Deaf Voice and the Invention of Community Interpreting

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Overview

This article presents an analysis of group-level dynamics in the field of signed language interpretation. Groups are us/them categorizations involving insider/outsider identities and memberships. The diagnostic interpretation presented here comes from the situated perspective of a professional ASL/English interpreter, an outsider who entered the field by chance and has spent the last twenty years trying to discern why intercultural communication using simultaneous interpreting appears to be so rife with contention. Theoretically, this is a story of intercultural encounter and organizational development informed by anti-audist, anti-oralist and pro-Deafhood sensibilities.

The goal of this article is to propose three, action learning “hypotheses” to be considered by interpreter educators as conceptual pillars for a comprehensive pedagogical framework that reinvigorates the original Deaf invention of community interpreting. “Although underexplored,” Stone (2009) demonstrates conclusively that “a translation norm exists within the Deaf community” (p. 172). The three hypotheses presented here seek to inspire collective reflection among stakeholders involved or concerned with simultaneous interpretation. Action learning describes one kind of relationship between an individual (e.g., a researcher, trainer, student, or participant/interlocutor) and knowledge. Action learning involves continuous, experiential cycles of investigation, comprehension, reevaluation, and new/revised comprehension among stakeholders (Kolb, 1984). In this case, several research methodologies have been merged, including participant-observation, critical discourse analysis, ethnographic action research, and some critical participatory action research. Patterns of discourse and social interaction that hold across multiple research sites have yielded the following tentative suggestions for growing the
prominence of signed languages, Deaf peoples, and the intercultural communication practice of simultaneous interpretation. ¹

The three hypotheses are presented separately as discrete proposals with specific supporting evidence; however, they are responsive to a composite cluster of inter-related phenomena. Untangling such interrelations is an interpretive task that goes beyond description—the logic used here involves distinguishing levels of social interaction and some of the discursive and cultural effects of language use. The two threads that tie these interdependent social phenomena together are time and ghostwriting (Adam, Carty, & Stone, 2011), especially as the Australian-Irish Deaf culture tradition of ghostwriting is invoked in the professional performances of American Deaf interpreters (Forestal, 2011) and elaborated upon as a Deaf translation norm by Deaf British translator/interpreters in broadcast television (Stone, 2009). The reemergence of Deaf interpreters has been described as “shifting positionality” (Cokely, 2005b, p. 3). This shift is from a position of dependence or oppression to one of empowerment and agency. Observable “resistance among hearing interpreters to chang[ing] how they [work]” (Forestal, 2011, p. 134) is, I argue, a “parallel process” (Alderfer & Smith, 1982) that mirrors the resistance of interlocutors (especially non-deaf interlocutors) to working with interpreters at all.

The theoretical claim is that temporality is neglected in most reflection and research about simultaneous interpreting because it has been taken for granted that the speed of information transfer is a highly significant and non-negotiable measure of effective interpretation. For instance, four of the eleven (73%) sub-criteria that Lee recommended (2009) are:

¹ Sites for action-learning research include workshops, invited presentations, and some of the author’s interpreting contexts for which participants (professional colleagues and/or interlocutors) completed written informed consent forms to authorize their participation in human subjects research.
for measuring the quality of delivery involve time overtly: long pauses, hesitations, false starts
and slow speech rate; and four more involve time implicitly: fillers, noise, excessive repairs or
frequent self-corrections. These sub-criteria are aimed at “deviations” from 1) content accuracy,
2) quality of target language production, and 3) “delivery speed” (p. 175). Lee whittles all the
various suggestions for assessment criteria in the academic literature down to these three because
they are the only ones for which rating scales can be established for reference. Lee claims that
the list of criteria may be exhaustive, but the practical use of so many criteria in test settings is a
moot point” (p. 173). Arguments about the values and benefits of taking or using time to
generate better interpretations and/or guarantee mutual understanding among interlocutors are
precluded from scholarly reflection about the quality of communication during simultaneous
interpretation because pace is so easy to measure and the values of speed are presumed.

Some of the temporal effects of privileging the speed of delivery are made visible in
tensions regarding the use of U.S. Certified Deaf Interpreters (CDIs) and British Deaf
Translator/Interpreters (T/Is) whose contemporary professional performances revive deeply
traditional Deaf community practices for mediating intercultural communication. “The cues,
discourse flow, and turn taking would be based on signaling behaviors normally employed by
Deaf persons” (Eldredge, as cited in Forestal, 2011, p. 116). In a similar vein, Adam et al. (2011)
describe “ghostwriting” as language brokering, translation, and interpreting “that Deaf people
have fulfilled as long as there have been signing Deaf communities” (p. 376).

**Background: Criticism and Absence**

Deaf criticism of simultaneous interpreters provides a strong clue to the problem of speed
in intercultural communication. Blame for unsatisfactory experiences with simultaneous
interpreting was initially cast on a “machine model” of interpreting (Baker-Shenk, 1986). Over
the ensuing decades, sensitivity and responsiveness to criticism of the machine model has been integrated into interpreter education programs and certification maintenance workshops, yet Deaf criticism of simultaneous interpreters persists (e.g., Kent, 2002; Kent, 2005; Kent, 2007; McDermid, 2009). Nowadays, deficiencies are usually cast as a problem of fluency: linguistic or cultural, or both. An interpreter’s degree of demonstrated Deaf culture awareness and ASL fluency are the criteria typically used to describe the consequential contrast between “evolved” versus “schooled” interpreters (Cokely, 2005a).

What we know from the history of the signed language interpreting field is that originally, at the birth of the profession in Evansville, Indiana in 1964, there was only one kind of interpreter. It was forty years before Cokely (2005a) coined the label “evolved interpreter” to distinguish homegrown community interpreters from their counterparts. Evolved interpreters are indigenous. They grow up within the language community interpreting for family and friends as necessary and have, therefore, internalized the norms of social behavior in practical ways, just like every other member or close friend of that culture.

There are distinctions to be drawn between evolved (hearing) interpreters and Deaf interpreters. “Even if interpreters are Deaf (hearing), they have grown up in the community and potentially have a high degree of fluency, but cannot reduce the influence hearing sound has on their way of thinking” (Stone, 2009, p. 95). Until the last few years, however, the crux of comparison, controversy and debate has fallen upon differences that have been observed and experienced by Deaf interlocutors between the performances and outcomes of interpreted interaction by evolved or schooled interpreters.

When this new group of a different type of person, labeled “schooled interpreters” by Cokely (2005a), began entering the field in large numbers in the 1970s and 1980s, a new way of
dealing with intercultural communication, called professional interpreting, was imposed on the Deaf community. Perhaps the most salient difference between the indigenous style of evolved interpreting and the professionalized style of schooled interpreting is relational: “Deaf individuals are being asked to give their trust to someone they have not met before, who has no prior or even current connection to their community, and who might not understand their values and culture” (McDermid, 2009, p. 111).

Scholarship shows that it also took time (two decades) for Baker-Shenk (1986) to generate the right label for the object of Deaf criticism—the machine model. It was twice that time (four decades) before labels for the resulting two types of modern interpreters were coined by Cokely (2005a). These are examples of inventing ways to refer to and talk about lived experience. Adam, et al. (2011) report the use of ghostwriting for a deeply-cultural aspect of Deaf lived experience that was not explicitly given its own label within other deaf communities. Discovering language that accounts for lived experience is a process of knowledge co-construction that illustrates group-level growth in discursive consciousness.

Giddens (1979) described the difference between “practical consciousness, as tacit stocks of knowledge which actors draw upon in the constitution of social activity, and … ‘discursive consciousness’, involving knowledge which actors are able to express on the level of discourse” (p. 5). The transition of practical consciousness to discursive consciousness occurs through reflection:

The reflexive capacities of the human actor are characteristically involved in a continuous manner with the flow of day-to-day conduct in the contexts of social activity. But reflexivity operates only partly on a discursive level. What agents know about what they do, and why they do it—their knowledgeability as agents—is largely carried in practical
consciousness. Practical consciousness consists of all the things which actors know
tacitly about how to 'go on' in the contexts of social life without being able to give them
direct discursive expression. (Thursby, n.d., Paragraph 10)

The premise of this article is that the reaction of the American Deaf community against schooled interpreters indicates the practical consciousness of evolved interpreters still evades professional discourse and remains explicitly absent in interpreter training.

For instance, the certified Deaf interpreters in Forestal’s (2011) research realized “there were times during their school or college years when they would interpret for their classmates, family members, or friends who asked for assistance with communication. They never thought to call this interpreting” (p. 51). The absence of discursive consciousness explains how, despite the growing prominence of discourse, dialogue, and interaction frameworks (e.g., Pöchhacker, 2007) for understanding the complicated social processes occurring among interlocutors and interpreters during simultaneously-interpreted communication, the field has not yet generated a model that animates the interpreter’s performance in a way that is predictably congenial to Deaf sensibilities.

The historical Deaf culture practice of ghostwriting, so named in the 19th century by a small Australian Irish Deaf community (Adam et al., 2011), and components of the Deaf translation norm (Stone, 2009) may now provide a better model. The new model should generate metaphors capable of acculturating simultaneous interpreters into professional performers who are successful in co-constructing relationships based upon mutual understanding among interlocutors in addition to the task of transferring information between them. This praxis hypothesis for paradigm shift can be evaluated through the work of Certified Deaf Interpreters, as already initiated by Forestal (2011) and Stone (2009).
Models and metaphors are conceptually different categories that are deeply intertwined in consciousness and language use (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Reddy 1979). Building on Reddy’s observation that the English language works against notions of fluidity and change by assigning static descriptions to animate processes, Roy (2000) described common metaphors for the interpreter’s role as a bridge or a channel in-between, in the middle of, or otherwise connecting differentiated speakers. The argument of this article is that engineering-based metaphors about the interpreter as a transmission machine accompanied its debut on the world stage, and these electronic and automatic images still inform the assumptions and expectations of interlocutors, as well as those of interpreters. Modern professional performance is based on institutionalized presumptions about how interpreting should be done and normative expectations about what interpreted communication should feel like. These internalized attitudes allow the influence of the machine metaphor to persist, despite new understandings about the unavoidably co-constructed and participatory aspects of all communication processes.

