as a unity for their own well-being. The arguments of Fitch and Herder noted the ways in which location and language both function to generate a “family” of people. To quote Herder (1784),

Nature brings forth families; the most natural state therefore is also one people, with a national character of its own. For thousands of years this character preserves itself within the people, and, if the native princes concern themselves with it, it can be cultivated in the most natural way; for a people is as much a plant of nature is a family, except that it has more branches. Nothing therefore seems more contradictory to the true end of governments than the endless expansion of states, the wild confusion of races and nations under one scepter. An empire made of a hundred peoples and 120 provinces which have been forced together is a monstrosity, not a state-body. (p.152)

Those families of people, then, are themselves best understood as a unified group which is benefited by the preservation of the larger whole, suggested Herder. What one comes to realize is that there is a philosophical undercurrent that informs our understanding of leadership and followership.

G. W. Friedrich Hegel’s work, famously, brought the more simplistic arguments of Fitch and Herder into the philosophical realms of metaphysics and epistemology. While today we cannot follow this metaphysics of a trans-individual super subject, the state, his understanding of history and language rightly suggested that unification of a people transcended any physical
understanding. To be a rational individual agent, according to Hegel, was to understand the whole as necessary and as a rational incarnation of the summation of shared, unified wills. The *Geist*, spirit (or mind) that emerges, though not a physical entity, is the spirit that moves history, the collective will that results from the reasoning of many minds through time. To quote Hegel (1820/1991),

> The state is the actuality of the substantial will, an actuality which it possesses in the particular self-consciousness when this has been raised to its universality; as such, it is the rational in and for itself. This substantial unity is an absolute and unmoved end in itself, and in it, freedom enters into its highest right, just as this ultimate end possesses the highest right in relation to individuals [*die Einzelnen*], whose highest duty is to be members of the state. (1820/1991)

The rational will of the substantial unity, then, is actualized by the emergent leader who may be described as the *Geist* personified. In our context, which is defined by the intersubjective communicative theory of discourse ethics, the leader’s role transforms from a charismatic leader to move masses, to one who empowers the agents to become rational participants in the shared construction of the state as community.

The fact that the human animal seems most motivated to follow powerful, aggressive, and often violent leaders is not evidence against the claim that leadership is grounded in beneficence and the search for one’s well-being, only that it is grounded in the belief in the rightness of personal beneficent teleology. The rationalizations that justify conquering, subjugating, or murdering others do not contradict the claim that leaders should be beneficent; they just add evidence to our belief that leaders should benefit *us*. It would be wholly irrational to
follow a leader who one believes will do one harm. So, at its conceptual core, leadership is grounded in beneficence. Otherwise, the very idea falls apart—i.e. Whatever a leader does, she had better benefit me, otherwise she will not have me as a follower. Yet, again, according to discourse ethics, the highest form of rationality is to understand that we have to develop the rational capabilities of agents, in our case the students, such that they can discern charismatic and fascist leaders form those that enable a democratic self-government, as Jefferson, for one, had in mind.

I suggest, then, that this normative core of beneficence is at the heart of many social tensions experienced by leaders today. The motion described by Gilligan of an ever-widening sphere of care and interest places many contemporary leaders in an untenable position. While at one time to be an industry leader may have meant only that one need benefit one’s stockholders, it is becoming increasingly difficult for leaders to maintain such narrow focus. The very idea of expanding beyond stockholders to stakeholders expressed the communal and care-based principle of expanding leadership such that everyone’s voice is heard, that everyone is led to realize their potential and receive the fullest ‘benefits’ from their education.

Historically speaking, what one comes to realize is that leadership has always been grounded in beneficence, or at least in its promise for some, and as the world becomes increasingly aware of the personhood the Other, leaders are expected to have broader and broader spheres of interest and a greater and greater capacity to maximize the benefit for many disparate persons. Such a positioning is already difficult, as the Hegelian unity may be untenable when the groups themselves are so diverse as to not share interests. (Note, however, that seeking such shared interest remains desirable, as those who do not may well find themselves at war due
to conflict of interests; discourse ethics and our application of its principles to teaching and research as servant scholarship are meant to promote a culture in which shared interest can be rationally determined by means of mutually respectful deliberation.) The deepest challenge, however, becomes the realization that in a capitalized system of commodification, leaders are expected to espouse and maintain systemsworld values while at the same time meeting the lifeworldly requirement that the hopes, dreams, and personal interests of the individual agents represented by that leader are simultaneously pursued and respected.

The implications, then, for this work on Educational Leadership, then, is twofold: 1) Educational leaders leader are often either teachers or their role is to facilitate teachers in teaching and, thus, they are either servants to students, knowledge, and the community or they are servants to service. The findings here reveal that teachers and administrators have been placed in a conceptually untenable position that need not be so. Simple readjustment of our notions such that the lifeworld is given primacy would go a long way to resolve those tensions. 2) Leadership, as a generalized construct, has at its conceptual core the assumption of beneficence. As leaders are mandated to benefit ever growing and ever more disparate populations, that teleology of beneficence must be maintained if the leader is to accomplish her aims, maintain her position, and maintain the integrity of the leadership notion. What is revealed here is that leadership itself is now suffering from the ever-increasing focus on the systemsworld and its bureaucracies as more important than the individual purposes and goals that result in the generation of the systemworld to actualize those goals in the first place. We claim that systemsworld leadership means the charismatic herd-following mass-oriented ‘leader,’ whereas a
servant leader ‘leads’ by empowering the agents involved in the community as a diversified yet shared unity.

