Title

Applying Moral Caution in the Face of Disagreement

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-1-2021

Subject Area

ARRAY(0x5645c6470ea8)

Abstract

In this paper I explore an epistemic asymmetry that sometimes occurs regarding the moral status of alternative actions. I argue that this asymmetry is significant and has ramifications for what it is morally permissible to do. I then show how this asymmetry often obtains regarding three moral issues: vegetarianism, abortion, and charitable giving. In doing so, I rely on the epistemic significance of disagreement and the existence of moral controversy about these issues.

Publication Title

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

10.1007/s10677-021-10155-x

ISSN

13862820

E-ISSN

15728447

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