The absence (until recently) of discursive consciousness about ghostwriting and the emergent practices of CDIs has delayed debate between the relational imperative and the informational bias in professional practices of simultaneous interpretation. Incorporating CDIs into the supposed-to-be-streamlined process of interpreting recalls both the linguistic capital and the embodied cultural capital of bilingual Deaf ghostwriters (Adam et al., 2011). Forestal (2011) describes this culturally-Deaf habitus (Bourdieu, 1986) in this way: “Deaf persons are accustomed to having communicative power among each other as they worked towards assuring that everyone was in the know within the Deaf community” (p. 115).

Inserting this Deaf habitus into/against the dominant ‘hearing way’ of social interaction is an act of Deaf voice that brings interpreting back to its pre-machine model community-oriented
roots. “Voice” is used here in the sociolinguistic sense to describe rhetorical effectiveness, specifically: “the capacity to make oneself understood…to generate an uptake . . . . More accurately, [voice] is the capacity to create favorable conditions for a desired uptake” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 68). Establishing conditions for Deaf interlocutors to be able to experience voice during interaction that is simultaneously interpreted could be chosen as the guiding principle for interpreter education.

**Hypotheses for Collective Action Learning**

Lee and Llewellyn-Jones (2011) generated a new metaphor, role space, which, combined with principles from traditional ghostwriting, opens possibilities for the emergence of an alternative model of simultaneous interpretation. Describing zones within which interpreters move is a metaphor using the idea of motion in physical space to illustrate shifting alignments of the interpreter with various interlocutors during the process of simultaneous interpretation. This is a metaphor, first, because in standard practice interpreters do not move: they tend to plant their bodies in a chair or remain standing in a relatively fixed location. Moving one’s body to be physically close to the auditory action is not a common interpreter practice, despite noticeable improvements that can be achieved in cross-language turn-taking when interpreters do physically follow auditory language action (for further discussion, see blog entries at http://www.reflexivity.us/wp/tag/interpreting/).

Role space is a metaphor in another domain of abstraction, too. Unlike the machine model’s (metaphorical) inference that the interpreter is a functional gear in an automated assembly of mechanical parts, the alignments that Lee and Llewellyn-Jones (2011) described are qualitative relationships (Goffman, 1990), not physical movements in actual space. Shifts within the zones of role space represent changes in the configuration of interpersonal relations among
participants in the communication event. Role space is thus a metaphor that draws attention to the relationships among interlocutors with each other as well as between interpreters and interlocutors. Relationships are temporal phenomena: they produce and reproduce identities, cultures, and all manner of dynamics at the interpersonal and intergroup levels.

The attention to relationships in the role space metaphor is significant because it represents an alternative to the machine model’s metaphorical implication regarding the supposed ease of information transfer. Despite critique and sensitivity training, present day simultaneous interpreting is expected to be performed as if the interpreter is a functional gear or a mathematical calculator who uses preprogrammed algorithms to automatically transform information instantly. Functionally isolating language use from social interaction in this artificial way creates an impetus for proceeding without concern for the quality of connection among interlocutors during the process of communicating. This is how the speed of delivery becomes justified as a measure of quality.

The speed problem in simultaneous interpreting is actually twofold: not only are interpreters and interlocutors trained to keep going as fast as possible, relationships develop (or fail to develop) in the dimension of time. Carey (1989) explained how information is used for controlling space, while rituals are used for co-creating relationships over time. Presenting this separation as a dichotomy is heuristic, as all four elements (relationships, information, space, and time) are always present and active in any communication process. Highlighting these two pairings of space with information and time with relationships shows how they often are determinative of communicative outcomes. For instance, these pairings show who is enabled to have (or be denied) voice. A speculation informing this article, then, is this question: What if Deaf people’s resistance to the engineered, transmission model of interpreting is against the
rituals of speed that guarantee information continues to be controlled through the relationships among only the fastest talkers?

The following three, action learning hypotheses are offered based on an analysis that suggests a different problem for interpreting than is usually considered. Posing this alternative relationship-centered schema does not diminish the necessity for interpreters to possess and demonstrate the highest quality linguistic fluency and the most advanced intercultural competence; simultaneous interpreters represent the best of the best of language artists. Rather, the intention is to propose the idea of working with the dimension of time as a baseline competence. Witter-Merithew and Johnson (2005) called for a possible strategy for determining the “starting place” (p. 25) for refocusing critique away from the transmission task in order to definitively ground the essential requirements of professional practice. Focusing on the need to use time to ensure mutual understanding is likely to improve the quality of relationships and therefore reduce inequality.

Hypothesis One (H1, praxis level) seeks to join with and build upon recent exciting developments in sign language interpreter research and training, notably Lee and Llewellyn-Jones’ role space (2011), Witter-Merithew, Johnson, and Nicodemus’s concept of the interpreter’s relational autonomy (2011), Stone’s work on a Deaf translation norm (2009), Adam et al.’s recovery of ghostwriting (2011), and Forestal’s research about CDIs (2011). As a question of praxis, H1 concerns the transaction between H2 and H3—the junction where microsocial behaviors meet macrosocial norms.

Hypothesis Two (H2, macrosocial level) treats professionalization as a type of institutionalization in order to question explanations, understandings and teaching about signed language interpreting that isolate the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf (RID) and the
American Deaf Community from historical developments of the last half of the twentieth century. Hypothesis Three (H3, microsocial level) explores the idea that “holding time” is the essential function of an authorized interpreter using role space according to culturally-Deaf principles for the special intercultural communication practice of community-oriented simultaneous interpretation. The hypotheses for collective action learning are as follows:

H1: The pivot for paradigm shift already exists in the ways evolved interpreters hold their ground in role space; this praxis has roots in the historical precedent of ghostwriting and is most evident in the contemporary practices of Certified Deaf Interpreters.

H2: The Deaf voice is a macrosocial expression of resistance for all language minorities:
   a) intergroup conflict within and about the intercultural communication practice of simultaneous interpretation is the result of an interaction taboo;
   b) the interaction taboo is formalized by restricting the interpreter from interpersonal participation in the interlocutors’ communication, an interpersonal reduction.

H3: Continuing Deaf dissatisfaction with most interpreters is microsocial evidence of inter-group conflict. It signals the possibility of an alternative conceptualization and basis for professional training and practice, tentatively labeled the relational model.

**H1: Holding Ground in Role Space**

Let’s begin with the praxis hypothesis (H1). Praxis is what one actually does, the behaviors, activities and experiences stemming from practical consciousness. The idea of this hypothesis is that Buber’s (1923) notion of "holding ground" provides an initial label for describing what CDIs, ghostwriters, and evolved interpreters do that is most appreciated by Deaf interlocutors during interpreted interaction. (For the clarity of the argument, the categories are presented generically. It should be kept in mind that some schooled interpreters satisfy these
relational criteria and some evolved interpreters do not.) The action learning potential of this praxis hypothesis is that it could lead to a definition for interventions by the interpreter as a curricular training standard as supported by Witter-Merithew and Johnson (2005).

Holding ground is a metaphor for ethical interpersonal communication: it specifically refers to a co-constructed interactive process in which a person (“I”) holds your own ground while being open to the other (“Thou”). Many scholars elaborate upon Buber’s concept of holding ground (Pearce, 2007; Stewart, 2006). In practice…

…holding your own ground (while being open to the other) means that you should not abandon or betray your own commitments, values, beliefs, and perspectives in order to ‘be with,’ engage with or listen to another – but [rather] that you can hold these while also holding—even if temporarily—the reported ideas, experiences, beliefs, perspectives, [and] even challenges of another. (J. Brooks, personal communication, August 25, 2012)

Suggesting Buber’s ethic of interpersonal communication as the practical starting point for interpreter education results from an action learning process based in thinking in terms of time (Neustadt & May, 1986). Thinking in terms of time allows one to consider that the disruptive effect of the machine model on the cultures of Deaf people is an example of a “black swan,” that is, an historical event with deep consequentiality that was not predicted and which has not yet been adequately explained (Taleb, 2005).

The ability to hold ground in role space could become a generative metaphor for simultaneous interpreting because it applies to practitioners and users alike; as such, it is compatible with contemporary dialogue and participation theories of language and social interaction. As the potential foundation for a new model with metaphorical value, holding ground in role space requires considering the relational aspects of interpreted communication as
equal to or more important than the informational content. These relational aspects are highlighted in the historical practices of ghostwriting, by the distinctions that have developed between the performances of evolved and schooled interpreters, and by the professional competence of Deaf interpreters.

**Culture is Relational**

Deaf people had practical consciousness about community-based interpreting long before the birth of the profession in 1964. “There have always been information sharers, and their responsibility within the Deaf community is to ensure that community members understand the information” (Stone, 2009, p. 19). In the 1980s, Sherwood referred to this “original cultural system that [had] been unconsciously derived and unconsciously manifested” (1987, p. 14). In the 1990s, Preston reported evolved interpreters continue to cite “their family [i.e., *communal*] experiences as favoring a less rigid and mechanistic approach to interpreting” (1994, p. 145).

Although not all evolved interpreters perform simultaneous interpretation satisfactorily, McDermid (2009) found that during the first decade of the twenty-first century, Deaf participants in simultaneous interpreting continued to prefer evolved rather than schooled interpreters. The constancy of this finding begs questions not only about what changed with professionalization, but also about what has not yet been recovered and restored from Deaf communal norms about cross-language, intercultural communication. As Stone says, “Deaf people have also acted as translators in Deaf communities since the nineteenth century; those who were better at reading English have always supported those who were not” (2009, p. 32). Characteristics of Deaf translator/interpreters and ghostwriters will be provided in the section on Hypothesis Three.