Primarily, the work has sought to produce a construct that itself may be used to evaluate our instantiation of the professoriate. Rather than solely evaluating the professoriate through a systems perspective (graduation rates, failure rates, performance on surveys, and publication), the work proposes a holistic evaluation model based on the lifeworld of the professoriate. Professors should be understood and evaluated for their ability to engage and promote the lifeworld of learning, and such evaluation requires the inclusion of qualitative as well as quantitative measures. More importantly, such understanding requires that one view the professoriate and our evaluation of professors from a holistic perspective—the qualitative should not be reduced to the quantitative for efficiency and organizational purposes. Understanding the roles of professors requires a robust dialectic, inclusive of the communities that they serve. The implication, then, for educational policy is significant: this work requires of institutions a significant revision on their instantiation of professor. Not only should evaluation practices be revised to include lifeworldly values and evaluative measures, but the university should be challenged to replace the notion “researcher” with the notion “scholar” as a means by which to include the many different forms of research in which a scholar may participate.

This work’s implication for practice is largely reflective and personal. The thrust of this work requires that practitioners of research and teaching reflect on themselves and whether or not they genuinely engage in their practice for beneficent, scholarly, and community-invested reasons. In the end, the ability of a university to actually determine if a professor is genuinely invested in the lifeworld of learning is impossible. One can only seek to observe the
consequences of one’s actions, which is already a systemsworld investigatory perspective, in order to infer that one does or does not hold the values espoused by the institution. While the consequences of the actions of an agent or an organization are rather telling in regards to their intentions, they do not enable the observation of the intentions themselves. For this reason, robust engagement in discourse is imperative. Professors must remain active in discourse, both inside and outside of the realm of academic publication. Their investment in communal dialectic regarding their own roles and the instantiation of those roles will play a determining role in the creation of “professor” into the future.

Suggestions for Future Research

How do professors understand their roles as teacher and as researcher?

- How do university administrators and leaders understand the roles of teacher and researcher?
- How do students understand the roles of teacher and researcher?
- What measures do universities use to evaluate professors participation in the lifeworldly values of their institutions?
- How do university IRB’s address the potential problems emerging of the use of student work in SoTL research?
- Are the actual instantiated roles of faculty as teacher and researcher commensurable?
- How do faculty understand “care” and its relationship to professorship?
- Does role ambiguity in the professoriate produce cognitive dissonance, role stress, and role strain?
Reflections on the Study

The final component of this project enables the author to do three things: further ensure credibility through a reflexive process that enables transparency and true dialectic with the reader, share his own thoughts on the construct developed, and present final conclusions. Such a final reflection should provide a brief insight into the mind of the researcher, providing the reader with an opportunity for full engagement and the ability to reproduce the reasoning that results in the conclusions drawn through this work by virtue of participating in a moment of identity-sharing through dialogue with the author.

This work has been an opportunity for me to investigate a concern that has grown more and more pressing as I have spent the last 17 years as a post-secondary student. I have been a student at the University of North Florida, now, for the greater part of my life. While the university has afforded me the most amazing opportunities of my life, I have also become rather jaded regarding the educational enterprise, and I have a cynicism that has only gotten worse as I began teaching in high school. While I find that many of the educators I know are willing to recognize the problems caused by students—largely as a result of student apathy, ignorance, and laziness—I see little done to address the problems emerging from educators themselves.

Perhaps only because I have come to know more about universities as I stay longer at my own institution, I feel as if I have seen a greater willingness on the part of educators and, more often, policy makers to do students harm. So in pursuing this project, my main concern was to look at a small portion of one tension that I experienced myself, and found an-ever increasing body of research to support—disengagement on the part of professors in favor of their research projects. I recall one well-respected professor once telling me that “pedagogy” was a term used
by the Education Department to avoid having to do real work. I recall also once being told by another professor not to work on a research project with someone because that person “only had an EdD.” In many ways, my experience has been one of dismissal and disregard in the academy for education—which, given the mission of the university itself, is fascinating.

My years have presented me with numerous professors who seemed to have little engagement with their students, and I often wondered how it was that professors could actively do so much harm to their students. Once, as an undergraduate student, I had a professor say to a classmate and me something derogatory, homophobic, and accusatory all at the same time. That same professor still receives scathing criticisms on his student evaluations, yet his tenure protects him. I have seen, on the other hand, deeply invested professors who I came to love treated with tremendous disrespect and ushered out of the university for numerous reasons, but most tellingly because they do not publish enough, or do not publish in a way that is respected by their institution. Of course, as only a student, I do not see behind the scenes. So I do not know what other facts play a role in the institution’s treatment of its faculty, but even so, my heart goes out to them.

