Is there a well-founded solution to the generality problem?
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2-1-2015
Abstract
The generality problem is perhaps the most notorious problem for process reliabilism. Several recent responses to the generality problem have claimed that the problem has been unfairly leveled against reliabilists. In particular, these responses have claimed that the generality problem is either (i) just as much of a problem for evidentialists, or (ii) if it is not, then a parallel solution is available to reliabilists. Along these lines, Juan Comesaña has recently proposed solution to the generality problem—well-founded reliabilism. According to Comesaña, the solution to the generality problem lies in solving the basing problem, such that any solution to the basing problem will give a solution to the generality problem. Comesaña utilizes Conee and Feldman’s evidentialist account of basing (Conee and Feldman’s well-foundedness principle) in forming his version of reliabilism. In this paper I show that Comesaña’s proposed solution to the generality problem is inadequate. Well-founded reliabilism both fails to solve the generality problem and subjects reliabilism to new damning verdicts. In addition, I show that evidentialism does not face any parallel problems, so the generality problem remains a reason to prefer evidentialism to reliabilism.
Publication Title
Philosophical Studies
Volume
172
Issue
2
First Page
459
Last Page
468
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
10.1007/s11098-014-0312-1
ISSN
00318116
E-ISSN
15730883
Citation Information
Matheson. (2015). Is there a well-founded solution to the generality problem? Philosophical Studies, 172(2), 459–468. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0312-1