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TESTIMONIUM

Risky Business: Russian Trade in the Ottoman Empire in the Early Nineteenth Century

Theophilus C. Prousis

Irregularities in the implementation of Russian–Ottoman trade accords often turned commercial promise into risky business for Russian merchant shipping in the Levant. The Russian archival records presented here for the first time in English translation — four restitution requests and trade loss inventories submitted to the Sublime Porte by the Russian envoy in 1816 — provide telling detail not just on the perils of Russian trade but on the extent of Russia’s commercial networks in the Ottoman Empire. The documents offer a Russian perspective on trade issues in the Levant and suggest the commercial dimension of Russian involvement in the Eastern Question.

Keywords: Eastern Question; Ottoman Empire; Russia; Shipping; Trade

The Russian ship San Nicolo (captain Andrea Manoli), belonging to merchant Christoforo Iorgandopulo and valued at 25,060 piasters, was seized in the port of Constantinople.

The Russian brig Candia (captain Marangopulo), valued at 11,236 rubles, or 139,045 piasters, was seized in the port of Amasya in Asia.

A customs official in Constantinople committed acts of violence against the Russian ship Sibyl (captain Val’iano).

These sample restitution requests, submitted to the Ottoman government by Russia’s envoy in Constantinople, shed light on the risks and perils of trade in the Ottoman
Empire in the early nineteenth century. Commerce became a crucial component of Russian involvement in the Eastern Question after the landmark Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji (1774), when Russia received the right of merchant shipping in the Black Sea and in other areas of the Ottoman Empire and the right to establish consulates anywhere in the Ottoman realm. Subsequent accords with the Sublime Porte, such as the Treaty of Commerce (1783), the Treaty of Jassy (1792), and the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), reaffirmed these trade and consular concessions. The opening of the Black Sea to merchant navigation stimulated the economic growth of the Russian South, the export of grains and other commodities via seaports like Odessa, and the development of a Russian merchant marine in the Euxine, the Levant, and the wider Mediterranean. Economic profit thus joined strategic, military, diplomatic, and religious considerations in defining Russian interests in the Near East and in shaping tsarist policy towards the Ottoman Empire.

The best way to study this commercial dimension is to examine primary sources, both published and unpublished, on Russia’s trade in Ottoman territorial waters from the Black Sea to the Levant. Archival and manuscript holdings, in particular Moscow’s Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (hereafter AVPRI), contain an extensive array of resources on Russia’s contacts and connections with the Ottoman Empire, including trade. Russian scholars have made excellent use of the AVPRI’s treasure trove in their studies on tsarist policies and interests in the Balkans, Greece, and the wider Ottoman world, and one hopes that they, along with scholars from Greece, Turkey, Britain, and North America who have had full access to AVPRI only since 1990, will continue to mine these sources for scholarly work on particular topics. For instance, a recent publication of AVPRI materials on Russia’s activities in Ottoman Palestine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries demonstrates the value of identifying documents on a specific theme or issue and making them readily available for scholarly research.

A broad selection of published AVPRI records can be found in Foreign Policy of Russia (hereafter VPR), 16 massive tomes covering the first three decades of the nineteenth century. To be sure, Russian and Western historians of tsarist policy in the Balkans and the Near East have tapped some of the relevant sources in this rich compendium, but VPR remains a neglected and little-used resource. The careful scholar interested in Russian commerce in the Black Sea and the Levant can glean countless details from VPR’s position papers, memoranda, diplomatic correspondence, and consular reports, published materials that warrant scrutiny for the study of Russian, Ottoman, Balkan, and Mediterranean history. The VPR records presented here for the first time in English — restitution requests and trade damage inventories submitted to the Sublime Porte by Russian envoy Grigorii A. Stroganov in December 1816 — offer telling detail and firsthand observation on the risks of Russian merchant shipping. I have translated these documents from published Russian translations based on the unpublished French originals. My English translations of Russian materials available in VPR deserve a wider audience: not only do they provide a Russian perspective on trade problems in the Ottoman Levant but, more
Important, they remind scholars and students alike of the wealth of information on early nineteenth-century merchant shipping and related issues in this multivolume series.

As useful as AVPRI and VPR are for researching the topic of Russian trade in the Ottoman Empire, a more complete understanding of this issue depends on the collaborative efforts of multiple scholars using multiple sources in French, British, Greek, Italian, and Turkish archives and libraries. Ottoman documents in particular remain indispensable for the study of Levantine commerce in the early nineteenth century, and it is hoped that more of these records will become accessible to a wider public. While my translations reveal a small piece of a larger picture, additional documents unearthed from other collections will balance the Russian perspective presented here.

Several types of Russian archival records illumine key aspects of Russia’s maritime exchange in the Ottoman Empire. Vedomosti (registers), prepared by consular officials in Ottoman ports and dispatched to the Russian Foreign Ministry and to the Department of Foreign Trade in the Finance Ministry, provide details on shipping activity in the Levant. These ledgers cite the numbers and names of foreign vessels, the flags they sailed under, the numbers and names of captains and sailors on most of the ships, the types and total values of cargoes, and the points of origin and departure for most of the carriers. Also useful are consular reports from various parts of the Ottoman Empire; they not only contain occasional summaries of the shipping register data but convey additional information on local trade, port facilities, economic conditions, commercial prospects, and related issues.

All of these documents offer a general profile of Russia’s Black Sea and Mediterranean merchant marine. Captains and sailors of Greek and Italian descent operated many of the Russian-flagged commercial vessels, working for merchants and shipowners, also of Greek and Italian origin, who resided in Odessa, Kherson, Taganrog, Feodosia, Nikolaev, and other Black Sea ports. Russia’s merchant network encompassed prominent trade centres from Toulon and Marseilles to Alexandria, Beirut, Smyrna, Constantinople, and Odessa. Russia’s chief exports included wheat, rye, barley, oats, salt, tallow, caviar, and iron, while imports from the Ottoman East consisted mainly of cottons, dried fruits, olive oil, coffee, tobacco, wines, and silks. Consuls of Greek, Italian, French, and Balkan descent staffed most of Russia’s consular offices in the Ottoman Empire. Their knowledge of Italian, French, and Greek, the main languages of trade in the Levant, and their familiarity with Ottoman society and institutions made these consular appointees potentially useful as intermediaries with Ottoman officials and as conduits of intelligence for the tsarist embassy in Constantinople and the Foreign Ministry in St. Petersburg.

Various records testify to problems and dangers in Russia’s exchange in the Ottoman Empire, none more so than the restitution claims and trade loss inventories delivered to the Sublime Porte by tsarist diplomatic officials in Constantinople.
Not only war and the threat of war but irregularities in the implementation of Russian–Ottoman trade agreements, such as Ottoman confiscation of Russian vessels and cargoes and excessive customs fees levied on Russian transactions in Ottoman ports, often turned commercial promise into risky business. Most of these abuses and disorders stemmed from the notorious capitulations — privileges and concessions awarded to subjects of European states that had treaty contracts with the Ottoman government. With the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, in particular its commercial clauses, tsarist Russia now joined the capitulatory system in the Ottoman East.