Even as an adjunct, I never saw behind the scenes because, despite the deeply inclusive nature of the chair of the department I worked for, the university itself does not provide adjuncts with a voice. I was voiced only by my chair, and had he not seen fit to include adjuncts in faculty events, it simply would not have been so. I remain grateful to him to this day. Yet, the actions of the faculty I have known, who are truly invested in their students, stand out to me, and that fact I find concerning. Deep concern, deep inclusiveness, the willingness to do whatever is necessary for those to whom we, as teachers, have committed our lives, should be the rule, not the
exception. It was for this reason that I chose the members of my committee that I did. These members are not only experts; they are faculty members who I could say from personal experience were always willing to help their students. We have not always agreed on what is best for students, and I can honestly say that I have been in severe arguments with everyone on my committee before and during my dissertation, both academically and sometimes, personally. Yet they have never given me reason to believe that they would not do what they believed was in my best interest as a student and as a person. They, I believe, are often the exception, and if I were to take a guess often find themselves at odds with an educational system that is becoming more corporatized and market-driven. So, I wanted to know what distinguished the best professors I know from the many I have experienced who seem at odds with themselves, with their students, or with education.

At its heart, I think this dissertation demonstrates that there need be no division between the scholar and the teacher. My goal in pursuing this project was not to demonstrate the converse, though I hope that it has. My understanding of professors as researchers was an image of research that distracts and distances one from the on-the-ground, in-the-mud battle that is teaching. I was wrong. Our systemsworld perspective of research left me with a misrepresentation of the role of scholarship in professorship, and I do not believe that I am the only person who had been deceived by the systems perspective that is coming to dominate the university system. I have come to believe through my research that good teachers are always good scholars, by definition, and that the attempt to disentangle the two can only do harm to the lifeworld of learning.
Reflecting on this work, I am in some ways concerned that it too clearly reveals my own positioning regarding care and education. I am deeply sympathetic to care theory, and wonder if I can justify basing education on care even without my own personal belief systems. Discourse ethics alleviates this concern, at least to a degree, due to its high level of objectivity and grounding in logic. To ground one’s ethic in logic may seem, at times, counterintuitive due to the highly affective perspective we take to ethics, but often yields the most intuitive results. It is not uncommon to criticize ethicists who seek to gain ethical insight through logic; they are accused of doing so due to a lack of emotional content, virtue, or care. Yet, thinkers like Kant, Rawls, and Habermas make demands of us that are not only extensive, but reasonable. It may well be that the human inclination to ground our ethical positions in intuitions and feelings primarily acts as a means by which to enable us to do what we want and justify it in a way we find most pleasing, which establishes a weaker foundation for ethics than objective rationality does.

Then, as it is the case that I am deeply concerned for the welfare of students, particularly at the hands of universities that tend to treat those students as wallets to be cleverly parted from their dollars, it is important that the conclusions I reach are not simply indicative of that concern. My own bias, my belief that the university system is quickly becoming a tool of marginalization rather than a force to combat it, may be wrong. Nevertheless, my intuition is that, fifty years from now, the privatization of the university system at the hands of those who seek a profit will be largely complete. By this, I do not mean that the private educational management companies will control all universities; that seems unlikely, and too obvious. Rather, I mean that our social system will continue to push the universities further and further toward the goal of producing producers.
The university system will function largely, if not solely, as a means by which to mass-produce relatively literate workers who can engage in an economy of information. The institutions, themselves, will no longer truly promote free inquiry, lifelong learning, or deep critical and skeptical thought. Engagement in the humanities will give way to the need to “educate for work.” Literature will become an unjustifiable course offering when compared with composition, and composition will be considered at its best when it prepares students to write for employers. In fact, there are likely those who would read this paragraph itself (though I doubt they would be willing to suffer through the care-theoretical philosophical “mumbo-jumbo” that is the rest of the dissertation) who would articulate the exact opposite point. They would suggest that we do a disservice to students if we do not prepare them for work, and the lifeworldly question, “But does that mean we are preparing them to live?” would be seen as a needless complexity, and equivocation that is best left to be determined at home in a holy place.

I think that the professors, as they have come to believe that survival requires a job, just like everyone else, will allow themselves to be pushed further and further away from the lifeworldly values that brought them to scholarship in the first place. They will find themselves conceding more and more to the systemsworld in order to “survive” in a system that cannot, by its very definition, understand the value of what they do and who they are. Then, the universities will die. The human drive for full, flourishing agency will likely never end, but we seem, at least in the States, content to pretend that we are flourishing and to pretend that others care. Our demand that our universities are worthless unless we exit them with the ability to become wealthy will eliminate the drive for full and robust learning from education.
This dissertation, itself, is just a shout into the void. We can theorize as much as we like, but we cannot change the fact that human beings are willing to trade lifeworldly investment in themselves for *panem et circenses*. We wish to be entertained and fed. Perhaps after the collapse of the university as we know it, centuries from now, there will be another resurgence of learning from the dark. Perhaps humanity will find itself despondent as it gropes around helplessly for meaning and once again recognize the import of the high energy state of learning for the purpose of producing agency. That time is not now, however. We are observing the close of the age of Enlightenment here in the U.S., if indeed we ever had one. Our greed is such an easily manipulated vice that we now allow others to educate our children into a system of indoctrination, marginalization, and meaningless work. In the end, I believe that “scholars who care” is a laughable notion in a society in which the systemsworld cannot quantify or recognize the value of care, or even the value of scholarship beyond the production of goods and power.

