Normative practices of other animals
Discussions of moral participation typically focus on mature humans acting at the 'pinnacle' of human cognitive capacity. But if we are to understand the evolutionary history of our moral psychologies and institutions, we need to examine the foundations of moral agency in the normative practices of other animals. This chapter embarks on this project by considering evidence that great apes and cetaceans participate in certain normative practices. After considering what counts as a normative practice, we analyze obedience, reciprocity, caring, social responsibility, and solidarity as these phenomena are manifested in groups of nonhuman animals. We then survey some evidence of at least some types of genuinely normative practice in chimpanzees, whales, and dolphins.
The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
Vincent, Ring, R., & Andrews, K. (2019). Normative Practices of Other Animals. In The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology (1st ed., pp. 57–83). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315719696-4