Meanwhile, McDermid, like many authors writing in the field, casts the machine model as an artifact from history, implying that it no longer has influence. “At one time [italics added], a
successful interpreter was compared to an inanimate translation machine” (2009, p. 108). This metaphor often was accompanied by critique at the individual level in that it ignores the humanity of the interpreter (Frishberg, 1990), but not for the metaphor’s adverse effects on the interpersonal relationships among interlocutors. Despite the fact that theory about interpreting has changed, the analysis represented in this article is based upon evidence that the metaphor of a machine continues to permeate the training and professional performance of interpreters as well as the expectations of interlocutors.

Caught up in the Machine (Part 1)

The implications of professionalization, specifically of investing professional authority in interpreters (Brunson, 2006), were not predicted by the tight community that launched and led the organizing process, which ultimately resulted in RID (Fant, 1990). Lacking discursive consciousness, that is, being unable to articulate the existing practical consciousness of Deaf ghostwriters, Deaf translator/interpreters, and Deaf ways of using evolved interpreters, members of the American Deaf Community and those non-deaf/hearing people who chose to develop careers in the field of signed language interpreting were plunged into intergroup conflict at a traumatic scale.

“I was a robot”

Moore and Levitan (2005) reported one of too many such instances when an interpreter’s authority to assess and act upon practical intercultural communication dynamics was suppressed by the pervasive machine logic.

We’ve read Lou Ann Walker’s harrowing account of ... [being] terribly constrained by the [RID] code of ethics ... a young, poor black woman who had killed her sister’s vicious boyfriend in self-defense... [who] should have been acquitted ... was found guilty and
sentenced to prison. Walker, who sympathized with the woman, was helpless to aid her in court: ‘I was a robot.’ (p. 522)

Preston (1994) explained that “a more mechanistic approach is thought to provide deaf people with unfiltered interactions with the Hearing world; any attempt at clarification merely sustains the barriers between the Deaf and Hearing” (p. 145). Preston’s emphasis on intercultural barriers captures Baker-Shenk’s (1986) original focus on the machine model’s unethical consequences, while also incorporating the meanings added when the Deaf community adopted and spread the term:

Let me clarify my use of the term ‘machine’ model. I first used this term at the 1985 RID Convention...since then, it has been used in a different way, specifically referring to the linguistic process of word-for-sign or sign-for-word, machine-like transliteration. (Baker-Shenk, 1992, p. 123)

A representation of the combined unethical and dysfluent machine model performance of interpreting was provided in a contemporary novel by Boyle (2006) in which identity theft has placed a young deaf woman, Dana, in police custody without her understanding the reason.

When the interpreter (Iverson) arrives, Dana describes the scenario this way:

There’s some huge mistake. All I did was run a four-way stop ... and they, they ...

Iverson took his time. His signing was rigid and inelegant but comprehensible...He held her eyes. His mouth was drawn tight, no sympathy there. It came to her that he believed the charges, believed she’d led a double life, that she’d violated every decent standard and let the deaf community down, one more hearing prejudice confirmed. Yes, his eyes said, the deaf live by their own rules, inferior rules, compromised rules, they live off of us and on us. It was a look she’d seen all her life…
It’s crazy. It’s wrong, a mistake, that’s all. Tell them it’s a mistake.

The coldest look, the smallest Sign. You get one phone call. (p. 12)

Although the novel does not specify that Iverson is a schooled interpreter, his performance is contrasted with a representation of an evolved interpreter:

Officer Runyon actually had her handcuffs out—she was shaking them in Dana’s face, warning her to calm herself down or she’d have no choice but to take her into custody—when the interpreter pulled up … her features already in motion as she crossed the street and stepped between the two of them. “What’s the matter?” she asked and signed it at the same time.

“He was chasing me. He wanted to hurt me. Peck,” Dana said, “Peck Wilson.”

The interpreter looked to P. Runyon and she just shrugged. “That’s all she can talk about. She’s hysterical.”

Who is Peck Wilson? the woman [interpreter] signed, turning to Dana and shutting out the officer.

The thief. He stole my identity. And he chased me, he—

Where is he?

Where is he? The question cut right through her . . . suddenly she was sobbing. The interpreter dropped her hands to her sides and then lifted them again and embraced her.

There was a long suspended moment, the stranger clinging to her in a crowd of strangers, and then she gently disengaged herself…I don’t know, she signed. But I know where his mother is. (Boyle, 2006, pp. 349-350)

The descriptions of the two interpreters’ appearances accentuate their contrasting behaviors. The evolved interpreter “possessed a pair of dark wide-set eyes that absorbed hurt and
confusion and delivered up absolution in its place” (Boyle, 2006, p. 350) while the schooled interpreter has a “punctilious mouth and accusatory eyes and…unforgivably sloppy signing” (p. 29). The two situations involve legal interpreting and require sharing information between police officers and a defendant/victim. The iconic evolved interpreter uses role space to align with Dana while the caricatured school interpreter uses role space to align with the police.

Both of these uses of role space can be critiqued on ethical grounds: each is an extreme characterization representing opposing ends of a spectrum. The iconicity of the evolved interpreter, for instance, includes inviting Dana to her apartment, hosting her overnight because she is far from home. Shared culture between an evolved interpreter and a Deaf interlocutor could invoke sociocultural norms that facilitate shifting the terms of interaction from institutionalized restrictions on ‘moving’ in role space, only to maximize the transmission of information to a kinship basis, which invokes relational considerations. The range of alignments possible during interpreted communication is an outgrowth of temporal processes: biographical and cultural.

Similarly, on the basis of shared “hearing” culture, such close alignments are possible between non-deaf interlocutors and evolved interpreters, and between schooled interpreters and non-deaf interlocutors. According to typical critiques, the most common missing—and missed—pairing is between schooled interpreters and Deaf interlocutors. As represented in Boyle’s (2006) story, the cultural commonality between Dana and the evolved interpreter enables a different kind of decision-making about how to best facilitate the articulation of necessary information between victim and police officer. The shared cultural framework of Deafhood embraces shifting role space alignments during interpreted interaction—especially alignments of the interpreter
with the Deaf interlocutor (for discussion of Deafhood as it relates to cultural commonality, see Ladd, 2003).

The evolved interpreter’s relational decisions to ‘shut the officer out’ and to align separately with Dana long enough to establish connection and glean essential contextual information are examples of a skill that can be developed and used regardless of the amount of direct cross-cultural exposure a student interpreter may acquire. In other words, one does not have to be an evolved interpreter in order to make that kind of decision. Schooled interpreters can learn how to judge when such temporarily radical re-alignments in role space serve the purpose of the overall communication situation.

The metaphor of holding ground may be a way to begin to explain practical skills of the evolved interpreter, including making active decisions about shifting functional alignments within the domain of time. Forestal (2011) found, for instance, that one of the most frequent reasons Deaf interpreters paused the research video to share their thinking with her was to “express reactions toward the H[earing] I[nterpreter] and the dialogue between the HI and the H[earing] C[onsumer]” (p. 87). Their most common criticism involved the failure of the hearing interpreter to manage or ‘hold’ time. In Boyle’s (2006) story, rather than forcing interaction with an apparently disinterested police officer, the evolved interpreter shifts to a kind of consecutive interpreting that divides time among respective interlocutors, ultimately enabling important information to be communicated while simultaneously validating Dana’s humanity (and taking nothing away from the officer, whose attention is diffused by multiple responsibilities at the scene of a crime).

H2: Interpersonal Reduction and the Interaction Taboo
The concepts of “interpersonal reduction” and “interaction taboo” were introduced in a chapter regarding spoken language simultaneous interpretation in the European Parliament (Kent, 2012). To re-state the praxis hypothesis (H1), the pivot for paradigm shift already exists in the ways CDIs and evolved interpreters hold their ground in role space. The shift in paradigm would be from the strict information-centric machine model to a more friendly relational model. The precedent for this relational model exists in the traditional Deaf culture practice of ghostwriting (Adam et al., 2011). The practices and principles of such a relational model are evident in the work of Deaf interpreters (Forestal, 2011; Stone, 2009).

The second hypothesis builds on and contributes back to both the first and third hypotheses. This institutional-level hypothesis (H2) represents the overarching macrosocial conditions that allowed the machine model to gain such metaphorical power within the field of simultaneous interpretation. The destructive microsocial effects of the institutionalized inheritance are what has been revealed in patterns of Deaf critique (H3) regarding general distinctions between the evolved and schooled characteristics of ASL/English simultaneous interpreters (H1).

To recap H2, the Deaf voice is an expression of resistance to the interaction taboo and points explicitly to intergroup conflict. The interaction taboo is most strongly evidenced in the reluctance of non-deaf interlocutors and many interpreters to embrace CDIs. (There is also reluctance by some Deaf people who seem to associate the use of CDIs with some kind of disability; this is another kind of reduction, a reactivity of prejudice and discrimination based in ableism (e.g. Griffin, Peters, & Smith, 2007). The goal of Deaf voice seems to be to establish conditions during interpreted interaction that enable hearing interlocutors to be able to
understand what Deaf people say and to act on Deaf intentions, especially when Deaf people (including Deaf interpreters) talk in culturally Deaf ways and enact culturally Deaf values.

The ultimate measure of success for the interpreted communication was historically defined by the Deaf community in regard to ghostwriters, who were valued because (among other skills) they could speak English well, but “the judgment for ‘speaking well’ comes from the success of the interaction rather than the intelligibility of the speech as judged by non-Deaf people” (emphasis added, Adam et al., 2011, p. 383). Additionally, judgment regarding the English fluency of Deaf ghostwriters probably spread “by ‘word of mouth’ with respect to the success of previous correspondence or interaction” (emphasis added, Adam et al., 2011, p. 386). These judgments are based in a future orientation to time regarding the outcome of interpretation, rather than a past orientation to time, which emphasizes the accuracy of translation by looking ‘backward’ to the so-called source.