Russia’s subjects who travelled, traded, and resided in the Ottoman Empire, along with their counterparts from France, Britain, and other European states, enjoyed reduced customs duties, exemption from Ottoman taxes and laws, and guarantees of personal security and freedom of worship. While these capitulatory favours were not always observed by sultans or automatically binding on regional and port authorities, they were routinely manipulated by foreign powers for the purpose of advancing strategic and commercial aims. A major abuse was the protégé system. At a price that became a profitable source of income for the Sublime Porte, envoys and consuls purchased berats (patents of protection) and then sold them to Ottoman subjects, who received capitulatory benefits in return for performing useful services in diplomacy, trade, and shipping. Protégés or beratlis (holders or owners of berats), drawn mainly from the sultan’s Christian population, enjoyed capitulatory status and were therefore considered foreign nationals. The Porte reaped short-term cash payments, protégés were exempt from Ottoman taxation, and foreign states used beratlis to extend their presence and influence in the Near East.11

Tsarist officials in the Ottoman Empire, often but not always backed by the Foreign Ministry, exploited the capitulatory and protégé systems to pursue broader claims of intervention and protection. Russia recruited a diverse group of protégés made up of naval and military auxiliaries who fought in Russo-Turkish wars, clerks and dragomans (interpreters) who helped staff consular offices, and sailors, ship captains, and traders who participated in Levantine and Black Sea exchange. Protégés involved in merchant affairs served as business partners, suppliers, and carriers, benefiting from capitulatory advantages and becoming middlemen in Russian–Ottoman trade networks.12

While the Ottoman government complained to all foreign envoys about irregularities in the protégé system, Russia posed a special problem because of its geographic proximity and its religious bond with Ottoman Orthodox Christians. Moreover, at least some of the merchants and shippers in Russia’s southern ports profited from the traffic in counterfeit ship titles. This fraudulent practice enabled Ottoman sailors and ship captains to hoist the Russian flag on vessels that, though registered as Russian-owned property, were in fact owned and operated by Ottoman subjects, many of them Greeks from the seafaring islands of Chios, Psara, Hydra, and Spetsae.13 These mariners and skippers enjoyed protégé status, while their employers in Russia had access to additional ships for the transport of commodities to and from Smyrna, Constantinople, Odessa, and other emporia.
Russian archival documents clearly indicate Ottoman efforts to curb abuses in the protégé system by curtailing the distribution of protection patents among Ottoman Christians, limiting the Russian flag to strictly Russian carriers owned and operated by bona fide Russian subjects, and reducing the number of protégés in Russian service. These attempts, accompanied by threats to seize cargoes from ships that illegally flew Russia’s banner, met with lukewarm support and reservations from tsarist officials. While the Foreign Ministry acknowledged the veracity of Ottoman protests and even instructed consular personnel to curb abuses in certifying berats and ship titles, it spoke out against confiscations of ship cargoes and against other acts of undue pressure that undermined the spirit and letter of Russian–Ottoman trade contracts. The Porte might very well authorize searches and seizures of vessels suspected of flying the Russian standard under false pretences, the Foreign Ministry stated, but any attempt to impound merchandise and ship property required the Russian envoy’s approval beforehand. In a sharply worded note to the Porte in August 1806, envoy Andrei Ia. Italinski maintained that even merchants and protégés who faithfully abided by treaty provisions and who did not abuse capitulations had to endure harassment, arbitrary fees, and other violations of Russian–Ottoman trade agreements.¹⁴

The Russo-Turkish War of 1806–12, a conflict provoked mainly by disputes over the status of Moldavia and Wallachia, exacerbated the discord over commerce and capitulations. Although maritime exchange between Russia and Turkey continued in the Black Sea and Odessa’s exports to the Levant actually increased during the conflict, commercial agreements were not always honoured.¹⁵ A detailed memorandum to the Foreign Ministry, penned by Joseph de Fonton, an experienced diplomat who had served at Russia’s embassy in Constantinople as an adviser and translator, examined some of the key problems and obstacles in Russian–Ottoman trade.¹⁶ Ottoman authorities, according to Fonton, violated treaty accords by evading prompt restitution to shippers and crews whose vessels fell prey to piracy in Ottoman waters. Ottoman inspections and occasional seizures of ship cargoes interfered with Russia’s asserted right of unimpeded merchant navigation, as did excessive fees and other restrictions on business transactions. On another contested matter, Fonton criticized the Porte for not honouring Russia’s treaty right to set up consulates anywhere in the Ottoman realm deemed essential to Russian trade interests. Requests for particular locations, Fonton maintained, met with Ottoman objections that the desired spots had little commercial value or were already under tsarist consular jurisdiction. The concerns addressed by Fonton continued to bedevil Russian–Ottoman trade ties and to echo in the communiqués of tsarist officials posted to the Levant.¹⁷

After the Congress of Vienna (1814–15), tsarist policy in the Near East sought to maintain cordial ties with the sultan’s government, negotiate specific points of contention in Moldavia, Wallachia, Serbia, and the western Caucasus, and uphold existing Russian–Ottoman accords. Directives from the Foreign Ministry instructed Russia’s new envoy at the Porte, Grigorii A. Stroganov, to act with prudence in urging
the Ottoman government’s compliance with all treaty provisos. Abuses of capitulations committed by Russian officials and subjects or by Ottoman authorities only served to jeopardize commerce and to compromise Russia’s protection of its own subjects and protégés doing business in the Levant. The removal of trade and consular infractions, the Foreign Ministry counselled, would strengthen cooperation between the two empires. Stroganov, however, faced an arduous task given the recent history of Russo-Turkish wars and the unresolved questions on consular diplomacy and other matters. While he adopted measures to regulate consular affairs and performed his duties with caution, the envoy vigorously defended Russian interests during his ambassadorship from 1816 to 1821.

Stroganov’s lengthy memorandum to the Ottoman government, dated 2/14 December 1816, set forth a series of grievances that undermined the spirit of friendship, peace, and reciprocity between the two empires. He detailed numerous violations of specific Russian–Ottoman treaty articles by Ottoman officials and subjects and assigned ultimate responsibility for these transgressions to the Porte. How firm was the current state of peace, he wondered, given the list of abuses? The Porte made the envoy wait 18 months before he could present credentials. Russian prisoners of war incarcerated in Constantinople, even after the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), had to endure hardship and mistreatment. Reprisals and other excesses in Serbia subverted that region’s autonomy. Forced requisitions in Moldavia and Wallachia deprived inhabitants of basic supplies and their means of livelihood, and the Porte’s seeming indifference to the well-being of Orthodox Christians in the Danubian Principalities compelled Russia to intercede on their behalf.

