Applying Moral Caution in the Face of Disagreement
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2021
Abstract
In this paper I explore an epistemic asymmetry that sometimes occurs regarding the moral status of alternative actions. I argue that this asymmetry is significant and has ramifications for what it is morally permissible to do. I then show how this asymmetry often obtains regarding three moral issues: vegetarianism, abortion, and charitable giving. In doing so, I rely on the epistemic significance of disagreement and the existence of moral controversy about these issues.
Publication Title
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
10.1007/s10677-021-10155-x
ISSN
13862820
E-ISSN
15728447
Citation Information
Matheson, J.D. Applying Moral Caution in the Face of Disagreement. Ethic Theory Moral Practice (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10155-x
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