Thus I will conclude in the following way: Through this discussion of faculty roles, there is an essential component of the professoriate that has not been discussed: service. The reason for this omission being that the role of service, the role of “servant,” is no longer essential to professorship. Faculty members are pushed to teach, and pushed to publish, but they are not pushed to serve. True, they are required to participate on committees, but that is a dramatically evacuated systemsworld picture of service. Reading carefully, one might note that it may well be the lack of stewardship that allows for the uncoupling of teaching from scholarship in the first place. The idea that educators are servants—servants to students, servants to knowledge, servants to the community—has been lost to the idea that they must demonstrate service to the institution
by performing a functional committee role. I conjecture that it will become harder and harder to find institutions that allow community service to count for tenure and promotion as time goes on.

Yet, it is that idea of service that is at the heart of caring scholarship, and, I believe, at the heart of education. It is the belief that, first and foremost, we are servants to others in need of our help that drives scholars to do the most good they can—to share their knowledge with others for no other reason than because it is the right thing to do. If, perhaps, when we hood our doctors and promote our professors, we considered those acts not just ones of celebration and merit, but of yoking, acts of solemn assimilation into a lifetime of service to a cause far greater than our individual selves, we could return our universities to their own best selves as servants to learners to the end of enlightening everyone.

**Epilogue**

As a final thought, it is important to note that little has been said about the implications of the shift in faculty roles for the roles of students. These two roles, however, are deeply intertwined. We cannot have one without the other—they act as a Derridian binary and define each other. Thus, shifts in faculty roles will significantly impact student roles. By my lights the shift in faculty roles as further defined solely in terms of the systemsworld has series and somewhat dystopian implications not just as consequences for students, but for the roles students play. As students become ever increasingly the servants of the intuition, meant to feed its need for funding as an ever replenishable supply of paying bodies the students take on a sacrificial quality.

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5 Here then we engage a kind of philosophical “thought experiment” both using discourse ethics and role theory to ask ourselves, “If faculty roles become x then what do the roles of students become?” We cannot know for sure what the consequences will be, but the implications of our sublimation of the professoriate to the systemsworld rather than to the lifeworld are ominous indeed.
I am reminded of Rene Girard’s (1977) *Violence and the Sacred*. Most eloquently, Girard described the deep need humanity feels for violence. The text suggests that the act of human and animal sacrifice was a means by which to mitigate and meet human demands for violence in a justifiable way. This is to say that the sacrificial act is deeply embedded in society as a construct and as a means by which to keep peace within society. Of course, today we believe we have moved beyond such things. It isn’t hard to see, though, that we have developed other forms of outlet for violence, like our criminal justice system. We do not reform criminals so much as punish them; rather than creating prisons that are communally engaged, educative, kind, and supportive for the purposes of rehabilitation, we send people to prisons that are repressive, miserable, overcrowded, underfunded, and abusive.

As soon as the judicial system gains supremacy, its machinery disappears from sight… In the case of sacrifice the designated victim does not become the object of vengeance because he is a replacement, it is not the “right” victim. In the judicial system the violence does indeed fall on the “right” victim; but it falls with such force, such resounding authority, that no retort is possible. (Girard, 1977, p. 22)

I think, though, that there are other more subtle metaphors and outlets for our desires to seek retribution and revenge, and one may well be our students and schools.

Ever increasingly, it seems we become more comfortable in universities with placing students on the metaphorical sacrificial alter. We are willing to use their work without their knowledge for institutional advancement; we know that many of them will fail and do little or nothing to prevent those failures; we use them for athletic teams that do them bodily injury, interfere with their studies, and provide no support once they can no longer play. There is
something to be said about the old stereotype of the professor who tells students to look around at the students next to them, because those people will have failed by the end of the semester. How is that failure, though, not the failure of the professor as well? I believe because on some level we have constructed an understanding of student and teacher that makes the student a deserving sacrificial victim to the university. Those who fail are offered up as evidence of rigor and institutional integrity. The need for violence has been economized into a need for “quality and verifiable evidence of practical and useful production” on the part of the university.

Likely the “student as sacrificial victim” metaphor seems almost absurdly extreme and unfair. Consider, though, that Girard wrote,

The sacrifice serves to protect the entire community from its own violence; it prompts the entire community to choose victims outside itself. The elements of dissention scattered through the community are drawn to the person of the sacrificial victim and eliminated, at least temporarily, by its sacrifice. (1977, p. 8)

The number of students who fail, and the pride we seem to take in that failure, suggest that some need is met by that failure. Moreover, even in those cases in which professors are pressured to pass students, often at the expense of learning suggests that we are willing to sacrifice the students’ long term welfare for an immediate societal aim of mass producing a competent and willing work force. Thus as cuts are made to humanities and students are pushed through the system at the expense of knowledge of self and society, their very lifeworlds are sacrificed to meet the demands of the systemsworld.

What I am suggesting, however, is not so much a physical instantiation of sacrifice, but a psychological and metaphorical one. I am suggesting that the motion to systemsworld and away
from the lifeworld leaves us with both the ability and the need to generate Others to which harm can be directed. Contemporary society does not allow for random violence, nor does it likely even acknowledge the harm done in constructing persons as purely systemsworld entities. Nevertheless, the harm is there. Our hopes, dreams, passions, and purposes are unfulfilled, ignored, and perhaps even reviled by a system that values production and makes commodities out of humans.