Contested borders figured prominently in Stroganov’s communiqué, as he complained about Ottoman disregard for the agreed-upon demarcation line along the Danube River. Several Danubian islands, instead of remaining uninhabited and thus not part of either empire, had been settled by runaway Cossacks who violated Russia’s territorial integrity in raids that brought harm to Russian subjects and their property. Ottoman construction activity and fishing installations also obstructed the agreed-upon navigation of the Danube near the Kilia estuary. The Russian–Ottoman border in Asia, in particular near the Kuban, Abkhazia, and Kars, fell prey to attacks by Circassians and other bandits who captured Russian subjects, livestock, and property and sold Russian captives into slavery. Thus, all was not well in Russian–Ottoman relations, the envoy noted, since four years of peace marked a continuation of war. The Porte not only allowed but tried to cover up repeated breaches of treaty accords, oblivious to the consequences and to the basic fact that its actions could not abrogate treaty articles purchased at the price of so much bloodshed and sacrifice. Stroganov conveyed the tsar’s peaceful intent, fairness, and restraint, requesting only the strict observation of treaty rights and the redress of legitimate claims.

The four records presented here appeared as appendices to Stroganov’s diplomatic memorandum of 2/14 December 1816. Though this was neither the first nor the last time that he spoke out against damage to Russian merchant shipping, the appendices
deserve scrutiny for their wealth of detail. They enumerate ship and cargo seizures by Ottoman officials, excessive customs charges, and other losses in the Dardanelles, the Danube, the Aegean, and the eastern Mediterranean. They cite the names of confiscated and detained vessels, the names of ship captains, the amounts of monetary claims, often in rubles and piasters, and the specific places where piracy and other abuses took place — the Straits, Constantinople, Sinop, Smyrna, Aleppo, the Morea, Crete, Samos, Tenedos, Chios, and Cyprus. These details help us understand not just the perils but the extent of Russian trade networks and the personnel of Russian commerce in the Ottoman Levant.

The first inventory (document #1) itemizes financial damage sustained by Russian ship captains in the Dardanelles resulting from confiscations of ships and grain cargoes committed by Hussein Bey, commandant of regional fortifications. To no avail did the Russian vice-consul and the ambassador protest against these coercive measures and the extra charges levied on Russian ships for the right to pass through the Dardanelles. Stroganov unequivocally impugned the Porte for permitting these abuses and for not making amends. The bill, according to the envoy, did not include commercial losses caused by the disparity between the lower government-fixed price of grain imposed upon Russian ships and the higher market price in the capital and other parts of the Ottoman Empire. In addition to specific damages, the document provides important details on Russia's Mediterranean merchant marine in the early nineteenth century. Vessels with Italian (San Nicolo, San Giorgio) and Greek (Constantine Helen) names and ship captains of Italian and Greek descent underscore that Russian commerce relied on Greeks, Italians, and Levantines who served in various capacities. The vast majority of these sailors, agents, captains, and shippers participated in Russian exchange not as naturalized Russian subjects but as protégés who benefited from capitulatory favours. It is simply impossible to state with any degree of certainty whether the 'Russian subjects' cited in all four inventories were indeed actual subjects of the Russian Empire; in all probability most of them were Ottoman subjects who sold their services to European great powers as commercial protégés.

The second register (document #2) identifies financial claims of Russian subjects which had to be set aside when war broke out in 1806 but which remained outstanding four years after the peace treaty of 1812. The dates cited indicate the envoy's unsuccessful requests for Ottoman compensation. Restitution claims put forth by 'Russian subject Kirch Oglu of Odessa' and 'Russian subject Spyridon Hadji Christo' signify a Turkish and a Greek presence in Russia's commercial enterprise in the Near East, while Ali Pasha's confiscations of property owned by state councillor Orio in Preveza and Vonitza make it clear that Russian subjects were fair game for the warlord of Iannina. Various petitions itemize merchant losses sustained in Egypt and the Black Sea port Sinop, but most of the damage to Russian shipping in the Levant resulted from acts of piracy by corsairs from Tunis and Algiers, semi-autonomous regions of the Ottoman Empire. Muslim corsairs from the Barbary coast and Christian corsairs from Malta had attacked European and Ottoman shipping in the Mediterranean for
several centuries, but by the early nineteenth century Greek piracy had become the main threat to British and Ottoman merchant carriers in the Levant. While Lord Byron evoked the romance and mystery of these pirates in his celebrated poem 'The Corsair' (1814), British consuls in Smyrna and Aleppo often complained about Greek corsair raids against British shipping in the Aegean. Thus, the attacks by Barbary pirates cited in Russian restitution requests could very well have been acts of Greek piracy.

The third inventory (document #3), the longest of the four records, enumerates robberies and other acts of violence committed by Ottoman officials and subjects in various locations: along the Russian-Ottoman border in Europe, in the interior of the Ottoman Empire, and in Ottoman ports. The restitution claims specify financial losses and cite dates of the envoy's unsuccessful bids to get compensation for Russian subjects. Abuses not related to commerce include breaches of Russia's territorial sovereignty by inhabitants of Moldavia who crossed the border, assailed Russian guards, abducted Russian families, and incited residents of Bessarabia, an Ottoman territory won by Russia in the Treaty of Bucharest. A local pasha in Djurdjevo, near Novi Sad in the Balkans, retaliated against residents of the area who had sought protection from Russian armies during the recent war, while a military officer in Izmail robbed Russian subjects who had been granted asylum in the town of Babadag. Attacks on Russian consuls and consular buildings took place in Wallachia, the Dardanelles, the Morea, and the port of Aleppo and on the islands of Santorini and Chios. Ottoman officials in Jaffa impeded the journey of Russian religious pilgrims on the pretext that their pilgrimage permits had expired.

This document offers extensive information on commercial damage caused by Barbary pirates and Ottoman customs officials. Corsairs from Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers assaulted Russian ships in the Aegean, while port authorities in Koroni, Navarino, and other parts of the Morea impounded cargoes, detained vessels, incarcerated captains, and snatched watches and other belongings of crews. Excessive customs fees victimized Russian carriers in Sinop, Smyrna, Constantinople, Adrianople, Tenedos, Chios, and Samos. This record also encompasses the claims of individuals victimized by graft, unreturned loans, and theft, such as the case against Ottoman subject Ligino, who fled Odessa after stealing 100,000 piasters from the Russian trader Ilia Manessi.

The most elaborate entry in this inventory relates violations of the Treaty of Commerce committed by Ottoman customs officials on Chios and Cyprus and in Saloniki, Patras, Aleppo, and especially Constantinople. The head of the customs office in the Ottoman capital, according to Stroganov, obstructed Russian trade through his arbitrary actions. For example, he refused to let a Russian merchant transfer his own merchandise, a cargo of iron that had just arrived via the Black Sea, to his own warehouses and demanded that the merchant sell the iron at a price set by the Ottoman Admiralty instead of at market price. The same official tried to exact a second customs fee from Russian traders who had already paid customs at another Ottoman port on the pretext that customs receipts from other Ottoman trade centres
were either forged or issued by someone who lacked the authority to do so. Thus, Stroganov protested, arguments arose, leading to a waste of time and causing significant harm to merchants. The director of customs in Constantinople also insisted on inspecting Russian ships, arguing that they carried goods owned by Ottoman subjects who had not yet paid duty.

