The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
8-1-2020
Abstract
In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections.
Publication Title
Erkenntnis
Volume
85
Issue
4
First Page
829
Last Page
840
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
10.1007/s10670-018-0052-2
ISSN
01650106
E-ISSN
15728420
Citation Information
Goldberg, S., Matheson, J. (2020) The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects. Erkenntnis, 85(4), 829-840.
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