I cannot help but wonder if this is how our post-secondary institutions have come to generate the students as potential sacrificial victims. They are an unregarded other. Even when we seek to maintain passing rates, it is not out of love or care, but out of a need to justify institutional worth. It may well that many professors and even the institutions themselves have come to resent the student-Other who comes to the institution often ignorant and lazy. I recall once a professor confiding in me that a student had angered him and that he was going to “crucify” the student. Institutionally, I have observed a similar phenomenon: a tendency to direct harm towards students who can do nothing to stop that harm. Perhaps by electing to be in the program in the first place we see them as willing sacrifices.

The concern is that it is hard to care for a sacrifice. It, the sacrifice, must be kept at a distance. It must be an Other, perhaps even a loved and respected other for its willingness to be sacrificed, but an Other nonetheless. But if we allow retribution to be taken out on students, how can we be said to be caring scholars? Students appear to be becoming simply a means to an end—a means by which to achieve our own institutional and professional goals. Most worryingly, the sacrificial act becomes a means of absolution. Simply, when our students fail miserably, leave the classroom crying, or are used for some research or institutional aim, we do
not have to feel guilty. It was a willing sacrifice and their loss is economized into a greater societal gain at the expense of their lifeworld and ours.
REFERENCES


Florida Atlantic University Division of Academic Affairs. (Feb 2012). Faculty Handbook.


APPENDIX

APA Code of Ethics, Principles

This section consists of General Principles. General Principles, as opposed to Ethical Standards, are aspirational in nature. Their intent is to guide and inspire psychologists toward the very highest ethical ideals of the profession. General Principles, in contrast to Ethical Standards, do not represent obligations and should not form the basis for imposing sanctions. Relying upon General Principles for either of these reasons distorts both their meaning and purpose.

Principle A: Beneficence and Nonmaleficence
Psychologists strive to benefit those with whom they work and take care to do no harm. In their professional actions, psychologists seek to safeguard the welfare and rights of those with whom they interact professionally and other affected persons and the welfare of animal subjects of research. When conflicts occur among psychologists’ obligations or concerns, they attempt to resolve these conflicts in a responsible fashion that avoids or minimizes harm. Because psychologists’ scientific and professional judgments and actions may affect the lives of others, they are alert to and guard against personal, financial, social, organizational or political factors that might lead to misuse of their influence. Psychologists strive to be aware of the possible effect of their own physical and mental health on their ability to help those with whom they work.

Principle B: Fidelity and Responsibility
Psychologists establish relationships of trust with those with whom they work. They are aware of their professional and scientific responsibilities to society and to the specific communities in which they work. Psychologists uphold professional standards of conduct, clarify their professional roles and obligations, accept appropriate responsibility for their behavior and seek to manage conflicts of interest that could lead to exploitation or harm. Psychologists consult with, refer to, or cooperate with other professionals and institutions to the extent needed to serve the best interests of those with whom they work. They are concerned about the ethical compliance of their colleagues’ scientific and professional conduct. Psychologists strive to contribute a portion of their professional time for little or no compensation or personal advantage.

Principle C: Integrity
Psychologists seek to promote accuracy, honesty and truthfulness in the science, teaching and practice of psychology. In these activities psychologists do not steal, cheat or engage in fraud, subterfuge or intentional misrepresentation of fact. Psychologists strive to keep their promises and to avoid unwise or unclear commitments. In situations in which deception may be ethically justifiable to maximize benefits and minimize harm, psychologists have
a serious obligation to consider the need for, the possible consequences of, and their responsibility to correct any resulting mistrust or other harmful effects that arise from the use of such techniques.

**Principle D: Justice**
Psychologists recognize that fairness and justice entitle all persons to access to and benefit from the contributions of psychology and to equal quality in the processes, procedures and services being conducted by psychologists. Psychologists exercise reasonable judgment and take precautions to ensure that their potential biases, the boundaries of their competence and the limitations of their expertise do not lead to or condone unjust practices.

**Principle E: Respect for People’s Rights and Dignity**
Psychologists respect the dignity and worth of all people, and the rights of individuals to privacy, confidentiality, and self-determination. Psychologists are aware that special safeguards may be necessary to protect the rights and welfare of persons or communities whose vulnerabilities impair autonomous decision making. Psychologists are aware of and respect cultural, individual and role differences, including those based on age, gender, gender identity, race, ethnicity, culture, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, disability, language and socioeconomic status and consider these factors when working with members of such groups. Psychologists try to eliminate the effect on their work of biases based on those factors, and they do not knowingly participate in or condone activities of others based upon such prejudices.
Statement of Professional Ethics

Preamble

As a community of teachers and scholars, the members of the MLA serve the larger society by promoting the study and teaching of the modern languages and literatures. In order to embrace this enterprise, we require freedom of inquiry. However, this freedom carries with it the responsibilities of professional conduct. We intend this statement to embody reasonable norms for ethical conduct in teaching and learning as well as in scholarship. The statement's governing premises are as follows:

1. The responsibility for protecting free inquiry lies first with tenured faculty members, who may be called on to speak out against the unethical behavior or defend the academic freedom of colleagues at any rank. In addition, faculty members have ethical obligations to students, colleagues, and staff members; to their institutions, their local communities, the profession at large, and society.¹

2. Our integrity as teachers and scholars requires the responsible use of evidence in developing arguments and fairness in hearing and reading the arguments of both colleagues and students.