The fourth register (document #4) provides a short list of claims submitted to the Porte before war broke out in 1806 and still outstanding four years after the peace treaty. Ottoman authorities seized Russian ships and cargoes in Constantinople, Sinop, Amasya, and Candia and confiscated money from the Russian consul in Patras. The Greek, Italian, and Russian names of commercial vessels, ship captains, and merchants suggest the difficulty of identifying bona fide Russian subjects who enjoyed capitulatory protection. For Russia and other European states, commerce in the Balkans and the Levant depended on an amorphous stock of Ottoman subjects who may or may not have been protégés of European powers. Greeks, Italians, Levantines, Turks, Slavs, and Romanians sold their skills as agents, shippers, brokers, sailors, and interpreters, diversifying the social and ethnic personnel of European trade networks in the Ottoman world.

Stroganov continued to lodge complaints about trade troubles in subsequent communiqués. When the Russian ship Leonidas, assaulted in broad daylight in the Galata harbour of Constantinople, had its flag torn to shreds by Ottoman sailors, the envoy protested at what he called an outrage against Russia's honour and dignity. In requesting the Porte to make a public apology and to punish the culprits, Stroganov's blunt note of December 1818 underscored the importance of flags as symbols of diplomatic immunity and as tokens of trust between two supposedly amicable governments. If a national banner could be treated with such disrespect in the Ottoman capital, he wondered what might happen to foreign flags and cargoes in remote parts of the empire not under consular jurisdiction. Continued infractions of commercial agreements prompted the envoy to argue, in a grievance delivered to the Porte in January 1819, that capitulatory benefits were necessary to shelter Russian and other foreign nationals in the Ottoman realm, a land he described as vastly different from European Christian countries in religion, laws, and customs. Equating the sanctity of treaties with the sanctity of monarchs' pledges, he insisted that envoys were duty-bound to guard and uphold capitulatory rights. In October 1819 the Porte's delay in confirming tsarist consular appointments in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Athens prompted Stroganov to protest against the Ottoman failure to observe treaty accords that permitted Russia to place consulates anywhere in the empire deemed crucial for trade.

War and the threat of war posed the most critical obstacle to commerce in the Levant, evinced in the Eastern crisis of the 1820s. The outbreak of the Greek revolt, naval clashes between Ottoman and Greek forces, and Russia's claim to protect Orthodox Christians disrupted Russian–Ottoman traffic and threatened the economic well-being of Odessa and other Black Sea ports. The Ottoman government suspected that Russian-flagged vessels transported arms and provisions to Greek rebels
or were owned and operated by insurgent shippers from Hydra, Psara, and Spetsae. Confiscations of grain exports from Russian ships and dwindling numbers of Ottoman vessels entering Black Sea markets not only aggravated Russian-Ottoman tension but eroded profits of more than a few Odessa merchants and shipowners. Indeed, one of these businessmen sent a formal complaint to Foreign Minister Karl V. Nesselröde in 1823, arguing that two of his ships had failed to secure the requisite Ottoman permission to sail the Straits. Additional records substantiate the dangers and risks of trade during the Eastern crisis and the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–29, a conflict caused primarily by disagreements over the status of the Danubian Principalities.

Trade formed part of the 'precarious balance' between conflict and negotiation that characterized Russian-Ottoman relations as the two adjacent autocratic empires competed for lands, peoples, and resources along porous frontiers and engaged in risky but mutually beneficial commercial exchange. Documents on trade in the Levant sharpen our view of tsarist endeavours in the Near East and help clarify the variety of interests that made the Eastern Question a multidimensional issue for the Russian state and Russian society. Additional AVPRI sources that should be tapped include consular service records, consular dispatches from the Balkans and the Near East, and commercial data on merchant navigation. These materials, along with relevant holdings in other archives and manuscript repositories, deserve a wider audience among scholars of tsarist Eastern policy, not least because they will invariably raise new questions on the complex of concerns and issues that became part of the Russian-Ottoman relationship in the nineteenth century.

I have endeavoured to render these documents in idiomatic English without altering their content and tone. For the sake of clarity I have rephrased the financial claims and restitution requests into complete sentences. Though I have made changes in syntax, sentence structure, and punctuation for more fluid translations, I have remained faithful to the meaning and details of the records. I have inserted brackets for my own emendations, translations of foreign terms, and brief explications. The occasional ellipsis denotes a word or phrase that I considered extraneous. All dates are in the Old Style Julian calendar, which in the nineteenth century lagged 12 days behind the New Style Gregorian calendar used in the West.

Confusion abounds when rendering the names of ships, captains, officials, and places cited in the documents, and I have approached the problem with the view that a completely uniform system is impossible. Many of the names have been transliterated from the Russian inventories, while others have been altered for coherence and authenticity. I have used Smyrna and Constantinople instead of Izmir and Istanbul, but Koroni and Sinop appear in their current spellings. While 'Panaiotti' and 'Kaloieraki' are strict transliterations from the Russian, I have used 'Panagioti' and 'Kalogeraki' to convey more accurately what are probably Greek names. I have translated the names of some Russian ships into English equivalents, such as Constantine Helen, Love of the Fatherland, St. Spyridon, Achilles, and Telemachus, while others, such as Madonna di Mongiana, San Nicolo,
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San Giorgio, San Dionysio, and Assunta, have been rendered in Italian to reflect their origin.

Document #1

‘An inventory of damages sustained by Russian [ship] captains in the Dardanelles, resulting from confiscations committed by Hussein Bey, commandant of the fortifications in this region’

For 3,800 kile [a Turkish measure for dry goods, equal to 40 litres] of grain, seized from the Russian ship San Nicolo (captain Liberio Vulisma), expenses and losses [amount to] 70,000 piasters.29

For 307 kile of grain, seized from the Russian ship San Giorgio (captain Spyridon Skuliano), expenses and losses [amount to] 42,000 piasters.

Expenses and losses, sustained as a result of the nearly four-month detainment of the Russian ship Madonna di Mongiana (captain Svorono), [amount to] 60,000 piasters.

Expenses and losses, sustained as a result of the three-month detainment of the Russian ship Constantine Helen (captain Georgio Mavromati), [amount to] 55,000 piasters.

For 815 kile of grain, impounded from the Constantine Helen and not returned, and also for the interest from the value of the cargo, [expenses and losses amount to] 13,299 piasters.

Expenses and losses, caused by the three-month detainment of the ship Iride (captain Vincenzo Ielike), [amount to] 60,000 piasters.

