Political Elites, Democracy, and Education
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
3-1-2020
Abstract
We identify conditions under which the political elite may overcompensate for the loss of de jure power by investing too much in de facto power so that the probability to have de facto power is higher under democracy than under nondemocracy. Then, we consider education and show that, under certain assumptions, the political elite may treat democracy and spending on citizens’ education as substitutes. Using African data and a fixed-effects estimator, we obtain empirical evidence in support of this theoretical prediction.
Publication Title
Review of Black Political Economy
Volume
47
Issue
1
First Page
75
Last Page
85
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
10.1177/0034644619865543
ISSN
00346446
Citation Information
Baliamoune-Lutz, M. (2020). Political Elites, Democracy, and Education. The Review of Black Political Economy, 47(1), 75–85. https://doi.org/10.1177/0034644619865543