3. As a community valuing free inquiry, we must be able to rely on the integrity and the good judgment of our members. For this reason, we should not

   - exploit or discriminate against others on grounds such as race, ethnicity, national origin, religious creed, age, gender, sexual preference, or disability
   - sexually harass students, colleagues, or staff members
   - use language that is prejudicial or gratuitously derogatory
   - make capricious or arbitrary decisions affecting working conditions, professional status, or academic freedom
   - misuse confidential information
   - plagiarize the work of others²
   - practice deceit or fraud on the academic community or the public

4. Free inquiry respects variety in the modes and objects of investigation, whether traditional or innovative. We should defend scholarly practices against unfounded attacks from within or outside our community.

¹...
5. Our teaching and inquiry must respect our own cultures and the cultures we study.

6. Judgments of whether a line of inquiry is ultimately useful to students, colleagues, or society should not be used to limit the freedom of scholars to pursue their research.

**Ethical Conduct in Teaching and Learning**

1. Teachers should represent to their students the values of free inquiry.

2. At the outset of each course, teachers should provide students with a statement on approaches to the course materials, on the goals of the course, and on the standards by which students will be evaluated.

3. Teachers should offer constructive and timely evaluation of students' work and specify the times and places when teachers are available to consult with students.

4. Teacher-student collaboration entails the same obligation as other kinds of research. Teachers and students should acknowledge appropriately any intellectual indebtedness.

5. Teachers whose research in any way includes students as subjects must make clear the obligations, rewards, and consequences of participation.

6. Teachers, in devising requirements for written work and oral discussion, have an ethical responsibility to respect both students' privacy and their emotional and intellectual dignity.

7. Teachers should keep confidential what they know about students' academic standing, personal lives, and political or religious views and should not exploit such personal knowledge.

8. Teachers must provide unbiased, professional evaluation of students seeking admission to graduate study or applying for financial support.

9. Teachers should provide direction to students, especially graduate students; should respect their scholarly interests; and should not exploit them for personal or professional ends. Teachers should not expect students, graduate or otherwise, to perform unremunerated or uncredited teaching, research, or personal duties.

10. Teachers working with teaching assistants have a special responsibility to provide them with adequate preparation, continuing guidance, and informed evaluation.

11. Teachers must weigh the academic performance of each student on its merits.

12. In overseeing and responding to the work of graduate students, whether they are in courses or at the thesis or dissertation stage, advisers should periodically inform them of their standing in the program.
13. Before graduate students begin searching for jobs, advisers and teachers should provide them with adequate and timely counseling and should be prepared to write honest and constructive letters of recommendation. Advisers or teachers who doubt their ability to evaluate a student fairly should decline the task of furnishing such a letter.

**Ethical Conduct in Service and Scholarship**

1. Scholars in positions of leadership should assist their institutions in devising and implementing policies and procedures that promote a positive working and learning environment.

2. A scholar who borrows from the works and ideas of others, including those of students, should acknowledge the debt, whether or not the sources are published. Unpublished scholarly material — which may be encountered when it is read aloud, circulated in manuscript, or discussed — is especially vulnerable to unacknowledged appropriation, since the lack of a printed text makes originality hard to establish.

3. Scholars should ensure that their personal activities in politics and in their local communities remain distinct from positions taken by their universities or colleges. They should avoid appearing to speak for their institutions when acting privately.

4. As referees for presses, journals, and promotion and tenure committees, scholars should judge the work of others fully, fairly, and in an informed way. A scholar who has any conflict of interest or is so out of sympathy with the author, topic, or critical stance of a work as to be unable to judge its merits without prejudice must decline to serve as a referee or reviewer. A scholar with a personal relationship that prevents an unbiased evaluation should turn down an invitation to serve.

5. Referees should discharge their tasks in a timely manner; they should decline invitations whose deadlines they cannot meet. Undue delay in review or publication justifies submission to another outlet, provided the first editor is informed.

6. Members of review committees must keep confidential all information about individuals, departments, or programs under evaluation.

7. Faculty members planning to resign an appointment should give timely, written notice of this intention in accordance with institutional regulations. Until the existing appointment ends, they should not accept another appointment involving concurrent obligations without the permission of the appropriate administrator.

**Conclusion**
This document focuses on the ethical obligations of members of the modern language profession. A common understanding of such obligations will enable us to exert appropriate restraints in exercising our responsibilities as scholars, teachers, and students and to promote ethical behavior in our departments and institutions.

History

"Statement of Professional Ethics" was adopted by the Delegate Assembly in 1991 and published in Profession 92. Earlier drafts were prepared by an ad hoc committee of the MLA appointed by the Executive Council in 1987, following a Delegate Assembly recommendation that such a committee be designated to "study professional ethics and provide MLA-endorsed guidelines" ("Professional Notes" 382). The committee members who prepared the statement were Barry Gaines, University of New Mexico; Lawrence Poston, University of Illinois, Chicago (chair); Roslyn Abt Schindler, Wayne State University; Mario Valdes, University of Toronto; and Louise Vasvari, State University of New York, Stony Brook.