Expenses and losses, caused by the detainment of the Russian ship San Nicolò (captain Apostolo Lefeochilo), [amount to] 48,000 piasters.

Total — 348,299 piasters


Document #2

[This inventory lists financial claims of Russian subjects submitted to the Porte prior to the Russo-Turkish War of 1806–12 and still outstanding after the peace treaty of 1812. The total bill amounts to 6,291,997 piasters and 54 para. The dates denote when Russian officials presented diplomatic notes to the Porte; the document does not list them in chronological sequence.]

1813 18 August; 1814 28 January

Algerians seized the Russian ship Love of the Fatherland in 1786; damages amounted to 3,477,367 rubles and 27 kopeks, or 4,346,712 piasters and 35 para in Turkish currency.
1814 28 November
Tunisians seized the Russian [vessel] Assunta in 1804 and executed [ship] captain Gavril in Tunis in 1813; damages total [no exact figure cited].

1813 21 August
An armed detachment of Kuchuk Ali from Paia seized a Russian ship (captain Laskari Kornelo) in 1804. Losses amount to 25,000 piasters.

1813 and 1814 [no specific months/days cited]
As of 1806 Russian merchant Alexiopulo is due 26,999 piasters after the cancellation of debts owed to him by a company that trades in sweets.

1814 11 May
The claims of Russian subject Kirch Oglu of Odessa, [submitted to] the governor of Germendzhik, Bash Hassan of Mesemvria, for the sum of 1,130 Dutch ducats amount to 14,420 piasters.

1814 11 May
The damages sustained by Russian merchant Khatranov in Sinope [amount to] 25,000 piasters.

1814 24 September
The debts of the deceased Aleko Soutso and his wife Mariona Stataki [owed] to a Russian merchant [total] 12,416 piasters.

To these sums one must add the damages resulting from armed attacks on Russian vessels by Barbary corsairs after the Treaty of Jassy [1792]; these claims, presented to the Sublime Porte, were not satisfied before the onset of war in 1806. After the peace agreement in 1812, they were not presented a second time because the [diplomatic] mission's archives were missing. But one of the Russian subjects victimized by the corsair attacks, Mr. Sil'va, recently submitted a claim for his estimated losses of 60,000 rubles caused by the seizure of his vessel by Algerians in 1803, [a sum] that amounts to 75,000 piasters.

Besides the inventories submitted to the Sublime Porte in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty of Bucharest, other claims are summarized below:

Ali Pasha of Iannina confiscated the property of actual state councillor Count Orio in Preveza and Vonitzia, valued at 100,000 Venetian guilders, which amounts to 1,400,000 piasters.

Russian captain Ilia Kalanarkopulo, commander of the ship St. George, sustained damages of 175,000 piasters off the coast of Egypt in 1802 when a mutiny of 400 men forced him to take them to Egypt.

Lieutenant captain Marangopulo sustained losses of 95,760 rubles and 38 kopeks, which amounts to 119,700 piasters and 19 para, when his corvette St. Spyridon was detained in 1806.

Russian subject Spyridon Hadji Christo, ordered to do so by a diplomatic note of 10 June 1800, gave the community of Gastuni a loan of 67,350 piasters (disregarding interest rates at the time).
The money of Russian merchant Karokachiani, borrowed by captain Paskali, was seized by the commandant of Achiolo, Mustafa Techelensoglu, who later was executed by order of the Sublime Porte. The sum [amounts to] 4,400 piasters.


Document #3

'A short report on acts of violence committed at the European border, inside the country, and in ports, and also on damages sustained by Russian subjects, with dates indicating when the envoy of his imperial majesty [presented] diplomatic notes [to the Porte]'

1813 6 August
Inhabitants of Moldavia breached the inviolability of Russian territory [when they] crossed the left bank of the Pruth River, attacked Russian guards, and abducted 20 families.

1813 20 August; 1813 18 October; 1815 24 December
Ottoman vessels claimed the right of unassisted passage along the left bank of the Danube, [and] their crews breached the inviolability of Russian territory, accompanied by insults and threats. The ayan [notable or governor] of Tulchin [ordered] an armed attack on a Russian ship, seized a Turkish passenger on board, and handed him over for capital punishment.

1813 8 November; 1814 18 November
The pasha of Ibrail and agents of the hospodar [governor] of Moldavia detained and confiscated a shipment of timber, the indisputable property of various Russian subjects.

1814 12 June
Ibrahim Aga, commandant of Tulchin, ordered the murder of four Russian fishermen [and] the seizure of their boat, nets, and all belongings, valued at 1,550 piasters.

1814 18 November
The ayan of Babadag seized, imprisoned, threatened to execute, and demanded tribute from Russian subjects Grigorii Smirnov and Illarion Pol'shakov, inhabitants of Tuchkov. [Damages amount to] 1,200 piasters.

1814 17 December
The commandant of Tulchin coerced Russian subject Ivan Sokolov, forcing him to sell his boat for 300 piasters even though it cost 2,000 piasters.

1815 8 June
An Ottoman police officer in Razyliman arrested and shackled Russian subject Grigorii Smirnov, confiscated his fish, and took his money; the sum total of losses amounts to 2,200 piasters.
An Ottoman guard in Sulina detained the Russian vessel Beatitude of the Virgin (captain Toka), an action that caused the ship to be grounded on the bank [of the Danube River] and to lose a cask of sugar valued at 2,000 piasters.

[The envoy] submitted requests about the flight of Cossacks with horses and belongings [across the border to Moldavia].

[The envoy] submitted requests about inhabitants of the Bessarabian village of Puteshti and their flight to Moldavia.

Inhabitants of Moldavia incited residents of Bessarabia to cross the border.

Inhabitants on the right bank of the Danube aided and abetted inhabitants on the left bank who fled with arms, property, and livestock to Isakcha and surrounding areas.

Ottoman agents incited inhabitants of the ceded lands [in Bessarabia] to cross the border.

Aidyn Pasha, commandant of Djurdjevo, ruled in an arbitrary manner and committed acts of violence against various residents of that region, for the reason that during the [recent] war they sought help from the armies of his imperial majesty; furthermore, [the commandant] ordered the hanging of some of [these residents] and continually oppressed those who, taking advantage of the benefits of the peace treaty, expressed the desire to settle in Russia.

The pasha of Vidin demanded that Russian merchant Pavlov hand over the goods on board the raft which sailed from Vienna.

The hospodar of Wallachia, without notifying in advance the Russian consul-general, ordered that Russian subject Androniko be taken from [the consul's] residence and imprisoned.

Veli Pasha of the Morea, out of hatred for every Russian, plundered all the property of the Benaki family when war broke out in 1806.

The Russian vice-consul on Santorini was subjected to insults and beatings on Naxos [and] was arrested on Spetsae by order of the kapudan pasha [grand admiral and commander of the Ottoman navy]; [the vice-consul's] documents and
cash were stolen while he was sent to the admiral's fleet in Satali, where he perished.

