Deep Disagreements and Rational Resolution

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

11-1-2021

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to bring together work on disagreement in both epistemology and argumentation theory in a way that will advance the relevant debates. While these literatures can intersect in many ways, I will explore how some of views pertaining to deep disagreements in argumentation theory can act as an objection to a prominent view of the epistemology of disagreement—the Equal Weight View. To do so, I will explain the Equal Weight View of peer disagreement and show how it entails that deep disagreements between epistemic peers are rationally resolvable. I will then examine a challenge to the Equal Weight View that claims that this consequence is untenable. Having motivated the challenge, I show that there is a viable response to make on behalf of the Equal Weight View. I conclude by considering and responding to several objections to this response.

Publication Title

Topoi

Volume

40

Issue

5

First Page

1025

Last Page

1037

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

10.1007/s11245-018-9576-y

ISSN

01677411

E-ISSN

15728749

Link to Full Text

Share

COinS