This original statement was substantially revised in 2004 by the Committee on Academic Freedom and Professional Rights and Responsibilities, whose members were Carla Freccero, University of California, Santa Cruz; Lisa Justine Hernández, Saint Edward's University; Sue Hintz, Northern Virginia Community College; Genaro M. Padilla, University of California, Berkeley; Andrew Parker, Amherst College (chair); and Gema Peréz-Sánchez, University of Miami.

Notes

1 When a faculty member's fulfillment of ethical obligations is reviewed, care should be taken that it, like other subjects of evaluation, is not arbitrarily or capriciously judged. Any actions that may lead to the nonrenewal of an appointment, to the dismissal of a tenured faculty member, or to other such sanctions should be pursued in accordance with generally accepted procedural standards. See especially the "1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure" of the American Association of University Professors, endorsed by the MLA in 1962 and augmented with interpretive comments in 1970, and the related AAUP "Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure."

2 In this statement we adopt the definition of plagiarism given in Joseph Gibaldi's MLA Style Manual: "Using another person's ideas or expressions in your writing without acknowledging the source constitutes plagiarism.... [T]o plagiarize is to give the impression that you wrote or thought something that you in fact borrowed from someone, and to do so is a violation of professional ethics.... Forms of plagiarism include the failure to give appropriate acknowledgment when repeating another's wording or particularly apt phrase, paraphrasing another's argument, and presenting another's line of thinking" (6.1; see also Gibaldi, MLA Handbook, ch. 2). It is important to note that this definition does not distinguish between published and unpublished sources, between ideas derived from
colleagues and those offered by students, or between written and oral presentations.

3 Such relationships impose on researchers a special responsibility to guard the students involved from such abuses as breach of confidentiality and research-related harm. Scholars should inform themselves of and observe institutional regulations and guidelines on the use of human subjects in research.

4 Teachers should familiarize themselves with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 CFR Part 99). As explained in the section of the United States Department of Education's Web site devoted to the act, FERPA is "a Federal law that protects the privacy of student education records. The law applies to all schools that receive funds under an applicable program of the U.S. Department of Education. FERPA gives parents certain rights with respect to their children's education records. These rights transfer to the student when he or she reaches the age of 18 or attends a school beyond the high school level" (Family Educ. Rights).

VITA

Nicolas Michaud

Education • Expect Fall 2015, EdD, Educational Leadership
University of North Florida

- **Master of Arts: English**, with Rhetoric and Composition Concentration
  May, 2014, University of North Florida
  4.0 GPA in English Course Work
  Specializations: Early American Literature, Twain Studies, Race and Gender Studies, Literary Theory.

- **Master of Arts: Applied Ethics and Applied Philosophy**
  May, 2008, University of North Florida
  4.0 GPA
  Thesis: "Control, Counter-Examples and Reasons-Responsiveness."

- **Performance Certification**: Percussion,
  December 2013, University of North Florida
  4.0 GPA

- **Bachelor of Arts: Music**
  May 2003   University of North Florida
  Magna Cum Laude
  Minor: Philosophy

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**Teaching Experience**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanities and Ethics</th>
<th>Florida State College, Jacksonville</th>
<th>2012-present</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Responsible for the design of the course and creation of the syllabus as well as all instruction. Teaching both online and ground courses.</td>
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<tr>
<th>12th Grade English &amp; Creative Writing</th>
<th>Duval Charter High School</th>
<th>2014-present</th>
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<td>• Responsible for the design of the course and creation of the syllabus as well as all instruction.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Philosophy</th>
<th>Jacksonville University</th>
<th>2008-2014</th>
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<td>• Responsible for the design of the course and creation of the syllabus as well as all instruction.</td>
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<tr>
<th>English and Aesthetics</th>
<th>The Art Institute of Jacksonville</th>
<th>2009-Present</th>
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<td>• Responsible for the design of the course and creation of the syllabus as well as all instruction.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Substitute Teacher</th>
<th>Duval County/Kelly Staffing</th>
<th>2012</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Responsible for maintaining the primary teacher’s lesson plans and for all instruction during the instructor’s absence.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Bioethics and Applied Ethics</th>
<th>Nova Southeastern University</th>
<th>2012-2014</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Responsible for the development, implementation, and adaptation of the course shell as well as for all instruction.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Honors Instructor</th>
<th>University of North Florida</th>
<th>2007-2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Responsible for the design of the course and creation of the syllabus as well as all instruction.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Research
Graduate Researcher, University of North Florida, January 2012-2015
- Responsible for assisting in research, editing, and analysis for the department of Educational Leadership.

Internship, Institutional Review Board, UNF, 2011-2012
- Reviewed the current status of UNF’s policies regarding the use of student artifacts for student purposes and produced policy proposals and research summaries for usage by the IRB for application to UNF research and quality enhancement, producing, "Principles and Best Practices for the Use of Student Classroom Work in Research or Quality Enhancement at the University of North Florida.”

Editorial Work
Writer and Editor, Popular Culture and Philosophy, 2009-Present
- Responsible for generating chapters for Blackwell and Open Court Publishing for their Popular Culture and Philosophy texts.