1814 12 June
Hassan Efendi, ayan of Razgrad, seized from Russian subject Dimitrion Vasilion the horses that Vasilion had sent to Rumelia for sale.

1814 31 December
A customs official in Svishchov levied a tax on titular councillor Pashkovich, who travelled as a courier, and committed other excesses during the passage from Vienna of a cargo ship named Cham.

1814 23 January
The pasha of Aleppo . . . forced the Russian vice-consul to pay 450 piasters. . . [This] sum was exacted from a Russian subject illegally [and] without a preliminary investigation.

1814 12 June
Hadji Ismail Aga of Svishchov seized the ship of Russian subject Nicholas Keto in 1813, costing the latter 270 ducats, which amounts to 3,780 piasters.

1813 18 June
Corsairs, flying the Italian flag after they [received] supplies in ports of the Morea, seized the Russian ship Nautical Seminary and Virgin of Providence (captain Bonaventure Konsil’o) one mile off the island of Sephanto [and] took the ship to one of the Ottoman ports for sale. . . . To retrieve the vessel after its arrival in Constantinople, captain Konsil’o had to pay 7,500 piasters at the request of the Porte.

1814 1 August; 1815 4 April; 1815 21 July
Ottoman subjects Sano Papardello and Hadji Kosta Panagiotu kidnapped captain Giorgio Karadji from the Russian ship Platov in Leonidi (the Morea) [and] seized all the ship documents and the ship, owned by Russian merchant Polia Varvatti and valued at [figure not cited in document].

Acts of Piracy in Ports of the Morea

1815 5 April
Captain Konstantin Stamuli was murdered in Koroni, and his watch was confiscated; [damages amount to] 785 piasters.

1815 8 May
The ship Leoniti was robbed in Koroni. The commander of the ship, captain Kokoli; his nephew; a ship cook; and a merchant from Trieste on board the vessel, were murdered. [Damages amount to] 50,000 piasters.

1815 13 September; 1816 26 June
The ship San Dionysio had 4,300 kile of grain seized in Koroni; captain Panagioti, reimbursed only at the rate of 10 piasters per kile, requests the remaining sum of
15,050 piasters as well as 13,200 piasters for salted fish that was lost and 11,557 piasters for other expenses, [for] a total of 39,807 piasters. 

1815 17 September

The ship *Achilles* (captain Konstantin Dimitriev) had 5,000 kilo of grain confiscated in Navarino.

1815 27 November; 10 June 1816 (a letter to the reis efendi [foreign minister])

The ship *Madonna di Mongiana* (captain Svorono) had 4,123 kilo of grain seized in Navarino, [and] the captain and crew members were coerced; all the damages [amount to] a sum of 65,000 piasters.

**Acts of Piracy Committed by Berbers**

(This category includes not only claims resulting from acts of piracy but other claims resulting from actions committed by Ottoman officials.)

1814 1 December

An armed guard of Algerians seized a ship . . . (captain Daal'); the ship was later returned, but the captain's belongings were stolen.

1815 5 April

A corsair from Tripoli attacked the Russian ship *San Dionysio* (captain Panagioti Apostolopulo). [A sum] of 451 tallaris, which amounts to 2,706 piasters, was stolen.

1815 27 November

A corsair from Tunis attacked the ship *Pache* (captain Kokoli). Baggage worth a sum of 1,837 tallaris, or 11,022 piasters, was stolen.

Corsairs from Tunis and Tripoli raided the ships *Adelaida* (captain Dodero), *Odessa* (captain Angelo Diodero), [and] *San Nicolo* (captain Dodero), stealing baggage worth the sum indicated in the ledger attached to [this] diplomatic note [no figure cited in document].

Algerians confiscated 508 tallaris, which amounts to 3,048 piasters, from two Russian subjects on board an Ottoman vessel (captain Mammuni); also seized were 25 ounces of Spanish gold and some watches.

A corsair from Tripoli attacked the ship *St. Alexander* (captain Raienkovich), took the vessel to Tripoli, then released [it]. Cargo losses and damages total 10,774 5/10 tallaris, which amounts to 64,644 piasters. In addition, the captain requests compensation for damage caused by the detainment of the ship.

1813 22 October

Count Shtakel'berg was robbed in the gulf of Volos and taken to Ludi Konissi; his personal belongings, worth 4,000 piasters, were seized, and [a sum of] 14,000 piasters had to be paid for his ransom. [Total damages] are 18,000 piasters.

1814 18 November

Major Prokopiu of Izmail robbed Russian subjects who had taken shelter in Babadag, where they had been granted asylum. Ottoman authorities compelled [him]
to return only a small part of what had been stolen, leaving a [sum of] 7,339 piasters that must be paid.

1814 11 May
The damage sustained by Russian subject Khatranov in Sinop, resulting from the actions of Ottoman authorities, amount to 20,000 piasters.

1814 18 November
The refusal of Ottoman authorities to render necessary help caused the wreck of the Russian ship San Nicolo (captain Orsali) and its cargo in Sulina.

1814 28 May
Ottoman subject Ligino fled Odessa after stealing 100,000 piasters from Russian merchant Ilia Manessi.

1813 11 August
Ramiz Pasha borrowed 6,600 piasters from Ivan Christodulo.

1813 20 August
A master craftsman from Nikolaev lent Ramiz Pasha a sum of 2,215 rubles, or 2,768 piasters and 30 para; yet another loan amounted to 150 ducats, or 2,100 piasters.
Afanasii Manuilo lent Bosniak Aga 9,372 piasters.
A Russian subject lent Kapydji Bashi Ali Aga a sum of 1,000 rubles, or 1,250 piasters.
A Russian subject lent a Turkish officer a sum of 400 rubles, or 500 piasters.

1815 10 September
Property belonging to lieutenant Vladimirescu in Little Wallachia was seized; the cost of damages, 290,400 piasters, was later reduced to 163,000 piasters.

1816 18 April
The baking oven of the vice-consul of Chios was damaged and plundered.

1815 18 June
Ottoman officials in Jaffa coerced Russian pilgrims on the pretext that the pilgrimage time period authorized by [their] firmans [Ottoman imperial decrees] had expired.

1815 13 September
[Captains and crews] of various Russian ships that dropped anchor at Tenedos had to endure insults and abuse.

1815 11 November

1815 26 November
Ottoman authorities in Smyrna coerced Russian subjects.

1816 11 January
A customs official in Constantinople committed acts of violence against the Russian ship Sibyl (captain Val'iano).
1816 September [no day cited]

The governor of the island of Samos committed acts of violence against captain Mussaki.

The governor of Samos threatened captain Pietro di Giovanni, resulting in the latter's rejection of restitution for damage to his ship and forfeiture of revenue from the freight contract.