Judgments based on outcome rather than delivery clearly reflect a cultural imperative to evaluate interpreter performance according to Deaf-defined criteria rather than criteria imposed externally by non-Deaf people. A similar emphasis on Deaf-defined criteria for the quality of interpreting is expressed by Deaf translator/interpreters working in broadcast television, who place “the greatest importance on the Deaf consumer understanding [the Target Language] information” (Stone, 2009, p. 109). This is inherently relational, i.e., the “construction of relevance” (p. 171) between the Deaf T/I and the audience.

As an historical development, the unexpectedly rapid growth of the signed language interpreting profession in the U.S. catapulted the American Deaf Community into confrontation with the larger “hearing” world. This is a classic case of intergroup conflict. What was striking about the institutional climate of the U.S. signed language interpreting profession in the 1980s
and '90s was how it became an extended site for a ferocious battle by culturally Deaf people to preserve ASL and residential schools for the Deaf as incubators for a vibrant, empowered, diverse cultural community within an encompassing American national identity. Nationalism was not an overt part of the ASL/English bilingual-bicultural movement for cultural education and language preservation, but its assumptions are microsocially embedded (Wilcox, 1989) in the gender and class structure of prominent Deaf activists, protestors, and educators. These assumptions were macrosocially evident in the widespread “English Only” backlash (Olson, 1991) against all bilingual education programs in the U.S.

While the discourse about the practical consciousness of American Deaf Culture in regard to simultaneously-interpreted intercultural communication continues to develop, parallel growth in discursive consciousness has been occurring in the domain of intergroup relations. Within the fields of Deaf Studies and ASL Studies, for instance, the concepts of audism (Humphries, 1975; Lane, 1992), oralism (Ladd, 2003), and bilingual-bicultural education (Mahshie, 1995) either accompany or prefigure the development of theories of whiteness (Fine, 1997), multicultural education (Nieto, 1992), and the embodied simultaneity of identities (Holvino, 2008). Such synchronic developments in social justice thinking and practice form the backdrop for schooled ASL/English interpreters in the U.S. who, like the author, entered the field in the 1980s and 1990s, becoming embroiled in what is essentially an ethnic conflict. We were caught up on the frontlines of a civil rights movement being resolved (to the extent achieved thus far) by means both nonviolent and inclusive.

There are many factors feeding the successes and sustained passion of ASL/English bilingual and bicultural activists. Certainly, the pervasiveness of cultural violations (notably by signed language interpreters, teachers of deaf students, and others) throughout the 1970s and
1980s (not to mention the previous century of repression) contributed to RID becoming a focal point for concentrated criticism. The purpose of H2 is not to emphasize condemnations but to try and generalize in a new direction in order to learn whether there is anything else the particularities of that era might teach. It turns out, for instance, that ideas about the schooling needed to professionalize interpreters came from Europe.

**Historical Foundations of Interpreter Education**

When a plan for organizing a sign language interpreting profession emerged unexpectedly from the 1964 Ball State Workshop (Fant, 1990), simultaneous interpreting between spoken languages had long been practiced at international venues such as the United Nations and the (then) young institutions of the European Union. In 1964, Europe already had three esteemed professional schools dedicated to the training of conference interpreters: the École de traduction et d’interprétation (School of Translation and Interpreting), known as ETI (established 1941 as the EIG, Ecole d’interprètes de Genève); the Institut Supérieur d’Interprétation et de Traduction (Higher Education Institute of Translation and Interpreting), known as ISIT Paris (est. 1957); and École Supérieure d'Interprètes et de Traducteurs (School of Interpreting and Translation), known as ESIT Paris (est. 1958).

Seleskovitch, founder of ESIT’s interpretation program, may have been the only one among the first generation of European interpreter-trainers who recognized the kinship between spoken and signed language interpreting. Her text, *Interpreting for International Conferences: Problems of Language and Communication* (1978), was immediately promoted as required reading by RID. Seleskovitch’s work has been identified by Pöchhacker (2007) as an early articulation of alternative interpretive theory presaging the linguistic turn in social thought, which is what has led to the current prominence of discourse, dialogue and interaction theories of
interpreting. “THE CONCERN OF INTERPRETERS IS DISCOURSE, NOT LANGUAGE.”

Seleskovitch typed on a handout for a teleclass through Waubonsee Community College in 1992 (Section I). Still, Seleskovitch’s ideas were heavily influenced by the model dominating conference interpreting, which owes its roots to the aftermath of WWII. At Nuremberg, the supposed dilemma of intercultural communication was laid bare:

> What were they going to do in the courtroom when an American prosecutor’s questions had to be understood by a German-speaking defendant and the German’s response had to be understood by one judge who speaks Russian, another who spoke French, and a third who spoke English? (Persico, 1994, p. 53)

**Nuremberg: The Originating Scene**

The possibility of generating mutual understanding among four languages was weighed from the beginning against a need for speed, yet the ramifications have received practically no investigation. Scholarship on the Nuremberg International War Crimes Tribunal is extensive; however, as of 1998, Gaiba estimated only a dozen pages involved interpreting, which were spread across a mere four sources: Conot, 1983; Neave, 1978; Persico, 1994; and Tusa & Tusa, 1983. The absence of interpreting from historical analysis is interesting because everyone was concerned with how long the Nuremberg trials could take because of the language differences. “The language problem had surfaced as soon as the talks began in London” (Persico, 1994, p. 53). The attitude that language difference is a problem was commonsense: consecutive interpretation would simply take too long.

Regarded as the birthplace of professional simultaneous interpretation, for our analysis what is important is that the crucible of an international court of law for crimes against humanity established the exemplar for the performance of simultaneous interpreting in all settings.
Requirements imposed on Nuremberg interpreters were dictated by unquestioned imperatives concerning speed, expectations for accuracy based largely on a myth of linguistic equivalence, and the ability of humans to interface seamlessly with electronic technology.

Cast as “this dumb idea that the Americans were putting on” (Gaskin, 1990, p.85), the solution to the language problem was generated by an interpreter. Colonel Léon Dostert had interpreted for General Eisenhower, and for both “the German Army, occupying his town during the First World War and for the American Army which liberated it” (Gaiba, 1998, pp. 133-134). An American military officer born in France, Dostert contacted two officials close to Chief Justice Robert H. Jackson and arranged with IBM to provide a demonstration to Chief Justice Jackson’s aide (Charles Horsky) and his son Bill, convincing them of the idea (Persico, 1994).

Whether Dostert had a flash of insight (spawned, perhaps, by his experiences as an immigrant), reasoned his way through the juxtaposition of time with multilingualism, or simply extended the knowledge he had of the recently patented Filene-Finlay equipment being built and distributed by IBM (Gaiba, 1998), somehow Dostert realized that the new “IBM System” (Tusa & Tusa, 1983) could enable interpretation to be conducted in parallel—simultaneously—rather than in sequence (consecutively). “Our work in Nuremberg was based essentially on [IBM’s development of] the Filene-Finlay system” (Uiberall, as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 43-44).

The IBM System

There was anxiety about getting the system in place. “The equipment went astray” during shipping (Tusa & Tusa, 1983, p. 218) and “everything depended on having the interpreting system in place on opening day” (Persico, 1994, p. 12). When it did arrive, only three weeks in advance (Gaiba, 1998, p. 39), “the British Signal Corps did all the wiring, and laid many miles of wiring in there. It was a very sophisticated network” (Chapman, as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 93).
While the wiring was being installed, the interpreters were playing at a mock trial in the
courtroom’s attic. “We played various roles which we had to guess at because no one had seen a
war crimes trial before. . . . we discovered a number of things that we had not thought of before”
(Uiberall, as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 42-43). In a review of Gaiba’s *The Origins of
Simultaneous Interpretation*, Morris summarized the complicated process this way:

> Those responsible for the arrangements as they affected the interpreters tried to ensure
that the latter had the best possible conditions for their work, subject to time and space
constraints. Having dared take the risk of making use of an untried approach - the
‘simultaneous’ technique had been used in the pre-war period only for the reading out of
pre-translated versions of speeches or simultaneously providing multiple-language
versions of consecutive interpretation - they tried to build in as many measures as
possible to enable the interpreters to do the best job possible. They also recognized the
human element. Arrangements were made to provide discreet signals when a speaker
needed to slow down, or if it became necessary to interrupt the proceedings for reasons
related to interpretation. A monitor in the courtroom constantly kept an ear on all
working interpreters, and was prepared to replace anyone who showed signs of fatigue, if
necessary interrupting the proceedings to do so. (1999, p. 352)

One of the most prominent features of the IBM system as it was used during the Nuremberg
trials was awareness of and attention to the social implications of using the technology.

Acknowledging these implications required participation by interlocutors: speakers and listeners
were actively involved in the overall facilitation of the simultaneous interpretation process.

> Alfred Steer, Administrative Head of the Language Division at the trials, explained: “We
had a system of two lights: a yellow one meaning ‘Please slow down,’ and a red one meaning
‘Please stop the proceedings momentarily’” (Gaskin, 1990, p. 38). The lights were an outcome of the mock trials:

In the first place, there is a certain speed beyond which you cannot possibly hear and talk, so there had to be a system to keep people from getting too fast. Then someone came up with the idea of light signals: a yellow light coming on for ‘slow down’, and a red one for ‘stop’. The latter was for situations where the interpreter could not carry on because he had a coughing spell or something – it happened once or twice – and then you pushed the red button, and everything stopped until you were ready to go on. (Uiberall, as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 43)

The role of a monitor was invented, as described above, to watch for impending interpreter failure. The monitor sat very close to the currently-working interpreter because “sometimes it was possible to step in and help” (Uiberall, as cited in Gaskin, p. 43). Alfred Steer stated, “I’d press the red one, which was in front of Lord Justice Lawrence, he would stop everything and I’d make the shift” (Gaskin, 1990, p. 38).