Editor-in-Chief, English Graduate Journal, UNF, 2013-Present
- Created and maintained the UNF English Department Graduate journal based on the proceeding from the UNF EGO Conference.

- Responsible for researching and writing two articles monthly that pertain to and assist international students in their educational endeavors in the U.S.

Program Development
Florida Philosophical Association, 2013-2014
- Assisting in the design and development of a philosophy teacher’s resource website.

Executive Director, UNF Drumlines, University of North Florida, 2005-2011
- Responsible for the creation of the drumline as well as for the musical education of the students on the drumline. Also responsible for all business regarding the drumline.

Tutoring
Lead Tutor, University of North Florida, 2006-2007
- Responsible for supervising the other tutors as well as tutoring.

English and Philosophy Tutor, 2005-2007
- Responsible for acting as a peer tutor in order to help other students understand the material.

Piano Teacher, Beaucleric Elementary School, 2001-2004
• Responsible for the creation of the curriculum as well as the private instruction of the students.

Private Percussion Instructor 2003-2011
• Responsible for percussion instruction in my private studio.

PUBLICATIONS:

Peer Reviewed

Competitive
• “Cracked Sinew and Caked Brain” Writing Contest Journal, Digital Commons, 1st Place Creative Non-Fiction.

Books
• Editor, Adventure Time and Philosophy (Open Court Publishing: Forthcoming, 2015).
• Co-Editor, Dracula and Philosophy (Open Court Publishing: Forthcoming, 2015).
• Co-Editor, Jurassic Park and Philosophy (Open Court Publishing: Forthcoming, Summer 2014).
• Editor Frankenstein and Philosophy (Open Court Publishing: 2014).
• Co-Editor, The Hunger Games and Philosophy (Blackwell Publishing: 2012).

AWARDS:
• Outstanding Faculty Award, Florida State College Jacksonville, (2014).
• First Place, Creative Non-Fiction, University of North Florida Annual Writing Contest (2014)
• Graduate student debater, ASHE Graduate Student Policy Seminar (2013)
• Delores A. Auzenne Fellowship for Graduate Studies, (2012-2013 and 2013-2014)
• Nominee UNF Outstanding Undergraduate Educator (2010)
• Vic Firth Endorsed Educator, 2008
• UNF Graduate Scholar 2007
• UNF Graduate Scholar 2006
• UNF Graduate Philosophy Paper Prize 2007
• UNF Graduate Philosophy Paper Prize 2006
KEYNOTE/GUEST SPEAKER:

- Cultural Appreciation Series, Guest Speaker, “Avarice and Entertainment” FSCJ March 2014
- Philosophy Commentator, WJXT, Jacksonville. Local TV 2014-Present.
- Regular Philosophy Commentator, WJCT, Jacksonville. NPR Radio 2013-Present.
- “Philosophy, The Hunger Games, and the Roman Empire” Guest Speaker, North Florida Community College, October 29th, 2012.
- “Care and Necessary Reciprocity for Effective Education” UNF Honors Symposium, Keynote Speaker. (2011).
- “Care as a Necessary Condition for Effective Education in Philosophy” Plenary Speaker, Florida Philosophical Association, (2010).
- “Is it Wrong to Eat Fetuses?” University of North Florida Guest Speaker, (2008).

PAPER PRESENTATIONS:

- “Swift’s Idealism: Gulliver’s Travel’s and the Rejection of Empiricism” Florida Philosophical Association Conference (2012).
- “Mark Twain’s Epistemology,” English Graduate Organization Conference, Fall (2012).
- “Can Good Teachers Give the FCAT?” Jacksonville University Philosophy Slam, (2012).
- “Health Care and Illegal Immigration” UNF Honors Society (2010).
- “The Error of Empathy” UNF The Other Club (2010).

SEMINARS:

SERVICE:

President, English Graduate Organization, (2011-2012)
Session Chair Florida Philosophical Association (2012).
Rater, The Center for Community Based Learning, UNF, (2012).
College of Arts and Sciences Advising Search Committee Member, (2010).
Reader Canadian Philosophical Association (2009 and 2010).
Committee Member: UNF, Taskforce for Undergraduate Advising (2009-2010).
Florida Philosophical Association Session Chair (2009).
Reviewer, UNF College of Arts and Sciences Advising Review Board (2008).
Committee member, Student Advisor: UNF College of Arts and Sciences Review, (2007).
Florida Philosophical Association Session Chair, (2006).

MEMBERSHIP:

American Education Research Association
Pi Lambda Theta
Sigma Tau Delta
Florida Philosophical Association
Phi Kappa Phi
Golden Key International Honors Society
UNF English Graduate Organization

REFERENCES:

Dr. James Beasley
  • University of North Florida English Department, Rhetoric
  • Director of the Rhetoric and Composition Program

Dr. Chris Gabbard
  • University of North Florida English Department
  • Previous Graduate Program Director

Dr. Chris Janson
  • University of North Florida Department of Education and Human Services
  • Professor Doctoral Program

Dr. Hans Herbert Kögler
  • University of North Florida Philosophy Department
• Department Chair

Dr. Tru Leverette
• University of North Florida English Department
• Online English Professor