Trade Obstacles

1813 21 April

Ottoman authorities in Sulina imposed a ship transit duty on Russian vessels sailing on the Danube.

1813 3 June

The commandant of Ibrail demanded that Russian merchants had to deliver to Constantinople Russian goods loaded in Tamorov.

1813 4 June

A customs official in Smyrna, on a far-fetched pretext spawned by his greed, made attempts to assess a double customs duty on Russian trade.

1813 8 December

Agents of the Moldavian hospodar in Galatz demanded that the price of goods imported from Russia and sold by Russian subjects be reduced. The hospodar's agents objected to the transfer of these goods to Constantinople [even when] they did not have to go through [local] customs.

1814 30 April

Ottoman officials in Smyrna attempted to subject Russian trade to a monopoly, [in violation] of Article 5 of the Treaty of Commerce.

1814 23 January

Wine revenue agents in the Dardanelles demanded a duty on the Russian vice-consul for the wine [he] received for his own use and also on Russian ships in transit for the wine provisions they needed.

1814 21 April

A customs official in Smyrna committed daily violations of the Treaty of Commerce. [He] made demands that Russian subjects should be charged a [special] duty and that if they refused to pay the tax, their brokers would be persecuted and Russian agents, as well as Russian subjects themselves, would be abused.

1814 8 May

The same [Smyrna customs] official made persistent claims about the payment of a double customs duty...
1814 27 May

A customs official in Adrianople illegally extorted a double customs duty, despite being presented with a customs receipt issued in Smyrna; he seized the goods of a Russian subject after the latter's refusal to submit to the demand [of a double duty].

1815 1 May

Officials of the hospodar in Galatz demanded that Russian merchant Prassino sell his imported Russian grain to Turkish retailers or it would be sent to [Constantinople] and handed over to state granaries.

1815 23 December; 1816 February [no day cited]

[Customs officials] in Constantinople detained for 40 days [a cargo of] Russian grain, the property of various Russian merchants, which had been shipped on Ottoman vessels; [the officials] prohibited the transfer of the grain to Russian ships, demanding that it be turned over to state granaries free of charge.

1816 12 July

Ottoman officials on the island of Chios violated Article 47 of the Treaty of Commerce, intending to charge Russian subjects a customs duty on dried fruits. Ottoman officials on Cyprus [and] in Saloniki, Patras, and Aleppo repeatedly tried to obstruct trade and to levy prohibitive tariffs on such goods as silk and wool; advancing similar demands, officials always refer to the Porte's firmans.

The conduct of the head of customs in [Constantinople] serves as proof that he allows his officials [to commit] all these extortions wherever they can cause damage to Russian trade. The demands of the director of the Constantinople customs office are so unfair as to be inconsistent with the [trade] agreements. For example:

1. After the arrival in Constantinople via the Black Sea of a cargo of iron, the director of customs thwarted the plan of a Russian merchant to transfer his own merchandise to his own warehouses; the official demanded from the merchant a 5 percent reduction from the total sum of [the cargo] to satisfy the needs of the Admiralty and wanted to buy the iron at a price set by the Admiralty rather than at a price that would have been acceptable to the owner of the goods.

2. The director of customs endeavours to force Russian traders to sell [cooking] oil and tallow, which they have imported from Russia, at a price fixed by the government.

3. The head of customs attempts to demand payment of a second customs fee from Russian merchants who have shown him receipts [verifying] payment of an initial duty; he does this on the pretext that receipts for goods arriving from any other Ottoman port are either forged or issued by someone who lacks the authority to do so. As a result, arguments arise, leading to a waste of time and causing significant damage to merchants.

4. The director of customs insists on inspecting Russian ships on the pretext that they carry goods belonging to Ottoman subjects who have not paid duties. Russian merchants encounter difficulties not only from the head of customs but also from assessors of the silk tax; besides the duties fixed by the customs tariff, they try to
extort 60 para for every oke [a unit of weight equal to about three pounds] of goods exported by Russian traders from Constantinople.

Hadji Ali Aga borrowed money from various Russian subjects, a sum amounting to 5,922 rubles, or 7,402 piasters and 20 para.

Menukh Aga borrowed money, a sum amounting to 1,318 rubles and 85 kopeks, or 1,648 piasters and 22 para.

In accordance with the figures cited in document [#3], the sum total of Russia's damages caused by Turkish authorities and their subjects amounted to 597,671 piasters and 72 para.

Source: 'Kratkii doklad o nasiliakh, uchinenykh na evropeiskoi granitse, vnutri strany i v portakh, a takzhe ob ushcherbe, ponesennom russkimi poddannymi, s ukazaniem not poslanniki e. i. v-va.' VPR 9 (1974): 724–29.

Document #4

[An inventory of financial claims submitted to the Porte by the Russian envoy Andrei la. Italinskii]

1814 11 May

The Russian ship San Nicolo (captain Andrea Manoli), belonging to merchant Christoforo lorgandopulo and valued at 25,060 piasters, was seized in the port of Constantinople.

1814 11 May

The Russian brig Megas Pyleon (captain Dionysio Manusso), belonging to merchants Kalogeraki and Andrea Lombardo and valued at 79,623 piasters, was seized in the same port [Constantinople].

1814 11 May

The Russian brig Candia (captain Marangopulo), valued at 11,236 rubles, or 139,045 piasters, was seized in the port of Amasya in Asia.

1814 28 May

Hadji Ali Spakhi, a customs official in Patras, confiscated a monetary sum of 10,140 piasters which the Russian consul intended to send to the island of Zante.

[No dates cited in the rest of the document]

The Russian ship St. Alexei (captain Miletti), valued at 24,000 rubles, or 30,000 piasters, was seized in Sinop.

A Russian ship (captain Panagioti Grimani) was seized in Sinop.

The Russian ship Catherine, belonging to Mr. Mosioniffioti and arriving from Alexandria with a cargo of various goods, was impounded in the port of Kutali.

The ship Telemachus (captain Athanasio Mavromati), flying the flag of the Republic of the Seven Islands, was seized in the port of Volos; the requested sum amounts to 79,346 tallaris, or 476,076 piasters.
The Russian ship *Madonna di Candelora* (captain Athanasio Svorono) was commandeered in the port of Amasya in November 1806.

The Russian ship *San Nicolo* (captain Dimitrio Vlakuli) was confiscated in Constantinople. For the cargo, belonging to Russian subject Giovanni Nicolo, a sum of 2,320 tallaris, or 13,920 piasters, is due.

The Russian ship *Madonna Pependi* (captain Nicolo Terendino), valued at 57,490 piasters, was impounded in the same port [Constantinople].

Two Russian ships were seized in the port of Candia. In the same town the residence of Russian vice-consul Bertran was plundered. The damages amount to 41,250 piasters.

In Constantinople in 1806 the Porte confiscated goods belonging to Russian subject Peristeri that were shipped on the Russian vessel *St. Onufrius*. [The ship] was also seized at the same time; the value of the goods on board amounts to 17,830 piasters.