Most surprising (looking back from today’s standard practice), the following was widely understood and accepted:

Interpreting in these cases had a lot of pitfalls, and very often at the end of the day we [interpreters] were not exactly overjoyed at the way it came through. We would run upstairs to the reviewing people and say, ‘Hey, that wasn’t exactly the best way to do it. Have you checked that?’ You had a lot of safeguards against mistranslations—I don’t think any that occurred remained in the transcript. (Uiberall, as cited in Gaskin, p. 47)

The reviewing process was the work of a third team of interpreters (Gaiba, 1998; Gaskin, 1990). Peter Uiberall, “one of the longest-serving interpreters at the Nuremberg Trials” (Morris, 1999,
p. 351), says it was a fight to convince the personnel people to allow the third team (Gaiba, 1998). Interpreter monitors (what we would call team interpreters today) and transcript reviewers were communication accommodations made in recognition that “the human element” (Morris, 1999, p. 352) had to be taken into account, including the effects of time pressure on spontaneous performance.

Making corrections and edits in the record after the fact was an embedded aspect of the Nuremberg precedent. “Upstairs in the court-house we had a section which was called the reviewing section, where the transcript of the preceding day was gone over by interpreters of the third team” (Gaskin, 1990, p. 45). Uiberall continued to describe the teamwork functions of the interpreters:

It was absolutely necessary to have three teams of interpreters: two teams alternated in the court-room, with one team on stand-by in the radio room behind, with phone connection [ready to relieve failing interpreters], and the third team was up in the reviewing section, going over the previous day’s transcript word for word: hearing the original, seeing the text of the translation and correcting it. (Gaskin, 1990, p. 45)

It also was not unusual for the interpreters to receive help from others in the courtroom. Besides debates over meaning among the legal counsel, Uiberall explained how defendants in particular were highly attuned to the interpreters when he said:

Whenever an interpreter got stuck on some technical term that a German witness used, you would see either Speer or Schacht or both quickly whip out a piece of paper, write the English term on it, and send it along the line to the defendant who was sitting closest to the interpreter, who slipped it under the glass partition. So we were grateful to them.
They were interested in good translation, as we were, and were helping where they could.

(Gaskin, 1990, p. 84)

**Interpreters on Trial**

IBM was “eager to pioneer the world’s first system of simultaneous interpretation” (Persico, 1994, p. 54), which they called the “International Translator System” (Tusa & Tusa, 1983, p. 110). The IBM System enabled up to five different languages to be transmitted along separate audio channels; the human beings required to produce the essential interpretations of the languages distributed across those channels were the last addition to this revolutionary technology. Chief Justice Jackson’s executive, Brigadier General Gill explained “the system would only work if every delegation recruited top-notch interpreters” (Gaiba, 1998, p. 45).

Discovering individuals able to operationalize IBM’s technology so that it could function as desired proved difficult. “Only one prospect in twenty had the mental agility to listen and talk at the same time” (Persico, 1994, p. 112). The requirements applied to prospective interpreters were as strict as those applied to the electronics. The skillset required for simultaneous interpreting was quickly differentiated from the skills required for a) consecutive interpreting, which utilizes notetaking and allows an interpreter to work with whole messages rather than fragments; and b) translating written texts, which occurs ‘off-line’ and ‘behind-the-scenes’ at the translator’s individual pace (Gaiba, 1998). Siegfried Ramler, another interpreter at Nuremberg, explained that simultaneous interpreting “called for the ability to think of the second best word instantly, or the third best word, because you could not afford to stop” (U.S. Courts, 2010).

By his own account, Steer in his administrative capacity tested approximately 400 potential interpreters, having the most success with individuals from small countries such as Belgium and Holland or who worked in telephone services:
The Paris international telephone exchange was a superb place to pick people up, because they had to deal with conversations in all languages. But I found that only about five per cent of experienced [consecutive] interpreters could do this Nuremberg job, because of the nervous control that was needed, and because it was simultaneous. (Gaskin, 1990, p. 39)

Uiberall emphasized the significance of the time element when he said, “Before 1945, simultaneous interpretation had not existed in the form in which we used it at Nuremberg. . . . something entirely new had come up: we had to do spontaneous interpretation, immediate interpretation” (as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 43-44). A mixture of concern, discomfort, and skepticism led planners of the tribunal to doubt this new means of manipulating time (Gaiba, 1998, p. 37). “The decision to use it at the trial was hard to take because no delegation felt comfortable with the multilingual character of the trial and most believed at first that simultaneous interpretation would not work at all” (Gaiba, p. 32). Indeed, “it was hardly credible that one system could provide access to five languages, and beyond imagining that translations [sic] would ever be able to keep up with the proceedings” (Tusa & Tusa, 1983, p. 110).

The Ideology of Speed

The ideology of speed is only touched upon here, but it completely infiltrates the interpreter’s role space. Griffiths (2004) briefly summarized an early champion of “the cult of speed” (p. 52), referring to Italian futurist Marinetti’s *New Religion-Morality of Speed* (1916), where he writes of “a new good: speed, and a new evil: slowness” because “slowness is naturally foul” (p. 52). Griffiths also quoted a critic:

Paul Virilio writes in *Speed and Politics* (1986) that “Western man has appeared superior and dominant, despite inferior demographics, because he appeared more rapid. In colonial genocide or ethnocide, he was the survivor because he was in fact super-quick
(sur-vif). The French word *vif*, ‘lively,’ incorporates at least three meanings: swiftness, speed (*vitesse*), likened to violence — sudden force, abrupt edge . . . and to life (*vie*) itself: to be quick means to stay alive . . . (p. 55)

For the Nuremberg trials, only those interpreters who were quick enough survived the encounter with the IBM system. “More than 200 people were tested before the trial to obtain the first 36 simultaneous interpreters” (Gaiba, 1998, p. 48). Turnover during the trial was calculated at 104% (Gaiba, 1998, p. 56). Steer explained this phenomenon further:

> I acted as an interpreter on a few occasions, but I wasn’t very good at it. You need a certain amount of absolutely iron nervous control, so that you can absolutely rely on the fact that you’re never going to stutter or stop, ever. (Gaskin, 1990, p. 38)

A court clerk, Ron Chapman, observed the situation: “The interpreters couldn’t wait until the whole question had finished, and then translate [sic] it, because it would take so long, and it would lose its continuation” (Gaskin, 1990, p. 93). Uiberall, who eventually became Chief Interpreter (Gaiba, 1998), described the Russian interpreters in this way:

> [They were] excellent – I never saw them flounder. And it is very difficult to translate into Russian, for the simple reason that the Russian is so much longer: there are more words, so you have to speak faster and get more in during the same period of time. (Gaskin, 1990, p. 70)

In fact, Steer explained, “if the lag got longer [than eight to ten seconds], the interpreter would soon get into trouble, because you can only hold a limited number of words in your memory under those conditions” (Gaskin, 1990 p. 39). Steer added, “it tickled me no end that [defendant Albert] Speer was the first one to grasp that this idea [of simultaneous interpreting] was workable and was saving an enormous amount of time” (p. 85).
The repeated emphasis on saving time, not being able to wait, needing to speak faster so as to compress language into less time than its grammar requires, and otherwise not losing time, demonstrate that speed was determined to be the single most significant criteria driving the professional delivery of simultaneous interpretation. “I know for a fact that it was such a stressful thing for these translators [sic] that two or three of them had nervous breakdowns during the trial. It was really terrible, because they could not afford to get a word wrong,” says Chapman (as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 93). In addition to creating speed as the primary baseline metric for assessing the functionality of a simultaneous interpreter, the normal processes of communicative repair were denied to interpreters. The participants at Nuremberg—judges, defendants, interpreters, administrators, witnesses, reporters and public observers—erected a social taboo to isolate the interpreter from the inherently interactive process of co-constructing meaning.

Iron Nervous Control and the Interpersonal Reduction

Steer, quoted above describing his inability to perform to the specification of speed admits, “I couldn’t attain that sort of assurance. . . . We found that the job of interpreting was so nerve-racking that the individual could not do this day after day” (as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 38). By assurance, Steer is probably referring to closure—that skill Ramler (U.S. Courts, 2010) names as “the ability to think of the second best word instantly [emphasis added], or the third best word.” There is a fallacy implied in Ramler’s description: the metaphor of number is an example of the myth of linguistic equivalence in that anyone or everyone would rank the first, second, and third “best words” similarly, despite interpreters’ professional knowledge that “There is no such thing as an exact translation of any word” (Uiberall, as cited in Gaskin, p. 48).

Isolation of the interpreter as a linguistic functionary who makes simple digital decisions is a mechanism of control (“this” word or “that” word). The interpreter is forced to eliminate the
relational. Cultural distinctions in terms of social interaction and the non-verbal are erased or suppressed in favor of the more palpable variables of language use at the levels of, say, morphology and syntax. This is evidenced by models for assessing the quality of interpretation, which always begin with an evaluation of the accuracy of diction (literally, ‘exact translation at the level of word) or sense (more loosely, at the level of phrasal or aggregate meaning) from source to target text (see Pöchhacker, 2001, p. 413). The success of the communicative interaction is represented as following linearly from “an accurate rendition of source.” The underlying assumption is that the faster an interpreter generates an “adequate target-language expression” then an “equivalent intended effect” is (apparently) guaranteed and the communication interaction is deemed successful on the basis of linguistic criteria alone. Notably, the temporal direction of evaluation is backwards rather than forward in time; the source is taken as definitive, instituting constraints on the target that can inhibit voice.

In other words, the cost of misunderstanding (or even failure) at the cultural or social level is presumed to be lower (as in, not worth worrying about too much) than the gain of connected knowing (i.e., of co-creating a relationship solidly based in mutual understanding). The supposedly lower cost of damaged relationships is quantified in an absolute sense (i.e, source-determined accuracy), which may not correspond with anyone’s desired outcome. As the control, the simultaneous interpreter is designed (technically, produced) to make steering adjustments. However, the institutionalized automatic pilot of the interpersonal reduction inhibits interpreters—and interlocutors—from operating with relational autonomy. Relational autonomy (Witter-Merithew et al., 2010) is the ability (one could perhaps go so far as to say the authority) of interpreters to choose alignments in role space. Witter-Merithew et al., explained “effective autonomy is achieved when the social conditions that support it are in place and give the
practitioner—and consumers—the confidence to take charge of choices” (p. 50).

Although these will not be detailed here, some of the disciplinary methods used to ensure interpreters’ conformity to the need for speed and limits of interaction include ridicule (Kent, 2009) and banishment or threat of banishment. For instance, the latter is exemplified in textbooks and scholarly literature on international business, which routinely include negative anecdotes or other aspersions against the use of simultaneous interpreters (Luo & Shenkar, 2006; Verluyten, 2000). These social sanctions emerge from the simple engineering standard utilized at Nuremberg: failure. “We had repeated instances when an interpreter would simply fail, break down, be unable to continue, and we would have to put in a substitute at as short notice as possible, so that the court wouldn’t be delayed any more than need be” (Steer, as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 38).

**The Interaction Taboo**

The conditions of the Nuremberg Tribunal combined with the IBM system created a perfect petri dish for the ideology of speed: insert bilingual or multilingual human being with iron nervous control and out spurts the professional simultaneous interpreter. No one seriously questioned the machine model until it reached beyond the conference and into the community. This is unusual in and of itself.

**The Social Construction of Technology**

In a landmark article about the social construction of the automobile, Kline and Pinch (1996) demonstrated conclusively how “users of technology acted as agents of technological change” (p. 764). Compare the automobile with the IBM system, and car drivers and passengers with interlocutors and interpreters. Kline and Pinch showed how farm workers in the rural United States acted with “interpretive flexibility” by adapting the automobile to a wide range of
practical uses that were unintended by the manufacturer. By interpretive flexibility, Kline and Pinch refer to the new meanings . . . given to the car by the new emerging social group of users . . . To the urban user the car meant transport. For the rural users we have identified, the car, as well as being a form of transport, could be a farm tool, a stationary source of power, part of a domestic technology [such as a laundry machine], or perhaps all of these. (p. 777) Kline and Pinch’s analysis shows a dynamic of competing interests among social groups who are brought into contact with each other by the technology. Such social negotiation is strikingly absent from the development of the system of simultaneous interpretation. Despite the pervasive evidence of failure at Nuremberg, no one questioned the loading of tasks onto the interpreter.

While the automobile industry struggled for decades to establish closure on the social meaning and practical uses of the car (Kline & Pinch, 1996), the first interpreters and the first consumers of simultaneous interpretation accepted the component specifications for the simultaneous interpreter without apparent question or critique. This model was picked up by the first wave of interpreter trainers without doubt and is evidence of the ideology of speed. No one imagined other, additional or different ways of using simultaneous interpreting because there was social consensus that the interpreter was supposed to blend in as an invisible part of the machine.

**Challenging the Machine’s Interaction Taboo, or, Caught up in the Machine (Part 2)**

With uncanny accuracy, Deaf people pinpointed the problem of speed in the machine-like, information-centric model of professionalized simultaneous interpreting. “The ‘machine’ or ‘conduit’ model...greatly limited [interpreters’] responsibility for either party’s understanding of the other’s message. Like a typewriter or telephone answering machine, we [interpreters] were
only to transmit what we had received without altering its contents in any way” (Mindess, 1999, p. 13). Hoza (1999) went on to say:

The focus of this [machine or conduit] metaphor is on interpreting the language of the participants, with the assumption that the primary difference between Deaf people and hearing people can be explained by differences in language and modality (signed vs. spoken language). The assumption is that the responsibility of the interpreter is to convey each person’s words, which would otherwise be inaccessible due to the modality difference. (p. 44)

As previously stated, Seleskovitch emphasized that “interpreters deal with discourse (acts of speech) not with language out of context” (1992, Section 1). However Deaf resistance to professionalized simultaneous interpretation as performed by schooled interpreters is aimed at language reduced to information only, illustrating the importance of both the relational (i.e., the context of the discourse) and the informational aspects of communication. Carey’s (1989) explanation regarding how these two aspects of all communication processes can be represented as if they are stand-alone, opposed models helps to think through the imbalance of the transmission/information model being privileged over the ritual/relational model. Carey elaborated upon the different emphases of these models in terms of controlling space (through the transmission of information, especially if only provided once) and co-constructing culture (through rituals repeated in time).

From this perspective, the history of simultaneous interpreting illustrates the colonization of time by the ideology of speed. This has been accomplished by socially constructing the simultaneous interpreter to enforce an interaction taboo: ‘Don’t move in role space!’ or, perhaps more precisely, “Don’t hold up time!” The interaction taboo is achieved by the interpersonal
reduction of the interpreter to an information-transmission component in an unstoppable machine. Together, the social residue of the machine metaphor perpetuates the bias of privileging information over relationship.

H3: Deaf Voice and the Discursive Invention of Community Interpreting

What Deaf people’s criticism brings into view is that the machine model outcome of the Nuremberg precedent is a transmission-based model of simultaneous interpretation—one that emphasizes information rather than relationships. In 1964, without a comparative historical context, and never having had a reason to defend the evolved interpreting model, signed language activists initiated an organizational process with unintended consequences. Suddenly, in less than a decade, the amazing intercultural communication accommodation of simultaneous interpretation was being experienced as contributing to the oppression of Deaf people more than alleviating it.

The third, action learning hypothesis takes the microsocial level of continuing dissatisfaction of the Deaf community with interpreters (especially schooled interpreters) as evidence that the practical consciousness of CDIs and evolved interpreters has not yet been fully realized in discursive consciousness. One factor in this institutional delay could be because many members of the Deaf community seem to also be conditioned by the ideology of speed and convinced that information is more important than relationship. The labels of conference and community interpreting signal the modern hierarchy: the ideology of speed prefers ‘talking about’ (to confer) rather than ‘talking with’ (to commune). Another factor in the delay has been the absence of Deaf terms for traditional practices such as ghostwriting, and little research regarding culturally Deaf norms for performing interpretation. If we are to successfully shift the
paradigm from relational neglect to a balanced incorporation of information with cultural variation, the new model and its metaphors must encompass interlocutors as well as interpreters.

**Constructing A Different Model**

Napier explained how the Conference of Interpreter Trainers (CIT) was established and “set the benchmark” of professional community interpreting for the world (2011, p. 357). CIT was established six years before Baker-Shenk (1986) publicized Deaf criticism of the machine model of interpreting. Within twenty years, Mindess could report that professors for spoken language interpreting at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (California) “consider sign language interpreters very advanced in our discussions about the cultural aspects of interpreting and in the idea of interpreters as bicultural mediators” (1999, p. 161). Proof follows in that the international Critical Link conferences on community/public service interpreting have included signed language interpreters on par with spoken language interpreters since their inception in 1995. And, finally, the premiere association for conference interpreters, the International Association of Conference Interpreters (AIIC), officially began to recognize and admit signed language interpreters at the dawn of the 21st century. How did signed language interpreters become so cutting-edge?

**Reclaiming Community Interpreting**

Members of American Deaf Culture understand the creation of the first professional organization for signed language interpreters as an “offshoot of the Deaf civil-rights movement” (Moore & Levitan, 2005, p. 525). This Deaf claim informs education, training, and professional development discourses within the field. It is a heritage that is acknowledged even though the debt of cultural damage has not yet been repaid. More significantly, this moral claim now has historical backing.
The lack of knowledge or awareness about ghostwriters on the part of ‘hearing’ interpreters (be they from Deaf families or not) [demonstrates that] hearing adults working as interpreters, even those who grew up in Deaf families, often do not know of these traditional structures for providing translation and interpreting. This highlights [evolved interpreters’] hybrid identity; as core members of the Deaf community Deaf people were aware even at a young age of the ghostwriters and their work. (Adam et al., 2011, p. 386)

This proof of the invention of genuinely community-oriented interpreting occurred within the Deaf community, among and between members of the Deaf community. The traditional practices of ghostwriters are visible today and becoming increasingly evident in the practices of Deaf interpreters.

**Deaf Norms for Interpreting**

The extrapolation that follows is drawn from the asynchronous practices of ghostwriters and Deaf translator/interpreters producing performed interpretation for British television. Those two practices differ in significant ways from the spontaneous simultaneous interpretation that is the main subject of this article. The argument being proposed is that the articulated aims and methods by which ghostwriters and Deaf translator/interpreters generate effective intercultural communication are temporal rubrics that make sense of the work being done by certified Deaf interpreters, and that this work already contains all the necessary components of a relational model for community interpreting. Kay (a participant in Stone’s 2009 research) states, “Hearing interpreters should copy Deaf interpreters” (p. 95). The question is what, exactly, should be copied?
There are several principles from the Deaf translation norm recorded by Stone (2009) that can readily transfer to simultaneous interpretation. These include very explicit guidelines regarding the use of role space, such as “taking no more or less time needed to ensure understanding” (emphasis added, p. 171). Specifically, the Deaf Translator/Interpreters in Stone’s study took the time to “give themselves the agency to construct an optimally relevant” target language text (p. 7-8), “rendering this information many times” (p. 170) to re-order and ensure restructuring and changing the information form of the source language, which may include adding information, increasing implicature, and enriching concepts. The goal is to facilitate the “least cognitive effort” for the Deaf audience by generating target language that is “easily comprehensible” (p. 167). It should be noted that comprehension is typically taken for granted by non-deaf interlocutors, which is another reason why any new metaphors must emphasize the interlocutor as a participant in the mutual construction of understanding.