*Source: VPR 9 (1974): 729. This document is untitled.*

**Notes**


[3] For an introduction to AVPRI's rich resources on all aspects of tsarist foreign policy, see Budnik, *Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii*. On AVPRI holdings on Russian trade and consular diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire, see Prousis, 'Archival Gleanings'; idem, 'A Guide to AVPRI Materials'.

[4] The works of Russian scholars cited below (Arsh, Dostian, Fadeev, and Sheremet) are partly based on AVPRI sources.


[8] Details on Russian trade with Constantinople, Patras, and Alexandria during the period 1800–1833 can be gleaned from these shipping *vedomosti* in AVPRI, f. 161, II–3, op. 34: 1802, d. 1, 'O dostavlenii vedomostei ob obrashchaliushchikhsia mezhdu Konstantinopolei i Chernomorskimi portami Rossiskikh i prochikh kupecheskikh sudakh i passazhirakh; o sostoyanii Rossiskoi torgovli v Konstantinopole i o torgovom balanze za 1800, 1801, i 1802 gg.', ll. 1–85; 1820, d. 1, 'O preprovozhdenii v Departamente Vneshnei Torgovli vedomostei o sostoyanii Rossiskogo moreplavaniia v Konstantinopole v techenie 1818–1820 gg.', ll. 1–13; 1821, d. 2, 'O preprovozhdenii v Departamente Vneshnei Torgovli vedomostei o sostoyanii Rossiskogo moreplavaniia v Konstantinopole v techenie 1818–1820 gg.', ll. 1–35; 1821, d. 3, 'O preprovozhdenii v Departamente Vneshnei Torgovli vedomostei o sostoyanii Rossiskogo moreplavaniia v Konstantinopole v techenie 1820 g.', ll. 1–2; 1825, d. 1, 'O preprovozhdenii v Departamente Vneshnei Torgovli vedomostei o sostoyanii Rossiskogo moreplavaniia v Egipte v techenie 1825 g.', ll. 1–4;
Consular records include these reports on trade and related issues in Trebizond, Sinop, the Morea, the Cyclades, and Saloniki, which focus on Greek merchant houses and commercial networks and include a good bibliography of Greek archival and published sources; Vassallo, 'The Maltese Merchant Fleet'; Kremmydas, 'The Greek Merchant Marine'; and Ovcharov, 'The Role of the Greeks in the Black Sea.

On capitulations and rogéti in the Ottoman Empire and their significant impact on trade, see these recent studies, which utilize both Ottoman and Western sources: van den Boogert, The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System; van den Boogert and Fleet, The Ottoman Capitulations; Hamilton, de Groot, and van den Boogert, Friends and Rivals in the East; Ahmad, 'Ottoman Perceptions of the Capitulations'; Goffman, 'The Capitulations and the Question of Authority'; idem, Izmir and the Levantine World; Also see Inalcik, 'Imtiyâzât'; Susa (Sousa), The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey, 1–173; Inalcik and Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 188–95, 480–83, 517–26, 724–42, 837–42; Rey, La protection diplomatique et consulaire, 199–244.

Greek skippers and sailors, owing to their navigational skills and commercial know-how, comprised a sizable portion of the Ottoman as well as the Russian merchant marine. Not just Greeks but Italians, Armenians, Jews, and Arab Christians played a large role in Ottoman maritime commerce. See the sections on trade in Inalcik and Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, and in Braude and Lewis, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. Also useful are Frangakis-Syrett, The Commerce of Smyrna, 68–74, 108–14, 174–77; Sheremet, 'Russko-turetskaia torgovlia i balkanske zemli'; Harlaftis, 'The Role of the Greeks in the Black Sea Trade'; Kardasis, Diaspora Merchants in the Black Sea, which focuses on Greek merchant houses and commercial networks and includes a good bibliography of Greek archival and published sources; Vassallo, 'The Maltese Merchant Fleet'; and Eyiip Özveren and Onur Yildirim. On the development of a Greek merchant fleet, also see Leon, 'The Greek Merchant Marine'; Kremmydas, Elliniki nautilia; idem, Synyria kai emporio; idem, To emporio tis Peloponnisou; Harlaftis, A History of Greek-Owned Shipping; Harlaftis and Charlaute, Istoría tis elínokritis nautilias.

Rey, La protection diplomatique et consulaire, 266–81; Arsh, Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii, 27–166; idem, 'O russkoi sisteme "pokrovitel'stva"', including information on fraudulent transfers of ship titles; Prousis, Russian–Ottoman Relations in the Levant, 1–8.

Upravliauskhii ministerstvom inostrannykh del A. A. Chartoryiskii poslanniku v Konstantinopole A. Ia. Italinskomu; 'Ministr inostrannykh del A. Ia. Budberg poslanniku
On the Russo-Turkish War of 1806–12, see Dostian, Rossiia i balkanskii vopros, 42–79; Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1–24. On Black Sea commerce and shipping during the war, see Herlihy, Odessa, 37–42; Zlotnikov, Kontinent’naia blokada i Rossiia, 253–57, 290–97, 320–23; Prousis, ‘Disputes in the Dardanelles’.


On tsarist policy in the Near East after the Congress of Vienna, see Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 24–41; Dostian, Rossiia i balkanskii vopros, 129–95.


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‘Observations extraite d’un mémoire sur le traité de commerce présenté au ministre de s. m. i. par le conseiller d’État Joseph Fonton en janvier 1809’, VPR 5 (1967): 464–70. For an analysis and an English translation of the Fonton memorandum, see Prousis, ‘Disputes in the Dardanelles’.


For the Eastern crisis of the 1820s and its impact on Russia’s Black Sea trade, see Fadeev, Rossiia i vostochnyi krizis, 52–57; Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution, 26–54; Sheremet, Turtsiia i Adrianopol’skii mir 1829 goda, 7–28; Herlihy, Odessa, 99–101. British consular records from Smyrna and other ports in the Levant reported frequent disruptions in British merchant shipping in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean in the early 1820s. See TNA, FO 78/136, parts 1–3, ff. 1–313.

See the essays in Fisher, A Precarious Balance.

Ottomanists have written scholarly studies on the complex array of currencies used in the Ottoman Empire. I have therefore made no attempt to sort out the exchange rates of the various currencies cited in the documents — rubles, piasters, Dutch ducats, Venetian guilders, and tallaris. The Ottoman Levant did not have a common or standardized system of currency for business transactions in the early nineteenth century; Ottoman gold and silver coins circulated with money from Austria, Spain, Venice, France, Holland, and Britain. The diverse mix of coins and their fluctuating values in regional markets would help explain why Russian and other European merchants in the Levant relied on Greeks, Armenians, Turks, Arabs, and Italians as middlemen and agents. See Issawi, The Economic History of Turkey, 326–29; Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire; idem, 'Evolution of the Ottoman Monetary System'.

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