Above all, ghostwriters and Deaf Translator/Interpreters are motivated to ensure understanding and construct relevance by expressing the communicative intent they perceived in the spoken language in a culturally appropriate way in the signed language (p. 7-8). Contrary to the transmission model’s emphasis on linguistic fluency as diction, “fluency within the Deaf perspective is not concerned with lexical choice; rather…[with] exhibit[ing] specific types of prosodic marking” (Stone, 2009, p. xi). Prosodic features are crucial because they construct coherence (p. 110, 168), allow perception of cultural ownership of the language (p. 94, 149), and establish rapport (p. 167). Rehearsal and repetition, or re-telling, in advance preparation are equivalent to repairs (e.g., restatements, rephrasing) during interaction. Perhaps “externalized editing” (p. 141) is another skill that certified Deaf interpreters already use. In fact, the Deaf translation norm insists on the interpreter’s presence, which “resists the idea of merely ‘relaying
the information” (p. 109). Instead, interpreters are to participate by “construct[ing] the action or dialogue as if involved in the scene rather than external to it” (p. 105). One of the ways this is accomplished prosodically is through eye blinks, which are of “dialogue rather than monologue frequencies (Sze 2004)” (in Stone, 2009, p. 167, 169).

In regard to producing the signed language used by Deaf interlocutors (ASL, BSL, or Australian-Irish Signed Language, for instance), evidence of the spoken source language should be removed, so that it “appears as if it were an original text rather than a translation or interpretation” (p. 110). In other words, it should be unmarked – not even using “marked language in order to bring mainstream concepts to the Deaf audience. The Deaf T/Is do not desire marked language, preferring instead metanotative features or individual style” (p. 106). Rather than assuming Deaf interlocutors have some fluency in English (or any other spoken language), the aim is to generate sense for Deaf monolinguals through prosody and other features of naturalness. To perform these linguistic tasks adequately, interpreters—Hearing as well as Deaf—must be more skilled than regular bilinguals.

In this summary of Deaf Translator/Interpreter’s work preparing for and providing translation performances for broadcast television, I am not ignoring the fact that the research conditions allowed the Deaf interpreters “to take as long as they required to render the S[ource] L[anguage] into the T[arget] L[anguage]” (Stone, 2009, p. 14). Rather, I am suggesting that reevaluating the supposed efficiency of time constraints is a necessary antidote to the grip of the ideology of speed within the information-biased model. Also, I am not engaging overmuch with the political or constructed audience components of Stone’s work (p. 165), as I believe experimentation, dialogue, and reflection on a relational model will redress these concerns. Adaptation and fluidity among interlocutors who are attentive to the interpreter’s engaged
presence and authorized use of role space will enable community interpreting to grow beyond its current limitations.

From the “unexpected outcome” (Fant, 1990, p. 6) of a federally-funded Workshop on Interpreting for the Deaf to the black swan onset of the machine model, the Deaf community has been caught up in modernity just like everybody else. Colonel Dostert promised “a trial in four languages [that] could proceed almost as rapidly as a trial in one” (Persico, 1994, p. 54), even as he admitted that there were “gremlins [that] still had to be worked out” (Persico, 1994, p. 54). In Dostert’s mind at that moment the gremlins were probably issues of information transmission, yet—now we know—there was a social challenge, too. The history of simultaneous interpreting includes the steady, persistent and determined progress of the Deaf community to return the professional practice of signed language interpreting back to its ghostwritten roots in communication practices in which people’s relationships with each other matter as much as the information they wish to share.

According to minutes published in Fant’s (1990) retrospective, 66 people launched the professionalization of simultaneous ASL/English interpreting. One-third of these founders were Deaf. They were called sustaining members, and seven of the Deaf sustaining members self-identified as interpreters. Mindess asked us to take note of the label, “sustaining [italics added] members” (1999). “Finally,” exclaimed three participants in Forestal’s (2011) research on Deaf interpreters, “when the HI on the video acknowledged the DI, and introduced the DI to the HC” (p. 68). That interpersonal moment is a microsocial reaction to a macrosocial (historical, institutionalized) dynamic: when the schooling of (those who would become) schooled interpreters expanded beyond the scope that could be managed by the Deaf sustainers, a
diagnosis of oppression emerged as both logical explanation and empowered resistance. In her conclusion, Forestal calls for social transformation:

Training for reacculturation (Bruffee, 1996, p. 66) towards a “community-based model” (Bartley & Stone, 2008) … would guide the DIs to shift from the mainstream model of interpreting. Training for hearing interpreters would guide them toward collaborating with Deaf interpreters as equal partners, with the DIs coordinating the team process. This will require a social transformation. (Forestal, 2011, p. 127)

**Resisting Role Constriction and the Devaluation of Relationships**

Celebrating the achievement of simultaneous interpreting at Nuremberg is warranted and necessary. Unfortunately, none of the holistic design components that acknowledged factors of social interaction from the Nuremberg precedent have been carried forward.

The fairness of the Nuremberg Trial is something that impressed me [said Peter Uiberall] at all times…The standards of fairness that were applied at Nuremberg were unique — they were unfortunately not copied everywhere else — and we were very proud of that…especially in the sense that any feature which favored the defendant was to be included.

(Gaskin, 1990, p. 85)

Instead, norms stemming from the ideology of speed, including the interaction taboo and the interpersonal reduction, intensified and remained unchallenged until the entry of Deaf people as a new social group began to negotiate the performance, use and practices of simultaneous interpreting. Indeed, “the relatively recent emergence of Deaf people interpreting on television has encouraged some debate by Deaf broadcasters and their allies about whether hearing interpreters should be working in this area at all (Duncan, 1997)” (Stone, 2009, p. 25). The criterion of speed engages two simultaneous decision-making processes, each in different realms.
Information, the overt message content, is one realm, and relationship, the sublime connection, is the other. At Nuremberg, interlocutors expected interpreters to function like the rest of the electronic device, and interpreters, for their part, did not want to fail. This combination privileged information over relationship, socially constructing a one-dimensional interpreter role rather than the multidimensional role space (Lee & Llewellyn-Jones, 2011) and deauthorizing the interpreter’s relational autonomy (Witter-Merithew et al., 2010).

The indicator of impending failure was slowing down, a violation of the ideology of speed. As Gaiba reported, “Speed was the acid test” (1998, p. 46; also Persico, 1994, p. 111-112). Breaking down was an unforgivable disruption to the onward rush. Exercising this rapid-fire iron nervous control has not exactly come without cost. For instance, Harvey (2001) described vicarious trauma suffered by interpreters who observe, witness, and otherwise find themselves in the position of participating in discrimination or any other stereotypical, prejudice-based behavior toward persons who are Deaf or hard of hearing.

Back at Nuremberg, the trauma situation was overt and stark. The stakes were extreme, the wounds fresh. “You didn’t have time to think about the content of what you were saying, but it came back to you in your sleep, in nightmares” (Uiberall, as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 48). It would have made sense, morally (in the situation) and ethically (according to overall principle), to insulate and protect oneself as an interpreter by elevating information over relationship. How else could one deal with “the general atmosphere of the trial [which] was depressing, to the point that one became inured by all the atrocities” (Gaiba, 1998, p. 157).

In an important sense, it was a certain set of relationships that were on trial: the rules of war between nations bearing down upon the interpersonal treatment of one’s enemies. After WWII, punishment is what mattered, this seemed to require an engineer’s precision in the realm
of information in order to determine degrees of guilt. To date, the “iron cage” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) of the interpersonal reduction in simultaneous interpretation represses the fluid flux of co-constructing mutual understanding. This is the context that birthed the machine model of interpreting. No wonder Deaf people were so taken by surprise by the machine-like performance of schooled interpreters; they had never experienced interpreting as a competitive trial among sworn enemies.

**Deaf Interpreter Process**

Summarizing results from her research “to discover the steps used to ensure effective interpretation, as well as the resources and strategies needed to accomplish analysis for interpretation” (Forestal, 2011, p. 40), Forestal found all of the characteristics of a Deaf translation norm as identified by Stone (2009). For this article, I am going to single out only the “management of the information flow” (Forestal, 2011, p. 116). Managing the flow features differently in her research than in Stone’s because the Deaf translator/interpreters in Stone’s study had to imagine their interlocutors (the television audience); the absence of back-and-forth interaction allowed them to focus exclusively on organizing the information. This is radically different than the interactive, turn-taking dynamics of face-to-face, real-time interpretation. Forestal’s method involved Deaf interpreters (DIs) reflecting on an experimental situation (viewed on video) as if they were interpreting with a Hearing team interpreter (HI) between a hearing consumer (HC) and a Deaf consumer (DC).

There was essentially one issue for the Deaf interpreters in Forestal’s (2011) study. “Foremost in the minds of the participants were compatibility with the hearing interpreter, and how the HI would respond to the DI as a team member” (p. 123). The relationship between the two interpreters represents the intercultural difference that must be mediated in any
simultaneously-interpreted interaction. This is the parallel process referred to at the beginning of this article. Parallel processes occur in “microcosm groups” composed by members of salient identity groups and organization groups (Alderfer & Smith, 1982, p. 40). The way the relationship plays out in a Deaf interpreter/Hearing interpreter team is a microcosm of the relationship among the Deaf and Hearing interlocutors in the communication event. A close reading of the participant quotes selected by Forestal shows that the absolute measure of the team relationship is the handling of time.

“We need to hold it,” said Participant B (Forestal, 2011, p. 80). There needs to be “no rushing…allowing more time to get the ‘full picture” (Participant E, p. 70), and “to make sure there was time to connect with the HI after receiving the information” (Participant D, p. 71). The experiment was designed for consecutive interpretation, an arrangement that elicited relief from the Deaf interpreter research participants in the preliminary interview because they perceived that this “would allow time for each party to go through each subtext and ensure understanding, requiring that both the HI and the DI understood the material as they could discuss ‘each part until there [was] a full thought’ (Participant C)” (p. 69-70).

Despite the researcher encouraging participants to stop the video as often as needed or desired, once the video was underway, all of the research participants were periodically “frustrated” or “overwhelmed” (Participant F, as cited in Forestal, 2011, p. 83) by the inability to control the pace. “The inability of the DI to control the flow and access to the information was influenced by several factors. These factors were the lack of monitoring and sharing of the responsibility by the team interpreter, the disruptive flow of the text through the HI, and not being able to induce pauses to the HI or HC for additional information, repetition, or
clarification” (emphasis added, p. 119). An intriguing element of the criticism is how frequently it is directed at the hearing interpreter instead of at the hearing consumer.

The concept of parallel process suggests that the Deaf interpreters are experiencing from the hearing interpreter what hearing interpreters often experience from hearing interlocutors (and sometimes from Deaf interlocutors, who may perceive saving face (Hoza, 1999) as a feature of continuous flow). This is the legacy of the machine model, particularly the interaction taboo (interpreters are not to intervene or interrupt the flow of information). This is one of the components of trauma to the interpreter (Harvey, 2001) that the popular Demand-Control Schema (Dean & Pollard, 2001) attempts to alleviate. DCS is an important innovation, however, it operates within the constraints of the transmission model and, as such, is best understood as an interim strategy en route to a truly relational model premised upon Deaf norms for interpreted interaction.

References by the Deaf interpreters to temporality in Forestal’s (2011) study are most prevalent when the information is most dense. This was also when participants “discuss[ed] how the HI should work with the participants in terms of chunking the information differently or when they wanted to convey the material to the DC” (p. 87). This is when participants “wanted to tell the HI to ‘hold on or slow down’” (Participant F, p. 77), that “the HC was going on too long on one part and … should pause” (Forestal, p. 81), or, “There is a run on here. I can’t see any separate ideas…Oh boy…HI is going on too long…hold on…” “Wait, I would ask to stop…Hold on” (Participant B, p. 79), or “hold it…to go at a slower pace” (Participant D, p. 73).

“Taking the time to explain” (Participant D, as cited in Forestal, 2011, p. 71) was most necessary when the information was “very detailed” (Forestal, p. 70). “Whoa, There are so many things to point out…I will ask the HI to pause here…” (Participant B, p. 80). In fact, the highest
percentage (21/120 = 18%) of video stoppages per section of the video made by the participants occurred during the discussion of FHA’s mortgage loan criteria. Forestal concluded that when there was “a lot of information to go through” (Participant B, p. 84), then “more pauses would be needed for clarification and additional time to review” (p. 84). For instance, in the densest chunk of information, there were “three things to explain…ask the HI to stop [to] allow [more time]…[to give] each one at a time, rather than pour all three at once” (Participant B, p. 74).

The temporal problem identified by Forestal’s (2011) participants is twofold, involving both the duration of turns and the density of information. Sometimes, they identify “the HC was talking was too long…the HI will have to notify the [HC]…to break up the information more…and [stop] more often” (Participant F, p. 76). Other times they “expressed a wish that ‘[the HI] would stop long enough to allow time to interpret’” (Participant F, p. 76). They suggest two specific remedies: for “the information to be parceled out in smaller chunks or pause as cued by the DI” (p. 75).

Again, this is a parallel problem that hearing interpreters frequently have with hearing interlocutors. What Deaf interpreters are asking of their hearing interpreter teammates is what hearing interpreters—both evolved and schooled—have been ‘asking’ (or needing to ask!) of interlocutors since professional signed language interpreting began: care about achieving mutual understanding and participate in the co-construction of relationships, rather than just letting them happen as fallout from the transmission machine’s insistence on what Participant F described as the “non-stop flow of information” (p. 83).

The Deaf interpreters sought to be authorized to manage time in order to achieve a “balance of working” with both the Deaf and Hearing consumers (Participant E, as cited in Forestal, 2011, p. 70). This distinguishes the interaction component of Forestal’s research from
the television audience translator/interpreters in Stone’s (2009) research. Otherwise, U.S. Deaf interpreters expressed the same goals and strategies as British Translator/Interpreters: to “make sure the DC understood before moving on to the next part” (Participant E, p. 70); not “throw [information]…without processing” (Participant B, p. 91); avoid marginalization (p. 121); and to create “an interactive dialogue” (p. 121).

The dialogic quality is needed as much by Deaf interpreters with the hearing interpreter teammate as with the deaf consumer. This parallel process also parallels the hearing interpreter’s need for dialogue with the hearing interlocutor: the rub of the original interaction taboo being passed on. Hope for the social transformation called for by Forestal (2011) resides in this co-constructive social process. If Deaf interpreters win their agency and are authorized to utilize role space and hold time, the achievement will likely morph to hearing interpreters and interlocutors—hearing and deaf—thus establishing a relational model as the new metaphor for community interpreting.

**Sustaining the Sustainers**

A Deaf version of relational interpreting has been being expressed for at least a few centuries. An anonymous reviewer for this article (not on the JOI editorial board) suggests:

One could say that during the time that ‘signing’ was prevalent on Martha’s Vineyard it is unlikely there was any need for interpreting because everyone on the island knew ‘signs’ to varying degrees. Once schools for the deaf and their by-products—communities of Deaf people—spread throughout the U.S. during the 19th century, there was more contact by Deaf ASL users with hearing people who did not know ASL. One could thus say that interpreting ‘evolved’ during that time period in the same sense [as] ‘evolved interpreters’ vs. ‘schooled interpreters.’
Culturally, the relational model lives: “I am THRILLED when I discover my interpreter is [an evolved interpreter]. It’s just so much easier and I can be myself and not have to worry that the message is getting garbled either to or from me. There’s no comparable feeling of relief of mind!” (J. Hill, personal correspondence, October 3, 2012). The relief is both informational and relational, with trust in ‘the message’ resting upon the ability to ‘be myself.’

It is interesting to note that spoken language community interpreters do not appear in the literature as receiving as much pressure from their linguistic minority constituencies as signed language interpreters have from the Deaf communities whom we serve. This may be because spoken language minority groups are engaged in their own developmental processes of moving practical consciousness to discursive consciousness in order to defend and uphold their unique and specific versions of evolved interpreters. The only parallel I have come across in the literature to date is with Aboriginal interpreters in Australia (Cooke, 2007).

Deaf criticism of schooled interpreters, although not well documented in the scholarly literature, gives strong evidence that there are intercultural problems with the prescriptions of the IBM system of simultaneous interpretation (see Kent, 2002; McDermid, 2009). Specifically, Deaf people have brought attention to the IBM system of simultaneous interpretation’s narrow, mechanical emphasis on the transmission of information, its ritualized ignoring of social and relational aspects of communication, and patent disregard for the culturally distinct identities of interlocutors. The hypotheses presented here suggest that the social neglect inherent in the transmission model encompasses all of the participants: not just the interpreters (through the interpersonal reduction and interaction taboo), but the deaf and hearing interlocutors too.

Insisting that the ritual elements of social interaction are as important as the information content has radical implications because it brings us face to face with the interaction taboo, the
interpersonal reduction, and the problem of speed in intercultural communication. Are you reluctant to slow down? Why or why not? Through dialogue and exploration, Deaf community members and signed language interpreters can continue to mark the trail from practical to discursive consciousness, promoting social justice and contributing to the larger struggle of humanity to shift the economic terms of survival from control to culture. One of the consequences of a model of relational interpreting might be to enhance the ability of interlocutors and signed language interpreters to increasingly practice culturally sensitive and culturally rich interpreting (Cokely, 2001) by holding time as a learned and cultivated strategy for holding ground in role space.

Conclusion

Rigid boundaries for the role space of the professional (schooled) simultaneous interpreter was socially co-constructed and institutionalized during the historic Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal. The horrifying context of the trial coincided with an exciting technological development, resulting in a pressure cooker template for the performance of simultaneous interpreting. Because the role space of the interpreter had already been confined decades before signed language interpreting started along the road to professionalization in the U.S., the shocks of intergroup conflict between the transmission-biased model with the more relationally-focused model of the Deaf community were sharp and painful.

Group dynamics ensued as a clash between different types of practical consciousness: by definition an ideology is usually beyond awareness, and the name of ghostwriting or its equivalent was unknown during that historical period. The resulting adverse consequences are what the Deaf sustainers and their allies have been attempting to resolve. The three action learning hypotheses offered here are proposed as a potential intervention in the intergroup
conflict by shifting the issue from outright oppression per se to the inherited speed problem with its overemphasis on information and subsequent neglect of relationships.

Together, the action learning hypotheses and research results presented here outline the contours of a potentially generative dialogue. Through collective exploration of the range of metaphors possible for grounding models of simultaneous interpretation, such as holding time in role space, interpreter trainers, practitioners, and scholars can move the field forward (Turner, 2005). Specifically, by considering what is missing—notably the consideration and practice of culturally different ways of *being in time*—we may succeed in drawing the practical consciousness of Deaf ghostwriters, evolved interpreters, and Deaf interpreters into public discursive consciousness and effectively train schooled interpreters in these ways. As RID nears its fiftieth anniversary, let us celebrate that relational, community-oriented simultaneous interpreting continues to evolve on the shoulders of Deaf sustainers who insist on making time visible, thereby refusing to surrender culture to the information machine.
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